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ABSTRACT 
Experiments 1-3 investigated the relationship between working memory and syllogistic and 
five-ten-n series spatial inference. A secondary aim was to replicate the findings of Shah t7 
and Miyake (1996) who suggested the use of separate central resources of working memory 
for spatial and verbal ability. The correlational analysis showed that the complex verbal and 
spatial working memory span tasks were associated together and consistently predicted 
reasoning performance in both verbal and visual modalities. The confirmatory factor 
analysis showed that three factors best accounted for the data -a verbal, a spatial, and a 
general resource. All the span tasks and most of the reasoning tasks significantly and 
consistently loaded the general factor. Experiments 4-6 investigated the relationship 
between working memory and a range of reasoning tasks - identified as either propositional. 
spatial, or quantifiable tasks. These experiments were based on the work of Stanovich and 
West (1998) who found that a range of reasoning tasks were predicted by cognitive ability 
and a reasoner's thinking style. The correlational anaylsis showed that the complex verbal 
and spatial working memory span tasks were associated together and consistently predicted 
reasoning perforinance. Two clusters of reasoning task emerged from the correlational 
analysis - one cluster related to the propositional and simple spatial reasoning tasks, whilst 
the other related to the quantifiable and complex spatial reasoning tasks. The confin-natory 
factor analysis showed that four factors best accounted for the data -a verbal, a spatial, a 
general, and a thinking style resource. All the span tasks and the reasoning tasks loaded the 
general factor, and most of the reasoning tasks further loaded the thinking disposition factor. 
These results are discussed in light of models of workino memory, theories of reasoning, 
and how to best characterise factor 3 (executive function) and factor 4 (thinking style) from 
tile factor analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1-A REVIEW OF WORKINGNIEMORY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE REVIEW 
This thesis addresses the question of whether v, -orking memorNY plays a role in the variation 
seen in perfon-nance on deductive reasoning tasks. Example 1.1 is an illustration ot'a 
complex deductive argument of the type to be used in the followlnz,, 
-, chapters. 
This problem 
requires the ability to temporarily store and integrate information in order to correctl% 
respond. 
The square is to the right of the triangle 
The circle is to the left of the triangle 
The rectangle is in front of the circle 
The crescent is in front of the triangle 
What is the relation between the rectangle and the crescent? 
Example I. I 
Example 1.1 involves the use of a temporary mental workspace in order to store 
intermediate steps of the task. For instance, the information in the second premise must be 
integrated with the information in the first premise. This information needs to be kept in 
mind whilst, additionally, integrating the infori-nation in the third and fourth premises. Oiil\- 
after total integration can a logical conclusion be made. Most accounts of the reasoning 
process rest on the assumption of limiting factors in performance. Consequently, the more 
capacity a reasoner has in order to store and process this type of problem, the better their 
perfon-nance xvill be. Thus the aim of the next five chapters is to investigate a range of 
reasoning tasks and measures of variations in peoples workin-g, memorý- capacity to test the 
relationship bet\\ cen the two. 
The first chapter reviews the working memory literature. The development of a model of 
working memory will be summarised. Chapter I investigates the development of specific 
components of the working memory model and the methodology that has been used to draxv 
out these claims. Chapter I then goes on to give an alternative approach to studying the 
relationship between working memory and reasoning, an individual differences 
methodology. The review will summarise what this approach has been able to unco-v-er 
about the processing and storage components of working memory and their relationship to 
cognitive tasks. Chapter 2 introduces the reasoning literature. The chapter focuses on two 
types of reasoning task that are consistently investigated throughout the thesis - syllogistic 
and spatial inferences. These tasks will be discussed in light of reasoning theory and the 
link with working memory (through a dual-task methodology). Chapter 3 presents three 
experiments that investigate the relationship between a range of working memory capacity 
measures and syllogistic and spatial reasoning tasks. The second experimental chapter 
(Chapter 4) extends this to a wider range of reasoning tasks. Chapter 5 contains a general 
discussion in the context of the current literature and recommendations for future study. 
I. 1.1 What is Working Memory? 
Gilhooly (1998) points out that information processing cannot occur without the reliance on 
both a long-term memory base and temporary mental workspace. We need to use 
knowledge of the world stored in our permanent memories (long-term), together with our 
understanding of the situation at hand (short-term), in order to perform even the simplest of 
tasks. Important information connected to the situation at hand must be successftilly passed 
on to short-term memory. This allows us to store information long enough to be able to use 
it, and, for this reason, it is often referred to as 'working memory'. 
2 
There are many examples from everyday life in o%-hich we employ memory as a tool. 
simple example would be an arithmetic problem. For instance, Example L-2 shows a simple 
sum. 
6)+2=? 
Example 1.2 
In order to correctly solve this problem, an individual must use a short-term memory buffer 
to store intermediate steps of the task. The first and second numbers must be multiplied 
together prior to the addition of the third number. Therefore, the sum of the first two 
numbers must be stored somewhere before being recalled to add to the third. Example 1.2 
illustrates the necessity of a storage resource in order to perform the task and reach the 
correct conclusion. 
Other instances of memory use from everyday life are more complex in nature. An 
illustration of one would be cooking a meal - creating the desired look, taste, and timing of a 
dish. An individual must follow steps in a recipe in the right order and at the right times. 
This requires them to process in parallel. They must remember many parts of the recipe at 
the same time in order to create the desired effect. Even buying the ingredients for the meal 
would involve the individual recalling what they must buy, what they already have at home, 
and when they must have completed the shop run by. Despite the time scale involved with 
cooking a meal (elongated in time), it involves formulating and retaining a plan and keeping 
track of its execution. 
These examples all require the ability to temporarily store in mind information related to the 
specific task. The examples illustrate that, as complexity increases, then the need for 
memory space increases. Therefore some tasks are more difficult than others. It might be 
3 
the case that limitations in the ability to hold information in short-term memorý- constrain 
individual performance of the task. So as the complexity of an individual's plan increases. 
and the activities related to that plan increase (processing), then they are more likel\ý to lose 
track of the goal. For instance, in the example of cooking a meal. one might go to the shops 
with a mental list of ingredients but get way laid by a trip to the bank which in turn causes 
you to forget something needed for the recipe. Information needed to execute a plan can be 
lost due to interference from other sources. Thus working memory holds the plan during 
execution and all the intervening steps. Working memory is a temporary memory work 
space with limited capacity. 
Working memory has been implicated as playing a major role in cognitive processing (e. g., 
Newell & Simon, 1972; Sanford, 1985). Theorists suggest that the limitation in working 
memory capacity is a factor contributing to difficulty in problem solving (e. g., Johnson- 
Laird, 1983). Daneman and Carpenter (1980) point out that information processing 
activities compete for this limited capacity and consequently, a task that has heavy 
processing requirements should decrease the amount of additional information that can be 
maintained. If working memory is a limiting factor on information processing activities, it 
may be implicated in patterns of individual differences across cognitive tasks. This thesis 
addresses these questions. Individual differences in a range of cognitive tasks that require 
storage and maintenance will be investigated in terms of their reliance on a short term 
resource. 
There have been two major approaches to the study of working memory and cognition. The 
first approach is the traditional one, set in the experimental vein (e. g., Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974). The strategy underlying these experiments rests on the assumption that working 
4 
memory has limited capacity. If a substantial amount of that capacity is takcii up by a 
supplementary task, then performance will deteriorate substantially. An alterriative to this 
approach is one based upon individual differences (e. g.. Shah & Miyake, 1996). Individuals 
can be given a range of tasks (e. g., memor-y and reasonin, -, measures) and a correlational 
approach can be used to identify which aspects of cognitive processing appear to be most 
closely associated with the measures of memory capacity. The objective of this chapter is to 
provide an integrated account of both these approaches in order to illuminate the role of 
working memory in cognitive tasks. The review begins v, -ith a summary of the precursors of 
the present working memory model. 
I. 1.2 From Short-Term Memory to Working Memory 
The study of short-term memory has been popular since the 1950s. In the 1950s many 
studies seemed to point to the need to separate long and short-term memory (e. g., Brown, 
1958, Peterson & Peterson, 1959). Following this vv-cre years of experimentation aimed at 
developing a model of short-term memory that accounted for all the experimental findings. 
Section 1.1.2 summarises the main findings of the research that led to the present model of 
working memory. 
There have been many diverse models of short-term memory (Hunter, 1957; Newell & 
Simon, 1972). Most of the earlier conceptions of short-term memory had a good deal in 
common, and approximated more or less to the one proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin 
(1968,197 1 ). This model was referred to as the multi-store or modal model and assumed 
three major components to memory. Firstly. there was a bank of relatively peripheral 
sensory stores. capable of parallel processing. These sensory buffers fed infonnation into a 
short-term store %Nhich was responsible for encoding the incoming material to stop it bellig, Z7 - 
forgotten. This was a necessary intermediate stage in the process of transferring 
information to the third component, the long-term memorý- store. The probability of 
learning anything permanently Nvas assumed to be a direct function of the amount ot'time an 
item resided in the short-term store or rehearsal buffer. 
There were numerous research studies carried out to evaluate and strengthen support for the 
modal model (e. g., Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966: Peterson & Peterson. 1959. Conrad, 1964: 
Milner, 1971). The evidence that follows relates to arguments that provide support for a 
separation of short-term and long-term memory. The modal model could explain many of 
the effects found empirically, from neuropsychological evidence to serial position CUrves. 
One line of evidence in support of the modal model came from the study of brain-damaged 
patients. If a long-term and short-term store are distinct systems, then evidence that storage 
in one system is intact, whilst storage in the other is damaged would provide support to the 
modal model. Milner (1966) worked with a patient named H. M., who was incapable of 
forming new memories, but could learn new skills. H. M. performed very poorly on 
standard tests of verbal learning (long-term memory), but his memory span (short-term 
memory) was normal. Baddeley and Warrington (1970) studied a range of amnesic patients 
and found that their performance was intact on numerous tasks assumed to rely on a short- 
term store. These tasks included memory span and the recency effect in free recall. These 
patients also showed grossly defective long-term memory performance. This evidence 
suggested that patients could have normal short-term store coupled ý, vith a defective Ion(-, - II L_ 
term store. The patterns of results seemed to suggest that those patients vvere incapable ot 
transferring information from the short-terrn to the Ion,,,, -ten-n store. Thus, these studies 
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appeared to support the distinction betý. veen short-term and long-term memory. assumin, -, the 
need for a separate short-term store. 
At about the same time, Shallice and Warrington (1970) reported the case of a patient K. F. 
with exactly the opposite pattern of defects, namely grossly defective short-ten-n memory 
coupled with unimpaired long-terrn learning. This patient was mildly dysphasic and 
marginally dyslexic, but overall had no general intellectual impairment. His digit span. ltý 
however, was grossly impaired, being limited to about v, ý'o items with auclitorý' presentation. 
but was reliably better when the presentation xvas visual. His long-term learning ability, as 
measured by performance on a paired-associate task, was quite normal, suggesting a -vcry 
specific defect to an auditory-verbal short-term storage system. All these neurological 
studies pointed to the need to separate short-term and long-term stores. 
In studies on 'normal' participants, when they were presented with a free recall test of a list 
of words, performance on the task produces a characteristic serial position curve (e. g., 
Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966). Immediate recall of initial items are good (primacy effect), 
middle items are recalled less well, whilst the last f6, v items are recalled very well (recency 
effect). After a brief filled delay (rehearsal-preventing task), however, the recency effect 
disappears, while performance on earlier items in the curve is relatively unaffected by the 
delay. It should be noted that a variety of variables have different effects on the early and 
middle parts of the list as opposed to the effects on the end of the list. Long-term learning 
was assumed to depend on holding information in a temporary short-term store until it was 
transferred to a Iong-term store. The probability of learning was assumed to be a direct 
function of the amount of time an item resided in the short-term store. The interpretation 
sug-gested that the recencY items are held in a temporary short-term store, while earlier items 
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are recalled from long-term memory. This is one of the strongest arguments for ffie 
separation of long-term and short-term stores due to the fact that free recall tasks appear to 
have two separable and quite different components. 
Another argument for the separation of short-term and long-term stores comes from 
evidence suggesting that the short-term store has limited capacity. but relatively rapid input 
and retrieval. The long-term store, on the other hand, has an enormous capacity, but tends 
to be slower to register information and retrieve it. Arguments for the limited capacitý of 
the short-term store come principally from tasks such as the digit span, in which the 
participant appears to be able to hold about seven chunks of information (Miller, 1956). 
More evidence for the modal model came from examining the type of coding each memory 
store relied upon. Sachs (1967) investigated this by studying the retention of prose 
passages. Sachs (1967) found that provided the sentence was tested immediately, 
participants were relatively good at detecting all changes, xý'hether in meaning or syntax. 
After one or more intervening sentences, however, the participant's capacity to remember 
the syntactic and surface features of the prose dropped dramatically, while retention of the 
meaning remained good. The generalisation here was that short-term storage relies upon 
phonological coding while long-term memory is more influenced by meaning. 
However, there were problems with the modal model, and it suffered as an account of the 
memory system in the following ways. The model indicated that patients xvith short-term 
memory deficits should also have problems in long-term learning-, such deficits were not 
apparent (Shallicc & Warrington, 1970). The assumption that maintainin(, an item in a 
short-term store NN ould ensure its transfer to a long-term store proved to be poorly supported 
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(Morton, 1967). The existence of long-ten-n recency effects, and the absence of a disruption 
of recency in free recall by a concurrent memory span task were also both inconsistent xvith 
the modal model's interpretation of recency (Baddeley & Hitch, 1977). Finally. the 
assumption that the short-term store relies on acoustic coding, and the long-term store on 
semantic, was clearly over-simplified (e. g., Baddeley & Levy. 1971). 
Baddeley's working memory approach, beginning with Baddeley and Hitch (1974). sought 
to address some of the problems of the modal model. They were interested in the role of 
short-term memory in general cognition. They did not reject the modal model's view of 
short-term memory, as rehearsing incoming information for transfer to long-term memory, 
but claimed that it had more important roles beyond this. The original working memory 
model has been itself modified and elaborated (Baddeley, 1981,1986) and in its 1986 form 
consists of a central executive, at the top of the hierarchy, controlling or directing the 
activities of two other components, the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketch pad. 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) identified active (processing) and passive (storage) components 
of a limited working memory capacity important in performing higher level cognitive tasks. 
They proposed that part of the limited capacity in the system (i. e., the central executive CE) 
was used for processing incoming information and internally generated information. The 
remaining resources (i. e., the phonological loop PL and visuo-spatial sketch pad VSSP) 
were proposed to be used for storage of the products of that processing. Figure 1.1 shows a 
simple representation of this working memory model. 
The PL is assumed to comprise two components, a phonological store that is capable of 
holding speech-based information, and an articulatory control process based on inner 
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speech. Memory traces within the phonological store are assumed to fade after about one- 
and-a-half seconds. The memory trace can however be refreshed b-,. - a process of reading off 
the trace into the articulatory control process, which then feeds back- into the store. This is 
the process underlying subvocal rehearsal. The articulatory control process is also capable 
of taking written material, converting it into a phonological code, and registering it in the 
phonological store. The VSSP has been conceived as a spatial analogue of the PL. Like the 
loop, it can be fed either directly through perception, in this case visual perception, or 
indirectly, in this case through the generation of a visual image. While processing 
information, the CE is considered a controller, selecting the most advantageous strategies 
for integrating information from several different sources. Thus, the CE is a central 
processor, requiring two peripheral or slave sub-systems (PL and VSSP) to store the 
information being processed. 
Visuo-spatial 
Central executive Phonological 
sketch pad loop 
Figure 1.1-A simplified representation of the working memory model (as Baddeley, 
1997) 
The working memory model refers to a system for the temporary holding and manipulation 
of information during the performance of a range of cognitive tasks such as comprehension. 
learning and reasoning. The initial research indicated that working memory was involved in 
temporary storage for a wide range of information processing skills (Baddeley, 1986,1997). 
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The working memory model was testable and productive. Section 1.2 s,,,, -stematicall,,, - 
explores this model by examining the experimental evidence for each of the three 
components. 
1.2 THE BADDELEYWORKING MENIORYMODEL 
I. 2. I Introduction 
This section summarises the many research studies that have been carried out to 
systematically test the characteristics of each component of the working memory model. 
Firstly the main choice of experimental methodology will be explained - the secondary task 
or dual-task methodology. This will be followed by the work, using this approach. that has 
tested the attributes of each working memory component - the PL, the VSSP and the CE. 
The strategy underlying research in this field rests on the assumption that -ovorking memory 
has limited capacity. If a substantial amount of that capacity is taken up by a supplementary 
task, then performance on a primary task (such as reading comprehension) should 
deteriorate substantially. Such deterioration should be shown across a range of cognitive 
tasks even though such tasks do not have an obvious short-term memory component. An 
obvious short-term memory component can be seen easily in recall tasks, or memory span 
tasks. This component is less obvious in tasks such as comprehension or problem-solving, 
In the case of processing verbal materials, there is abundant evidence that effects of working 
memory load does occur. As an example of this, Baddeley, Eldridge. Levvis and Thomson 
( 1984) showed that a concurrent task involving retaining sequences of digits consistentl,, 
slo\Ncd down the verification of simple sentences. Retaining a sequence of digits must rely 
on a short-term store in order to be able to recall them at a later date. If performance on 
verifying sentences is degraded, ý, vhen carried out concurrently with this. the standard 
assumption has been that the two tasks are competing for a shared resource. 
Working memory has been studied mainly by the use of such concurrent or interlerencc 
(dual-) task methodology. For example, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) presented participants 
with visual sequences of three to six digits ý, N-hilst they listened to a prose passage. 
Statistical analysis indicated that comprehension was not significantly impaired by a 
concurrent load of three digits, but was reliably impaired by a six digit load. Earlier 
experiments (Hitch & Baddeley, 1976) demonstrated that participants are capable of holding 
a substantial number of digits in short-term store at the same time as performing the 
complex cognitive operations involved in learning, comprehension, and reasoning. In terms 
of latency however, a clear effect of concurrent load on a range of cognitive tasks was 
found. That is, the speed of performing a primary task involving learning. comprehension 
or reasoning, was found to be poorer when carried out xvith a digit load. 
A special case of dual-tasking involves the use of articulatory suppression (repeating out 
loud the word 'the'). Concurrent articulation has been utilised to block the use of the PL. 
Thus, if concurrent articulation produces poorer performance on another. concurrent, task, 
then it might be inferred that this second task also uses the PL (Eysenck, 1986). What 
follows is a summary of the experimental evidence relating to the three components of the 
working memory model. 
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I. 2.2 The Phonological Loop 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) suggest that the PL system cornprise, ý a phonological store and 
an articulatory control process. In its initial formulation. the PL was assumed to fuiiction 
like a tape loop of limited duration. The loop Nvas assumed to hold about 1 .5 sec of specch- 
based material in temporary storage and to be capable of maintaining this by means of 
articulatory rehearsal. This simple notion of the PL xvas able to account for a wide ran, -, e of 
results. These phenomena are often thought of as the rudiments of verbal short-term 
memory, and collectively they pro-, 'ide converging e%'idence for the characteristics of the 
PL. 
The phonological similarity effect indicated a poor immediate memory for phonologically 
similar items (Conrad & Hull, 1964; Baddeley, 1966), and it is the best knowii phenomena 
associated with verbal short-term memory. Specifically, this effect refers to the fact that 
recall of a series of words or letters is more difficult when the words or letters for recall 
sound alike. This could be explained by assuming that the PL is based on phonological 
coding. Similar items have easily confusable codes, leading to impaired performance. 
Thus, the phonological similarity effect arises because items contained within the 
phonological store will become conftised when they are phonologically similar to one 
another. As verbal sequences are held in this store whether they are heard or read, the 
phonological similarity effect appears for both visually presented and auditorilý, presented 
material. 
Verbal serial recall is also disrupted by the concurrent presentation of irrelevant speech 
(Colle & NA'elsh, 1976). This disruptive effect is even greater when the irrelevant speech 
comprises words that are phonologically similar to the vvords for recall. Salame and 
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Baddeley (1982) gave participants a sequence of visually presented digits accompanied by 
either a spoken word, nonsense syllable. or xvith no distraction. Participants sho'%ved an 
increase in errors when attempting to ignore either words or nonsense syllables. An 
explanation of this finding was that participants were subvocally articulating the visual 
digits, and were therefore using their phonological store. The effect of irrelevant speech 
arises from the fact that heard speech directly accesses the phonological store, thereby 
disrupting its current contents. 
A further phenomenon in verbal serial recall is that sequences of long words can be recalled 
rather less well than sequences of short words. Baddeley, Thomson and Buchanan (1975) 
investigated this word length effect and found that memory span for short words is greater 
than for long. This could be explained by assuming that short words are better remembered 
simply because they can be articulated more rapidly. Spoken duration was seen as critical 
in explaining the articulatory control process. The word length effect was interpreted as 
reflecting the operation of subvocal rehearsal. Words that take a longer time to say are more 
difficult to rehearse, and therefore will be less well retained. 
Finally, retaining a verbal sequence is dramatically impaired when participants are 
simultaneously required to repeat aloud an irrelevant speech sound such as 'the, the, the' 
(Levy, 1971,1975). Murray (1968) found that this suppression impaired performance on a 
memory task. Articulatory suppression also removed the word length effect for visual and 
auditory presentation, and removed the phonological similarity effect but only when the list 
for recall was presented visually (Baddeley, Lewis & Vallar, 1984). The model accounted 
for the word length effect by suggesting that articulatory suppression blocked the operation 
of subvocal rehearsal, thereby removing the potential for rehearsing words of different 
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length. The model accounted for the phonological similarity effect by suggesting that %vith 
articulatory suppression, visually presented material could not be transferred into the 
phonological store and the phonological similarity effect disappeared. As auditon- 
presentation results in direct input into the phonological store, the potential for phonological 
confusion remained even with articulatory suppression. 
As stated in Section 1.1.2, the modal model was unable to ftilly explain vvhy patients could 
have a defective short-term memory but normal long term learning. The modal model 
theorists suggested that long term learning depended crucially upon a short-term store. 
Thus, if this short-term store were damaged, then it would follow that long term learning 
would also suffer. Atkinson and Shiffrin (1971) suggested that those patients suffering from 
a defective short-term memory should also suffer a failure of long-term memory. This was 
found to be unsupported in many cases (Shallice & Warrington, 1970). This type of 
neuropsychological evidence has been applied to a working memory model, and is briefly 
described below. 
The working memory hypothesis would argue that patients in this position had suffered 
damage to one of the subsidiary slave systems of working memory rather than to the CE. A 
wide variety of neuropsychological literature supports the notion that there are distinct 
working memory systems for spatial and verbal information (Milner, 1971; Paivio, 1971). 
For instance, if one assumes a deficit in the phonological store, then this is able to explain 
both their impaired memory span and their comparatively non-nal cognitive performance on 
other tasks such as long-term verbal leaming, where one might expect semantic coding to be 
more important than phonological. Vallar and Baddeley (1984) studied a patient named 
P. V., who had a very pure and specific deficit in auditory short-term memory performance. 
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With the exception of this specific deficit. P. V. appeared to be intellectually entirely normal. 
with a high level of verbal and performance I. Q.. excellent long-term memory. and no 
apparent problems of speech or language (Basso. Spinnler. Vallar & Zanobio, 1982). It -was 
suggested that P. V. 's deficit was an impairment. though not complete disruption, of the 
phonological storage component of the PL. 
The findings summarised above describe the PL as comprising a phonological store and an ltý 
articulatory control process. Due to the effects found, research supports the notion of 
information being stored in a phonological, or as a verbally based code. The findings 
informed researchers of the structure of a working memory model and PL component. The 
PL model appears to offer an adequate and useful account of the available evidence. 
1.2.3 The Visuo-Spatial Sketch Pad 
Normal memory and neuropsychological research suggests the need to separate visuo- 
spatial and verbal processes of memory (De Renzi, 1982; Milner, 197 1; Paivio, 197 1). Thus 
Baddeley's (1983) concept of a VSSP is in line with other fields of research. He conceived 
the VSSP as analogous to the PL, providing temporary storage and maintenance of visuo- 
spatial rather then verbal material. There appears to be good evidence for the occurrence of 
a temporary visuo-spatial sketch pad that is capable of retaining and manipulating images, 
and is susceptible to disruption by concurrent spatial processing (Baddeley, Grant, Wight & 
Thomson, 1975). This simple notion of the VSSP was able to account for a range of dual- 
task results. 
Baddelcy, Grant, Wight and Thomson (1975) used a tracking task that required participants 
to keep a st\ lus on a spot of light, the performance being measured by the total amount of 
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time on the target. Tracking was combined with a paired-associate learning task-. 
Participants were required to associate adjectives with nouns for highly imageable pairs 
(strawberry-ripe) and for abstract pairs (gratitude-infinite) of words. Participants vvere 
required to learn and recall these lists either concurrent with pursuit tracking or in a control 
condition. If the VSSP utilises images, then using concurrent tracking might reduce the 
advantage seen on an imageable list learning task. Baddeley et al. (1975) showed that v, -hen 
either an imagery or an abstract learning task was performed concurrently with visual 
pursuit tracking, the fon-ner had a much greater disruptive influence on tracking 
performance. This could be explained by a visuo-spatial subsystem of working memory 
responsible for imagery, which is implicated in both the use of imagery in recall tasks and in 
spatial tracking. 
Baddeley and Lieberman (1980) investigated whether the subsystem responsible for 
imagery was visual or spatial in nature. They found that a spatial tracking task with no 
visual component had an effect similar to that of visual pursuit tracking on performance of 
visual and verbal memory tests. However, there was no effect on imagery if the visual task 
had no spatial component. This added strength to the notion of a subsystem based upon 
spatial coding. 
Phillips and Christie (1977) postulated that if a separate visuo-spatial subsystem exists, then 
it should be possible to devise a task that places heavy demands upon this subsystem but 
minimal demands upon the CE. Farmer, Berman and Fletcher (1986) took this proposal and 
used spatial suppression (sequential tapping of four targets) as the concurrent task, which 
should place little demand on central processes. Results indicated that sequential tapping 
did interfere with performance on a spatial, but not a verbal, reasoning task. 
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Neuropsychological evidence has also been interpreted as suggesting the need for a storage 
system that relies on visuo-spatial infon-nation. De Renzi and Spinnler (1967) studied a 
group of patients all of whom suffered from colour-blindness as a result of cortical damage. 
Such patients report the inability to answer such questions as, 'What colour is the banana'-. " 
and are not able to select the appropriate colour from a set of crayons. The converse pattern 
of visual processing deficit also occurs, with the patient able to localise an object accurately, 
but not able to recognise it, a deficit known as agnosia (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987). It 
has been argued that two separate locations exist for visual imagery. One, which is 
primarily concerned with visual aspects of imagery is dependent on the occipital lobes. The 
second system is one that depends principally on spatial coding, and is dependent on the 
functioning of the parietal lobes. Thus imagery has related but separable visual and spatial 
components. 
The visual-spatial distinction has been fleshed out more recently. Logie (1995) suggested 
that a dissociation could be made between a capacity for retaining visual patterns (the visual 
cache) and that for retaining sequences of movements (the inner scribe). Through dual-task 
studies, it has been demonstrated that the retention of spatial patterns, but not visual 
information, was disrupted by arm movements during a retention interval. On the other 
hand, retention of visual information, but not spatial patterns, was disrupted by a visual 
interference task inserted between presentation and retrieval (e. g., Logie & Marchetti, 
1991). Thus the VSSP has been fractionated, as was the PL, into a passive visual cache and 
an active spatially based rehearsal system called the inner scribe. 
Baddeley (1986) points out the analogy between the PL and the VSSP. Both systems 
appear to take advantage of an essentially passive perceptual input store. In both cases, the 
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problem of coping with rapid decay from the store appears to have been solved by an active 
control process based on a response system, articulation in the case of the PL and eve 
movement in the case of the VSSP. These allow the transformation of a passive perceptual 
store into an active memory system that enables the organism to take information out of the 
relevant input store and to feed it back, thereby continuously refreshing the trace and 
minimising forgetting. 
So far the findings from research are in relation to the hypothesised PL and the VSSP. 
These two components of the working memory system have been conceived of as relatively 
passive in nature. Remembering a list of words would be considered a passive act - reliant 
on a system that could store them in order to recall them at a later date (PL). Remembering 
a matrix of randomly filled cells would be considered a passive act - reliant on a system that 
could store them in order to recall them at a later date (VSSP). Evidence has strengthened 
the view that there need to be passive storage systems for phonological and visuo-spatial 
coding in memory. These two systems could deal with simple processing, such as the 
passive storage of words, or the use of simple imagery in recall. However, alone, they could 
not deal with the problems illustrated in Examples 1.1 and 1.2. A more active system, 
capable of processing, storing and co-ordinating activities, would be required in these 
instances, and Baddeley identified it as the CE. 
1.2.4 The Central Executive 
The CE is the most crucial component of working memory. This is because it is postulated 
to be responsible for the selection, initiation, and termination of processing routines (e. g., 
encoding, storing, retrieving). The term CE was also used to imply some type of supervisor, 
capable of selecting strategies and integrating information from several different sources. 
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The evidence put forward to substantiate the claim for a CE in the former cars was less 
well formulated than the evidence to support both slave systems of ., ý-orking memory. 
Baddeley (1986,1990) equates the CE with the supervisory attentional system (, SAS) 
described by Norman and Shallice (1980) and by Shallice (1982). According to Shallice 
(1982), the SAS is a limited capacity system and is used for a variety of purposes. It is 
involved in tasks that need planning or decision making, as k,, -ell as for trouble shooting in 
situations in which the automatic processes appear to be running into difficulty. The SAS 
would be used in novel situations, and in situations that are dangerous or technically 
difficult. Norman and Shallice (1980) apply their model to a number of phenomena, 
including those situations in which participants are able to perform two apparently 
demanding tasks simultaneously. The model assumed the need to resolve conflicts so as not 
to overload the system, and that overall supervisory control was exercised by the SAS 
system. 
The function of the CE/SAS can perhaps be most clearly illustrated in studies of patients 
suffering from frontal lobe syndrome. Rylander (193 9) characterised the deficit as, 
'disturbed attention, increased distractability, a difficulty in grasping the whole of a 
complicated state of affairs ... well able to work along old routine 
lines 
... (but) ... 
cannot learn to master new types of task, in new situations ... (the patient is) ... at a loss'. 
One of the tasks claimed to be dependent on the frontal lobes is the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test (WCST). This involves presenting the participant with a pack of cards, on each of 
which is a pattern made up from various numbers of shapes which vary in colour, size and 
surround. The patient is instructed to sort the cards into piles on the basis of some rule. 
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Once a rule has been acquired it is changed, until all the cards have been sorted on the bask 
of all the rules. Patients with frontal lobe damage tend to learn the first rule but appear to be 
unable to escape that rule, ý, vith a very high propor-tion of their errors bein, -, based on the old 
rule. Shallice (1982) explains that since the SAS system is not functioning propcrly. the 
patient is at the mercy of the currently active schemata. If a situation cxists in ý\ hich one 
schema is clearly dominant, then it will continue to dominate, leading to perseveration. 
Although the SAS research is not directly related to the distinct research area investigating 
CE function, it is of some use in summarising some common characteristics betý, veeii the 
two. Understanding the function of the frontal lobes seems likely to offer fruitful challenges 
of the potential applicability to the concept of working memory. 
Baddeley (1986) suggests a crucial role of the CE in understanding the processes of agei 11 (1, 
dementia, the role of the frontal lobes, and its role in intelligence. If the CE is a svstern 
capable of attentional control, selecting and operating control processes, then damage to this 
system would have far reaching effects on any information processing activity. 
As with the PL and VSSP components of working memory. secondary task methodology 
has been used to investigate the characteristics of the CE. If leaming and/or retrieval were 
limited by the amount of available attentional capacity, then requiring a participant to 
perform a second attention-demanding task during learning or retrieval should cause 
performance impairment. Hitch and Baddeley (1976) used a digit load as a secondary task 
and found that a two-digit load did not affect performance on a verification task. This v, -as 
presumably because the load placed only minor demands on the PL component. A longer 
series of di-its would occupy more of the available capacity up to a point at výhich capacity 
is exceeded and errors creep in. Indeed. additional memory load substantialk- intertCred 
with the verification task (a six-digit load). The concurrent load forced the participant to 
divide his/her attention between the separate processes of verification and short-term 
storage, hence the interference in this situation. The evidence suggested that a limited 
capacity executive processing system must be brought into play when dealing with larger 
memory loads. 
Many experiments have found that a decrement occurs in learning when carried out 
concurrently with a six-digit load. These decrements in learning can be seen across a range 
of tasks, including paired-associate learning (Baddeley, Eldridge, Lewis & Thomson, 1984) 
and the retention of prose (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). A secondary task that diverts attention 
from learning will tend to impair performance, with the degree of impairment increasing as 
the degree of diversion increases (Murdock, 1965). 
An alternative secondary task assumed to tax CE resources of working memory is random 
number or letter generation. Random generation methods require participants to generate 
sequences of numbers or letters, making the order as random as possible (Baddeley, 1966). 
Random number generation is a more common method then random letter generation, 
although the same points apply to both. A person's success in carrying out this task can be 
measured in three ways. The first is to count the frequency with which each number is 
emitted - the more biased the distribution, the more redundant the output. The second 
measure involves scoring the number of different number pairs generated in a hundred 
responses. The third measure uses the number of stereotyped number pairs such as I and 2, 
or 7 and 8 that follow the chronological sequence. 
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Baddeley (1966) investigated random generation as a secondary task methodology. He 
combined choice reaction time and random letter generation. The participant's priniarý task 
was to sort playing cards into 1,2,4, or 8 categories. The participant xvas required to make 
one response every two seconds, a rate that allowed perfect performance even in the most 
demanding 8 choice condition. It was expected that the more difficult the sorting response. I 
the more of their available supervisory capacity should be absorbed, given that the card 
sorting task was not highly over-leamed, and the less random their output of letters should 
become. This indeed was found and the results were highly consistent and broadly fitted the 
conceptualisation that the process of random generation depends on a system of limited 
informational capacity - hence the more rapid the rate, the less random the output, and the 
larger the set of selection alternatives, the slower the maximum generation rate. 
Baddeley (1966) suggested that random generation requires a mechanism with a clear 
selection process that behaves lawftilly and has limited capacity. Random generation 
disrupts the operation of the CE by its demands for the constant switching of retrieval plans, 
involving the generation of a set of digits which correspond to randomness. Baddeley 
(1996) suggested that an adequate model of random generation is still needed and concluded 
that it is unclear to what extent the load imposed by generation stems from 1) the need to 
switch strategies, 2) the problem of accessing new strategies, or 3) the monitoring of the 
response output. Thus random generation appears to involve many processes assumed to 
rely on executive function. These operations involve retrieving and control processes which 
map onto the function of the CE as proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974). 
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) looked at the concept of automaticity, which adds to the 
justification to use random generation as a research tool. This concept shows that the 
repeated pairing of a specific stimulus with the same response will gradually reduce the 
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attentional demand of responding to the stimulus. Random generation could be seen as the 
opposite end of this continuum, where the aim is to generate a response that is minimally 
associated with what went before. The patterns of results produced by Baddeley (1966) are 
consistent with the idea that, even with practice, random generation continues to place 
heavy demands on the underlying mechanism of control processes. 
The CE offers the mechanism for control processes in working memory, including the co- 
ordination of the subsidiary memory systems, the control of encoding and retrieval 
strategies, the switching of attention, and the mental manipulation of material held in the 
slave systems (Baddeley, 1996). The CE itself was originally conceptualised as being 
equipped with a supplementary storage capacity. The detailed nature of the processes 
attributed to the CE were derived empirically and have been briefly explained above. The 
organisation of these processes remains an open question and is the subject of ongoing 
empirical exploration. 
1.2.5 Summary 
The working memory model outlined above contains three components - the PL, the VSSP, 
and the CE. Dual tasks have been used to load different components of the memory system 
in order to see the effects of these when carried out concurrently with primary cognitive 
tasks. This methodology allowed the investigation of the importance of the working 
memory system for a variety of information processing activities. Articulatory suppression 
has been used to disrupt the PL component of working memory. This was shown to rely on 
the encoding of speech based material maintained by rehearsal. Tracking tasks were used to 
disrupt the VSSP component of working memory. These have been shown to rely on spatial 
processes that would disrupt any competing spatial material. Random generation tasks have 
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been used to disrupt the CE component of working memory. These tasks are assumed to 
rely on selection and retrieval processes. If performance on any of these secondary tasks 
disrupted performance on a primary cognitive task. thev were said to share a commoii 
resource. 
Neuropsychological evidence has also been forwarded to support the idea of the xkorking 
memory model. Selective impairment on some tasks. and not others. suggested that part of 
the short-term system could be affected by damage, whilst leaving other areas unimpaired. 
One could assume a deficit in a component of the short-term memory system which xý as 
able to explain why patients were impaired on partiCUlar activities. but not others. The 
neuropsychological evidence could be interpreted as supporting the existence ofthe three 
subsystems of working memory (PL, VSSP and CE). 
The model, and associated assumptions about concurrent tasks and neuropsychological 
work, has been used to investigate cognitive tasks that require both the processing and 
storage of information. What role do the working memory sub-components play in 
particular cognitive tasks? One approach to studying the role of working memory in 
complex cognition is to use dual task methodology, and this will be summarised in detail in 
Chapter 2. These studies have revealed knowledge about the role of different components 
of working memory in a variety of cognitive information processing activities, following the 
Baddeley model perspective. An alternative method of the study of working memory and 
complcx cognition is an individual differences approach. This approach uses -ý,, arious 
working memory span tasks as research tools. These span tasks are designed to represent 
the Nvorkin,, mernory demands during the performance of complex cognitive tasks by L- - -- Z7 
placing simultaneous demands on both processing and storage. This indivIdual dIfferenccs 
approach specifies the role of working memorý in complex cognition bý correlating 
participants' performance on these span measures with that on other tar(aet tasks. 
1.3 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND WORKING MEMORY 
I. 3.1 Introduction 
Individual differences and working memory research addresses the same issues as the dual- 
task work, but in a contrasting style. An individual differences approach is an alternative 
way of thinking about working memory. This tradition, in contrast to the dual-task \\ ork, 
has not adopted the Baddeley framework. The dual-task work indicated ý, vorkin,, memory 
involvement in perfon-ning higher level cognitive tasks -a decrement was seen in 
performance on a primary task when performed concurrently v, 'Ith a secondary task, 
assumed to load one of the working memory systems. The individual differences approach 
tries to identify components which we can measure independently and in which there is 
independent individual variation. This approach is an alternative way of seeing which 
components are involved in cognitive processing, for instance reasoning. 
The initial research concentrated on fluent reading ability, where individual differences are 
known to exist between people. Early studies attempted to test the hypothesis that fluent 
reading ability depends upon working memory. For instance, Perfetti and Lesgold (1977) 
used a standard digit span measure, which required participants to remember a set of digits 
and then to recall them in the order in which they had heard them. The more digits a person 
could remember, the hi,, her was their short-term memory capacity score. They found only a 
weak relationship between this and readim-, skill. Daneman and Carpenter (1980) suggested 
that working memory contains procedures for both processing as \\ell as storage functions. tý - 
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They suggested that the digit span used by Perfettl and Lesgold (1977) maN have been a 
reliable measure of a certain type of storage, but required little in the xvay of simultaneous 
storage and processing. It might be that the standard digit span was a good predictor of an 
individual's ability to store numbers in the PL, but was not a good predictor of executive or 
active processes related to the role of the CE. Thus, tasks developed since these early 
studies recognise the fact that a span task, which taxes both the storage and processing of 
information simultaneously, is measuring something different from passive span tasks, such 
as the digit span. 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) argued for the importance of storage and processing of activities 
within working memory. The limitation in capacity is believed to reside in simultaneously 
satisfying both the processing and storage demands that a given task imposes. Baddeley 
(1986) conceptualised working memory as an active system for temporarily storing and 
manipulating information. As we have seen, the two storage systems (the PL and VSSP) 
are assumed to be relatively passive slave systems primarily responsible for the temporary 
storage of verbal and spatial information. A memory task that taxes the participants 
capability to store verbal or spatial information may lead to results telling us the capacity 
that person has in respect to these systems. The CE is conceptualised as very active and 
responsible for the selection, initiation, and termination of processing routines (e. g., 
encoding, storing, and retrieving). A memory task that taxes the participants capability to 
store and process information concurrently may tell us about the capacity that person has in 
respect to this systern. 
There are two types of memory span of interest here - simple and complex measures. The 
simple measures refer to those with no obvious processing requirement. They only require 
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the storage of information for later recall. The complex measures refer to those with both a 
storage and a processing requirement. They require both the storage and processing of 
information. The simple or passive measures can be mapped onto BaddeleN-*s two slave 
systems, where information is stored for future recall. The complex or active measures can 
be mapped onto Baddeley's CE system, where information is actively processed. 
Engle, Kane and Tuholski (1999) state that when they refer to 'working memon- capacity' 
they mean the capabilities of the limited capacity attention mechanism which Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974) called the CE. Kane and Engle (1998) made the argument that the construct of 
working memory capacity is isomorphic with the capacity for controlled processing, which 
has a strong relationship to general fluid intelligence. Kane and Engle (1998) tested 
participants on a variety of complex and simple working memory span tasks, together with 
two tests of fluid intelligence. Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed the need to separate 
the simple and complex span tasks even though the two constructs were strongly related. 
The complex span tasks were shown to connect strongly with the measures of general 
intelligence, however the simple spans were not connected in this way. This finding lends 
support to the idea that the component of the working memory tasks that is important to 
higher-order functioning is controlled attention. As for Baddeley and Hitch (1974), the 
results here suggest that what is important in the complex span measures is processing 
capacity, not storage. 
Some of the passive measures of working memory capacity can be related to the PL 
component. As previously mentioned, the standard digit span was assumed to investigate 
whether individual differences in verbal ability reflected differences in passive verbal 
working memory capacity. The word span is another task that has been suggested to 
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measure this relationship (Shah & Miyake, 1996). This task requires participants to 
remember a set of words in a set. At the end of a set, their task is to recall each word in the 
order in which they have seen them. This task can be mapped onto the PL component due 
to the fact that it only requires the storage of verbal information, and there is no processing 
involved. 
Other passive measures, for Instance the simple arrow span., were developed to 'nx-estigate 
whether individual differences in spatial ability may reflect differences in passive spatial 
working memory capacity (Shah & Miyake, 1996). This task requires participants to 
remember the orientation of a set of arrows in a set. At the end of a set, their task is to recall 
the orientations on a recall grid, in the order in which they have seen them. This task can be 
mapped onto the VSSP component due to the fact that it only requires the storage of spatial 
information, and there is no processing involved. 
Another span measure is the complex reading span which was developed to investigate 
whether individual differences in reading comprehension may reflect differences in complex 
working memory capacity. This complex span task contained both processing and storage 
components. The reading span task was designed as a span measure of functional working 
memory capacity for language. The task requires the simultaneous maintenance and 
processing of verbal information. A single trial consists of the individual presentation of a 
small set of sentences. The participant is asked to read each sentence within a set 
(processing component), whilst remembering the last word of each sentence (storage 
component). At the end of a set of sentences, part1cipants are asked to recall the last word 
of each sentence in the order in which they read them. The number of sentences per set is 
inci-cmented from trial to trial and the participant's reading span is defined as the maximum 
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number he/she could read -,,,, hile maintaining perfect recall of the final , vords. In the context 
of the Baddeley model, this task is assumed to measure the capacity of the CE component of 
working memory, due to the additional processing function (Daneman & Carpenter. 1980). 
A major stream of research studies in working memory has been concerned with the role ot' 
working memory in aspects of reading. Advantage can be taken of the knowledge that 
individual differences between people occur in reading ability. Participants can be gi\-cii a 
range of tasks (memory and comprehension tasks). and a correlational approach can be used 
to identify which components of language appear to be associated most closely --. N-ith 
different kinds of memory capacity. Although language comprehension is not being studied 
in this thesis, these studies are important, as many working memory measures were devised 
in light of their findings. 
1 . 3.2 Working Memory Capacity and Reading Comprehension 
Using span measures as a technique is an artificial I aboratory -based process. Thus, it is 
fortunate that in educational and clinical settings, it is of ecological validity (Baddeley, 
1979). The most obvious relevance is in relation to learning the complex but important skill 
of reading. This section begins with some evidence of the applicability of using memor-,,, 
span as a research tool in the area of reading development. This will be followed by a range 
of studies of adult reading performance. Reading comprehension has been included because 
the main tradition of individual differences research stems from here. 
The evidence seems to suggest that the PL, or some similar system, plays an important role 
in learning to read (Jorm, 19831). Case, Kurland and Goldberg (1982) researched the 
de\ elopment of memory span in children by studying the relationship between vocabulary. 
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digit span (remembering a sequence of six digits) and the speed xvith which a child could 
process digits. Their results showed that a child's capacity on all these measures increased 
systematically with age. They argue that the primary cause for increase in memorly span 
stems not from a change in strategy adopted, but rather from an increased efficiency in 
carrying out the relevant control processes. The findings xere suggested to show that as a 
child develops, their language skills become more efficient. This allows them to perform 
operations such as rehearsal more easily making fewer demands on the limited attentional 
capacity, and hence allowing more items to be stored. The Baddeley framework can be 
applied here in two ways. The first explanation could be that the memory span is dependent 
on a limited capacity CE. The executive might use processes such as the PL system to store 
information, thereby freeing capacity for storing more items, either directly within the CE, 
or indirectly by the more efficient use of control processes. As a child develops, the PL 
system will become more and more efficient, and as such will require progressively less 
monitoring by the CE. The second explanation might be that the effects could be explained 
entirely in terms of the PL, without recourse to further assumptions about the CE. These 
findings for the development of reading skills in children should be reflected in the findings 
from adult studies, surnmarised next. 
Using an individual differences approach, Daneman and Carpenter (1980) attempted to test 
the hypothesis that adult comprehension depends upon working memory capacity. Earlier 
studies (Guyer & Friedman, 1975) had attempted to explore this question using standard 
digit span measures, and found only a weak relationship between digit span and 
comprehension. Daneman and Carpenter (1980) argued that the digit span might be a 
reasonable measure of a certain type of storage, but requires little in the way of 
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simultaneous storage and processing. The-v argued that the essence of -working memon- is 
that it divides its capacity between storage and processing. 
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) gave participants the reading span task (both visually and 
auditorily presented), together with a task involving the reading of passages of prose about 
which they had subsequently to answer questions. They also gave their participants the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), a more general test of intelligence. It was found that 
people who had higher span scores performed better at comprehension and the capacity to 
draw inferences and to integrate information (a correlation of . 72). There was also a healthy 
correlation (. 59) between working memory span and performance on the SAT. These 
findings have subsequently been replicated (e. g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1983; Just & 
Carpenter, 1992). 
Using the reading span as a working memory capacity task was clearly a very powerful 
predictor of reading comprehension. However, both its strength and its weakness stem from 
the fact that it is itself a relatively complex task, probably involving strategy selection, the 
PL, and knowledge of vocabulary, as well as the capacity to co-ordinate these various 
aspects of memory. A more varied approach to the study of comprehension came from Jane 
Oakhill and colleagues. Oakhill, Yuill and Parkin (1986) tested two groups of children on a 
test based on Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) reading span task. One group of children 
were normal on tests of vocabulary and the ability to read single words, but were poor 
performers on tests of comprehension. This group was tested against a group of children 
who performed normally overall. Oakhill et al. (1986) modified the reading span task, 
replacing the sentences with groups of three numbers (alleviates specific language 
difficulties). The children were instructed to read out the groups of three numbers, and then 
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recall the last number from each group. The reasoners were presented witht'-N-O. thFCC. or 
four groups of numbers. It was found that the children in the high comprehension group did 
better than children in the low comprehension group, and this difference increased as the 
number of digit groups became greater. Even without a language content to the task, the 
differences between groups still occurred. This finding was similar to that found by 
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) and the assumption was that the two groups differed in the 
attentional capacity of the CE. 
Other aspects of reading comprehension have also been investigated, including syntactic 
ambiguity. Just and Carpenter (1992) uncovered a number of systematic individual 
differences in reading comprehension that were related to working memory capacity for 
language. They used the reading span task devised by Daneman and Carpenter (1980), 
together with a garden path task devised by Ferreira and Clifton (1986). The garden path 
task was constructed in such a way that the reader may initially assign incorrect structure to 
a sentence and then have to go back and re-analyse it again. The reader could avoid being 
led down a garden path only by making immediate use of infon-nation not based on 
grammar alone (semantics). Their results showed qualitative and quantitative differences 
between readers in their ability to accurately comprehend certain sentences as a function of 
working memory capacity. The qualitative differences among readers included the 
permeability of their syntactic processing to pragmatic information, and in their representing 
one versus two interpretations of a syntactic ambiguity. The quantitative differences among 
readers included the time course of comprehension and the accuracy of comprehension. The 
results showed that reading slows down at just that point in a sentence that introduces a 
computational demand, and slows down more for low span than high span participants. One 
explanation of this was because people with larger working memory capacities for language 
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were able to draw on a larger supply of resources. According to this viexv. working memory 
constraints exist in the maximum amount of activation that one has avallable for allocation 
to the processing and storage functions and manifest themselves mainly in the form of 
processing slowdown, the gradual loss of critical inforination, or both under capacity- 
demanding situations (Shah & Miyake, 1996). In conclusion, this study showed that 
performance differences in the comprehension of syntactically ambiguous sentences could 
also be explained in large part in terms of working memory. 
A question that arises is whether these patterns of correlations between working memory 
and comprehension are due to storage or processing functions, or both. Daneman and 
Tardif (1987) argue that task-specific processing skill, not storage. is the real cause of 
individual differences in working memory capacity and the accompanying correlation with 
comprehension. They studied the relation between verbal abilities and three different span 
tasks: a verbal span, a math span, and a spatial span. All spans were similar at surface 
value, and all had a processing and storage component that could be assessed separately. 
The only factor that seemed to be important in determining whether a particular task would 
or would not predict reading skill was the domain of the processes that task tapped. For the 
task to predict reading skill, the processes had to be symbolic, that is, involve the 
manipulation of words (verbal processes) and, to a lesser extent, numbers (maths processes). 
The verbal span task again predicted a participant's ability to perfonn a reading 
comprehension task, as well as a general aptitude test (vocabulary test). None of the spatial 
measures correlated above zero with verbal ability. The most striking finding, accordino to 
Danernan and Tardif (1987), was that individual differences in processing accounted for all 
the interestino indi6dual differences in comprehension and verbal ability. This study 
showed that the processing component of a task is as, or more. important than its storage 
component and must be taken into account when looking at working memory capacity. 
In a similar vein, Turner and Engle (1989) report two experiments which investigated 
whether correlations between the complex span and reading comprehension depend on the 
nature of the processing component and individual skill in that task. This and other studies 
(e. g., Engle, Cantor & Carullo, 1992), crossed the types of processing required in a span 
task (sentence verification or numerical equation verification) with types of information to 
be remembered (words or digits). The main findings can be summarised as follows. The 
span tasks correlated with verbal ability scores equally well when the processing component 
of the span task involved language processing and when it involved numerical processing. 
Again, it can be seen that the complex spans predicted performance of a participant's ability 
for reading comprehension. This study showed the importance of looking at both storage 
and processing components of tasks and is consistent with Daneman and Tardif's (1987) 
findings where comprehension correlated with both verbal and math spans. This study is 
also consistent with the notion that CE working memory resources are required when 
comprehending, due to the correlation wIth the complex span measures. The span measures 
required both storage and processing of information which might be afforded by a centrally 
controlled resource. 
Although Daneman and Carpenter (1980) showed that simple span measures do not 
correlate with comprehension, there is contrasting evidence that they do. La Pointe and 
Engle (1990) investigated the relationship between a simple word span and the reading span 
task and reading comprehension. Their results showed evidence for a relationship between 
both span measures (simple and complex) and reading comprehension. An explanation for 
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this may have been that the PL was also involved in comprehension. La Pointe and Engle 
(1990) conclude that the reading span does not measure a working memory specific to 
reading. They found that reading comprehension was predicted as N\ ell by a complex span 
task involving arithmetic as by one involving reading. More importantl-,. -. the simple word 
span task also significantly predicted comprehension and, in some cases. did so as well as 
did the complex span task. This suggested that the complex and simple span tasks may not 
have been greatly different in what they measure. 
La Pointe and Engle (1990) found a correlation bevveen simple word span and 
comprehension whereas previous studies by Daneman and Carpenter (1980) and Turner and 
Engle (1989) did not find these correlations to be significant. The strategy used by La 
Pointe et al. (1990) was to see whether simple spans correlated with reading comprehension 
under conditions in which the presentation modality was more similar to that used with the 
reading span task (both visually presented). La Pointe et al. (1990) suggested that the 
reading span task does not have a special relationship with reading comprehension as 
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) proposed. However, this was only when similar conditions 
were upheld for both the simple and complex span measures. La Pointe et al. (1990) argued 
that one factor that both span tasks have in common is a reliance on verbal knowledge. 
They suggested that it might be some form of articulatory coding that is the critical factor. 
In contrast, however, Waters and Caplan (1996) were interested in the measurement of 
verbal working memory capacity and its relation to reading comprehension. Participants 
carried out the following tasks - Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) reading span task. four 
versions of a related sentence span task in which reaction times and accuracv, on sentence 
processing, Nwre measured along with sentence-final word recall. t\\o number :,, cneration 
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tasks designed to test working memory, digit span. and two shape- generation tasks designed 
to measure visuo-spatial working memory, plus standard vocabularv and readiniz, tests. 
Their results showed that it is the processing component of the sentence span tests that is the 
ma or determinant of the correlation between these tests and comprehension. The results j 
suggested that sentence span tasks are unreliable unless measurements are made of both 
their sentence processing and recall components, and that the predictive value of these tasks 
for reading comprehension abilities lies in the overlap of operations rather than in 
limitations in verbal working memory that apply to both. 
This section outlined the initial individual differences research in relation to comprehension 
and reading ability. The reading span task was devised with both a storage and processing 
component which might reflect the operations of a CE of working memory. These types of 
span task were favoured over and above the former span measures used, such as the digit 
span. The standard digit span type task shows little relationship with reading 
comprehension arguably because it relies only on a storage component. It can be seen that 
the only span measures that consistently showed positive and significant relationships with 
adult comprehension were those that relied on both storage and processing components. 
The evidence put forward might suggest that a working memory capacity reliant on both 
storing and processing of information is required for the process of reading comprehension. 
This conclusion could be ftilfilled by the notion of a centrally controlled processor for 
language based ability. The research also shows that comprehension and reading ability 
have been linked with a working memory capacity for language due to the correlations with 
verbal abilities, but not with spatial ones. This section also presented evidence that span 
measures relating to letters or numbers showed positive relationships with reading ability. It 
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was only the spatial spans that were not predictive of compreheiision (Daneman &- Tardif. 
1987). 
The findings presented in this section, althou-, -, h not based upon Baddeley's model. can be 
mapped in this way. Research into the de-velopment of reading sho,, ved that it relied on a 
system for speech based coding - as articulation skills improve. so does reading 
performance. These studies were based on using a digit memory span as a measure of 
simple working memory capacity. Memory span was found to be related to the abilit% to 
read. These findings could be taken in conjunction with Baddelev's working memory 
model by recourse to the PL component. Research into the ability to read in adults also 
showed that it relied on a system for verbally based information due to the fact that 
comprehension correlated with complex spans based upon verbal material. These findings 
could be interpreted in line with Baddeley's idea of a CE component of working mernory. 
Thus, reading comprehension seems to be predicted consistently by complex span tasks 
assumed to measure the CE systems of working memory. The findings showed that 
individual differences in working memory capacity can account for variations in 
performance on comprehension and reading skill tasks. Looking at individual differences in 
working memory and reading has been a successful approach. It is encouraging that the 
application of this approach has been so fruitful, and lends more support to applying the 
same approach in relation to reasoning. If it is the case that these measures only relate to 
language abilities, they may not be as useful for examining the role of working memory in 
reasoning. However, it appears that this is not the case and Section 1.3.3 follows on in the 
individual differences vein coverl II itv measures and working mernory from in-, -, co-gii'tive abili 
this perspcctive. 
38 
1.3.3 Working Memory Capacity and Cognitive Ability 
Cognitive psychologists have examined the role that simple information-proce s sing abilities 
play in moderating individual differences in complex cognition. Areas of study include 
comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter, 1992). which has already 
been discussed, as well as reasoning (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990) and academic 
achievement (Engle, Cantor & Carullo, 1992). One common thread in this xork is the 
importance placed on the role of working memory. These investigations link t-%N-o central 
constructs - working memory capacity and cognitive ability - which arise from tx, ý-o distinct 
bodies of literature on individual differences in cognition - the information-processing and 
the psychometric traditions, respectively. 
Perhaps one of the most comprehensive studies of working memory capacity and cognitive 
ability was carried out by Kyllonen and Christal (1990). They used a battery of 25 tests to 
723 military recruits to investigate the relationship between reasoning ability and working 
memory capacity. They used six tests of working memory capacity, together with four 
general knowledge tests, two processing speed tests, and 15 reasoning tests. The working 
memory span tasks were all based upon either alphabetic or arithmetic problems where 
participants had to recall the inferred relationships between letters or numbers in series. 
The span tasks required concurrent processing and storage and could be mapped onto the 
CE system of working memory. The reasoning tests were selected from the paper-and- 
pencil Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The reasoning tasks were 
based upon three types of reasoning factor proposed by Carroll (1989) - deductive serial 
reasoning (nonsense syllogisms), inductive (verbal analogies) and quantitative (arithmetic) 
reasoning. The results demonstrated a consistent and remarkably high correlation between 
reasoning ability and working memory capacity. Confirmatory factor analysis yielded 
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consistently high estimates of the correlation between these two factors (r = . 80 to . 90). 
Kyllonen and Christal's (1990) measures of reasoning kNere standard cognitive ability tests 
and these were found to have strong relationships with measures of working memory 
capacity. Kyllonen and Christal (1990) interpret their results as an indication that individual 
differences in reasoning ability reflect differences in working, memory capacity (e. u. 
Kyllonen, 1996). 
Similarly, Jurden (1995) was interested in indi-vidual differences in workiii- memorv and t7 - 
complex cognition. In two studies, participants completed two , vorkii10 memory span tasks ltý - 
designed to assess verbal and nonverbal working memory, as vxll as assessments of verbal 
intelligence, nonverbal intelligence. and academic achie\ cment. Verbal xvorking memor\ 
was assessed with an adaptation of the reading span, whilst nonverbal working memory was 
assessed using the computational span task (Salthouse & Babcock. 1990). The verbal span 
required participants to read sets of sentences and answer a multiple choice question about 
each, as well as remembering the last word of each sentence in a set. In contrast, the 
nonverbal span required participants to solve simple arithmetic problems with a recall 
component. Verbal working memory had no relationship with nonverbal intelligence but 
did relate to verbal intelligence, whereas nonverbal working memory had no relationship 
with verbal intelligence and academic achievement, but did relate to nonverbal intelligence. 
Kyllonen and Christal"s (1990) data were also reanalysed. Autonomous verbal and 
nonverbal working memory factors were each identified with multiple indicators. Verbal 
\\, orking memory was more highly correlated with verbal assessments than oath non\-crbal 
assessments', the opposite was true for quantitative working memory. These results, 
together with Jurden's (1995) experiments, suggest that Nvorking memory capacity can 
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predict the performance of cognitive tasks. other than comprehension. and that a 
dissociation can be seen between verbal and nonverbal xvorking memory. 
Shah and Miyake (1996) have also identified dissociations between different types of 
working memory capacity. They investigated spatial thinking and language comprehension 
by comparing the magnitude of correlations between individuals performance on a spatial 
span task and a reading span task with other spatial and verbal ability measures. They also 
examined the relative contribution of the processing and storage components of spatial and 
verbal working memory for predicting performance on spatial and language tasks. The 
results from their first experiment showed a correlation between the complex spatial span 
task and the spatial ability measures, but not with the verbal ability measures. In contrast, 
the complex verbal span task correlated with the verbal ability measures, but not with the 
spatial ability measures. Again, the working memory tasks predicted specific performances 
on the ability tests. 
In their second experiment in this series, Shah and Miyake (1996) developed four different 
working memory span measures by crossing the type of processing requirements (mental 
rotation or sentence verification) with the type of information to be maintained for later 
recall (spatial orientations indicated by arrows or two-syllable words). This interference 
paradigm was used to demonstrate that both the processing and storage requirements in a 
working memory span task contribute to the pattern of correlations with complex cognitive 
tasks. Participants were either in the arrow or word conditions, where the span tasks 
involved remembering spatial or verbal information, respectively. The same battery of 
cognitive ability tests were used for participants in both conditions, in conjunction with the 
span measures. They compared the pattern of correlations for the span tasks involving the 
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processing and storage of same-modality information, xvith the patterns obtained for the 
span tasks based on different-modality information, and with the simple spans that required 
no explicit processing. The results showed that only the span tasks involving the sarne 
storage requirement (i. e., spatial or verbal information) showed similar correlations xvith the 
same domain ability tests. The results replicated the dissociation between verbal and spatial 
working memory found in Experiment one, and further demonstrated that both the 
processing and storage demands of working memory tasks are important for predicting 
performance on spatial thinking and language processing tasks. 
Shah and Miyake (1996) did not measure a participant's accuracy in performing mental 
rotation or sentence verification (processing component). They suggested that there was no 
indication of participants trading processing accuracy for better span scores. They 
investigated the role of processing in Experiment 2 by manipulating the processing 
requirement to same or different modalities in relation to the ability measures. These 
findings were based on the storage components of the span tasks measured, and it must be 
acknowledged that this study made no separate assessment of the processing component of 
the span tasks. 
This section has sum-marised a number of studies that have investigated the links between 
working memory capacity and cognitive ability. Many different span tasks have been 
devised and can be interpreted as measuring individual differences in the components of 
Baddeley's (1986) working memory model. The span measures are assumed to reflect 
either the passive storage of the subsystems, the PL or VSSP, or to reflect active processing 
within working memory, the CE. The span tasks are based on the storing and/or processing 
of information and they measure verbal and nonverbal material. The findings from this 
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research showed a confirmation of the link between xýorking memor-y capacity and 
cognitive ability. The studies illustrated links between verbal spans and verbal abilitieS. 'lot 
nonverbal ones. It is worth pointing out that the nonverbal tasks xvere mostly based on I 
numerals, not spatial information. The majontv of the findings in this section lend support 
to the view that the processes involved in complex cognition tasks could reflect the 
resources afforded by a CE of working memory. Some of the research shoAed that the 
spans with different processing and storage components actually correlated Nvith one 
another, especially when the information was based on verbal or mathematical abilities. 
This was assumed to reflect a unitary working memory system, where the spans measured 
this capacity. However, other studies have shown a dissociation between span tasks with 
different processing and storage components. These findings might suggest a separation of 
central resources of working memory. 
Very little of the individual differences research has been conducted strictly within the 
Baddeley framework, although as discussed, most of the findings can be reconciled with his 
model. However, one aspect of the findings that may not be so easily reconciled is evidence 
for the separation of resources at the CE level - that there may be a dissociation between 
different types of working memory capacity. Therefore, Section 1.3.4 discusses what 
research does exist about the idea of a unitary executive and questions whether it could be a 
range of different systems for varying infon-nation. 
I. 3.4 Is Working Memory Capacity Domain-General or Domain -Specific? 
Many of the studies described in Section 1.3.3 examined working memor-y capacity in 
relation to whether the CE's capacity could be separated for different types of information. 
If a task dependent on verbal or spatial ability could be predicted equally %\ell from both 
verbal and spatial spans then a general architecture explanation could be accepted. Put 
another way, this finding would support the view that a domain- i ndepende nt explanation of 
working memory CE resources fits the data best. If a task dependent on verbal or spatial 
ability could be predicted differently from a verbal or spatial span task, then a specific 
architecture explanation could be supported. Put another way. this finding %\ould support 
the view that a domain-specific explanation of working memory CE resources fits the data 
best. This section will outline the traditional unitary view of working memory capacity 
first. This notion supports the view that all higher level cogniti\-e thinking is reliant on a 
single pool of general purpose resources. The section will go on to examine a more 
contemporary separability view of working memory capacity. This notion supports the 
view that there are separate pools of resources that different processes and representations 
rely upon. 
Turner and Engle (1989), as explained previously, asked the question as to whether working 
memory is task dependent. The span tasks correlated with verbal ability scores equally \ýcll 
when the processing component of the span task involved language processing and when it 
involved numerical processing, suggesting some domain-generality of working memory. 
This work indicated that, when the processing component of the span task was arithmetic- 
related, it led to correlations with reading comprehension similar to those found when the 
processing component was reading. This added more evidence, claimed Turner and Engle 
(1989) and others (e. g. . Engle, 
Cantor & Carullo, 1992), that working memory resources are 
domain geiieral. However, it should be noted that Tumer and Engle (1989) only looked at I 
linguistic versus numerical processing. They did not look at specifically spatial tasks. only 
nonverbal tasks, in relation to verbal tasks. 
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Jurden (1995) also investigated the separation of working memory capacity for differelit 
types of information and his study was summarised in Section 1.3.33. Verbal working 
memory was shown to have no relationship with nonverbal intelligence. whereas now, erbal 
working memory was shown to have no relationship with verbal intelligence and academic 
achievement. In Kyllonen and Christal's (1990) study, confirmatory factor analý sis 
suggested the existence of a single working memory factor -a verbal versus quantitativc 
content factor. Jurden's (1995) results, together with the re-anaIN-sis of KvIlonen and 
Christal's (1990) study, suggest that rather than being a unitary system, the working 
memory system may be a parallel processing system. The subsystems may operate in 
tandem, possess some degree of autonomy, and have their own control processes. It is of 
note here that many of these studies have used a separation of information by recourse to 
verbal versus nonverbal assessments. However, as also seen for Turner and Engle (1989). 
nonverbal does not necessarily mean specifically spatial and this should be noted. 
Daneman and Tardif (1987) argue that individual differences in ýworking memory capacity 
for different types of information should be examined. As -v, 'e have seen, they studied the 
relation between verbal abilities and three different span tasks: a verbal span, a math span, 
and a spatial span. The processing component of the spatial span required participants to 
view sets of cards. Each card contained three 3x3 tic-tac-toe grids. with red and blue 
tokens occupying certain cells. The participants were to imagine the three grids as 
representing the top, middle, and bottom layers of a three-dimensional tic-tac-toe game. 
They were to mentally combine the three layers and locate the winning line by touching the 
three tokens xvith their finger. After a set of tv, -o to four cards. the storage component of the 
spatial-span task required the participants to recall the winning lines for all the cards in the 
set. If the niath span and spatial span measures predicted reading skill as well as the ., crbal 
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span measure then there would be support for a general working memory sN stern. I t'onl,., - 
the verbal span measure predicted reading skill then there would be support for a language- 
specific processor. Daneman and Tardif (1987) showed that only the math and verbal span 
tasks, not the spatial span task, predicted verbal ability. They concluded, therefore, that 
there are separate working-memory resources for language- and nonlanguage-based 
information processing. They suggest that rather than the PL and the VSSP acting as 
temporary storage systems with processing ftinctions limited primarily to rehearsal, they 
should be considered as the processors themselves. 
As stated in Section 1.3.3, Shah and Miyake (1996) tested the separability of working 
memory resources for spatial thinking and language comprehension. In Experiment one, all 
participants completed a complex spatial and verbal working memory span, plus a simple 
spatial span measure. The complex and simple spatial spans were developed as spatial 
analogues to the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) reading span task and the digit span, 
respectively. In the complex spatial span measure, the task was to decide whether each one 
of a set of letters was normal or mirror imaged while simultaneously keeping track of the 
orientation of each of the letters in the set. In the simple spatial span measure, the task was 
to keep track of the orientations of a set of arrows. They also completed a battery of tests 
including tests of spatial visualisation, perceptual speed, and verbal and quantitative tasks. 
Their results showed a correlation between the complex spatial span task and the spatial 
ability measures, and a correlation between the complex verbal span task and the verbal 
ability measures. The spatial spans were not correlated with verbal ability, the verbal span 
was not correlated with spatial ability. An exploratory factor analysis was also performed 
on this data, with a resulting two factor model (uncorrelated). The first factor was loaded 
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highly on the three spatial ability measures, the two spatial span tasks. but not the verbal 
measures, indicating that this was a spatial factor. The second factor was loaded highlýy on 
the two verbal measures, but not on the spatial ability measures, suggesting that this was a t-- 
verbal factor. Shah and Miyake (1996) interpreted this result as evidence for domain 
specific components of active working memory, beyond the scope of the subsystems 
identified in Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) model. 
Similar conclusions regarding the non-unitary view of CE resources have been drawn from 
work investigating working memory span and executive function tasks. Lehto (1996) was 
interested in the relationship between working memory capacity and three executive 
function tests - the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) plus The Tower of Hanoi JOH) 
and Goal Search tasks were studied. The digit span and word span tasks were used as 
measures of simple working memory capacity (PL). The sentence-word span, operation- 
word span and memory-updating and backward digit span were used as measures of 
complex working memory capacity (CE). The executive tasks used are commonly 
employed to measure executive function amongst patients with frontal lobe injury. The 
WCST correlated significantly with working memory tasks, the storage function of working 
memory probably being a limiting factor in card sorting. The two other executive tasks did 
not correlate with working memory tasks. In addition, none of the executive tasks exhibited 
any significant intercorrelations. The present results and evidence from earlier studies 
suggest that there does not exist a unitary, limited capacity central executive. The absence 
of interrelationships between tasks led to the conclusion that these tasks tap into separate 
functions that are independent of one another and unrelated to working memory capacity. 
Lehto (1996) only used span measures based upon verbal information, not spatial. It might 
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be that if Lehto (1996) used working memory spans based upon spatial Int'On-nation. links 
may have been seen between it and the spatial executi-,, e tasks. such as the TOH. 
This final section has opened up the question of whether working memory central resources 
are domain general or domain specific. The field of research is split bet%\ cen traditional 
views that suggest a unitary executive and those that suggest a separability of executive 
processes for varying information. Many studies only concentrated on verbal span measures 
with verbal and nonverbal cognitive tasks. Only Daneman and Tardif (1987) and Shah and 
Miyake (1996) used spatial capacity measures based on both the storage and processing of 
spatial information. More research is needed to systematically examine the role of both 
complex verbal and spatial capacity measures and their relationships to individual 
differences in complex cognition, this being one of the primary issues with which this thesis 
is concerned. 
1.4 CONCLUSION FOR THE WORKING MEMORY REVIEW 
This review started with a look at the precursors to the contemporary model of working 
memory. The modal model (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971) was found to be a too simplistic 
account of the available evidence, thus the working memory model (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974) was developed. Researchers have tried to establish that firstly the capacity of this 
svstem is limited, and secondly that using a substantial amount of this available capacit%, 
should have broadly comparable effects across a range of different cogniti-ý, -e tasks. 
Much of the evidence for a tripartite model of working memory came from dual-task \ýork. 
These studies examined detriments in performance on a primary task when carried out 
concurrently Nvith a secondary task assumed to load one of the working memory subsystems 
(e. o., Hitch& Baddeley. 1976, Vallar & Baddelcv, 1982). 'Working memory has been 
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conceptuallsed as an active system for temporarily stonng and manipulating Information 
needed in the execution of complex cognitive tasks (e. g., learning. reasoning. and 
comprehension). 
The PL has been conceptualised as responsible for storing speech based information (e., -,.. 
Baddeley, 1966; Baddeley, Thomson & Buchanan. 1975). The VSSP has been 
conceptualised as responsible for the manipulation and temporary storage of visual and 
spatial information (e. g., Baddeley & Lieberman, 1980). The CE is postulated to be 
responsible for the encoding, storing, and retrieving of information (e.,,., Baddelev. 1966). 
Many studies have been carried out to draw out the characteristics of the three systems that 
make up the working memory model. Research has provided evidence that the PL is a 
speech-based system and is important for learning to speak and to read and for 
comprehending spoken discourse. Work using the dual-task paradigm suggests the 
separability of a system for setting up and manipulating images, the VSSP. The pattern of 
results suggests separate visual and spatial components of imagery. Evidence put forward 
for the CE system has been less clear. However. it has been suggested that the Norman and 
Shallice model gives a good account of the functioning of the CE. Experimental evidence 
(random generation) supports the claim that the system involves processing and storage 
resources, and that scheduling and planning also play a role. The experimental evidence 
gives only a general picture of the characteristics of this systern and it is the least defined 
component of the working memory model. 
The i-c%, IcN\- continued by describing an alternative way of looking at the role of Aorking 
memoi-v capacity in cognition - through an individual differences approach. 'ýVorkin, -, 
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memory span tasks have been used in conjunction %ý ith a range of cognitive task s to 
evaluate the relationship betv, -een them. A range of xvorking memory span tasks have becn 
sho-vvn to be predictive of performance on comprehension tasks (e. 2.. Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter. 1992) and cognitive ability tasks (e., -,.. Kyllonen & 
Christal. 1990; Jurden, 1995). 
The review ended with a look at the contemporary view of the structure of working 
memory. Span tasks considered to represent either the storage of information in the PL and 
VSSP, or processing and storage in the CE show differing results. One perspectivc showed 
evidence for a unitary CE (e. g., Turner & Engle. 1989). ývhilst another showed evidence for 
separate pools of CE resources (e. g., Shah & Miyake, 1996). 
The value of the individual differences approach must be emphasised due to the wide range 
of results that can be accounted for when predicting from capacity measures. This approach 
has informed us about the role of working memory in cognitive tasks. It can be seen from 
this review that working memory capacity was a significant predictor of an individual's 
performance on a range of cognitive tasks, including comprehension and cognitive ability. 
A range of measures have been employed in looking at individual differences in cogniti\, c 
ability. However, the individual differences work, as yet, has not tackled the relationship 
bem, een complex deductive tasks and working memory capacity tasks. The dual-task work 
has hivestigated a much wider range of ability and complex deductive reasoning tasks and 
these complex tasks need to be addressed from the complementary individual differences 
perspective. Deductive reasoning tasks, such as syllogistic and spatial reasoning. have not 
been investigated in relation to a participant's working memory capacity for different sorts 
of information. 
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The evidence concerning the unitary versus non-unitary ý, ýIexý- of CE resources also raises 
interesting research questions. If it is the case that verbal and spatial executive resources are 
distinct, this has obvious implications for the structure of the working memory model 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). This thesis will further examine the evidence for this proposal. 
In addition, this thesis will examine the extent to \vhich xvorking memor-v capacity predicts 
performance on a range of reasoning tasks. It Nvill also examine whether different reasoning 
tasks draw more on spatial or verbal capacity resources. To what extent are indi,, -idual 
differences in reasoning explained by individual differences in working memory? Which 
reasoning problems seem to rely on a verbal working memory resource, and which on a 
spatial resource? There are a number of reasoning theories, that specify different 
representations and processes, and it may be possible using this methodology to 
differentiate between these theoretical accounts. In the chapter that follows, a summary is 
provided of these theoretical perspectives and the evidence for the role of working memory 
in human reasoning is examined. 
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CHAPTER 2-A REVIEW OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
2.1 IN'TRODI'CTION TO THE REVIEW 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis is interested in the question of whether working 
memory plays a role in performance on deductive reasoning problems. From Chapter I it 
could be seen that, through both a dual-task and individual differences methodolo y. 9ý 
working memory was implicated in performance seen on many cognitive tasks. This 
experimental series addresses the relationship between complex deductive reasoning tasks 
and working memory capacity tasks, taking an individual differences approach. The two 
tasks that have been consistently used throughout this thesis are syllogistic and five-term 
series spatial inference problems. Therefore this review of deductive reasoning will 
concentrate on these tasks and use them as examples for discussion. 
Chapter 2 will introduce the literature on deductive reasoning. After a short introduction, 
the literature relating to syllogistic inference -,, vill be summarised. The nature of syllogistic 
problems, the phenomena associated with them, and the theories that have been forwarded 
to explain these phenomena will be outlined. This will be followed by an explanation of 
spatial inference. Chapter 2 then goes on to review the literature concerning the connection 
between reasoning and working memory. Research that has examined the role of working 
memory in reasoning using dual-task methods will be examined first. Thisv, -ill be followed 
by an alternative way of looking at working memory and reasoning from an individual 
differences approach. Chapter 2 will end with a more detailed rationale for the first set of 
experiments. 
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2.1.1 What is Deduction? 
The word 'reason' can be defined as "the intellectual facultý- by which conclusions can be 
drawn from premises" (The Oxford English Dictionary, 1995). Deduction is central to 
human intelligence and without it we would not be able to learn and apply general 
principles, or generalise our experience from one situation to another. To be able to reason 
deductively, the reasoner must attend to and process particular steps of the task in mind, and 
this is where working memory comes in. To be able to reason is a fundamental attribute and 
individuals often reason to draw novel inferences using background knowledge. Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne (199 1) suggest that deduction is used in all sorts of situations including the 
formulation of plans and the evaluation of actions, as well as to determine the consequences 
of assumptions and hypotheses. 
Evans, Newstead and Byrne (1993) give some examples of deductive arguments. Working 
out whether we qualify for a home improvement grant or a tax rebate, or whether a child can 
choose the combination of school subjects that they wish, are all examples of deductive 
reasoning. These examples involve understanding rules and regulations and applying them 
to personal circumstances. Thus deductive reasoning involves a process where the goal is to 
draw a valid consequence from the premise information given. This thesis indirectly 
examines the question of how deductive reasoning problems are represented, stored and 
processed; and directly examines whether they rely on a limited working memory capacity. 
As mentioned in the brief introduction above, Chapter 2 will be concentrating on two types 
of deductive task - syllogistic and spatial inference. The past research concerning both these 
types of task have uncovered certain phenomena that needs to be accounted for by any 
reasoning theory. Theories of deductive reasoning should be able to explain . N, hy, in 
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general, people show evidence of lo ical competence on these tasks. They should also 9 
provide theoretical accounts of the errors that people make in reasoning and thk2 way in 
which people's knowledge influences their pattems of response. 
This review chapter will describe the phenomenon associated with deductive reasoning 
tasks and discuss claims concerning the underlying mental processes. The focus %vIII be on 
syllogistic and five-term series spatial reasoning problems in terms of their nature. 
performance on them and theoretical explanations for them. In this ý, vav. reasoning theor% 
will be introduced in light of the findings for these tv, -o tasks. The chapter v, -Ill move on to a 
discussion of the research that has examined the role of working memory and reasoning. 
This will be done by firstly examining research that has employed a dual-task methodology. 
An alternative approach will then be proposed, using an individual differences methodology 
to examine the relationship between deductive reasoning and working memory capacity 
tasks. Finally, the rationale for the thesis in general will be introduced. Section 2.2 outlines 
the nature, patterns of performance and theoretical accounts of these performance patterns 
for the syllogistic task. 
2.2 SYLLOGISTIC REASONING 
2.2.1 Syllogisms 
A definition of a syllogism is, 
afiorm of reasoning in which a conclusion is drawnftom two given or assumed 
propositions (premises). - a common or middle term is present in the two premises 
but not in the conclusion, which may be invalid (The Oxford English Dictionary, 
1995). 
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A syllogism consists of tv, -o premises and a conclusion that link three classes. Fhe 
following is an illustrative example of a sN-Ilo(-, ism (Example 2.1) 
Some of the actors (a) are bakers (b) 
All of the bakers (b) are carpenters (c) 
Therefore, 
Some of the actors (a) are carpenters (c). 
Example 2.1 
The premises contain three terms (a. b, and c) one of v, -hich. the middle term b, occurs in 
both premises. The conclusion connects the other txý o terms (a and 0. Each premise can 
take one of four forms or contain one of four quantifiers - All. Some, None, and Some not. 
The form of the quantifiers determines the mood of the syllogism as shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 shows the moods of the premise information as described by Evans, Newstead 
and Byrne (1993). 
Quantifier Evans 
or Mood Classification 
All as are bs A universal 
Some as are bs I particular 
No as are bs E universal 
Some as are not bs 0 particular 
Table 2. I- The four moods of the syllogism 
I'lie mood of the whole syllogism is determined by the premises and conclusion, and an 
exarnpIc of an I EO problem (shown in Table 11) WOUld be Example 12. 
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Some bakers are athletes 
No bakers are carpenters 
Therefore, 
Some carpenters are not athletes. 
Example 2.2 
Table 2.2 illustrates the figure of a syllogism as determined by the position of the three 
terms within the two premises. Figures I and 2 are asymmetrical because B is located in 
different places in the two premises. Figures 3 and 4 are symmetrical because B is located 
in the same place in the two premises. 
Figure I Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 
Premise IAB 
Premise 2BC 
BAAB 
CBCBBC 
Table 2.2- The four figures of the syllognsm 
Following Cohen and Nagel's (1934) scholastic logic, there are four figures, and in addition 
the two premises and conclusion can each contain one of four different quantifiers. This 
calculates to 256 different syllogisms (64 premises *4 conclusions = 256 syllogisms). 
Some of these syllogisms are valid arguments,. they Nield a conclusion that must be true 
that its premises are true. Some of these syllogisms are invalid arguments, they do 
not yield a valid conclusion to the premise information given. Scholastic logicians accepted 
no logical effect of premise order and therefore ignored half of the possible syllogistic 
structures. Todav all 512 structures are investigated in Ps-vchology, because performance on 
these problerns may be affected in x,, -aN, s other than logic. 
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One of the first studies investigating all 64 forins of premise information was Dickstein 
(1978). Participants were presented with a syllogism and v, -ere required to indicate which of 
five conclusions followed (i. e., all, some, none, some ... not, or Impossible to tell). Thus the 
data collected referred to a participant evaluating rather than producing a conclusion. 
Participants did make many errors on this syllogistic task, and the rank ordering of the 
difficulty in solving each syllogism was evaluated. The invalid problems were found to be 
harder than the valid ones. Some of the valid syllogisms were solved accurately nearly all 
the time (e. g., All of the bs are as, All of the cs are bs resulted in 95% accuracy), whilst 
others were very rarely solved correctly (e. g., None of the bs are as, All of the bs are cs 
resulted in 24% accuracy). 
Experiments that investigate syllogistic reasoning tasks follow very different methodologies 
and therefore may reflect different aspects of the reasoning process. The premises can be 
given followed by all the possible conclusions as response options. Within this evaluation 
approach there are many more variations in methodology. Participants can be presented 
with complete syllogisms, two premises and a conclusion, and asked to judge their validity. 
In this method, participants must evaluate rather then produce a conclusion. Participants 
can also be presented with the two premises and asked to generate their own conclusions. 
Studies investigating performance on this task indicate a vast difference in difficulty 
between the valid syllogisms. Some are so easy that a child could solve them, some so hard 
that an adult has problems responding correctly. There are a range of phenomenon 
associated with syllogistic reasoning which any theoretical account must explain. The 
following section aims to summarise the findings of research investigating the nature of 
different syllogisms. 
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2.2.2 Syllogistic Reasoning Phenomenon 
Theoretical accounts of syllogistic reasoning performance must be able to account for 
performance patterns found in syllogistic experimental data. As already mentioned, some 
syllogistic problems are solved nearly all the time, whilst others are hardly ever solved 
correctly. An example (Example 2.3) of an easier valid syllogism can be seen below. The 
following examples are taken from Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991). where participants ,, vere 
asked to generate their own conclusions to the syllogistic statements presented. 
All actors are bakers 
All bakers are carpenters 
Therefore, 
All actors are carpenters. 
Example 2.3 
The conclusion to this syllogism was produced by 89% of participants. The following 
syllogism is an example (Example 2.4) of a harder valid problem (taken from Johnson-Laird 
Byme, 1991). 
No actors are bakers 
Some bakers are carpenters 
Therefore, 
Some carpenters are not actors. 
Example 2.4 
The conclusion to this syllogism was produced by only 20% of participants. The preferred 
conclusion that was systematically observed to be used by the other participants was that 
there was no valid conclusion. The differences in accurately responding to these types of 
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valid syllogism must be accounted for by theory. The following syllogism is an example 
(Example 2.5) of an in-valid problem (taken from Johnson-Laird & B,, me. 199 1). 
Some athletes are not bakers 
All bakers are carpenters 
Therefore, 
No valid conclusion. 
Example 2. -5 
There is no one conclusion that interrelates the end terms here. so a logical conclusion is not 
possible. The preferred conclusion, however, that xvas produced by the ma - 101-Ity of 
participants was that some athletes are not carpenters. The pattern of s,,,, stematic errors 
observed in Examples 2.4 and 2.5. when individuals produce syllogistic conclusions, must 
be explained by theoretical accounts. 
Many different aspects of the syllogistic problem have been explored, and have been found 
to have an effect on accurate responding. The mood and figure of the premise information 
affect the conclusions drawn. Typically, it has been found that syllogisms in Figure I are 
the easiest, those in Figure 4 the hardest, and those in Figures 2 and 3 somewhere in 
between (e. g., Frase, 1968). This has become known as the figural difficulty effect. 
On occasions. participants seem to prefer conclusions in one direction rather than another. 
the directional effect of the conclusion (e. g., Johnson-Laird & Steedman. 1978). Studies 
havc related these directionality effects to the four figures of syllogistic reasoning (e. (, j,, 
Frase. 1968, Dickstein, 1978). These authors suggest that the natural order of processing in 
figure I (AB-BC) is fromA to C, however in figure 4 (BA-BC) is from C to A. Johnson- 
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Laird and Bara (1984) proposed that reasoners have to carry out mental operations on 
syllogistic premises in order to bring the t-wo middle terms into conti[juity. Premises i II in 
figure I already occur in an order in -vbich the two occurrences of '13' follow one anotlier. 
and so there is no need for any operation to bring them into contiguity. Premises in figure 4. 
however. requires the reasoner either to re-new their interpretation of the first premise in 
order to switch it round or else to switch round their interpretation of the second premise 
and then re-new their interpretation of the first premise. These, and other studies (c. g., 
Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978) demonstrated that people prefer to process information in 
a forward rather than a backward direction. 
Thus, individuals are influenced by the order of the terms in the premises, however, they are 
also influenced by the content assigned to the premises and conclusion. Belief bias effects 
can be seen as errors that occur when reasoners make inferences on the basis of the 
believability of the conclusion, rather than the logical structure of the syllogism. There have 
been many studies that have investigated this claim (e. g.. Kaufmann & Goldstein, 1967; 
Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985). There are three basic 
findings from these studies, highlighted by Evans, Newstead and Byme (1993). It is 
suggested that believable conclusions are more readily accepted than unbelievable ones. I 
Secondly, it has been shown that logically valid conclusions are more readily accepted than 
invalid ones. Thirdly. evidence reveals an interaction between logical N-alidit,,,, and 
believability such that the effects of believability are more marked on invalid conclusions. 
All these factors must be taken into account whilst deten-nining how individuals attempt and 
solve these types of problem. 
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In summary, there are four findings from the syllogistic studies that theoretical accounts 
must explain. The first finding is that reasoners show competence on the syllogistic task - 
more va i in erences are drawn than invalid ones. A sub-set of s. yllogisms is usuallýy solved 
quickly and correctly, whilst another sub-set is found to be very difficult to solve accurately. 
The second finding is that the ordering of the premises affects the difficulty of correctly I 
responding - syllogisms in figure I are easier to solve than those in figure 4. The third 
finding is that the order of the terms in the premises influences the preference of the 
conclusion generated - the preferred conclusion for figure I is A-C, the preferred conclusion 
for figure 4 is C-A. The fourth finding is that the believability of the conclusion in 
evaluation tasks influences the extent to which reasoners endorse the given conclusion. 
There is an interaction between validity and believability -a greater effect of believability 
can be seen for the invalid problems. In the following section a range of theories of 
syllogistic reasoning will be examined. In addition, the extent to which each of these 
theories can explain the data will also be summarised. 
2.2.3 Theories of Syllogistic Reasoning 
There are many explanations proposed for the errors individuals produce on syllogistic 
tasks. The reasoner must interpret the premises, combine the premises, and produce a 
response. Error may occur at any of these stages. This section will discuss different 
theories that have tried to explain the syllogistic phenomena described above. The first set 
of theories loosely fit into approaches based upon verbal processes and include 
interpretational, rule and verbal reasoning accounts. The second set of theories loosely fit 
into approaches based upon processes that involve the manipulation of mental models or 
analogical representations. The final set of theories are based upon heuristics, where 
syllogistic reasoning performance and errors are explained through the application of simple 
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strategies. What folloý, vs is a summan- of how each of the three classes of theory describe 
and account for the data. 
9 Verbal processing accounts 
The first class of explanations suggest that people make errors in interpretin-L, the premise 
information. For instance, given the premise *All as are bs' '. participants may draw the 
incorrect inference that *All bs are as'. According to standard logical criteria, this rex, ersing 
of terms does not hold. Some authors suggest that people may illicitly convert the 
quantifiers in each premise (e. g., Chapman & Chapman, 1959, Revlis, 1975. Newstead, 
1989). There is still an incomplete understanding of the role conversion plays in the 
interpretation of the premise information, although it may be part of the explanation of 
accurate performance. Other authors suggest that people may interpret the quantifiers 
according to their meaning in everyday language rather than in a logical -ý, vay (e.,,., Begg & 
Harris, 1982; Politzer, 1990). These studies produced conflicting evidence for the errors 
being based on Gricean maxims. Gricean maxims refer to rules governing the use of 
language in everyday conversation. For instance, it would be wrong to say 'some' when 
you know 'all' to be the case. In conclusion, it seems appropriate to propose that there is 
some evidence to suggest that Gricean maxims could be responsible for some of the errors 
which occur on syllogistic reasoning tasks (conversion). Although this theory does not fully 
explain the effects of figure and belief, considered earlier. The studies have demonstrated 
that indeed these types of error occur, but there is little evidence to suggest this as the major 
limitation in solving syllogistic problems (Newstead, 1995). 
As in other areas of reasoning, there is a theoretical debate as to whether the fundamental 
processcs involved in syllogistic reasoning are based upon propositions, mental logic, or 
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deduction rules (Rips, 1994). and those that are based upon arrays, spatial representations. 
or mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
The mental logic approach to reasoning is a well established theory and attempts have been 
made to explain syllogistic reasoning performance (see Rips, 1986). It is suggested that 
people reason by constructing proofs using an internal set of abstract reasoning rules. The 
logic is abstract and general purpose and all real-world problems must be translated into 
some kind of abstract code in order for reasoning to occur. 
The most complete formal rule theoretic explanation for syllogistic reasoning comes from 
Rips (1994) (although, see Braine & O'Brien, 1998, who have also developed an account of 
predicate logic). Rips (1994) suggested that people first convert the premises into an 
abstract propositional form. They then apply the appropriate inference rules to produce the 
conclusion generated. Errors are explained by the absence of an appropriate rule, or by the 
total length of the reasoning process, or by failure to encode the premises correctly. 
Following is an example of a syllogistic argument (Example 2.6) given as an example by 
Rips (1994). 
All square blocks are green blocks 
Some big blocks are square blocks 
Thus, 
Some big blocks are green blocks. 
Example 2.6 
A set of inference rules can be applied to the quantified statements, showing the argument to 
be deducible. The quantifier rules (Elimination and Introduction) for this example are 
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shown in Figure 2.1. As the syllogistic argument becomes more difficult. then the set of 
rules associated with processing it will also increase. 
Deductive Processes 
a. + (FOR ALLx)(IF Square-block(x) THEN Green-block(x)). 
b. + (FOR SOMEx)(Big-block(x) AND Square-block(x)). 
C. Big-block(b) AND Square-block(b). 
d. Big-block(b). 
e. Square-block(b). 
f. IF Square-block(b) THEN Green-block(b). 
g. Green-block(b). 
h. Big-block(b) AND Green-block(b). 
i. (FOR SOMEx)(Big-block(x) AND Green-block(x)). 
Rules 
Premise 
Premise 
FOR SOME Elim. 
AND Elim. 
AND Elim. 
FOR ALL Elim. 
IF Elim. 
AND Intro. 
FOR SOME Intro. 
Figure 2. I-A set of inference rules for a syllogistic problem (Example 2.6) 
Rip's (1994) work clearly captures competence in syllogistic reasoning by equipping 
individuals with deductive processes and inferential rules that allow them to accurately 
evaluate syllogistic conclusions. Individuals can solve valid problems because they possess 
and apply these rules. Invalid conclusions are correctly rejected because there are no rules 
to form a proof 
Rips proposed that systematic errors made on syllogistic problems are due to the inability to 
access certain rules. So the difficulty in solving any deductive argument is related to the 
number of rules required and the availability of those rules. The directional effect is 
explained by a guessing heuristic. Whilst this enables a description of a preference for 
certain conclusions, the heuristic is ad hoc and based on the data. The issue of figure is 
explained as a by-product of implicature and rule use rather than the order of the tenns 
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themselves. When these are held constant Rips reports no figural differences in his data. 
Quite how figural difficulty is a product of rule use is not made explicit, and hov, this might 
explain the preference for conclusions in a certain direction is also left unexplained. In 
addition, Rips has been criticised due to his inability to explain 'content effects' in 
reasoning. The strong syntactic nature of his theory. which implements logical rules on 
logical forms, means that this account is not ideally suited to accommodate the influences of 
belief 
Some accounts propose formal inference rules prescribed by logic, whilst others propose 
verbal processes, similar to those used in verbal comprehension, as the major determinant in 
solving syllogistic problems. A theory that proposed these types of processes was put 
forward by Polk and Newell (1995) and is called the verbal reasoning (VR) theory. Polk 
and Newell (1995) suggest that representational processes alone can explain reasoning 
performance. VR is proposed to be accomplished exclusively by existing comprehension 
and production skills, in particular, by comprehending and recomprehending the premises, 
that is, by building an initial model and incrementally augmenting it. Polk and Newell 
(1995) proposed four processes of VR: initial encoding, conclusion generation, reencoding, 
and giving up. For example, consider the following syllogism (Example 2.7). 
Some B are A 
All B are C 
Thus, 
Some A are C 
Example 2.7 
65 
The first stage, initial encoding, is when individuals encode direct knowledge from the 
premise information. The individual constructs a mental model of a situation in which the 
premises are true. These models identify properties corresponding to the topics of the 
propositions being encoded. In Example 2.7 this would involve encoding the first premise 
into an annotated model, followed by the second premise. For instance, 'some B are A' 
would be annotated as (B*), (B* A), where * is an identifying property in relation to 'some 
B'. The second premise, 'all B are C' would be additionally annotated as (B* C). (B* A C), 
where * is an identifying property in relation to 'all 13'. 
Once the premises have been encoded, an attempt is made at producing a conclusion based 
on the annotated model. This is done by using a simple generate-and-test procedure. First, 
simple propositions are proposed that are considered to be true based on the annotated 
model. The simple propositions that VR may propose include the legal syllogism 
conclusions but may also involve the middle term, other quantifiers, or both. If none of the 
proposed propositions are legal syllogism conclusions, generation fails and reencoding is 
evoked. For instance, with Example 2.7, the initial encoding might trigger the following 
conclusions - 'some B are A', and 'all B are C'. Neither of these conclusions is a legal one, 
and thus reencoding occurs. 
If generation fails to produce a legal conclusion, an attempt is made to try to extract 
knowledge from the premises by reencoding. Unlike initial encoding, reencoding chooses a 
property based on the annotated model (the reference property) and then tries to extract 
additional knowledge about that property from any premise that mentions it. In Example 
2.7 reasoners might reencode 'some B are A' using 'C' as the reference property ((B* 
(B *AQ, or alternatively reencode 'some B are A' using 'A' as the reference property 
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((B* C), (A*), (B* A* Q. From the second reencoding, based on indirect kno,. N-ledge about 
W, the extracted annotated model leads to the generation of a legal conclusion, 'some A 
are C'. If the generation of a conclusion does not relate the end tenns (A and Q. reencoding 
must occur until the reference property leads to a legal conclusion. It is assumed that most 
individuals give up only as a last resort, when they feel confident that repeated attempts to 
extract more knowledge will not lead anywhere. 
The theory offered by Polk and Newell (1995) has a number of properties relevant to the 
question of functional constraints. The model performs the task of reading the two premises 
and attempting to produce a conclusion. The model is functional in that it draws on 
abilities, like language skills, that exist to provide the reasoner with certain functional 
capabilities (such as speaking, listening, reading) motivated independently of the particular 
task. Reasoner's difficulties with the task are explained as a consequence of this functional 
basis. Polk and Newell (1995) point out that although reasoners' everyday language skills 
can serve to perform the task, they are not perfectly adapted to that task, and so by 
themselves are not adequate for perfect performance. Thus, difficulties with the task are 
explained by recourse to functional, not resource, constraints. 
Polk and Newell (1995) proposed that participants make errors in syllogistic tasks because 
they accept plausible conclusions. The acceptance of particular conclusions is not based 
upon logical validity due to the fact that only plausible conclusions are considered. An 
explanation of preferred conclusions from particular premise combinations are also covered. 
For instance, negative quantifiers in the premise information create negative associations 
between classes in the annotated model and tend to lead to negative conclusions. The 
theory also explains the directional effect to a point. It can explain why there is a preference 
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for conclusions in the A-C direction for figure 1, and C-A direction for figure 2. This is 
because the identifying end term for figure I is A and for figure 2 is C. Conclusions linked 
to these properties are likely to be tried first and consequently. are the preferred conclusion 
directions. Belief bias is also investigated. Verbal Reasoning attempts are often 
inconclusive, so other knowledge sources are used on which to base a decision. Also. 
because reasoning attempts can be faulty, results people would normally accept as valid are 
reconsidered if contradicted by beliefs. 
Polk and Newell (1995) carried out extensive statistical modelling of existing data obtained 
from syllogistic reasoning tasks (as well as a discussion of five-term series spatial 
descriptions and other reasoning tasks). They suggest that accounts based on verbal 
reasoning could account for the reasoners' performance. They go on to say that 
assumptions about linguistic processes and their results provide the theoretical leverage in 
almost every explanation, including relational deductions. Therefore, Polk and Newell 
(1995) proposed that the central processes in deductive reasoning are linguistic or verbal 
comprehension processes. These included processes involved in encoding, re-encoding, and 
generation of information rather than reasoning-specific skills. This theory has been 
developed as a general theory of cognition rather than as a direct model of particular 
reasoning tasks. Thus, Polk and Newell (1995) proposed that reasoners use verbal 
comprehension processes that are common to reasoning and language tasks alike. 
0 Analogical processing accounts 
An alternative view of syllogistic reasoning performance has been put forward by the 
mental model theorists. There have been many proponents of the models approach to 
reasoning (e. g., Erikson, 1978, Fisher, 198 1; Sternberg & Turner, 198 1). Johnson-Laird's 
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(1983) mental models theory is the best developed of this class of approaches and has been 
applied to many reasoning tasks subsequent to its initial strong association xvith explaining 
syllogistic reasoning. It is assumed that people form representations of the premises 
consisting of tokens of the terms linked together so as to exempliýv the stated categorical 
relationships. Each token represents an individual element of the set. In the examples used 
previously, each token would represent a profession (e. g.. actor. baker etc. ). They then seek 
to combine the two premise representations into an integrated representation from which a 
possible conclusion can be read. 
Participants must integrate the information contained in the premises, construct a model of 
that information, draw a putative conclusion, and then search for alternative models that 
might refute the initial conclusion chosen (falsification). In some cases there is claimed to 
be only one way in which the premise representations can be combined (single model), but 
in other cases there may be two or three possibilities (multiple models). If people do 
explore all possible premise combinations then they perform perfectly. Suboptimal 
performance is explained by failure to consider all ways of combining premise information 
due to working memory limitations. The theory predicts that syllogisms that can be 
represented in a single model will be easier than syllogisms that can be represented by 
multiple models, and this proves to be the case. 
As an example, consider the following one-model problem (Example 2.8). In Johnson- 
Laird's (1983) mental models theory, the information in this syllogism would be 
represented in the following type of mental model, shown in Figure 2.2. 
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All of the actors are bakers 
All of the bakers are carpenters 
Therefore, 
All of the actors are carpenters. 
Example 2.8 
[[a] b] C 
[[aJ b] C 
Figure 2.2- Mental model representation for a single model syllogistic problem (Example 
2 . 8) 
The brackets shown in the annotated model in Figure 2.2 represent that a is exhausted in 
respect to b, and b is exhausted in respect to c. The three dots shoxvn at the bottom of the 
annotated model indicate that there could be other individuals who are not yet represented in 
the model. With one-model syllogisms it is not necessary to flesh out the model in order to 
produce the conclusion that 'all of the as are cs'. This one-model syllogism is a valid 
argument and depends on the construction of this one model. There is no other way of 
constructing a model where the conclusion doesn't hold. In contrast, the following problem 
is a multiple model syllogism (Example 2.9). 
Some of the actors are bakers 
None of the bakers are carpenters 
Therefore, 
Some of the actors are not carpenters 
Example 2.9 
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In Johnson-Laird's (19833) account, the inforination in this syllogism could be presented in I- 
any one of the following types of mental model (Figure 2.3'). 
(3) a [b] 
a [b] 
a [c] 
1c] a 1cl 
Figure 2.3- Mental model representation for a multi model syllogistic problem (Exaiiiplc 
2.9) 
This multi-model syllogism is a valid argument that does depend on the construction of 
more than one model. In the context of the process of mental model theory, a participant 
would first integrate the premise information. They would then construct a model from this 
information, and the one constructed might well be Figure 2.3 (1). A putative conclusion 
would then be drawn from this initial model, for instance, that none of the actors are 
carpenters. Then they might search for alternative models. perhaps generating Figure 2.3 
(2) and (3), which refute the initial conclusion. The only conclusion that holds across all 
three models is that some of the actors are not carpenters. 
If the full set of models are not generated. erroneous conclusions may be produced that are 
consistent with a subset of the models generated. This means that once a possible 
conclusion has been established, the validity of this needs to be explored by constructing 
alternative models in x\ hich the premises are true but where the conclusion does not follow. 
If people fail in this exploration. then they adopt the initial conclusion as valid, but if the\ 
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succeed, they try to find another possible conclusion and, failing that, say no conclusion 
follows. Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) found that the majority of their participants could 
correctly solve one-model syllogisms, whilst hardly any could correctly sol-ve multi-model 
problems. 
Many of the main syllogistic phenomenon described can be explained by recourse to the 
mental models theory. Easy syllogisms involve the construction of a single model. 
Difficult syllogisms involve the construction of multiple models. If more than one model 
has to be constructed to reach the right response, then the problem will be more difficult 
than a one-model problem. This factor explains the difference in difficulty among the valid 
syllogisms, and it accounts for the characteristic errors made on the multi-model problems. 
Successful, or competent reasoners produce the correct conclusion due to the fact that they 
choose one supported by all possible models. Unsuccessful reasoners may only construct a 
sub-set of the models and produce erroneous conclusions based on this set. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (199 1) have provided an explanation of the figural effects on the 
conclusion production task in their re-analysis of Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984). They 
found fewer correct responses , and more erroneous conclusions that no valid conclusion 
follows, on figure 4 syllogisms (BA-BC). This was attributed to the directional Preference 
in which reasoners construct mental models, since they tend to form a model of the first 
premise and then add the information in the second premise to this. If the conclusion is read 
off in a left-to-right direction, then the observed preferences would be expected. Because 
individuals prefer to process in a forward direction, A to C conclusions should be easiest to 
solve, and this has proved to be the case (Dickstein, 1978). Figural effects stem from the 
difficulty of rearranging the information so that the two middle tenns occur together. In 
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figures 3 and 4 (see Table 2.2) the middle terms appear in the same positions in both 
premises, and so cause the most difficulty in the rearrangement of B. Conclusion preference 
is seen as a by-product of the way in which terms are integrated into working memory. 
Belief bias effects have also been explained. According to this account, unbelievable 
conclusions cue the search for counterexamples, so invalid unbelievable conclusions are 
more likely to be rejected. The search will also be cued by valid unbelievable conclusions, 
although there are no models in which the conclusion does not hold and therefore the 
conclusion will not be rejected. This proposal explains the interaction between belief and 
logic. 
The mental models theory tries to encompass all stages of syllogistic reasoning, namely, 
interpretation, premise combination, and response production. The theory proposes that it 
explains both rational competence and the pattern of performance, including errors and 
difficulties. It should be noted that the mental model theory suggests that reasoning occurs 
primarily when there is a subsequent attempt to falsify conclusions generated from the 
models constructed. This is done, as stated previously, by attempting to construct 
alternative models in which the conclusion no longer holds true. This notion is at the heart 
of the mental models theory. However, it is worth pointing out that recent evidence 
suggests that falsification may not be a common strategy (Newstead, Handley & Buck, 
1999; Evans, Handley, Johnson-Laird & Harper, 1999). 
Another explanation, based on the idea that reasoners construct analogical models of the 
syllogistic premises, proposed that people use a mental analogue of Euler circles to 
represent set membership and the relations between sets (e. g., Erikson, 1978; Guyote & 
Stemberg, 198 1). The Euler circles indicate the possible relationships berween the three 
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classes a, b and c. Erikson (1974; 1978) assumed that individuals encode premises as Euler 
circles, but can only handle one diagram for each premise. Once the individual has fon-ned 
these representations, they try to combine the two diagrams they have constructed. Erikson 
(1974; 1978) again assumed that people can handle no more than one composite 
representation. In combining premises in this way. clearly a number of representations are 
overlooked. This theory is difficult to evaluate due to the fact that testable predictions are 
hard to derive for new data sets. Thus Euler circles has not been a recent contender to 
explain syllogistic performance. 
Another explanation sees performance as a search through the problem space, and that this 
latter is best characterised as involving representations analogous to Venn diagrams (e. g., 
Newell, 1981). Venn. diagrams involve three overlapping circles, each of which represents 
one of the sets in the syllogism. Syllogisms can be solved by marking these circles in 
specified ways for different premises. While Venn diagrams are recommended by many as 
a good technique for solving syllogisms, it has not often been claimed that they provide a 
means by which people actually do solve syllogisms. Newell (1981) presented no empirical 
evidence to support his claim. However, Newell (1990) has more recently proposed that 
Venn diagrams are only used by reasoners who are expert in their use and that the problem 
space he introduced could be translated as a mental models explanation. 
0 Heuristic processing accounts 
The last class of explanations to be considered are models that propose that error occurs at 
the response stage of reasoning and that performance is based upon heuristics or biases. 
Woodworth and Sells (193 5) were the pioneers of a response generation explanation of 
syllogistic reasoning performance called 'atmosphere. They suggested that people respond 
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on the basis of the "mood" of the quantifiers presented in the premises. not on the basis of 
logical analysis of the problem (Sells, 1936). Begg and Denny (1969) are also proponents 
of this view and put forward two rules by which people respond: 
Quality Rule - if one or more premise is negative then the preferred 
conclusion will be negative. 
Quantity Rule - if one or more premise is particular then the preferred 
conclusion will be particular. 
For instance, an example of the use of the quality rule can be seen in Example 2.10. Since 
both the premises are positive and particular, there should be a strong preference for a 
positive, particular conclusion. The predicted conclusion 'Some A are C' is in fact given 
regularly by participants (90% of responses in Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984). 
Some A are B 
Some B are C 
Example 2.10 
Overall, the atmosphere hypothesis has been found to account well for the response data in a 
number of studies (Begg & Denny, 1969; Revlis, 1975; Dickstein, 1978). Although 
atmosphere theory predicts the response data reasonably well, it does not explain why 
people respond according to the principles of quality and quantity. 
The matching hypothesis (Wetherick, 1989) is another response generation explanation of 
syllogistic reasoning performance. It is simpler than the atmosphere notion and has been 
explored by Wetherick and Gilhooly (1990). It is suggested that reasoners match the 
quantifier in the conclusion to that used in the more conservative of the premises. Evidence 
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for the existence of matching as a strategl% , vas reported by Wetherick and Gllhool-, - (1990). 
Wetherick (1989) put forward the following rule - 
Give as the conclusion a proposition of the same logicalform as the more 
conservative of the premises, where the logicalforms are ordered. for conscrvati, s m, 
ftom most to least, "No ", "Some Not ", -Some " and -A 11 ". 
When the two quantifiers are the same in the two premises, atmosphere and matching make 
exactly the same predictions. The predictions only differ with the premi-se pairs IE and 0E. 
where atmosphere predicts an 0 conclusion, matching an E conclusion. Thus, matching 
adds little to atmosphere. Atmosphere and matching are examples of theories that only 
focus on predicting data and give no explanation of theoretical underpinning. Due to their 
inability to explain why reasoners adopt these heuristic strategies, they are not fully 
established models of syllogistic reasoning. Why is it that individuals should induce these 
heuristics'? The phenomenon of syllogistic reasoning performance is not ý\ ell explained, 
although an alternative does have a theoretical underpinning, and is called the Probability 
Heuristics Model (PHM, Chater & Oaksford, 1999). 
Following in the same vein as the atmosphere and matching theories is the probability 
heuristics model (PHM) of Chater and Oaksford (1999). The PHM suggests that syllogistic 
reasoning performance may be determined by simple but rational informational strategies 
justified by probability theory rather than by logic. Oaksford and Chater (1992.1993) 
argue that none of the currently proposed mechanisms for deductive competence (e. g. rules, 
models) are capable of accounting for real-world reasoning, because they place a high 
demand on the limited information processing capability of human beings. 
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Chater and Oaksford (1999) claim that the purpose of syllogistic argument is to link- the 
"end terms" in the chain via their connection with the "middle term". So, as in a chain. the 
strength of the conclusion that links the end terms depends on the strength of the weakest 
link. In other words, the heuristics, to be described below. rely on an ordering in the 
informativeness of quantified statements that serve as premises of syllogistic arguments. 
Chater and Oaksford (1999) specify the following order of informativeness, starting with the 
most highly informative: All > Most > Few > Some > None > Some ... Are Not. 
Following are the heuristics that implement the informativeness principle. At the 
algorithmic level, participants are suggested to rely on three generation heuristics - the min- 
heuristic, p-entailments, and attachment-heuristic. These will be explained briefly below. 
The min-heuristic is explained as follows - 
Choose the quantifier of the conclusion to be the same as the quantifier in the least 
informative premise (the 'Min-premise ). The max-heuristic refers to a participants 
confidence in the conclusion generated in proportion to the informativeness of the 
most informative premise (the 'max-premise ). 
The most informative conclusion that can validly follow from a pair of syllogistic premises 
always follows this rule. Furthennore, some conclusions probabilistically entail (p-entail') 
other conclusions. For instance 'Some' entails 'Some are not'. Thus, the second heuristic 
is, the p-entailments, explained as follows - 
The next most preferred conclusion will be the p-entailment o the conclusion Of 
predicted by the min-heuristic (the 'min-conclusion ). 
The p-entailments include a family of heuristics corresponding to the probabilistic 
relationships between the various quantified statements that make up the premises of a 
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syllogism. These first two heuristics specifý- the subject of the conclusion. The third 
heuristic specifies the order of end terms in the conclusion, the attachment-heunstic. and is 
explained as follows - 
If the min-heuristic has an end term as its subject, use this as the subject of the 
conclusion. Otherwise, use the end term of the max-premise as the subject o the ?f 
conclusion. 
The theory assumes that individuals first interpret quantified statements as probabilistic 
statements. They then use these probabilistic semantics in deriving an analysis of 
informativeness, which justifies the informativeness ordering over which the heuristics are 
defined. Thirdly, individuals do not explicitly consider validity, it being seen as a by- 
product of the process, defined over probabilistic statements. 
All Y are X 
Some Z are Y 
I-type conclusion 
Some Z are X 
(max-premise) 
(min-heuristic) 
(by min) 
(by attachment) 
Example 2.11 
The heuristics can be illustrated by Example 2.11. By the min-heuristic, the conclusion is 
'Some'. The min-premise has an end term (Z) as its subject. Therefore, by attachment, the 
conclusion will have Z as its subject term and the form 'Some Z are V. 
Many of the phenomenon of syllogistic reasoning performance can be explained by recourse 
to the PHM. Logical competence is explained by individuals correctly applying the min- 
heuristic (and to some extent p-entailments when required) and the attachment-heuristic. 
These are performed without any knowledge of probability or validity. If there is a valid 
conclusion to be found, then individuals will tend to draw it. Errors are explained due to 
78 
individuals employing heuristics that produce a plausible, but inappropriate conclusion. 
The figural effects are explained by specific processes that determine conclusion direction 
(attachment-heuristic). Belief bias is explained as a response bias. False conclusions carry 
no inforinativeness, thus participants are biased towards accepting conclusions they believe 
because it is something that arises automatically in the context of everyday reasoning. 
However, this explanation of belief bias does not explain the belief-logic interaction, it only 
predicts a main effect of belief. 
At the computational level, PHM follows recent work showing that simple heuristics can be 
highly adaptive insofar as they approximate optimal solutions (e. g., Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). It is suggested that these heuristics are used in place of complex and 
sometimes computationally intractable optimal strategies, which are therefore denied any 
cognitive role. Rather than seeking a post hoc explanation of the success of processing 
principles observed in human performance, the PHM is suggested to describe the optimal 
theory and processing heuristics in tandem. PHM has been confirmed by two experiments 
with syllogisms involving 'Most' and 'Few' which are beyond the scope of other accounts. 
However, Chater and Oaksford (1999) make no attempt to consider the way people 
represent syllogistic premises which is where mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) fairs 
better. 
9 Summary 
This section outlined many differing explanations for an individual's performance on 
syllogistic reasoning tasks. The first set of approaches see verbal processes as most 
important. Performance on the syllogistic problems are suggested to rely upon 
propositional or verbal information. Some accounts suggested that the premises are 
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converted (e. g., Chapman & Chapman, 1959) and others suggested that the rules goveming 
language, Gricean maxims, are involved when explaining syllogistic phenomenon (e. g., 
Politzer, 1990). Both of these theories can not fully explain all of the syllogistic phenomena 
and so are not complete accounts. Another set of theorists believe that syllogistic premise 
information is translated into an abstract propositional code and inference rules are applied 
in order to form a mental derivation of the conclusion from the premises (e. g.. Rips, 1994). 
The last theory from this approach, verbal reasoning, suggested that there are four 
propositionally based processes that are used to process deductive arguments (e. g., Polk &- 
Newell, 1995). Polk and Newell (1995) make no claim about special processes to support 
logical reasoning by constructing and manipulating multiple models. 
The second set of approaches see the representation of syllogisms as spatial or analogue in 
nature. Performance on the problems are suggested to rely upon the construction of a 
mental analogue of the syllogistic premises. Some accounts suggest that the premises are 
represented by tokens in a mental model, which may be spatial or propositional in nature 
(e. g., Johnson-Laird, 1983). This theory can account for a variety of responses, including 
conversion and figural effects. Others suggest that individuals use models of the premises 
based upon either Euler circles (e. g., Erikson, 1978) or Venn diagrams (e. g., Newell, 198 1), 
which require spatial representations. However, there is little empirical support for the 
claim that mental representations rely upon the construction of Euler circles or Venn 
diagrams (Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993). 
The last set of approaches claim that syllogistic reasoning performance depends upon 
processes other than those proposed by formal logic. Performance is suggested to rely on 
strategies, heuristics or probability, rather than an underlying logical reasoning mechanism. 
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Some theories recognise that individuals may be led by the mood of the premise 
information. the atmosphere hypothesis (e. g., Begg & Denny. 1969). Others suggest that 
individuals match the quantifier in the conclusion to that used in the more consen-ative of 
the premises, the matching hypothesis (e. g., Wetherick, 1989). These respoiise bias 
accounts lack theoretical underpinning. The last of the theories looked at in this section was 
called the PHM (e. g., Chater & Oaksford, 1999). They suggested that syllogistic reasoning 
performance may be determined by simple but rational informational strategies justified b\ 
probability theory rather than by logic. 
The next section will introduce the task that is to be used as the spatial equivalent to the 
syllogistic reasoning problems. The task will be outlined and evidence xvill be put forward 
for particular phenomenon associated with it. These inferences depend on relational terms 
such as 'to the left of and 'to the right of. These inferences underlie many of our more 
complex, abstract skills, such as mathematical, scientific and probabilistic thinking (e. (, L-1 I 
Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). 
2.3 SPATIAL REASONING 
2.3.1 Spatial Inference 
Spatial reasoning is widespread in our everyday activities and interaction with the world: it 
underlies our ability to plan a route and to imagine objects from descriptions of their 
arran,, ement. There are many types of reasoning problem based upon spatial information. 
In this thesis, five-term series spatial inference problems are investigated, although much 
i-cscarch has investigated three-term series problems. The following is an example 
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(Example 2.12) of this where three terms can be arranged in a linear order. and support a 
determinate conclusion. 
The duck (a) is to the right of the pig (b) 
The sheep (c) is to the left of the pig (b, ) 
Therefore 
The duck (a) is to the right of the sheep (c) 
Example 2.12 
A more complex problem is the five-term series spatial inference which consists of four 
premises and a conclusion that link five classes. The following is an illustrative example of 
one where a determinate conclusion can be supported (Example 2.1 31). 
The duck (a) is on the left of the pig (b) 
The sheep (c) is on the right of the pig (b) 
The cow (41) is in front of the duck (a) 
The horse (e) is in front of the pig (b) 
Therefore, 
The cow (d) is on the left of the horse (e). 
Example 2.13 
The premises contain five terms (a, b, c. d. and e), two of which are not explicitly related in 
aiiy of the premises given (always d and e). Byme and Johnson-Laird (1989) based their 
two-dimensional spatial deductions on four different orientations, illustrated in Table 22.3. 
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Figure I Figure 2 Figure 33 Figure 4 
ABCDCA 
ABC 
EACD 
Table 2.3- The four orientations of two-dimensional spatial deductions 
It should be noted again that many differences exist betv, -een methodologies used to 
investigate spatial relations. The premises can be given folloxýed by all the possible 
conclusions. Participants can be presented ýý ith a complete spatial inference and conclusion 
then asked to judge their validity. These are evaluation tasks. Participants can be presented 
with the premises and asked to generate their own conclusions. This is a production task. 
The relational reasoning problems studied as part of my thesis concentrate on five-tcrm 
series spatial descriptions (Byme and Johnson-Laird, 1989). As Nvith syllogistic reasoning 
exercises, similar results have been found in respect to spatial problems. Some individuals 
find certain relational inferences more difficult than others, tlie% take longer to make some 
inferences, and they make more errors ý, vhen they must make the inference in a short time. 
There has been a large body of research investigating hov, ý individuals solve this type of 
inference. The following section aims to summarise the findings of research, in relation to 
both three-term and five-term series problems, investigating the relative difficulty of spatial 
descriptions. 
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2.3.2 Spatial Reasoning Phenomenon 
As previously mentioned, some spatial problems are solved nearlN all the time. 'whilst others 
are hardly ever solved correctly. An illustration (Example 2.14) of an easier three-tenn 
series valid spatial inference can be seen below. 
The antelope is to the right of the baboon 
The camel is to the left of the baboon 
Therefore, 
The antelope is to the right of the camel. 
Example 2.14 
The next illustration (Example 2.15) shows a similar three-term series problem, but this 
time there is no determinate conclusion that can be drawn between the end terms. 
The baboon is to the right of the antelope 
The camel is to the left of the baboon 
Therefore, 
No valid answer. 
Example 2.15 
Individuals make more correct inferences from the determinate problems with a valid 
answer (69% correct) than from the indeterminate problems , vith no valid ans-,, ver (19% 
correct, taken from Bvrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989). The five-tenn series problems can he 
illustrated in the same way. Example 2.16 shows a fi-ve-tenn. series description xvhere the 
conclusion is detem-iinate. 
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The baboon is on the right of the antelope 
The cat is on the left of the antelope 
The dog is in front of the cat 
The emu is in front of the baboon 
Hence, the dog is on the left of the emu. 
Example 2.16 
The following spatial inference is an example (Example 2.17) of a valid problem that is 
valid but indeterminate, supporting more than one distinct layout. 
The baboon is on the right of the antelope 
The cat is on the left of the baboon 
The dog is in front of the cat 
The emu is in front of the baboon 
Hence, the dog is on the left of the emu. 
Example 2.17 
The last type of spatial inference (Example 2.18) to be investigated are the indeterminate 
problems, where no valid conclusion follows. 
The baboon is on the right of the antelope 
The cat is on the left of the baboon 
The do,, is in front of the cat 
The emu is in front of the antelope 
Hence, the dog is on the left of the emu. 
Example 2.18 
8 
Participants make more correct inferences from the problems that -were detemiInate and 
valid (70% correct), such as Example 2.16, than from those that -were indeterminate and 
invalid, such as Example 2.18 (15% correct). The problems that were indeten-ninate but 
valid, such as Example 2.17, were intermediate in difficulty (46% correct; taken from 
Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989). The level of difficulty amongst spatial inference problems 
must be accounted for by any theory. Theory must also explain other factors of representing 
and processing these spatial problems, to be discussed next. 
Many different aspects of the spatial inference have been explored, and have been found to 
have an effect on accurate responding. The phenomena of spatial reasoning has been 
reviewed by Evans, Newstead and Byrne (1993). The format of the following summary will 
follow the same vein. Three-term series problems were originally studied to investigate the 
representations individuals adopted in order to correctly respond. The initial research 
explored whether spatial reasoning was reliant on spatial arrays or linguistic representations, 
exploring the phenomena of markedness. Four phenomena will then be summarised that 
help further clarify the representation of spatial inferences as either spatial or verbal in 
nature. Lastly, two contemporary accounts of the mechanisms underlying more complex 
spatial reasoning will be explored. 
The initial debate concerning different representations of three-term series problems centred 
around whether they were based on directional spatial arrays (e. g., De Soto, London & 
Handel, 1965) or based on linguistic compression (e. g., Clark, 1969a). The spatial array 
view suggests that individuals go beyond the propositional form of the premises and 
construct some representation of the described situation which is independent of the 
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describing language. The linguistic view suggests that individuals presen-e the 
propositional form of the language used in the description. 
Markedness refers to the adjectives used to describe the premise information in a spatial 
description. This phenomenon has been studied to try and distinguish between the spatial 
array and linguistic accounts. For instance, 'Sally is better than Tom' is an unmarked 
adjective because it only describes relative goodness, it does not provide absolute 
information about whether they are both good or bad. However, 'Sally is it-orse than Tom' 
is a marked adjective because it not only describes relative goodness, but also provides 
absolute information about the fact that they are both performing badly. The spatial array 
view suggests that marked and unmarked adjectives are represented in similar ways. In 
contrast, the linguistic view suggests that they are represented in different formats because 
marked adjectives require the encoding of additional information. 
Potts and Scholz (1975) suggested that their participants discard the linguistic information 
once they represent the adjectives in a uniform format. According to this spatial array view. 
individuals prefer to construct arrays from the top-down, rather than the bottom-up. For 
instance, 'A is better than B' requires construction of the array, 
A 
B, 
where as 'A is worse than B' requires construction of the array, 
B 
A. 
De Soto, London & Handel (1965) found that judgements based on the first unmarked array 
('better') were correctly answered 61 % of the time, whilst the second marked array 
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('worse') was only judged correctly 43% of the time. This study found that reasoners 
performed at a higher rate on the unmarked adjectives as opposed to the marked adjectives. 
According to the linguistic view, individuals construct an economical linguistic 
representation of the premises. 'Worse' describes the relative badness of the t,.,, -o entities. 
and it provides the absolute information that they are both bad, and so requires more 
information to be stored than the unmarked adjective (Clark, 1969a). In support of this 
claim, Clark (1969) found that 'A is better than B, B is better than C' which is based upon 
unmarked adjectives was easier than problems such as 'C is worse than B, B is worse than 
A' which is based upon marked adjectives. 
The spatial array view proposes that individuals represent the unmarked and marked 
adjectives in a uniform spatial array. The differences in difficulty arise because reasoners 
have a preference for constructing arrays in a top-down rather than a bottom-up direction. 
The linguistic view proposes that individuals represent the unmarked and marked adjectives 
in two different linguistic formats. The differences in difficulty arise because they compress 
the information in their linguistic representation, sometimes eliminating information that 
must be recovered subsequently to make an inference. Similar predictions about the 
difficulty of problems are made by the spatial array theory's top-down preference 
hypothesis and by the linguistic theory's compression hypothesis. 
More recent research is most consistent with a spatial array view, and this evidence will be 
considered next, relating to how an integrated representation of the premise information is 
constructed. Descriptions of a single array can differ in the difficulty with which people 
make the inferences they support. Each description may describe the same layout, but the 
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order of the terms in the description. and the relations used to express the arrangement. lead 
to differences in the ease with which people make inferences. Evans. Newstead and Byrne 
(1993) consider four lines of evidence to help clarify the nature of an individual's 
constructed representation of five-term, series problems. This evidence relates to the 
integration of the premises, the continuity of information, the determinac%- of the 
description, and the distance effect. 
The first strand of research looks at how people might integrate premise information 
Hunter, 1957, De Soto, London & Handel, 1965). Hunter (1957) proposed that the 
problems that were hardest to solve required the use of transformations in order to combine 
the premise information. It has been shown that indeed the order of terms affects the 
conclusions produced. For instance, the ordering AB-BC tends to show more conclusions 
produced in the A-C direction, whereas the ordering BA-CB tends to show more 
conclusions produced in the C-A direction (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984). One possibility 
is that the integration of the premises in working memory may be easier for certain orders 
(e. g., Trabasso, Riley & Wilson, 1975). These results, and others (e. g., Mayberry, Bain & 
Halford, 1986), suggest that people must attempt the integration of the premise information 
and deal with it as a whole not parts. This has implications for working memory due to the 
fact that information in the premises must be integrated into a unified seriation. 
Baguley and Payne (1998) used the more complex five-terin series spatial reasoning 
problems to clarify predictions about increased processing cost during premise integration. 
The foliowIng predictions vvere all upheld. When mental model construction entailed the 
convet-sion ot'a sentence in order to enter a new token in an existing model. reading times 
increased. When a description was rendered indeterminate (i. e. when a clash occurred) 
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reading times increased. Reading times for the initial sentence vvere greater than for 
subsequent sentences (because two tokens have to be added to the model). This studY 
provided more evidence for the construction of a mental model by looking at premise 
integration specifically. 
The second source of evidence regarding the processing and representation of relational 
tasks is the continuity of information given in the premise information (e. g., Potts, 1972; 
Smith & Foos, 1975). Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird (1982) found that a referentially 
continuous description, in which each adjacent pair of sentences had a referent in common, 
required less listening time and elicited more correct diagrams than a referentially 
discontinuous description, in which the first and second sentences had no referent in 
common. Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird (1982) suggested that participants try to integrate each 
incoming sentence into a single coherent mental model, and that those sentences which 
cannot be immediately integrated are represented in a propositional form. This evidence 
lends support to the idea that it is easier to understand descriptions that present the 
information in a continuous order, which facilitates the combination of the information in a 
series into an integrated representation. 
The third source of research findings in respect to these relational problems is the 
detenninacy of the description (e. g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989). A determinate 
description is one where valid relations can be made between objects in a set. An 
indeterminate description is one where no valid relation can be made. Mani and Johnson- 
Laird (1982) carried out two experiments that investigated how participants recalled their 
representation of spatial clescriptions. They used determinate and indeterminate problems to 
study whether they were processed differently. In Experiment one participants remembered 
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the meanings of determinate descriptions very much better than those of irossl-, 
indeterminate descriptions. In the second experiment the, y found that althOLI-, -, h the semantic 
implications of a determinate description are better remembered than those of an 
indeterminate description, the verbatim details of an indeterminate description are easier to 
recall than are those of a determinate one. 
Mani and Johnson-Laird ( 1982) suggest that these results indicate the existence of two t% pes 
of encoding -- propositional representations and mental models. The propositional 
representations are harder to remember but correspond to sentences in the description. 
These representations were seen more for participants processing indeterminate, rathcr than 
determinate, problems. The mental models are easier to remember but are analogous to 
spatial arrays and accordingly poor in linguistic detail. These representations were seen 
more for participants processing determinate, rather than indeterminate, problems. 
The fourth and final class of phenomenon regarding the nature of spatial relations suggests 
that people are faster and more accurate in their judgements of the truth of inferred 
information than of presented information (e. g., Potts, 1972). This has also been named the 
distance effect. For instance, given A-B, B-C, C-D, A-B is truly presented, and A-C is truly 
inferred. Studies have shown that the farther apart the two terms to be judged are. the easier 
it is to compute their distance (e. g., Moeser & Tarrant, 1977). Thus, judgements about 
inferable relations are faster than judgements about presented relations. This research lends 
more support to the notion that reasoners must combine premise information in order to 
produce accurate conclusions. These results make sense if individuals are using a spatial 
arnty representation. The array must be inspected whether the judgement to be made is 
intCrred or presented. The farther apart the two terms are in the arrav, the easier it is to 
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compute their distance. This is because they construct an integrated representation that 
makes explicit the relations between the tenns. 
Other research trends have concentrated on strategy explanations of performance. which 
mask the underlying processes and representations. Strategists have worked on the 
possibility of people using both spatial and/or linguistic processing techniques (e., -,.. 
Johnson-Laird, 1972; Stemberg, 198 1 ). Many factors may influence the strategy an 
individual may use, for instance the instructions given (e. g., Barclay. 1973). or with trainin, tý 
(e. g., Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972; Mynatt & Smith, 1977). An interest in strategies as 
used in performing deductive tasks has revived in past years (e.,,., Byrne & Handley. 1997-, 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1990). However, they remain an unsolved issue in the present 
research field (e. g., Roberts, Gilmore & Wood, 1997). 
This section has highlighted the findings from the original work on three-term series 
problems, and more recent work on five-term series. The two early theories of the mental 
representations and cognitive processes required to make relational inferences are that they 
depend on procedures that construct and manipulate spatial arrays or models, and that they 
depend on procedures that construct and manipulate linguistic representations. The spatial 
array account proposed that individuals construct a uniform array with a preference for top- 
down models. The linguistic view proposed that individuals represent marked and 
unmarked adjectives in different formats where difficulty arises due to information 
compression. 
Four strands ot'research further clarified the nature of the representation of spatial 
inferences. Thc evidence suggests that individuals construct representations that inte(-, rate I- 
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information from the premises, where continuous descriptions are easier to understand. 
Determinate descriptions are easier than indetenninate ones. and inferred distances are 
easier than presented ones. The evidence presented suggests that individuals construct 
models based on the structure of the situation the premises describe, rather than on lin-guistic 
representations based on the language used to describe the premise information. 
The earlier research on spatial reasoning studied three-terin series problems and was 
problematic because no clear evidence was presented for either the spatial array or Iiiiguistic 
account. More promising results were found from research investigating five-term series 
problems, outlined above. The next section summarises theoretical accounts of threc-. four- 
and five-term series spatial problems to see how individuals infer from spatial descriptions. 
The theories that follow have been developed to provide an explanation for performance on 
spatial inference tasks using the types of problem outlined above. 
2.3.3 Theories of Spatial Reasoning 
Two major theories have evolved in this area - one based on inference rules, and the other 
based on models. The inference rule theorists suggest that the process of deduction depends 
on the particular rules and postulates that are used in deriving the conclusion (e. g., Hagert, 
1983,1984). The models approach theorists suggest that an individual imagines the state of 
affairs described in the premises, draws a conclusion from such a mental model, and 
searches for alternative models that might refute that conclusion (e. g.. Byrne & Johnson- 
Laird, 1989). 
0 Inference rule accounts 
The theories in this section link with the rule theories put forward to explain syllogistic 
inference in Section 2.2.3 (verbal processing accounts). The inference-rule theorists 
postulate a mental logic consisting of formal rules of inference that are used to derive 
logical conclusions (e. g., see Osherson, 1975- Braine, 1978; Rips, 1983). It is suggested 
that people reason by constructing proofs using an internal set of abstract, general purpose 
reasoning rules. The logic is abstract and general purpose and all real-world problems must 
be translated into some kind of abstract code in order for reasoning to occur. There have 
been inference-rule theories put forward for this type of two-dimensional spatial reasoning 
problem (e. g., see Hagert, 1983; OhIsson, 1981,1984,1988). Hagert (1984) proposed an 
inference-rule system for two-dimensional reasoning that uses the following sorts of rules. 
Consider the following premises in Example 2.19. 
B is on the left of A 
C is in front of B 
Therefore, 
A is behind and right of C. 
Example 2.19 
The first and second premise would be represented linguistically as: - 
Left (B, A) 
Front (C, B) 
The information in these two premises would then be integrated according to the following 
rule-. - 
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Left (x, p and I- ront (--. x) implies Left (Front (--. x) ý) 
The conclusion could than be implied by the premises (referred to on the right-hand side of 
the rule): - 
Left (Front (C, B) A). 
This abstract rule must be translated back to natural language to be able to produce a 
conclusion. If more rules are required in order to produce a conclusion, the more errors are 
likely to affect the reasoning process. 
9 Model accounts 
Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989) proposed that human mental logic does not consist of 
formal rules of inference. Instead the mind contains procedures that manipulate mental 
models (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Byrne and Johnson-Laird 0 989) distinguish between one- 
model problems and multi-model problems, as they did for syllogistic reasoning (Johnson- 
Laird & Bara, 1984). 
The following is a one-model spatial two-dimensional inference (Figure 2.4). The next 
problem is a two-model spatial two-dimensional inference (Figure 2.5). 
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Premises Alodel 
A is on the right of B 
C is on the left of BCBA 
D is in front of CDE 
E is in front of B 
Therefore, 
D is on the left of E. 
Figure 2.4- Mental model representation for a one model spatial problem 
Premises Models 
B is on the right of A 
C is on the left of BCAB or A C' B 
D is in front of CDEDE 
E is in front of B 
Therefore, 
D is on the left of E. 
Figure 2.5- Mental model representation for a multi model spatial problem 
Mental models theory explains that people naturally reason by imagining the state of affairs 
described in the premises. drawing a conclusion from such a mental model, and searching 
for alternative models that might refute that conclusion. Therefore, the first spatial problem 
should be easier due to the fact that the description is consistent x\ ith only a single model. 
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Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989) proposed that reasoners can construct a model of the 
situation from their knowledge of the meaning of the relational terms. In their 1989 paper. 
Byrne and Johnson-Laird describe two experiments to investigate how people reason about 
the spatial relations among objects. Their experiment used two-dimensional layouts of 
spatial descriptions, a deductive reasoning task based on five-term series problems, 
previously unstudied. The experiments tested the predictions of the inference-rule theory 
against those of the mental models theory. 
The mental models theory predicts that problems requiring only one model of the spatial 
layout to be constructed should be easier than those requiring more than one model to be 
constructed, even when the multiple model problems have valid conclusions. Contrasted 
with this is the theory based on rules of inference that predicts that problems based on fewer 
inferential steps should be easier than problems based on more steps. The first experiment 
held constant the number of inferential steps specified by the inference-rule theory, but 
varied the number of models required to make a valid response: the one-model problems 
were reliably easier than the problems requiring more than one model. The second 
experiment contrasted opposing predictions from the two theories, and once again the 
results supported the model based account. 
Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989) concluded that it is easier to draw a valid spatial inference 
when a description corresponds to just a single layout as opposed to two or more distinct 
layouts. This, they say, can readily be explained if people are naturally reasoning by 
imagining the state of affairs described in the premises, drawing a conclusion from such a 
mental model, and searching for alternative models that might refute that conclusion. 
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9 Summary 
This section has highlighted two major theories in explaining performance on two 
dimensional spatial inferences. Hagert (1984) proposed that premises are represented 
linguistically and integrated by inference rules. This is a well specified account where the 
representations are verbal in nature. Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989) proposed that 
premises are integrated into representations based on procedures that construct alternative 
models. This account makes the claim that the representations are spatial in nature. 
2.4 REASONING AND WORKING MEMORY 
Three classes of theory emerged to explain a reasoner's performance and difficulties 
encountered on syllogistic and spatial inference tasks. The first class of theorv was based 
upon verbal accounts of the processes involved. These theories suggested that deductive 
reasoning performance can be explained by recourse to linguistic, rule-based, or 
comprehension processes alone (e. g., Rips, 1994; Polk & Ne\\ ell, 1995. Hagert, 1984). 
The second class of theory was based upon the notion that reasoners construct spatial or 
analogical representations of deductive arguments (e. g., Johnson-Laird, 1983. Byrne & 
Johnson-Laird, 1989). The third class of theory suggested that deductivc reasoning 
performance can be explained by simple heuristics, although this was only seen for 
syllogistic problems (e. g., Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990; Chater & Oaksford, 1999). 
The question xvith which this thesis is concemed is to , N-hat extent do these deductive tasks 
draw on the notion of a limited working memory capacity as a source of difficulty in 
performing them" Without recourse to some sort of temporary mental ýwrkspace. the 
ability to reason deductively would be very difficult (see Example 1.1. Chapter 1). 'What 
most theorics do havc in common is their reliance on the notion that a major factor in 
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problem difficulty is a limited working memory capacity. These theories x-vould make 
different predictions about the role of working memory in performance of the tasks. The 
inference rule theorists might expect stronger links between the syllogistic and spatial 
deduction tasks and verbal working memory capacity tasks, rather than with spatial capacity 
tasks. The model theorists might expect stronger links between the syllogistic and spatial 
deduction tasks and spatial working memory capacity tasks, rather than with verbal capacity 
tasks. The heuristic accounts might expect small relationships between deductive reasoning 
and working memory due to the reliance on simple strategies. There is limited research 
investigating these types of deductive reasoning task and working memory, although a dual- 
task methodology has been employed to some effect. 
2.4.1 Dual-Task Work 
From the outline of theory above it is clear that there is no generally agreed account of how 
people process deductive arguments, although many of these accounts do agree on the 
involvement of working memory capacity as a limiting factor (e. g., Fisher, 1981; Johnson- 
Laird, 1983; Stemberg & Tumer, 198 1). Gilhooly and Logie (1998) observed that the two 
areas, working memory and reasoning, have been studied in relative isolation. Therefore, 
the question of how working memory is implicated in the performance of complex cognitive 
tasks needs to be addressed. This section aims to explore the role working memory plays in 
accounting for the performance limitations associated with these deductive tasks. 
Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) early work considered the role of working memory in simple 
deductive tasks, such as the AB task (A does precede B, given BA - True or False? ). 
Articulatory suppression was used as a secondary task to load the PL of working memory. 
A detriment was seen in performance on the primary AB task when the two were carried out 
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concurrently. Farmer, Berman and Fletcher (1986) replicated these results - articulatory 
suppression, when carried out concurrently with the AB task, disrupted performance on the 
primary task. In contrast, spatial suppression (continuous sequential tapping) produced no 
reliable interference when carried out concurrently with the AB task. The Fanner et al. 
(1986) study adds to the earlier work by comparison between secondary tasks, strengthening 
the view that the AB task requires the PL of working memory for accurate performance. 
Dual-task work has also investigated the role of working memory in performance on 
conditional reasoning problems (If p then q, p. therefore what follows? ). Evans and Brooks 
(198 1) used conditional reasoning problems which were performed concurrently with 
articulation of a set of digits, with or without memory load. Logical performance was not 
impaired by the competing tasks and the latency of responding was actually faster under 
concurrent articulation, without memory load, than in a control group. Halford, Bain and 
Mayberry (1984) questioned these findings, suggesting that the load imposed by the 
secondary tasks used by Evans et al. (1981) wasn't great enough. Halford et al. (1984) 
reported studies using algebraic problems (e. g., (7[ ]3)/4=1) performed concurrently with a 
short-term memory load. An interaction was found between difficulty of the algebra 
problem and concurrent memory load, but the point at which interference occurred was at or 
above span. These results support the contentions of Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and refute 
those of Evans and Brooks (198 1). 
") investigated the use of all three of the working memory Toms, Morris and Ward (199) 
components in conditional reasoning. Only the tasks assumed to load the CE (verbal 
memory load was given, not random number generation) disrupted performance. This 
indicated that the CE of working memory was involved in the performance on a conditional 
100 
reasoning task. This study further strengthens the links betx\ccii the use ofovorking, memory 
in performing conditional reasoning tasks. 
Klauer, Stegmaier and Meiser (1997) also used propositional reasoning problems as the 
primary task, together with the follo%6ng secondan- tasks: articulatory suppression (PL). 
verbal random number generation (CE), and spatial random number eneration (CE). Each 
participant worked through the primary and secondary tasks both alone and together. 
Articulatory suppression and random number generation degraded solution accuracy on the 
primary tasks. This study used a baseline comparison for both primary and secondary tasks, 
whereas Toms et al. (1993) did not. Thus seen together, these studies further implicate the 
role of the CE and PL components of working memory in propositional reasoning tasks. 
The major impetus of dual-task work has been in investigating the role of ýýorking memory 
in syllogistic tasks. Gilhooly, Logie and Wynn (1999) reviewed a programme of research 
on syllogistic reasoning performance and working memory components. Categorical 
syllogisms were used as the primary task, together with a variety of secondary tasks: 
random number generation (verbal and spatial) (CE), articulatory suppression (PL), and 
tapping (VSSP). In one experimental series, all participants carried out 20 syllogisms in 
control and dual-task conditions (Gilhooly, Logie, & Wynn, 1999). Response accuracy on 
the primary task was looked at. Latency measures were also used - the time to read and 
formulate a conclusion (premise processing time), and the time to indicate the chosen 
conclusion from a menu (conclusion reporting time). They collated evidence in relation to t-- 
the role the PL. VSSP and CE play in syllogistic reasoning in participants of varying skill 
lc\-cls and in participants after training in syllogistic reasoning. 
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Higher skill participants followed a high load strategy . N, hich loaded the CE, PL. and 
imagery subsystems. Lower skill participants followed a less demanding strategy 
(matching) which did not load working memory components as heavily. This finding is 
consistent with an earlier study by Gilhooly. Logie, Wetherick and Wynn (199' )) who found 
that, in untrained or unskilled participants, working memory played only a minor role in 
perforinance of syllogistic reasoning tasks. This finding was interpreted as supporting the 
fact that most untrained participants did not reason logically and therefore did not place 
heavy demands on working memory. For the trained, or high skilled participants, in the 
later study, training seemed to result in better performance at the expense of an additional 
load on the executive resources of working memory. Overall. these studies were suggested 
to support the view that high accuracy strategies, such as those followed by the high skill 
and trained participants, load the CE to a marked degree and also load the PL subsystem to a 
significant but lesser degree. These results indicated that varying secondary task loads can 
bring about changes in strategy and complement the results of Klauer, Stegmaler and Meiser 
(1997), who found that changing strategy (increasing strategy load) affected the impact of a 
fixed secondary load (tapping). Many other studies have shown similar results (e. g., 
Sternberg & Turner, 1981, Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick & 
Wynn, 1993) and conclude that the role of working memory components in reasoning 
performance need to be recognised. 
Other dual-task research has focused on spatially based primary tasks, such as the manikin 
task (e. g., Farmer, Berman and Fletcher, 1986), and the space fortress task (e. g., Logie, 
Baddeley, Mane, Donchin, & Sheptak, 1989). Oakhill and Johnson-Laird (1984) 
investigated four-term series spatial problems by asking participant's to draw their 
representations of different problems whilst performing concurrent tasks suggested to load 
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working memory components. Referentially continuous and discontinuous descriptions 
were used. The first experiment investigated the affect of caM-ing outvisuo-spatial 
tracking as a secondary task -a detriment in performance on the primary task was seen. The 
second experiment investigated the effect of remembering six random digits as a secondarv 
task -a detriment again was seen in primary performance, but it affected discontinuous 
more than continuous descriptions. The results suggest that both continuous and 
discontinuous descriptions rely on the VSSP, but discontinuous descriptions tax The PL to a 
greater extent than do continuous descriptions. These results were taken as consistent with 
Baddeley's notion of two slave systems. 
Klauer, Stegmaier and Meiser (1997) used three-term and five-term series spatial reasoning 
problems as the primary task, together with the following secondary tasks: articulatory 
suppression (PL), tapping (VSSP) and random number generation (CE). Each participant 
worked through the primary and secondary tasks both alone and carried out together. 
Articulatory suppression and random number generation degraded solution accuracy on the 
primary task. 
Vandierendonck and De Vooght (1997) also looked at the performance on spatial 
descriptions and working memory load. However, unlike Klauer, Stegmaier and Meiser 
(1997), a distinction was made between processing the premise information and reporting 
the conclusion. They used 4-term series spatial reasoning problems together with the 
following secondary tasks: articulatory suppression (PL), tapping (VSSP). and RIR (CE). 
Random Interval Repetition (RJR) looked at the average time elapsed between the 
presentation of a beep and the occurrence of the response of the beep. Articulatory 
suppression, tapping, and RIR degraded primary task perfon-nance (solution accuracy). 
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Only tapping and RIR affected premise processing time. The results from this research. and 
the other non-verbal deductive task research, suggest a clear role of working memon- 
components, especially the CE system, in the perfon-nance of reasoning problems. 
In summary, there are some consistencies between conditional. syllogistic and spatial tasks 
in relation to the dual-task work. They all seem to involve the CE component of -,, ý-orking 
memory. The conditionals and syllogistic tasks additionally seem to involve the PL 
component, whereas, the spatial task additionally seems to involve the VSSP component. 
Additionally, a distinction was found between simple verbal and simple spatial tasks and the 
detriments seen in performing them concurrently with PL and VSSP secondary tasks, 
respectively. Taken all together, the dual-task work surnmarised here supports the view that 
the components of working memory are involved in performance on a wide range of 
deductive reasoning tasks. A major role can be seen for some sort of executive resource in 
nearly all cases of deduction reviewed here, and a lesser role for both a verbally and 
spatially based resource for storage of the products of that processing. The Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974) working memory model seems supported in nearly all the research, although 
each study only answered certain questions, with differing tasks, differing designs and 
interpretations of data. 
The dual-task findings can be explained in the context of the three classes of reasoning 
theory surnmarised in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.3. Most of the verbally based and analogical 
based processing accounts of deductive reasoning would expect working memory load to 
disrupt performance due to explicit processing involved in the tasks. However, the verbal 
reasoning theory of Polk and Newell (1995) is a special processing case. They suggest that 
verbal reasoning is accomplished exclusively by existing comprehension and production 
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skills. Polk and Newell (1995) suggested that there are no special reasoning processes - not 
only are there no logical proof procedures. but there are also no special processes to support 
logical reasoning by constructing and manipulating multiple models. Therefore, it might be 
expected that reasoning performance would not show significant relationships xvith 
measures of an explicit system, such as working memory. However. from the summary of 
research investigating verbal comprehension and working memory, it can be seen that these 
two constructs do correlate. Thus, if this account is to be supported, this correlation must be 
explained. Lastly, the heuristic accounts of deductive reasoning might expect less 
detriments in performance on a primary task when carried out with a working memory dual- 
task because the reasoner is assumed to use a less demanding heuristic based strategy. 
There may be some support for this claim from the training/skill evidence of Gilhooly, 
Logie and Wynn (1999). However, there are a number of difficulties in interpreting the 
dual-task work and the following section highlights some of these. 
2.4.2 Difficulties of Interpreting Dual-Task Work 
Navon (1984) showed that none of the methods assumed to measure demand on a common 
resource can be known to do so. Even if there is no obvious component common to two 
tasks that interfere, interference may still occur because doing one task changes the 
conditions under which the second must be performed. If researchers are using dual-task 
methodology, care should be taken to look at performance on both the primary and 
secondary tasks. This generates a question of how to measure performance on tasks such as 
concurrent articulation or random generation (Wagenaar, 1970; Evans, 1978). 
Baddeley (1986) points out concerns about whether the two levels of difficulty in the 
concurrent tasks are sufficient to produce differential effects on performance. Baddeley 
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(1986) also points out a second problem. That is, that participants do not invest the same 
amount of attention in the secondary task across all conditions. Attempts have been made to 
counter these problems (e. g., Evans, 1978; Bourke, 1997). although completely alleviating 
them can never be achieved due to the nature of secondary task methodology. 
Pashler (1994) also highlighted the problems associated with dual-task methodology. He 
asked the question why people have trouble perforining two tasks at the same time. Pashler 
gives three classes of explanations. The first is capacity sharing - people may share 
processing capacity (or mental resources) among tasks. The second explanation is 
bottleneck models - parallel processing may be impossible for certain mental operations. 
The third explanation is cross-talk models - where two alternative explanations make 
differing predictions. It may be easier to perform two tasks concurrently when they involve 
similar inputs if this meant that the same set of processing machinery could be 'turned on' 
and used for both. Alternatively, it may be more difficult to perform two tasks when they 
involve similar information. Pashler (1994) identified the need to learn about how the 
mechanisms apparent on these simple tasks manifest themselves in more complex activities 
of comprehension, reasoning and thought. Do mental processes produce a bottleneck 
because they require the activity of a single brain structure or ensemble of structures or 
because of mutual inhibition, or do they do so for some as-yet unsuspected reason? Clearly 
these questions need to be answered before the dual-task data can be interpreted 
unequivocally. 
Another difficulty with the dual-task method is that the working memory model was partly 
built on this tradition. Therefore, any problems associated with this method are also 
associated with the assumptions of a tripartite system of working memory. Starting with a 
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specific model could presuppose the type of interpretation made of the data. Using a 
specific model might also lead researchers to use particular dual-tasks, at the exclusion of 
others, and in this way may limit the results found. 
Thus, problems have been indicated in the use of the dual-task methodology - both in the 
carrying out of these tasks and their measurement. Navon (1984) suggested that 
interference found between performance on primary and secondary tasks may not be due to 
a common resource pool. Other factors as simple as same modality tasks may also have had 
an effect. In other words, interference seen on a primary task might be associated with 
similar materials used in the secondary task, and not due to the use of the same system of 
working memory. Others have criticised existing dual-task work in the way they measure 
the interference shown (e. g., Wagenaar, 1970; Evans, 1978). 
Are there any alternatives to the dual-task approach when investigating the role of working 
memory in reasoning? Another approach does alleviate the problem of being encumbered 
by a supplementary task and involves measuring the capacity of an individual's working 
memory system and relating capacity to individual performance on cognitive tasks. This 
approach takes advantage of the individual differences that occur in cognitive abilities. 
Participants can be given a range of tasks, and a correlational approach can be used to 
identify which components of cognitive processing appear to be associated most closely 
with capacity to carry out that cognitive task. The dual-task and individual differences work 
may be complementary in advancing knowledge about the role of working memory in 
reasoning. In the following section reasoning and working memory will be examined from 
the individual differences perspective. 
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2.4.3 Individual Differences in Reasoning and Working Memory Capaciq- 
A question that remains from the research carried out on syllogistic and spatial inferences is 
how individual differences in performance on these tasks is explained. Stanovich and IvVest 
(e. g., 1998) have studied differences that can be seen bemeen the normative and descriptivý2 
accounts of human reasoning. These accounts refer to -, ohat would be expected due to 
traditional logic, as opposed to what is actually seen in practice. What Stanovich and West 
(1998) suggested is that these individual differences and their patterns of covariance might 
have implications for explanations of why human behaviour often departs from normative 
models. Stanovich and colleagues refute the claim that the gap betv, -een normative and 
descriptive explanations represent instances of human irrationalitN. Stanovich and West 
(1998) examined the performance errors hypothesis across a wide range of tasks from the 
reasoning and decision-making literature. For certain classes of task they found significant 
cross-task correlations. This suggested that participants giving the normative response on 
one task were usually significantly more likely to give it on another. 
Stanovich and West (1998) investigated the extent to which measures of cognitiN, e ability 
and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety 
of deductive tasks. These reasoning tasks included the selection task, belief bias in 
syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, and statistical reasoning. These tasks were 
given together xvith cognitive ability tasks. Verbal and mathematical SAT scores v, -ere 
reported, together with the Raven Matrices, and reading comprehension scores which ý, N ere 
all combined to give a cognitive ability composite score. A thinking dispositions 
questionnaire was also completed. The questionnaire was made up of -various items across a 
number of scales including activel-v open-minded thinking. counterfactual thinkiný_,. 
absolutism. dogmatism. paranon-nal beliefs and social desirability response bias. The 
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authors used the cognitive ability composite score as a measure of cognitive capacit,., -. The 
authors used the thinking dispositions composite score as a measure of thinking style (a 
high score indicating that the individual ýý as open-minded. counitively flexible and had a 
sceptical attitude). 
If the reasoning tasks correlated positively xvith these measures of cogn-itive ability then it 
might justify the use of the normative model being employed to evaluate performance. 
Their results showed that indeed, cognitive ability measures did correlate ýN-Ith performance 
on a wide variety of deductive and problem solving tasks. Thus. the authors concluded that 
capacity limitations influenced the actual performance on the deductive tasks, as judged 
against normative criteria. It was also found that the thinking dispositions composite score 
was significantly correlated with each of the four reasoning tasks, although the correlations 
were smaller in magnitude then for those seen with cognitive ability. It was also found that 
there were significant correlations between the reasoning tasks, apart from one (between 
argument evaluation and statistical reasoning). Although the highest correlation was 
between the syllogistic and selection task performance (. 36). correlations almost as strong 
were obtained between tasks deriving from the deductive literature (syllogistic reasoning 
and selection task) and the inductive reasoning literature (statistical reasoning). Jointly. 
cognitive ability and thinking dispositions accounted for a moderate amount of variance in 
overall rational thinking performance, although cognitive ability was a stronger unique 
predictor. Stanovich and West (1998) concluded that cognitive abilitv measures capacity. 
and that thinking style is a measure of what participants do --. vith that capacity. 
This notion has implications for patterns of individual differences across reasoning tasks 
(Stanw, lch. 1999). Stanovich (1999) suggests that if it were onlv performance errors which 
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accounted for the differences between the normative and descriptive accounts, there should 
be no significant correlations between disparate reasoning tasks. The positive relationslups 
obtained between tasks indicated that departures from normative responding on each of 
them were due to systematic limitations in processing and not to non-systematic 
performance errors. 
Two alternative ways of studying the relationship between working memory and reasoning 
have now been outlined. The first relied on the notion that if detriment is seen on a primary 
task when it is carried out concurrently with another, presumed to load a working memory 
subsystem, then they are sharing this common resource. The second relied on the notion 
that variation in performance on deductive reasoning tasks can be predicted by tasks 
suggested to measure the capacity of working memory subsystems. Both of these accounts 
are consistent with most of the processing theories of reasoning reviewed earlier in this 
chapter. These accounts can not be reconciled with those theories suggesting a heuristic 
explanation of the data. They suggest that implicit processing alone accounts for the 
reasoning performance. However, it is important to consider that other individual 
differences may exist, other than capacity limitations, that explain variations on reasoning 
tasks. Indeed, there is some evidence in the literature that the strategies people adopt may 
explain differences in perfonnance. 
2.4.4 Strategy Effects 
Theorists have used different explanations as to why some people deviate from a normative 
logical response. Rule theorists propose that easy valid inferences are made by accessing a 
corresponding elementary inference rule. Difficult valid inferences have no corresponding 
inference rule, thus reasoners must construct a proof of several steps to derive the 
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conclusion. Mental models theory proposes that easyvalid problems rely only on an initial 
set of models to be combined. More difficult problems require the initial set of models to be 
combined and fleshed out to search for alternative models. Roberts (1993) states that 
If a theory of reasoning is being proposed that is intended to describe the processes 
used by allpeoplefor all reasoning tasks, then what is the status of this theory if it 
is subsequentlyfound that not all people are using the same processes? 
The existence of individual differences in strategies used to solve deductive reasoning 
problems casts doubt on the status of theories which propose general underlying cognitive 
processing. It may be that theories must account for the times at which people draw on 
short-cuts or different strategies in order to solve deductive reasoning tasks, and not just 
concentrate on the process the majority are shown to follow. Individuals may adopt 
different strategies that are verbal or spatial in nature and they may draw on working 
memory resources in different ways. There are many studies that have investigated what 
these different strategies are and how they may be accounted for by theory. What follows is 
an examination of the literature suggesting that individuals may rely on linguistic and/or 
spatial processes or strategies. 
For instance studies have investigated strategy use for performing the picture verification 
task. Carpenter and Just (1975) produced data to suggest that participants solved these 
problems using a deduction rule strategy. Although, MacLeod, Hunt and Mathews (1978) 
found that a section of their participants appeared to be using a strategy based upon mental 
models. This finding was also replicated by Marquer and Pereira (1990). This research 
suggests that a combination of processes may be called upon when solving these problems. 
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Another example of this type of research investigated syllogistic deductions. Sternberg and 
Weil (1980) identified people that spontaneously used mental models strategy, deduction 
rule strategy, and a mixture of the two (the majority of participants). Galotti, Baron and 
Sabini (1986) claimed to have found evidence that formal rules could explain certain aspects 
of the performance of their participants in a syllogistic reasoning task. They found that 
some participants -- generally the ones classified as "good" reasoners -- started formulating 
their own rules as the task progressed. This is perhaps best classified as -strategies- that 
participants picked up and not formal rules present prior to the task. This, then, is not 
convincing evidence to support the formal rules approach. Ford (1994) also looked at 
strategy use when solving syllogistic problems. One group represented the relationship 
between classes in a spatial manner that was supplemented by a verbal representation. The 
other group used a primarily verbal representation. This research again lends support to the 
view that both linguistic and spatial procedures may be used in the pursuit of accurate 
performance. 
There have been studies within the area of spatial reasoning tasks showing that people solve 
these problems by using mental models or deduction rules (e. g., Lohman & Kyllonen, 
1983). Many studies have shown that individuals may progress from one strategy to 
another as they gain expertise (e. g., Johnson-Laird, 1972; Trabasso, Riley & Wilson, 1975). 
Wood, Shotter and Godden (1974) suggest that participants may abandon flexible strategies 
early on in experiments in favour of a quicker, short-cut strategy suited to only certain 
problem types. This, in effect, shutting out other possible solutions due to strategy 
limitations. In addition, Gilhooly, Logie and Wynn (1999) suggested that low skill 
participants used a simple strategy, whilst high skill participants used a more demanding 
one. 
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Other studies have shown that different individuals may use different strategies in relational 
reasoning e. g., OhIsson, 1984). Egan and Grimes-Farrow (1982) 111 ipants. partici 
post three-term series spatial deductions, and revealed striking individual differences in the 
way problem representations were described. Two contrasting strategies were identified. 
The "concrete properties" thinkers concentrated on the physical properties of the objects in 
the description. The "abstract directional" thinkers concentrated on directional 
representations for every relation. Egan et al. (1982) suggest that different strategies Aere 
used, so a theory of reasoning must account for why individuals adopt one strategy over 
another. 
Still other studies have suggested that people may use a combination of spatial and 
linguistic processes when solving spatial descriptions. For instance, Mani & Johnson-Laird 
(1982) suggest that their results indicated the existence of two types of encoding -- 
propositional representations and mental models - propositional representations that are 
relatively hard to remember but correspond closely to the sentences in the description, and 
mental models that are relatively easy to remember but are analogous to spatial arrays and 
accordingly poor in linguistic detail. 
This section has highlighted the problem that individuals might use different strategies 
when performing deductive reasoning problems. It is important to note that these strategy 
effects exist and may occur with all the problems to be used in this thesis. It is important to 
bear these effects in mind when looking at the patterns of data produced on all the reasoning 
and working memory span tasks used in this series of experiments. 
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The focus of this thesis looks at the role of working memon- from an individual difference,, 
perspective. This is because. although major links have been drawn between xý, -orkinp 
memory and reasoning via dual-task methodolo,,, ý. no Nvork looks at working memorN 
capacity tasks and reasoning/deduction via correlational means. The next section aims to 
provide a rationale behind an individual differences approach. based on a general look at 
work in this area. 
2.5 RATIONALE FOR THESIS 
REASONING WITH A LIMITED WORKING MEMORY CAPACITN'- 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES WORK 
Chapter 2 started with a summary of the phenomenon associated . vith two types of 
deductive reasoning task - syllogistic and spatial inference. It was found that for 
both types of problem, reasoners can answer according to normative criteria. 
Figural difficulty and conclusion preferences were also found to affect both t-,,, Ipes of 
task. The believability of the conclusion was another phenomenon that needed to 
be addressed by any theory of reasoning. 
As previously discussed, there have been attempts to investigate how individuals process 
and store deductive reasoning tasks. There are a wide range of explanations available in 
the literature suggesting that no one theory can account for all the effects found when 
individual's solve these types of problem (e. g., Rips, 1994; Johnson-Laird, 1983): Polk & 
Ncý\ cl 1,1995, Chater & Oaksford, 1999). The theories put forward to explain the 
phenomenon associated xvith deductive reasoning tasks were separated into three classes. 
The first class loosely proposed a verbal. or rule-based, or comprehension account 
Rips, 1994: Polk & Newell, 1995). The second class proposed that the reasoner relied on 
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spatial or analogical representations (Johnson-Laird. 1983). The third class of theorv 
loosely fitted into one that proposed the reasoner relied on simple strategies Chater 
& Oaksford, 1999). These theories make differing predictions about the role of working 
memory in the performance of deductive tasks. 
For instance, Johnson-Laird (1983) proposed mental models as the mechanism by which 
people solve deductive tasks, whereas Rips (1994) proposed propositionally based rules as 
most important. What all these theories have in common (i. e., rules, mental models) is 
their reliance on the notion of some explicit system that affords the reasoning process. 
Thus, it might be that working memory predicts performance on deductive tasks. The 
verbally based theories (i. e., rules) might expect verbal working memory capacity to 
predict reasoning performance. The verbal reasoning theory (Polk & Newell, 1995) can 
be considered a special case due to the following explanation. The process of reasoning is 
suggested to rely upon the same processes as used in verbal comprehension. However, 
considering the fact that these two processes, reasoning and verbal comprehension, have 
been found to correlate, the same predictions might be made. as for the other verbally 
based accounts. The spatially based accounts (i. e., mental models) might expect spatial 
working memory to predict performance on deductive reasoning tasks. In contrast to 
these theories, the heuristic based accounts make no claims about underlying explicit 
processing (e. g., Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990, Chater & Oaksford, 1999). These theories 
proposed that reasoners use very low load strategies, which require little in the way of 
processing. Thus, they might not expect reasoning performance to be highly correlated 
with working memory capacity. 
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Many studies have investigated the role of the working memory subsystems in the 
ability to reason deductively. These studies have been based on dual-task 
methodology. The major finding was that for every study, except one, working 
memory was implicated in all the deductive tasks investigated. This included tasks 
such as syllogisms, spatial inference, conditionals, as well as more simple cognitive 
tasks. The component of working memory that was most highly implicated as a 
resource in performing complex deductive tasks was the CE. When the deductive 
tasks were carried out simultaneously with random number generation, assumed to 
measure the capacity of the CE, a detriment was seen in primary task performance. 
Therefore, the two concurrent tasks were assumed to be sharing the CE as a 
common resource. 
The review then went on to criticise the dual-task approach, suggesting problems 
when two tasks are carried out concurrently. Whenever two tasks are carried out 
simultaneously, problems will arise with measuring the trade-off between tasks. 
Problems were also highlighted in the difficulties associated with measuring the 
performance on tasks such as random number generation. 
Individual differences was then introduced as an alternative way of looking at the 
role of working memory in reasoning, and at the same time would alleviate the 
problems associated with the dual-task work. Stanovich and colleagues used ability 
tests, not working memory tasks, as measures of cognitive capacity. They also 
used thinking disposition as an additional measure of an individual's style of 
thinking. Both cognitive ability and thinking dispositions were predictive of 
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performance on a wide range of deductive tasks. As seen in Chapter 1, the use of 
individual differences in complex cognition has proven fruitful a-, -, ain. 
It is generally assumed that working memory capacity is fixed, but that capacitN is likelN 
to fluctuate across individuals (e. g., Just & Carpenter. 1992: Shah &N ll-% ake, 1996). The 
standard method of measuring working memory capacity is exemplified by Daneman and 
Carpenter's reading-span task, as summarised in Chapter 1. People must carry out the 
maintenance of a set of last words whilst reading sentences in a set. This task, as 
previously discussed, requires both the storage and processing of information afforded by 
an executive resource of working memory. Studies show that cognitive tasks are 
positively related to a multitude of working memory capacity measures such as these (e. g., 
Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Turner & Engle, 1989; Jurden, 1995). 
Chapter I also summarised research related to the dichotomy between the unitary/separate 
resources issue of the central executive component of working memory. There is no 
agreement as to whether differing types of information are dealt with by similar or 
contrasting central resources of working memory. Some have assumed that all 
information is processed by the same executive (e. g., Turner & Engle, 1989). whilst others 
have assumed the need for separate resources for verbal and non verbal information (e. g., 
Daneman & Tardif, 1987; Jurden, 1995; Shah & Miyake, 1996). This thesis tries to 
answer this dichotic dilemma by using verbally and spatially based working memory span 
and deductive reasoning measures. 
There has been no specific research investigating working memory capacity 
measurcs and complex deductive reasonim, tasks. such as syllogisms and spatial 
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inferences. This thesis attempts to rectif',, - this oversight by usl itv measures n, -, capac 
together with complex sy I logistic and spatial relation tasks. Thisthesls%\Ill 
examine the pattern of covariance between a range of ýý orking memory measures 
and performance on deductive reasoning tasks, with particular focus on syllogistic 
and spatial inference. 
As we have seen, some deductive tasks may rely more on spatial than verbal processm-, 
and vice versa. The series of experiments in the following chapter uses syllogistic tasks 
(verbal) and spatial relation tasks (spatial), together with working memory capacity 
measures, in order to examine the relationship between the two and to potentially 
differentiate between reasoning theories. The distinction between verbal and spatial 
deductive tasks will also allow the investigation of the separability of CE resources of 
working memory (Shah and Miyake, 1996). Thus, the first set of experiments uses a 
range of working memory capacity measures, proposed to measure both storage and 
processing for verbal and spatial resources, together with verbal and spatial deductive 
tasks. Correlational and factor analyses will be performed on the data in order to 
determine the relationships between the capacity and reasoning measures. An in depth 
introduction of the rationale behind the first three experiments follows. 
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CHAPTER 3- WORKING MEMORN'WITH SYLLOGISTIC AND 
SPATIAL INFERENCE 
3.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION FOR EXPERIMENTS 1-3 
Chapter 3' presents three experiments designed to investigate the relationship bem-ccii 
working memory and perfon-nance on two deductive reasoning tasks - spatial and 
syllogistic inference. As of yet, there are no studies in the literature that have investigated 
the relationship between individual differences in deductive reasoning and xý orking 
memory capacity. The first set of experiments aims to do this b\ using a range of xý orkino 
memory capacity measures, proposed to measure people's ability to simultaneously store 
and process spatial and verbal information, togethcr with spatial (five-term serics) and 
verbal (syllogistic) deductive reasoning tasks. 
As could be seen from the first two chapters, the role of working memory in reasoning has 
previously been investigated using dual-task methodology. Studies using syllogistic 
inferences as a primary task identified differing detriments in performance v,, hen carried out 
with secondary tasks assumed to load the CE, in comparison to secondary tasks proposed to 
load the two slave systems of working memory (Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick & Wynn, 1993; 
Gilhooly, Logie & Wynn, 1999). Gilhooly et al. (1993) investigated verbally and visually 
presented syllogistic problems, and in a further set of studies (e. g.. Gilhooly et al., 1999). 
syllogistic performance was studied for low and high skilled, as well as trained participants. 
It was found that alloxving the premises to be available on screen at all times (visual 
condition) leads to higher performance rates. This was presumed to be due to the reduction 
in verbal working mcniory load. The results also suggested that, II low skilled in untrained or 
participants. Nvorkin-, -, inemory played onlY a minor role in performance of sYllog7i ic st 
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reasoning tasks. This was interpreted as indicating that the participants relied on loxv 
demand strategies that did not place heavy demands on v, -orkin, -, memory. HoNvever. there 
was a small effect of random number generation for these participants xvhich is suggested to 
show some role of executive processes in the implementation of the matching heuristic. In 
the more recent studies, participants who performed poorly %ý ere largely unaffected by the 
secondary tasks, consistent with earlier findings. Hovve-ver, those participants who had 
produced the highest scores following training were especially Vulnerable to the disruptive 
effects of random generation. This result was consistent with the idea that training results iii 
better performance at the expense of an additional load on executive resources of workiiio 
memory. This is suggested to support the v'ievv- that performance on syllogistic inferences, 
especially for trained participants, relies on executive resources of working memory. 
The work investigating spatial inferences as the primary task also identified detriments in 
performance when carried out with secondary tasks assumed to load the different 
components of working memory (Klauer, Stegmaier & Meiser, 1997). Klauer et al. (1997) 
used three-term and five-term series spatial reasonin,, problems and found that both 
articulatory suppression (PL) and random number generation (CE) degraded primary task 
performance. Vandierendonck and De Vooght (1997) investigated spatial reasoning with a 
concurrent task assumed to load the VSSP of working memory - tapping. It was found that 
the three concurrent tasks assumed to load the PL, VSSP and the CE degraded accurate 
performance on the four-term series spatial inferences. These studies suggest that a passive 
verbal and spatial store as well as an active processing component of working memory play 
a role in performance on spatial inferences. 
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The common finding across the experiments inivesti gating complex deductive tasks and 
working memory is that perfon-nance is degraded on these priman. tasks bý secondar), tasks 
assumed to load the CE component of v, -orking memory. The major finding for syllogistic 
inference was that verbal working memory plays a role III in performing them, *n,,, ol\-*n-- both 
CE, and to some extent PL. components of working memory. The major finding, for spatial 
inference was that spatial working memory also plays a role in performing them, involving 
CE, PL, and VSSP components of working memory. These studies demonstrated that 
performance on these different deductive reasoning tasks depends on different sub-systerns 
of working memory. although the CE is assumed to be the most heavily implicated system 
across both tasks. Thus, an aim of this thesis is to use the syllogistic and spatial deductive 
tasks in order to determine the extent to which these tasks draw upon different working 
memory resources. 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that dual-task studies were difficult to interpret. Some of these 
problems concerned the use of this methodology in specifying the degree of CE 
involvement in complex cognitive tasks. For instance, Pashler (1994) argued that a 
bottleneck can occur in dual-task situations at the response selection phase (i. e., tvvo 
responses can not be selected at the same time) even when other perceptual, cognitive, and 
motor processes can co-occur. In addition to this, there are problems associated vvith the 
strategic trade-off between primary and secondary task performance. This type of strategic 
trade-off is a source of concern, particularly when the supposedly secondary task is as 
complex and demanding as random number generation. These considerations suggest that 
x\ lien applied to the CE, the simple dual-task logic might not always hold. 
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An alternative approach to examining the role of working memory in complex cognitive 
tasks is from the perspective of individual differences. Many studies have investigated the 
relationship between measures of working memorý- capacity and performance on other 
cognitive tasks (Kyllonen and Christal. 1990; Shah & Miyake. 1996). In the context ofthis 
work, many measures ofvýorking memory capacity have been developed. These measures 
can be mapped onto the different subsystems of the v,, orking memory model. For instance. 
reading comprehension was best predicted by complex measures of capacitý that invol-ve 
both a processing and storage component, measures that are assumed to reflect the capacity 
of the CE (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980, Shah & Miyake. 1996). It might be expected that 
these complex measures of working memory capacivy. assumed to reflect Cl` processing, 
will predict performance on both the syllogistic and spatial reasoning tasks. Other working 
memory capacity tasks, such as the simple word and arrow spans (e. g., Shah & Miyake, 
1996), are assumed to reflect PL and VSSP storage, respectively. Given the dual-task work, 
it might be expected that simple measures of PL storage, such as the word span, will 
correlate with syllogistic reasoning and spatial reasoning. but measures of VSSP storage, 
such as the arrow span, may only be expected to predict spatial reasoning. 
Carrying on in the individual differences vein, many researchers have investigated the issue 
of the separation of executive resources in working memory for information processing 
activities. Some of these researchers proposed that all cognitive infori-nation processing is 
afforded by a singular, general executive resource (Turner & Engle, 1989). Other 
researchers have identified separate central resources of working memory for verbal and non 
verbal information (Jurden. 1995. Shah & Miyake, 1996). Therefore, another aim of this 
thcsis is to further investigate the separability claim of working memoi-N resources for 
ciccluctive rcasoning task-s. as yct underrepresented in this field. Many working memor. N 
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capacity measures of CE resources have now been developed. Some of these are proposed 
to rely on verbal processing and storage components (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). whilst 
others have been proposed to rely on spatial processing and storage components (Daneman 
& Tardif, 1987; Shah & Miyake, 1996). By using all of these capacity measures in 
conjunction with syllogistic and spatial reasoning tasks, it may be possible to identiýv which 
reasoning tasks rely on which type of working memory resource. 
Another aim of this thesis is to examine the implications of patterns of relationship between 
working memory and reasoning for theories of deductive reasoning performance. This 
series of experiments will look at patterns of covariance between the working memory and 
reasoning measures in relation to the explanations made by different reasoning theory. 
Three classes of reasoning theory were introduced earlier, one class relying on verbal 
processes, another on spatial/analogical processes, and a third on heuristic processes. These 
reasoning theories all give differing accounts as to the representation of deductive tasks in 
the mind. Given the Shah and Miyake (1996) framework, these classes of theory might 
make different predictions about the degree to which different deductive reasoning tasks 
involve verbal versus spatial working memory capacity. The theories that assume the use of 
verbal processing and representation (Rips, 1994; Hagert, 1984) might predict that both 
syllogistic and spatial reasoning performance be predicted by verbal working memory 
capacity. (It should be noted that Rips (1994) only studied propositional and syllogistic 
tasks; and Hagert (1984) only studied spatial inferences. Therefore, any predictions about 
specific deductive reasoning tasks are taken in this context). However. Polk & Newell's 
(1995) Verbal Reasoning theory, that involves comprehension, suggests that people do not 
have special procedures for processing deductively, and that this process is not resource 
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intensive. Therefore, this theory might not expect a relationship between reasoning 
perfon-nance and working memory capacity. However. reading comprehension does 
correlate with working memory capacity (Daneman & Carpenter. 1980) and therefore. based 
on the available evidence, it might expected that these patterns of relationship are obsen-ed. 
Those theories that assume the use of spatial processing and representation (Johnson-Laird, 
1983) might predict that spatial working memory predicts reasoning performance, although 
Johnson-Laird (1983) acknowledges the possibility that mental models contain information 
that could be propositional in nature. However, what processing accounts do have in 
common, for instance rules and mental models, is the notion of a mental workspace in 
which to carry out computations. 
The theories that assume a heuristic account of the reasoning process (Wetherick & 
Gilhooly, 1990; Chater & Oaksford, 1999) have only been applied to syllogistic reasoning 
performance. In contrast to the processing theories, these accounts do not draw on the 
notion of an explicit processing system having a functional role in reasoning. They only 
claim a minor role for working memory in reasoning of this kind. Therefore, there is no 
reason to expect that measures of the explicit system (working memory spans) would 
predict logical performance on the syllogistic task. 
Because this series of experiments investigates both verbal (syllogistic) and spatial (five- 
term series) reasoning and working memory capacity measures, this distinction can be used 
to identify and differentiate between the reasoning theories. Studies investigating relational 
reasoning have shown that a spatial representation is invoked by the content of the premises 
(Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989). It is not so clear from the syllogistic reasoning xvork 
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whether performance depends upon spatial or verbal representations (Ford, 1994). An aim 
here is to identify which working memory resources are used on these deductivc reasoning 
problems. 
In summary, the primary aim of this set of experiments is to investigate the degree to which 
individual differences in working memory can explain the variation in performance on 
syllogistic and spatial inference tasks. The secondary aim is to replicate the finding of a 
dissociation of spatial and verbal central executive resources reported by Shah and NI 1ý akc 
(1996). The final aim, given this dissociation, is to examine the deurce to \, diich the 
reasoning tasks rely on verbal versus spatial working memory. 
Experiment I in this series uses measures which include simple and complex verbal and 
spatial working memory span measures (Shah & Miý-ake, 1996; Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980; Daneman. & Tardif 1987), together with verbal and spatial reasoning tasks 
(syllogistic and five-term series spatial inferences) and ability (Browii. Bennett & Hanna, 
1981; Smith & Whetton, 1988) measures. This allows an assessment of the relationship 
between deductive reasoning, working memory and a range of spatial and verbal abilities. 
In Experiment I the deductive tasks are presented verbally to participants, requiring them to 
keep in mind the premise information during the problem solving process. An additional 
aim in this chapter was to investigate whether modality differences in presentation 
influenced the patterns of correlation with the working memory measures observed. 
Presentation modalltv and working memory capacity were ftirther investigated in 
Fxperiments 2 and 3. 
I --,.; 
3.2 EXPERIMENT I 
3.2.1 Aim 
Experiment I was designed to assess the relationship between the following inforination 
processing activities - the aptitude for verbal and spatial reasoning, togetlier with the 
capacity of working memory for verbal and spatial material. Five,, vorking memory span 
tasks were used - two complex spatial measures, one complex verbal measure. and a simple 
spatial and simple verbal measure (Daneman & Tardif, 1987; Shah &- NIIN-ake. 1996-, 
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). The complex span measures involve simultaneous 
processing and storage (CE), whilst the simple spans invol-ve passive storage (PL and 
VSSP). The span tasks were given together with two reasoning tasks, syllogistic and five- 
term series spatial inferences. Tests of verbal and spatial ability were also completed 
(Brown, Bennett & Hanna, 1981. Smith & INI-letton, 1988). 
Experiment I investigated the degree to which individual differences in working memory 
capacity can explain variation in performance on syllogistic and five-term series spatial 
tasks. Experiment I also addressed the separability issue of central resources within 
working memory. Experiment I follows the same types of predictions made by Shah and 
Miyake (1996), but based on deductive reasoning problems. Thus, a dissociation might be 
expected between the measures of verbal and spatial working memory. Given this 
dissociation, the degree to which syllogistic and spatial inferences involve verbal versus 
spatial working memory resources can be investigated. 
Another important application of looking at a range of v, -orking memory capacity measures t-- I 
and deductive reasoning tasks is in relation to reasonino theorv. Given the Shah and 
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Miyake (1996) separability hypothesis. the three classes of theory. introduced earlier. might 
make different predictions about the relationships between capacity and reasoning. I- 
Experiment I will investigate these working memory and complex cognitive tasks in 
relation to the verbal, spatial/analogical, and heuristic accounts of reasoning. 
3.2.2 Method 
Pilot Study 
The working memory span tasks were based on measures reported in the literature (e. g., 
Shah & Miyake, 1996). A series of computer programs were developed in Visual Basic. A 
pilot study was run to ensure that these tasks were easy to understand, use, and at a 
reasonable difficulty level. There were alterations made to certain features of some of the 
span tasks. These adjustments will be explained within the procedure for each individual 
measure that follows. The tasks were given to a number of participants, and their verbal 
accounts of the tasks enabled these adjustments to made. 
Participants 
Forty-six participants took part in this study - 18 of whom were men and 28 of whom were 
women (mean overall age = 25). The participants were undergraduate students and 
postgraduate students at the University of Plymouth and they received course credit or cash 
payment for participating. None of the sample had prior training in logic and all were native 
English speakers. 
Procedure 
Experiment I was carried out in two testing sessions per participant, the sessions being of 
approximately equal length. Participants signed up in a time slot on an experimenter sheet 
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for session one. Session two was arranged individually xvith each participant at the end of 
session one. Session one consisted of five tasks. All participants carried out these tasks in 
the following order (where an asterix (*) indicates a computerised task): - 
spatial ability measure, 
simple verbal word span*, 
simple spatial arrow span*, 
complex verbal sentence span*, 
complex spatial letter span*. 
Session two consisted of four tasks. All participants carried out these tasks in the following 
order: - 
spatial inference measure (verbal presentation), 
syllogistic inference measure (verbal presentation), 
complex spatial tic-tac-toe span, 
verbal ability measure. 
What follows is a summary of each task used in Experiment 1. 
Simple Verbal Word Span (word) 
Procedure 
All four computer based span tasks were developed in Visual Basic 4.0. The simple word 
span task was based on one used by Shah and Miyake (1996). The span task was designed 
to measure a participant's relatively passive storage capacity for verbal information. There 
was no explicit processing requirement. The words were chosen from the Oxford 
Psycholinguistic Database (Quinlan, 1992). The words were all two syllables long and were 
concrete nouns. All the words were checked for frequency in Kucera and Francis's (1970) 
corpus of over one million words. The frequency of words ranged from 5 to 216 in their 
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corpus. None of the words in a particular set began with the same letter (see Appeiidix A 1.1 
for a full list of the words used). Participants were instructed to remember a set of these 
words that appeared on a computer screen. A single trial consisted of the individual 
presentation of a set (two to seven) of words on the computer screen. Each item appeared 
on the screen for 800 ins, with an interstimulus interval of 50 ms. At the end of each trial, a 
light bulb appeared on the screen, indicating that the participant was to recall the to-be- 
remembered words. The participants gave written responses to the word sets. There were 
five sets at each set size, from two to seven, for a total of 30 sets, presented in the order of 
increasing set size. The participants also received practice sets of words at the two-word set 
level. An example of a set of two words given to the participants is 'wallet', followed by 
'coffee' (see Appendix Al. 2 for a full set of instructions). 
Scoring 
The participant's simple word span score was defined as the maximum level at which a 
participant correctly recalled all the words in the correct order for at least three of five trials. 
If the participant was accurate in two of the five trials at the next level, the score was 
incremented by half a point. In relatively rare cases in which a participant successfully 
recalled less than three of the five sets at a particular level but was able to recall two or more 
sets at a higher level, the average of the lower and the upper limits was used as the span 
score. The maximum score obtainable for the span measure was 7. A global score was also 
calculated for this task as follows. If a participant was accurate on a set, regardless of level, 
they received a point for each correctly recalled word (e. g., a participant gets four of the 2- 
sets correct and three of the 3-sets, global score = ((4*2) + (3*3) = 17)). The maximum 
score obtainable for the global measure was 135. 
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Simple Spatial Arrow Span (arrow) 
Procedure 
This task was based on one used by Shah and Miyake (1996). The span task was designed 
to measure a participant's relatively passive storage capacity for spatial infon-nation. There 
was no explicit processing requirement. A set of arrov, -s (two to six) was presented on the 
screen with each arrow in one of eight possible orientations. Each arrow remained on the 
screen for 1000 ms, with a short delay (250 ms) between the presentation of arrows. 
Following the presentation of a set of arrows. a participant's task xvas to identify the 
directions that the arrows were pointing in on a diamond shaped grid that appeared on the 
screen after every set. The grid appeared on the screen -with eight sqUare "buttons*' 
indicating the eight possible orientations. The task of the participant 1, vas to Use a mouse to 
click in the direction that each arrow was pointing in the order of appearance. There were 
three trials at each level, from two to six arrows, for a total of 15 trials. There were no 
practice sets before commencing the task. Following is an example of set of arrows at the 
two arrows level. The first arrow appears on the screen as shown in Figure 3.1. Then a 
second arrow appears on the screen as shown in Figure 33.2. Following the presentation of 
the two arrows, a recall grid appears on screen onto which the participant mouse-clicks the 
correct orientation of each arrow in the set in the order in which they were presented. as 
shown in Figure 3.33. 
Fig, ure 3. I- Arro\\ spaii. representation ot'ari-o\\ I 
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Figure 3.2- Arrow span, representation of arroý\ -1 
_IEJIx! 
1\ cl, 
0 
0 
00 
0 
0 
Figure 3.3- Arrow span, recall grid for arrows 
Scoring 
The participant's simple arrow span score was defined as the maximum level at which a 
participant correctly recalled the spatial orientation of all the arrows in the correct order for 
at least two of three trials. If the participant was accurate in one of the three trials at the 
next level, the score Nvas incremented by half a point. If a participant did not follow this 
pattern of scorino, the average was taken of their lovvest and highest correctly recalled set. 
Iri other , vords. any discrepancy between the upper and lox,, -er limits was solved by taking 
the avcra,, e of thern. The maximum score obtainable for the span measure Nvas 6. A global 
13 1 
score was also calculated for this task. The maximum score obtainable fOr the LIobal 
measure was 60. If a participant was accurate on a set, regardless of leý el, they receiN cLi a 
point for each correct arrow (e. g., a participant gets two 2-sets correct and one 3-set. global 
score = ((2 * 2) + (1* 3) = 
Complex Verbal Sentence Span (verbal) 
Procedure 
This task was based on the reading span task developed by Daneman and Carpenter (1980). 
The verbal sentence span task was designed as a span measure of functional workin- 
memory capacity for language. The task requires the simultaneous maintenance and 
processing of verbal information. A single trial consisted of the indn, 'idual presentation ot'a 
small set of true or false sentences on a computer screen. The end words of each sentence 
were chosen from the Oxford Psycholinguistic Database (Quinlan. 1992). The end . vords 
were all one or two syllables long and were concrete nouns (for instance, 'morning', Iine) 
Word frequency was checked as seen for the word span (Kucera & Francis, 1970). The 
frequency of words ranged from 5 to 216 in their corpus. Sentences were allocated 
randomly as true or false prior to the start of the experiment and remained in the same order 
throughout. Except for the tNv, o set size, all sets contained a mixture of true and false 
sentences. An example of a set of two sentences given to the participants is 'breakfast is 
eaten in the morning', followed by 'a ruler dra,, \-s a straight line'. In this instance, both 
sentences xvere true and the words to be remembered were 'morning' and Iine'. 0-verall. 
there were as many true as false sentences in the sets. None of the end xvords in a particular 
set be, -, an with the same 
letter (see Appendix A 1.3 for a full list of the sentences used). The 
sentence remained on the screen for 800ms. after which tx\o boxes appeared marked 'true' 
and 'false". The participants task was to respond to the sentence by pressing eithei- the tl'Lle 
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or false button using a click of the mouse. The buttons appeared on the screen for a 
maximum of 20OOms. The next sentence in the set appeared on the screen 250ms after the 
response boxes disappeared. At the end of each set of sentences a light bulb appeared on the 
screen indicating that the participant must now recall the final words of that particular set of 
sentences. A response sheet was provided for their answers. The participants N-vere 
instructed to click the light bulb with their mouse to move on to the next set of sentences. 
After an entire set of sentences was presented, the participants task was to recall the final 
word in each sentence, in the order in which they had seen them. The verbal span task 
included a total of 25 sentence sets, 5 sets at each level ranging from two-sentence to six- 
sentence sets, and participants were presented with increasingly longer sets of sentences. 
The participants also received practice sets of sentences at the two-sentence set level (see 
Appendix A 1.4 for a full set of instructions). 
Scoring 
The participant's complex verbal span score was defined as the highest set size for which all 
of the final words of the sentences were recalled in the correct sequence, for at least three of 
the five sets. Half a point was added to the score if the participant's recall was accurate on 
two of the five sets at the next set size. The maximum score obtainable for the verbal span 
measure was 6. A global score was also calculated for this task as follows. If a participant 
was accurate on a set, regardless of level, they received a point for each correctly recalled 
final word (e. g., participant gets four 2-sets correct and three 3-sets, global score = ((4*2) 
(3*3) = 17)). The maximum score obtainable for the global measure was 100. The number 
of errors made in the verification component of the task (true/false judgement) was also 
collected (verbal error). 
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Complex Spatial Letter Span (letter) 
Procedure 
This task was based on one used b-v Shah and Miyake (1996). The spatial task "vas desiumed 
as a span measure of functional working memory capacity for spatial information. The task 
requires the simultaneous maintenance and processing of spatial information. A single trial 
consisted of the individual presentation of a small set of normal or mirror-imaged letters (F. 
J, L, P, or R) on a computer screen. The same letter was used throughout a set. and the 
participant was told which letter would appear on the screen in that particular trial. Each 
letter was presented in one of seven orientations (in 45' increments, excluding the upri-ght 
orientation), and each of the 70 possible combinations (letters x orientations x 
normal/mirror- image status ) appeared once in the task. The presentation of letters was 
constrained such that opposing orientations were not presented successively Ný ithin a set and 
that the same orientation could appear only once in the same set. Shah and Miyake's (1996') 
design was altered slightly due to the problems found in the pilot study. The task differs 
from Shah and Miyake's (1996) task where stated below. The participant was asked to 
respond to whether the letter was 'normal' or 'mirror-imaged' by clicking the mouse in the 
appropriate box on the screen - Shah and Miyake's (1996) participants responded aloud and 
a trained experimenter then recorded their response. The letter remained on the screen for a 
maximum of I OOOms after the participant had pressed one of the boxes indicating 'non-nal' 
or 'm irror- image'. Shah and Miyake (1996) used a maximum of 200ms at this stage. Ifno 
response was made the letter remained on the screen for 50OOms. Shah and Miyake (1996) 
used a maximum of 2200ms at this stage. The next letter appeared on the screen following 
a delay of 250ms. After the entire set of letters was presented, a diamond-shaped grid 
appeared on the screen with el, -, ht -buttons- indicating the seven possible orientations (plus 
upright). The task of the participant was to use a mouse to click in the direction of the top 
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ofeach letter in the order of appearance. After the participant clicked on the appropriate 
number of buttons, the grid disappeared from the screen and the first letter of the next trial 
appeared. The spatial span task included a total of 20 letter sets. 5 sets at each level ran-g"112' 
from two-letter to five-letter sets, and participants were presented with increasingly longer 
sets of letters. The participants also received practice sets of letters at the t,, N-o-letter set 
level. Following is an example of set of letters at the two letter level. The first letter 
appears on the screen as shown in Figure 3.4. For each letter. participants must remember 
the orientation of the letter as well as processing it as normal or mirror-irriaged. Then a 
second letter appears on the screen as shown in Figure 3.5. Follox\ln,, the presentation of' 
the two letters, a recall grid appears on screen onto which the participant InOLISe-Clicks the 
correct orientation of each letter in the set, in the order they were presented, as shown in 
FIgUre 3.6. 
Figure 3.4- Letter span. representation of letter I 
1 
-3) 
5 
PRACTICE TRIAL W 
Normal Mirrored 
Figure 3.5- Letter span, representation of letter 21 
Figure 3.6- Letter span. recall grid for letters tý -- 
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Scoring 
The participant's complex spatial span score v, -as defined as the highest set size for which all 
of the spatial orientations of the letters -, vere recalled in the correct sequence. for at least 
three of the five sets. Half a point was added to the score if the participant's recall was 
accurate on two of the fit've sets at the next set size. When a participant successfully recalled 
less than three of the five sets at a particular level but was able to recall two or more sets at a 
higher level, the average of the lower and the upper limits , vas used as the span score (limits 
score). The maximum score obtainable for the span or 11 imits measure was A -, -, 
Iobal 
score was also calculated for this task. When a participant Nvas correct on a full set of 
letters, regardless of set-size, they were awarded one point per correctly recalled letter. The 
maximum score obtainable for the global measure vvas 70. The number of errors made in 
the verification component of the task (norm al/mi rror- image judgement) ý\ as also recorded 
(letter error). 
Complex Spatial Tic-Tac-Toe Span (TTT) 
Procedure 
This task was also designed as a span measure of ftinctional working memory capacity for 
spatial information. The task requires the simultaneous maintenance and processing of 
spatial information. The procedure followed was as Daneman and Tardifs (1987) study. 
Participants had to identify a series of winning lines in a game of three-dimensional tic-tac- 
toe. Each A4 card depicted a two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional tic-tac- 
toe game. The card was divided into a top, middle, and bottom panel, each containing a 30 
cell grid xvIiich participants were to imagine as the top, middle. and bottom platforms on a 
three-dimensional tic-tac-toe board. Some of the cells were occupied by red and blue tokens 
representim, the pieces of the two plavers in the -, ame. III Z--l -- 
Embedded in this configuration of 
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tokens was a winning sequence, that is.. three tokens of the same colour that formed a 
straight line in conformity with the rules of three-dimensional tic-tac-toe (a line that was 
horizontal, vertical. or diagonal in a two-dimensional or three-dimensional plane). tlic 
participant's task in each case was to locate the Nvinning line. Participants saw one card at a 
time and identified the winning line by touching the three tokens with their index finucr. At 
the end of a set of two, three, or four cards, participants had to recall the locations of cach 
winning line in the set by pointing to the correct positions on an actual three-dimensional 
tic-tac-toe game board. Participants were given several practice items at the two winiung 
lines level before the test began. They were warned to expect the amount of winning lines 
per set to increase during the course of the test. The span test consisted of five sets each of 
two, three, and four winning lines. Participants were presented with increasingly long sets 
of cards. Participants continued through all of the fifteen sets (five sets each of two, three, 
and four cards). Following is an example of a set of lines at the two line level. Please note 
that the representations shown in Figures 3.7 to 3.9 are from the computerised version of the 
task used in Experiment 2 onwards. The first line appears on a card as shov, -n in Figure 3.7. 
For each winning line, participants must remember its orientation whilst processing it by 
pointing out its position. Then a second line appears on a card as shown in Figure 3.8. 
Following the presentation of the two lines, a real 3-dimensional recall grid is used onto 
which the participant points out the correct winning lines in the set, in the order they had 
been presented, as shown in Figure 3.9. 
Scoring 
The number of sets correctly recalled, per line, was taken as a measure of a participant ,s 
complex spatial TTT span. For example, if a participant was correct on all five of the mo- 
card sets. and only one of the five three-card sets, he/she was assigned a span of 1 3) 
( "+2+2+2+" 13). Ifapartici 2+- ipant was correct on four out of the fi,, e tý, vo-card sets. two 
13 8 
out ofthe five three-card sets, and one of the five four-card sets. he/she was assigned a , pan 
of 18 (2+2+2+2+3+3+4=1 8). The maximum score obtainable on this task , vas 45. 
0 
XD 
XX 
Figure 3.7- TTT span, representation of winning line I 
xl 
X0 ý 
X 
101 
X0 
ý ýx 
Figure 3.8- TTT span. representation of winning line 2 
139 
Figure 3.9- TTT span, recall grid for winning lines 
Spatial Inference (spatial ver) 
Procedure 
The procedure followed was based on Byrne and Johnson-Laird's (1989) study. Fach 
participant received 24 two-dimensional spatial problems. The order of presentation was 
randomised before the start of the experiment but remained in this order for each participant. 
The spatial problems were used from each of four possible orientations as shown in Figure 
3.10. 
A D C A E 
D 
Figure 3- 10 - Four possible orientations for five-terrn series spatial problerns 
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All 24 problems had valid conclusions. Half of the spatial problems, according to model- 
based theory, had one model answers. Figure. 33. II presents an example of this. 
Premises Models 
The apple is on the left of the orange AOB 
The banana is on the right of the orange MP 
The melon is in front of the apple 
The peach is in front of the banana 
Hence, what is the relationship between the melon and the peach? 
Figure 3.11 -A one model spatial problem 
Only one model or spatial array of the premises can be used herc to describe the layout of 
the objects within this set. The correct answer would be that the melon is to the left of the 
peach. The other half of the spatial problems, according to model-based theory, were 
consistent with two models or spatial arrangements, but'ýNerc -valid. Figure 3.12 shokvs an 
example of this. 
Premises 
The torch is on the right of the hammer 
The drill is on the left of the torch 
The spanner is in front of the drill 
The pliers are in front of the torch 
Models 
HDTDHT 
sP 
Hence, what is the relationship between the spanner and the pliers? 
Figure 3 . 12 -A multi model spatial problem 
141 
More than one model of the premises can be used here to describe the layout of the objects 
within this set. In both of these models it holds that the spanner is to the left of the pliers. 
A full list of all the problems used can be found in Appendix Al. 5. The participants were 
given instructions by way of an example. They N,, -ere told that the experimenter would read 
aloud a description of the layout of some objects, which they could imagine arranged on the 
floor in front of them. They were encouraged to listen attentivelý-. The description was read 
to them twice at a reasonable pace. They were then asked about the location of two of the 
objects, e. g., "What is the relation between the dish and the spoon? " The participants were 
told that their answers must include one of the following: to the left of. to the right of 
behind, in front, and not enough information to tell. The two items requiring the participant 
to infer a relationship were always the pair of items (the D and the E in the examples) that 
were not explicitly interrelated in any premise of the four-premise problems. The 
participants were provided with an answer sheet for their responses to the 24 spatial 
problems. The participants were given a practice probtern before they began the test items to 
ensure they understood the process of fonning a conclusion and the format that each 
problem was in (see Appendix Al. 6 for a full set of instructions). 
Scoring 
The number of spatial problems correctly solved (out of a maximum of 24) was taken as a 
participanfs score for the spatial reasoning task. This figure was then used in the main 
analysis. In addition, it was noted how many of each type of problem (one-model or two- 
model) was solved. This was used in further analysis to test the assumptions made bý, the 
mental model theory of reasoning. 
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Syllogistic Inference (sylls ver) 
Procedure 
A series of 20 syllogisms was presented to each participant. The order of presentation was 
randomised at the start of the experiment and then remained in that order for each 
participant. The syllogisms were used from all of the four possible figures: AB-BC. BA- 
CB, AB-CB, and BA-BC- All of the syllogisms used had valid conclusions. Twelve 
syllogisms, according to the model-based theory, had one model answers. Fi, ure 'I - 1. ) 
shows an example of this. 
Premises (AB-BC) 
Some of the Welders are Builders 
All of the Builders are Carpenters 
Figure 3.13 -A one model syllogistic problem 
Ilodels 
W [[B] C] 
W [[B] C] 
Only one model of the premises can be used to describe the relationships between the 
classes. The correct answer here would be that some of the welders are carpenters. Eight of 
the syllogisms, according to model-based theory, had more than one model answers, but 
were valid. Figure 3.14 presents an example of this. 
Prenilses (AB-BC) 
Some of the Electricians are Bakers 
None of the Bakers are Geologists 
Models 
E [B] E [B] E [B] 
E [B] E [B] E [B] 
[G] E [G] E [G] 
[G] [G] E [G] 
Figure 3.14 -A multi model syllogistic problem 
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More than one model of the premises can be used to descnbe the relationships between the 
classes. The correct answer here would be that some of the electricians are not geologists as 
this is the only conclusion that holds across all three models. A full list of all the problems 
used can be found in Appendix ALT Instructions that were olven to the participants 
included a full explanation of what the task required. The participants NN cre told to provide 
a conclusion to the information given in the two statements. The participants were given an 
example of a syllogistic argument, and v, -ere shown all the quantifiers that Nvere possible in 
the conclusion: all, some, none, some .... not, and not enough information to tell. 
The 
participants were told that the written instructions could be kept in front of them to assist in 
the answering of the set of problems. The participants wcre given a practicc syllogism 
before they began the test items to ensure tliev understood the process of forming, a 
conclusion and the format that each problem , vas in. Each syllogism . vas read aloud to the 
participant twice, at a reasonable pace. They were always told xvhich two terms in the 
premises to link together in the conclusion. The participants were instructed to %%rite their 
conclusion to the syllogism on the response sheet provided (see Appendix Al. 8 for a full set 
of instructions). 
Scoring 
The number of syllogisms correctly solved (out of a possible maximum of 20) was taken as 
the participant's score on the syllogistic reasoning task. This figure was then used in the 
main analysis. In addition, it was noted how many of each type of problem (e. g. one- 
model, or multi-model) was solved. This was used in further analysis to test the 
assumptions made by the mental model theory of reasoning. 
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Spatial Ability (spat ability) 
Procedure 
This task was taken from the National Foundation for Educational Research (Smith & 
Whetton, 1988). The General Ability Tests provide four separate assessments. The present 
study used one of those assessments, the Spatial Ability I-est. The test required the 
encoding, rotation and comparison of complex visual images. The participants task ý\ as to 
imagine what a flat pattern would look like if it were cut out and folded into a solid object. 
The participants were given a booklet of 20 flat patterns, each of v, -hich had four solid 
objects shown below the flat pattern. They were also giveii a response sliect. Their task 
was to answer 'no' if one of the four solid objects definitely could not be made and 'ves' if 
one of the objects definitely could be made from the relative flat pattern. The participants 
were given fully standardised instructions. 
Scoring 
If the participant accurately responded to a yes/no question, they received a point. The 
maximum score obtainable on this task was 80. 
Verbal Ability and Reading Rate (ver ability, RR) 
Procedure 
The task used to measure participants verbal ability was part of the Nelson-Denny Reading 
Test (Brown, Bennett and Hanna, 198 1). The Nelson-Denny Test provides an assessment of 
the skills involved in the reading process - reading comprehension, vocabulary 
development, and reading rate. The present study used the reading comprehension and 
reading rate measures. The participants task was to read completely through a passage of 
text and then answer the questions folloxving that passage. The questions had multiple 
choice answers (fix e choices per question). The participants were given a booklet of eight 
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passages. They were also given a response sheet. The participants readmLy rate xxas 
assessed in the first minute of the test. This -was achieved by timing ho-w far each 
participant read within that minute on a standardised scoring sheet per line of text. Thý: 
participants were given fully standardised instructions. 
Scoring 
If the participant accurately responded to a multiple choice question. thc% received a pollit. 
The maximum score obtainable on this task was 336. The standard scale present in the 
Nelson-Denny test was used to assess a participant's readinu rate. It7 
3.2.3 Results 
In addition to correlational analyses and t-tests, confirmatory factor analysis was also 
performed on the data from this experiment. Analyses based on correlations and 
comparison of means will be reported here, but the factor analysis for all of the first three 
experiments will be discussed in a factor analytic section after Experiment 3. 
Please note that from now on all the task names will be simplified for use in the results 
section. The labelling will be as marked in brackets in the procedure section - for instance, 
the complex spatial letter span will be expressed as letter in the results section. There are a 
number of options for scoring many of the span tasks. However, only one method per task 
will be used throughout the results section. Reasons for use of particular scoring methods 
xvill be explained below. The cross-correlations of the global, normal and limits span scores 
N\ ere between r= . 76* * and r= . 95 ***. This suggests that the measures reflect the same 
underlying processing capacity. The global score was chosen for use due to it being a I-- 
continuous -, ariable N\ ith a Nvider range. The global score NN-111 be used throughout the 
following six expcriments t'Or the arro\\. \\ord and ýcrbal spans. For the letter span a floor 
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effect in the normal spatial letter span score was found. The following anal-, sis accounts for 
this by using the spatial letter limits score, as described in the method section. This limits 
score was calculated by taking the average score between a participarifs lowest and highest 
set size (the intercorrelation between the spatial letter span and spatial letter limits , core ý\ as 
. 76* *). 
3.2.3. I Descriptive Statistics 
One participant was dropped following an examination of the descriptive statistics and 
scatterplots for the arrow s an. There was an outlying score which was ske%ving this p 
measure (a low score). The participant also voiced concern during the experiment in 
relation to their ability to continue xvith other tasks. The participant generally under- 
performed on all tasks, and was considered to be unrepresentative of scores obtained by all 
others within the sample. Without this participant, the distribution of scores was rouglily 
normal for all the tasks. Thus, the participant who scored 0.0 on the arrow span was 
dropped and the rest of the analysis was run on 45, not 46, participants. Table 3.1 shoN\ s 
descriptive statistics and reliabilities for the nine measures used in Experiment 1. 
Due to different (but related) scoring methods being used for the span measures, as opposed 
to Shah and Miyake's (1996) data, it is hard to make meaningful comparisons of average 
scores and standard deviations with those they obtained. Experiment 1 uses the global score 
\ý here as Shah and Miyake (1996) used the strict span score. Regardless of these related 
scoring methods the data from the span measures, using the scoring method described 
previously. do indicate a good overall range. There are no heavilv skewed distributions. 
indicatim, the absence of floor and ceiling effects. 
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It is of interest here that on the verbal span task. participants made on average almost 8 
errors (8%) in total when making the true/false judgement in processing. Also. participants 
made on average almost 9 errors (13 %) in total v, -hen making the normal/mi rror-imaged 
judgement in processing. These error levels are similar for both the complex verbal and 
complex letter span tasks. These levels are well below that expected if a guessing strategý 
(50% error rate) had been used by participants. This finding suggests that participants are 
attempting both the processing and storage components of the tasks. 
Mean SD Min Max Skewness Reliability 
Span Tasks 
arrow 25.38 10.26 10 54 . 54 . 77 
word 49.31 15.43 26 94 . 96 . 76 
verbal 34.09 17.00 8 71 . 42 . 92 
verbal error 7.76 5.67 0 27 1.33 - 
letter 3.08 1.10 0 5 -1.26 . 69 
letter error 8.78 5.97 1 26 1.17 - 
TTT 17.71 8.26 6 45 1.05 . 51 
Reasoning Tasks 
spatial ver 14.18 4.25 7 23 . 15 . 77 
spatver IM 8.20 2.56 3 12 -. 28 - 
spatverMM 5.98 2.57 1 11 . 13 - 
sylls ver 9.98 2.35 4 18 . 94 . 
45 
syllsverlM 8.78 1.36 4 10 -1.32 - 
syllsverMM 1.20 2.07 0 8 2.04 - 
Ability Tasks 
spat ability 61.11 10.87 33 80 -. 73 - 
ver ability 22.36 6.56 5 33 -. 94 - 
RR 253.58 60.05 162 413 . 60 - 
Table 3.1- Descriptive statistics for Experiment I tasks (n=45) 
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"Fable 3.1 also shows data for the reasoning and ability measures. The spatial and verbal 
ability measures show a good overall range of scores indicating the varied performance 
levels for the participants. 
Each span task was inspected for each participant to ensure internal reliability o f- the 
measures. Their reliability was assessed by performing a split-half test calculation on eýich 
of the five span measures used. The Spearman-Brown formula , N-as then used to provide an 
estimate of reliability for each task. If a corrected correlation of over r= . 70 is obtained, the 
result is highly satisfactory for group measurement (Rust & Golombok, 1999). If a 
corrected correlation of over r= . 50 is obtained, the result is adequate for group 
measurement (Rust & Golombok, 1999). Any corrected correlation beloxv r= . 50 is 
considered inadequate for use (Rust & Golombok, 1999). The corrected correlations for the 
span tasks were as in Table 3). 1. Table 3.1 shows that the arrow. word and verbal span tasks 
produced a reliable odd-even corrected correlation of over r= . 75. The letter span produced 
an odd-even corrected correlation at an adequate level. The non-computerised TTT span 
produced the lowest corrected correlation of r= .51, but this is still of some value 
in group 
measurement. This lower reliability for the non-computerised TTT span may have been due 
to an audience effect - the experimenter was involved at every stage of the task and may 
have inadvertently influenced responses made by the participants. It might also be due to 
the non-computerised nature of the task. Procedural differences between participants are 
more likely when the Experimenter is implementing a non-computerised version of the task, 
rather than the standardised computer-based ones. 
Each reasoning measure was also assessed for internal reliability using Cronbach's alpha. 
This method assesscs reliability from the consistency of all items in the sum scales and 
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thereby reduces the arbitrariness of the split-half method xhich just divides the scale in a 
random manner. As seen in Table 3.1, the reliability estimate for the spatial reasoning task 
was adequate for group measurement (r = . 77). The reliability estimate for the syllogistic 
reasoning task was just below an adequate level for group measurement (r=. 45) 
3.2.3 .2 The Span Measures 
Correlational analysis was carried out on the data in order to assess the relationships 
between the nine measures used in Experiment I (see Appendix B 1.7 for a full matrix). 
Significant relationships would suggest some commonalities between the tasks. Due to the 
size of the whole matrix, it has been split into sections in order to ans\ýer specific questions. 
The correlational analysis begins by examining the prediction that a dissociation , vould be 
expected between the complex verbal and spatial spans, as in Shah and Miyake (1996). Fhe 
correlation matrix for Experiment I span measures is presented in Table 3.2. 
Firstly, Table 3.2 shows the highest correlation is betv, -een the complex verbal and word 
span measures at (r =. 59, p <. 001). This is unsurprising given the similarity between 
material to be remembered, in this instance words. It is of note that the word span is 
assumed to measure passive resources of working memory, whilst the verbal span is 
assumed to measure active and passive resources of working memory. The word span also 
correlated significantly with the two complex spatial measures, letter and TTT (r =. 42. r= 
39, p <. 01), but not with the simple arrov, - span (r = . 23). The word span correlated 
significantly with the complex spatial spans which might indicate that an element of both 
spatial measures involved similar processes to that of the word span. 
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arrow word verbal verbal err letter letter err 
arrow I 
word . 23 1 
verbal . 11 . 59*** 1 
verbal err . 05 -. 17 -. 29- 1 
letter .31* . 42** . 37* -. 28- 1 
letter err -. 12 -. 24 -. 41 ** . 49*** -. 27' 1 
TTT . 08 . 39** . 31* -. 25' . 55*** -. 218 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '= p <0.1, * =p <0.05, ** =p<0.01, *** =p <0.001) 
Table 3.2- Experiment I correlations between the five span tasks 
An absence of a correlation between the word and arrow spans would be expected if the two 
tasks were in fact tapping into the two sub-systems of working memory which are thought 
to be separate resources. The second highest correlation was between the two complex 
spatial spans (at r =. 55, p <. 001). This would be expected if they rely on similar 
information and are tapping into common properties afforded by the same resource. The 
only significant correlation in relation to the simple arrow span was with the complex letter 
span (r = .31, p< . 
05). This finding was also seen in Shah and Miyake's (1996) data. Of 
note here is the fact that the arrow span did not correlate with the complex TTT span (r = 
08). The complex verbal span also correlated significantly with both the complex spatial 
spans. This indicates that there may be similar processes common to all, and is not 
consistent with the dissociation between verbal and spatial resources over and above the 
sub-systems of working memory. 
Lastly, the processing error associated with the complex verbal and letter spans was looked 
at. There was a significant cross correlation between these two types of error (r = . 49, p< 
. 05). 
These two tasks rely upon very different Information (true/false versus normaUmirror- 
image judgements) but seem to be related in some way. If there was a dissociation between 
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the way we process verbal and spatial information, this correlation would not be expected. 
The error associated with the complex verbal and complex letter spans correlated negatively 
with all the complex span measures (r= -. 25 to r=-. 29, p <. 10 for verbal error. r=-. 27to 
r=-. 4 1, p<. 10 to p< .01 for letter error). This suggests that as an individuals perfon-nance 
improves on the complex verbal and complex letter spans, their processing error on the 
complex spans decreases. It also suggests that people making errors on the processing 
component are also making errors on the memory component of the tasks. 
There are two major findings here. The first is that no clear dissociation was seen between 
the complex span measures, a finding inconsistent with Shah and Miyake (1996). The data 
indicates there are significant correlations between all the complex span measures. This 
may lead to the conclusion that the complex spans are tapping a common resource of 
working memory. The second finding is that there is no significant correlation, although 
they are still positively related, between the simple spans. This may be expected if these 
measures reflect the passive storage capacity of the PL and VSSP systems of working 
memory. 
3.2.3.3 The Span and Reasoning Measures 
The next set of correlations refer to the relationships between the span measures and the 
reasoning measures. The data in Table 3.3 refers to whether individual differences in 
working memory predict individual differences in both spatial and syllogistic reasoning, and 
spatial and verbal abilities. Past dual-task literature has shown that spatial and syllogistic 
reasoning involve the CE component of working memory, whilst it is less clear of the role 
played by the two sub-systems. The reasoning tasks shown in Table 3.3 would be expected 
to show relationships with the complex measures of working memory. The extent to which 
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spatial reasoning and syllogistic reasoning tasks relate to particular complex span tasks may 
lead to a better understanding of the role of spatial and verbal working memorý- resources in 
deduction. 
arrow 
span 
word 
span 
verbal 
span 
letter 
span 
TTT 
span 
spatial 
ver 
syllogisms 
-ver 
spatial verbal 
ability ability 
spatial ver . 10 . 50*** . 36* . 24 . 48*** 1 
sylls ver . 43 
** . 40* . 30* . 37* . 10 . 27' 1 
spatial ability . 26' . 06 . 19 -. 05 -. 00 -. 12 . 
28' 1 
verbal ability . 12 . 12 . 10 . 19 . 
22 -. 09 -. 04 . 11 1 
RR -. 10 . 20 . 32* . 05 . 03 -. 
12 -. 13 . 07 S-)*** 
(two-tailed sig. levels: ' =p <0.1, * =p<0.05 ,=P <0.01, *** = P<0.001) 
Table 3.3- Experiment I correlations between the span, reasoning and ability tasks 
Considering first the verbally presented spatial reasoning task (spatial ver), Table 3.3 shows 
the best predictors are the word (r = . 50, p< . 001) and 
TTT (r = . 48, p <. 001) spans, and to 
a lesser extent the verbal span (r = . 36, p< . 05). 
These results are consistent with past 
results investigating the relationship between spatial reasoning and working memory. For 
instance, Vandierendonck and De Vooght (1997) found that dual-tasks assumed to load both 
the verbal and spatial stores, as well as those secondary tasks assumed to load the CE, 
interfered with spatial inference as a primary task. The correlation between the spatial task 
and the TTT span may suggest that both tasks rely on common processes that are spatial in 
nature. This correlation might also suggest that both these tasks rely on general working 
memory resources. This is because all of the complex span measures shown in Table 3.2 
correlate significantly, perhaps suggesting a common resource for both verbal and spatial 
material. The correlation between the spatial task and the word span may suggest that both 
tasks rely on common processes - the necessity of holding in mind premise information. 
153 
Perhaps the verbal presentation mode increased the load on verbal working memory. This 
finding will be followed up in Experiments 2 and 3 by controlling for modality differences 
(presenting problems both verbally and visually). The last significant correlation was 
between the spatial reasoning task and the verbal span (r = .36, p< . 05), suggesting the 
need, in both tasks, to store and process verbal information. So for the verbally presented 
spatial reasoning task, the results shown in Table 3.3 are consistent with the view that both 
spatial and verbal resources of working memory are required in order to solve five-term 
series spatial inferences. In addition, it may be assumed from this data that some sort of 
passive verbal storage is also required (link with word span) in order to perfonn the task. 
Turning now to the verbally presented syllogistic reasoning task (syllogisms ver), Table 3.3 
shows the syllogistic task is predicted by all the complex and simple span measures, apart 
from the TTT span (correlations ranging between r =. 30 and r=. 43). Onepossible 
interpretation of this is that both verbal and spatial strategies are used in order to solve a 
verbally presented syllogistic task. These results are compatible with the notion that both 
spatial and verbal resources of working memory are required in order to solve verbally 
presented syllogistic reasoning tasks. Again, however, due to the fact that the complex span 
measures correlated significantly, a general resource explanation of these correlations may 
provide the best account. 
Table 3.3 presents a generally positive matrix where both reasoning tasks are concerned. 
The data in Table 3.3 indicates that the word and verbal spans consistently predict 
performance on both reasoning tasks, spatial and syllogistic. The pattern becomes more 
complicated in relation to the spatial spans, although they do predict the reasoning tasks 
overall. The data in Table 3.3 also shows that performance on spatial reasoning moderately 
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correlated %vith performance on syllogistic reasoning (r=. 27,. p<. l0), althouP-hthisIsa 
borderline effect. 
Finally, the ability measures will be discussed in relation to the span measures used. Table 
3.3 shows a significant correlation between reading rate and the verbal spaii. One possible 
explanation for this is that efficiency in the processing of sentences is aided by quicker rates 
of reading. Table 3.3 also shows a highly significant correlation betAecn verbal ability and 
reading rate (r = . 52, p< . 001). This would be expected due to them being related 
components of the same standardised task. Table 3.3 indicates no further significant 
relationships between the span measures and spatial or verbal ability tasks. Shah and 
Miyake (1996) did find significant correlations bet,, veen spatial and vei-bal abilities with 
spatial and verbal spans, respectively. The results shoxvn in Table 3.3 differ from Shah and 
Miyake's (1996) results which is quite surprising. An explanation for this could be specific 
to the particular tasks used in this experiment. Experiment I used different abilitv measures 
to those used by Shah and Miyake (1996), although it is not clear \\hN, the abillty tasks here 
are not correlating with working memory capacity. This discrepancy remains an unsolved 
issue with respect to the ability measures that merits further investigation. However, the 
main focus of this thesis is on deductive reasoning, and it should be noted that there was no 
further inclusion of ability measures in the following studies. 
3.2.3.4 Further Analysis 
What follows is other analysis carried out on the data relating to the easy/hard divide in both 
the spatial and syllogistic task. Past research suggests that problems that only need one 
model to be constructed in order to reach a conclusion should be easier than problems where 
multiple models are needed. 
1ýý 
correct 
spatial IM 68 
spatialMM 50 
syllogismsIm 73 
syllogismsmm 1ý 
Table 3.4 - Experiment I% of correct responses to IM and MM problems 
Problem difficulty percentages for the spatial and syllogistic task are presented in Table 3.4. 
The IM problems, both spatial and syllogistic, are solved more often than the N I\ 1 
problems. An average of 14 out of 24 (5 8%) verbally presented spatial inferences \ý ere 
solved, 8 of which were single model problems. An average of 10 out of 20 (50%) verbally 
presented syllogistic inferences were solved. 9 of which \ý ere single model problems. To 
confirm the significance of these differences, t-tests were performed on the data (see 
Appendix B 1.1 for full results). Participants performed at a significantly higher rate on both 
the syllogistic and spatial one model problems, than the corresponding multi-model 
problems (d. f. = 44, t= 19.5, p= . 001; d. 
f = 44, t=5.2, p= . 005 respectively). 
3.2.4 Discussion 
The results from Experiment I suggest that individual differences in working memory 
capacity can explain variation in performance on syllogistic and five-term series spatial 
tasks. Fxperiment I also addressed the separability issue of central resources ý, vithin 
\N orking memory. Experiment I followed the same types of predictions made by Shah and 
Miyake (1996), but based on deductive reasoning problems. There was no indication that 
one reasoning task could be better predicted by verbal than spatial span tasks, and vicc 
N ersa. Both the verbal and spatial spans predicted indiN idual differences on the reasoning 
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tasks, a similar pattern of correlations being observed for both the syllogistic and spatial 
inference measures, when verbally presented. 
Positive relationships were shown between the span measures used in Experiment 1. These 
results do not replicate the dissociation between verbal and spatial working memory shown 
by Shah and Miyake (1996). There was no indication that five-term series problems were 
best predicted by spatial working memory and syllogisms by verbal working memory, even 
at the level of the simple span measures, that are assumed to measure the relatively passive 
PL and VSSP resources. 
The complex working memory spans were designed in order to assess individual differences 
in centrally processed information. The verbal and spatial span tasks consisted of different 
processing and storage components, indicating the verbal or spatial nature of the task. For 
instance, the verbal span combined the active task of verifying sentences as true or false 
with the passive task of remembering the last words of each sentence. Where as, the letter 
span combined the active task of verifying letters as normal or mirror-imaged with the 
passive task of remembering the orientation of each letter in a set. These complex measures 
of working memory were shown to cross correlate significantly. In addition, the processing 
components of the tasks also cross-correlated significantly. This suggests that both span 
tasks draw on common resources - this resource may be identified as a domain general 
working memory resource. This interpretation suggests that there may be a common central 
resource of working memory which is tapped by both the working memory span measures. 
the processing components of these tasks, and the reasoning tasks. This will be further 
addressed in the factor analysis section at the end of this experimental series. 
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The aims outlined at the start of this experiment relied upon the assumption that a 
dissociation would be observed between verbal and spatial complex working memorý- spans. 
This was not found and so no clear evidence can be forwarded for a separation of CE 
resources of working memory, as measured by the complex spans. Consequently. due to 
this lack of dissociation, no clear interpretation can be made of the verbal versus spatial 
resources that different reasoning tasks rely upon. In addition, another expectation was that 
the simple word and arrow spans would be dissociated for verbal and spatial information, 
respectively. Again, there was no clear indication of this, although they showed a low 
positive correlation, perhaps questioning the assumption that the simple spans map onto the 
PL and VSSP systems of working memory specifically. What can be said when looking at 
this correlational data is that there is clear evidence that working memory capacity did 
predict deductive reasoning performance. 
As well as the deductive tasks correlating with the capacity measures, they also correlated 
marginally well together. Although a small sample was used here, these results are not 
inconsistent with Stanovich and West (1998). They showed that a range of deductive 
measures correlated significantly together and with measures of cognitive ability. Their 
result is consistent with the findings here in that the spatial and syllogistic task showed a 
borderline relationship with each other and with the capacity measures. 
The extent to which these findings are consistent with the theoretical accounts of syllogistic 
and spatial reasoning, presented at the beginning of the chapter, is also of interest. 
However, any interpretation must be considered in light of the failure to find a clear 
dissociation between the complex span measures, discussed above. Nevertheless, these 
findings do have implications for the three classes of reasoning theory discussed In Chapter 
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2. The findings clearly show that working memory correlates vvith reasoning performance. 
which is consistent with the processing theories. However, it is difficult to distinguish Z-- 
between the processing accounts in relation to verbal or spatial representations. 
Nevertheless, the finding that reasoning draws on working memory resources is a challenge 
to accounts that suggest that reasoning involves a low processing load, for instance the 
heuristic accounts. This will be summarised in more detail in the general discussion at the 
end of this chapter. 
The reasoning tasks in Experiment I were presented verbally which entails keeping the 
premise information in mind. A possible interpretation of the results found is that 
performance on both types of problems first requires the interpretation of the linguistic 
information given in each premise. This link with verbal comprehension or processing may 
explain the relationships of both syllogistic and spatial inferences with the simple and 
complex verbal working memory resources. The verbal information may then be processed 
by the manipulation of some form of mental model. If the manipulation of such a mental 
model is spatial in nature then spatial working memory capacity should predict performance 
of both syllogistic and spatial inferences. The spatial inferences correlated highest with the 
word span, which at first glance seemed to disagree with the many authors maintaining a 
spatial model explanation. Assuming that the word span measures the capacity of the PL, a 
possibility might be that people are relying on their passive phonological store to hold in 
mind premise information due to the verbal presentation modality. They may need to 
translate this verbal information before constructing a mental model. 
Further investigation was needed to investigate the influence of modality of each of the 
reasoning tasks (verbal versus visual presentation). The pattern of correlations between the 
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word span and the spatial inference problems indicated that indiN iduals may be holding 
premise information in mind before being able to translate and interpret it. By presenting 
them visually, the need to keep the premise information in mind may be reduced. Hence. 
there may be less involvement of the PL, as measured by the word span. Reductions might 
be expected in the correlations between verbal working memor\ and spatial inferences, but 
especially with the simple word span. Thus, Experiment 2 investioated the r-- 
interrelationships between the span measures and performance on five-term senes spatial 
reasoning problems using both verbal and visual presentations. 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 2 
3.3.1 Aim 
The pattern of findings in Experiment I suggested that both syllogistic and spatial 
inferences are predicted by a sub-set of both verbal and spatial ýwrking memory capacity 
measures. This may have been because the verbal presentation involved keeping in mind 
premise information. Therefore, the correlations with verbal working memory are perhaps 
not unexpected. However. this does not necessarily show that the deductive processes 
involved in the tasks involve similar processes to those involved in the verbal span tasks. 
Thus, the main aim of Experiments 2 and 3 is to examine this by controlling for modalitý' of 
presentation. 
Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick and Wynn (1993) investigated syllogisms, presented both 
vcrbally and visually. together with dual tasks proposed to load the xNorking memory sub- 
components. The\- proposed that presenting the syllogisms verbally vvould cause a higher 
memory load due to holding in mind the premise information and that conversely, 
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presenting the syllogisms visually, so that the premises %ý ere continuously available for 
inspection, would lower the memorv load. Indeed. a significant effect of memon- load on 
accuracy of syllogistic performance vvas obtained. Experiments 2 and ') investiL,, itc the 
influence of presentation mode - both spati I111 ial and syllogistic tasks \\-']I be presented in both 
modalities, together with a range of working memory measures. 
Experiment 2 used four working memory span tasks: one complex spatial measure, oiie 
complex verbal measure (Daneman & Tardif. 1987: Daneman & Carpenter. 1980). and a 
simple spatial and verbal measure (Shah & Miyake. 1996). The span tasks were , iN-cn 
together with two reasoning tasks, a spatial inference task presented both verbally and 
visually. It might be expected that when the spatial inferences are presented visually, a 
higher accuracy rate is indicated in performance than when tlic% are presented verbally. The 
tasks were as Experiment I unless otherwise stated. 
The complex spatial letter span task was not used in Experiment 2 due to the following 
reasons. Firstly the two complex spatial span measures from Experiment 1, letter and TTT 
spans, correlated significantly (r=. 55). This would suggest some similarity between the 
types of information being remembered and the resources required to respond to those tasks. 
Of all the computerised span tasks, the letter span measure showed the lowest reliability (r = 
69). The non-computerised version of the complex TTT span also showed a low reliabilit"'. 
although in this study a computerised version of the task was developed. Computerising the 
TTT span would alleviate the effect of the Experimenter (an audience) that niay have 
contributed to its low reliability in Experiment 1. Due to major time constraints in running 
individual differences studies, it was decided that only one complex spatial span could 
viably fit into the time scheme. Therefore, a version of the complex TTT span, compatible 
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with the other span task methodologies, -, vas used instead of both the letter and non- 
computerised TTT tasks. 
Experiment 2 in this series examines the extent to which the patterns of correlation in 
Experiment I resulted from the modalitv of presentation of the fiN e-term series relational 
reasoning problems. The additional visual reasoning task will allo\ý the assessment of 
resource differences dependent on task modality. A reduction of the involvement of the PL 
component, as measured by the word span, might be expected when presenting the spatial 
task vIsLially. Experiment 2 again addressed the separability issue of central reSOUrces 
within working memory. Experiment 2 allows a further test of the separability hypothesis 
(Shah and Miyake, 1996). 
3.3.2 Method 
Pilot Study 
In Experiment 2, it was decided to computerise the complex spatial TTT span used in 
Experiment 1. This was in order to stanclardise the presentation of all the span tasks in the 
same format. A pilot study was run to ensure that the new Visual Basic computer span task 
(TTT span) and the visually presented spatial inferences vý'ere easy to understand, use, and at 
a reasonable difficulty level. The new tasksxN-cre run on several participants who 
hi,, hlighted any difficulties they had Nvith responding to the tasks. 
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Participants 
Forty-nine participants took part in this study - 12 of ýNhom were men and 37 of v, -hom %vere 
women. The participants ývcre undergraduate students and postgraduate students at the 
University of Plymouth and they received course credit or cash payment for participating,. 
None of the sample had prior training in logic. or prior experience on any of the tasks used 
in Experiment 1. They were all native English speakers. 
Procedure 
Experiment 2 was carried out in one testing session per participant, the session being of 
approximately an hour and a half long. Participants signed up in a time slot on an 
experimenter sheet for the session. The session consisted of six tasks. All participants 
carried out these tasks in the following order (where an asterix (*) indicates a computerised 
task): - 
spatial inference measure (verbal presentation), 
complex spatial tic-tac-toe span*, 
complex verbal span*, 
simple arrow span*, 
simple word span*, 
spatial inference measure (visual presentation)*. 
What follows is a summary of those tasks used in Experiment 2 which have not already 
been introduced in Experiment 1. 
Simple Verbal Word Span (word) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Fxperiment 
16-3) 
Simple Spatial Arrow Span (arrow) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
Complex Verbal Sentence Span (verbal) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
Complex Spatial Tic-Tac-Toe Span (TTT) 
Procedure 
This task was designed as a span measure of functional working memory capacity for 
spatial information, as explained in Experiment 1. The procedure followed was based on 
Daneman and Tardifs (1987) study, but what follows are the parameters used to 
computerise this task. Each screen displayed a card depicting a two-dimensional 
representation of a three-dimensional tic-tac-toe game. The card was divided into a top, 
middle, and bottom panel, each containing a30 cell grid vdilch participants were to 
imagine as the top, middle, and bottom platforms on a three-dimensional tic-tac-toe board. 
Some of the cells were occupied by red (X) and blue (0) tokens representing the pieces of 
the two players in the game. Embedded in this configuration of tokens was winning 
sequence, that is, three tokens of the same colour that formed a straight line in conformity 
with the rules of three-dimensional tic-tac-toe. The participant's task in each case was to 
locate the winning line. Participants saw one card at a time on the screen and identified the 
winning line by clicking the three tokens with their computer mouse (in any order). The 
computer emitted a beep if the participant clicked on an incorrect line. At the end of a set of 
tN\ o. three, or four cards, participants had to recall the locations of each . vinning line in the 
set (in the order in which they had seen them) on a three-dimensional tic-tac-toe game board 
representation on screen. -1-licy did this by clicking their computer mouse on the screen in 
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the correct positions on the 3-D board representation. Participants %ýere given several 
practice items at the two winning lines level before the test be-, -, an. They were , varried to 
expect the amount of winning lines per set to increase during the course of the test. The 
span test consisted of five sets of two. three, and four winning lines. Participants ýNere 
presented with increasingly longer sets of cards. Participants continued through all of'the 
fifteen sets (five sets each of two, three, and four cards). Please see Figures 3.7 to 3.9 in 
Experiment I for a depiction of a two line set. The only difference between the t-, vo tasks 
was that in this version all cards and recall grids xvere computerised and participants made 
choices by mouse clicks rather than by pointing out the winning lines to the Experimenter. 
Scoring 
The scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
Spatial Inference (spatial ver and spatial vis) 
Procedure 
The procedure followed was based on Byrne and Johnson-Laird's (1989) study, and as 
Experiment 1. Each participant received 16 two-dimensional spatial problems in both 
modalities, verbal and visual. The same 16 problems, a sub-set of the 24 used in 
Experiment 1, were used for both the verbal and visual task. but the content and order of 
presentation was changed. The problem content can be found in Appendix A1.5. The order 
of presentation of problem in both tasks was randomised before the start of the experiment 
but remained in this order for each participant. 
Instructions for the verbal problems: The procedure was identical to Experiment 1. 
Instructions for the visual problems: The screen displayed a set of instructions, similar to 
those for the verbal problems. The instructions explained that in this part of the experiment 
the participants vvould be asked about the relations between objects in a set. A problem 
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would appear on the screen describing the layout of a set of five objects. Shortlýý 
after-wards, a question would also appear on the screen asking them to relate t-, N-o of the 
objects within a set. They were told that there would be 16 descriptions using the following 
terms to describe the layout of the objects: in front, behind, left and right. The participants 
were told that their task was to link two of the objects in the set using the above relations. 
They were told to imagine the five objects as if they were in front of them and then appl,, - 
these relations to them. They were also told that for some of the descriptions they may feel 
there was not enough information to determine the relation between the objects, in which 
case they should answer "not enough inforination". The instructions continued výith a 
summary on how to respond to the descriptions. The participants were told that the screen 
would also display a blank box in which they were to type their responses to each problem. 
For example, if they thought that the answer was "fork left of plate" then this is what they 
should type. There was a button to press to move on to the next problem. They were given 
one practice problem. 
Scoring 
The scoring was identical to Experiment I- 
3.3.3 Results 
In addition to correlational analyses and ANOVAs, confinnatory factor analysis was also 
performed on the data from this experiment. The correlational, significance analysis and 
discussion of findings for this experiment will be reported in this experimental section, but 
the factor analysis for all of the first three experiments will be explored in a factor analytic 
section that follows Experiment 3. 
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The cross-correlations of the global and normal span scores ý, vere again highly significant. 
Due to this, all scoring methods used in this results section are as previously explained in 
Experiment 1, at the start of Section 3.2.3. 
3.3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Two participants were dropped due to reasons consistent with those concerning the dropped 
participant in Experiment 1. These participants expressed verbal concern throughout the 
experiment on their performance, but were asked to continue regardless of this. When 
looking at the results, both these participant's scores on all tasks was extremely loxv and no 
other participants failed the tests in such a manner. Thus, the participants who scored 0.0 on 
the arrow span were dropped and the rest of the analysis was run on 47, not 49, participants. 
A summary of descriptive statistics and rellabilities for the measures used in Experiment 2 
can be found in Table 3.5. 
Mean SD Min Max Skewness Reliability 
Span Tasks 
arrow 24.94 9.53 5 51 . 56 . 80 
word 52.06 16.56 26 88 . 49 . 92 
verbal 38.47 17.96 10 88 . 36 . 90 
TTT 8.40 5.19 0 24 . 47 . 80 
Reasoning Tasks 
spatial ver 9.34 3.75 2 16 . 14 . 80 
spatverlM 5.64 1.90 1 8 -. 56 - 
spatverMM 3.70 2.33 1 8 . 23 - 
spatial vis 11.21 3.13 6 16 -. 33 . 75 
spatvis IM 6.30 1.69 3 8 -. 63 - 
spatvisMM 4.91 1.86 2 8 . 11 
Table 3.5- Descriptive statistics for Experiment 2 tasks (n=47) 
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Table 3.5 shows that the span tasks were responded to with a good overall range and 
distribution of scores and are consistent with the results obtained in Experiment 1. The data 
of all tasks show distributions that were not distorted by skewed distributions. There was 
no evidence of floor or ceiling effects. The only discrepancy is the TTT span, which shows 
a lower mean score in Experiment 2. Note that The TTT span is computerised in 
Experiment 2. It may be that the removal of experimenter intervention after e,., -ery set of 
lines by computerising the task enabled participants to answer without embarrassment of 
incorrect responding. Table 3.5 also shows data for the reasoning measures. There NA-as 
again a good range of scores overall, and the ranges of data were normally distributed. 
The reliability of the span tasks was assessed again by performing a split-half test 
calculation on each of the four span measures used. The Spearman-Brown formula was 
then used to provide an estimate of reliability for each task. The corrected correlations for 
the span tasks were as in Table 3.5. Table 3.5 shows that all the span tasks used produced a 
reliable odd-even corrected correlation of over r= . 75. A corrected correlation of over r= 
75 is deemed satisfactory for group measurement (Rust & Golombok, 1999). The non- 
computerised TTT span produced a low, but adequate, corrected correlation of r= . 51 in 
Experiment 1. The now computerised version in Experiment 2 produced a much higher 
corrected correlation of r= . 80, 
deemed very satisfactory in group measurement (Rust & 
Golombok, 1999). 
Each reasoning measure was also assessed for internal reliability using Cronbach's alpha. 
As seen in Table 3.5, the reliability estimate for the spatial reasoning task, in both 
modalities, was satisfactory for group measurement (r = . 80 
for verbal and r= . 75 
for 
visual). This is consistent with the results found in Experiment I (see Table 3.1). 
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3.3.3.2 The Span Measures 
Correlational analysis was carried out on the data in order to investigate whether the tasks 
were associated together (see Appendix BI. 8 for a full matrix). The results for Experiment 
2 span measures are presented in Table 3.6. 
arrow word verbal TTT 
arrow I 
word . 28' 
verbal . 10 . 64*** 1 
TTT . 19 . 40** 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '=p<0.1, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.0 1, ***=p<0.00 1) 
Table 3.6- Experiment 2 correlations between the four span tasks 
Firstly, the highest correlation is between the word and verbal span measures, as in 
Experiment I (r = . 64, p <. 001). The word span also correlated significantly with the 
complex spatial measure (r = . 
40, p <. 01), and there was borderline significance with the 
simple arrow span (r= . 28, p <. 10). 
The word and arrow span correlation is consistent vith 
the result found in Experiment 1. although significance there was not reached (r = . 23). It 
may be that the arrow and word spans tap separate storage systems afforded by the VSSP 
and PL respectively, although they may also be measuring some common resource. The 
arrow span did not correlate significantly with the other span measures, another result 
consistent with Experiment 1. In Experiment I the arrow span only showed a significant 
relationship ývith the letter span, which was not used here. Lastly, the verbal span correlated 
with the TTT span (r=. 41, p< . 01). a reasonably moderate relationship. 
Experiment I and 
2 showed no clear dissociation between complex measures of spatial and verbal %\orkin,, 
nicniory. No evidence \\ as found for a dissociation between tasks designed to measure 
centrally allocated ý\orking memory resources. Daneman and Tardif (1987) used the TTT 
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span in conjunction with a math and averbal span task. Daneman and Tardif (I 98T) 
showed that only the math and verbal span tasks. not the TTT span task, predicted verbal 
ability. They concluded that there are independent processors in memory for language and 
non-language based information. The correlations bet-ween complex span measures in 
Experiments I and 2 are incompatible with this finding. 
In conclusion for the data shown in Table 3.6. the results are consistent with those obtained 
in Experiment 1. A positive matrix can be seen between all the span measures in Table 3.6. 
The data indicates there are significant correlations between the vvo complex span measures 
used. This result would not be expected if there was a total separation of verbal and spatial 
resources at the level of the CE. The results from this, and Experiment 1, support the notion 
that all information, be it verbal or spatial in nature, is dealt with similarly by a domain- 
general resource. Experiment I and 2 both show low correlational relationships between the 
word and arrow spans. Thus, the data from both cxperiments also lends support to the 
notion of two separate sub-systems of working memory that deal with the passive storage of 
verbal versus spatial information. However, the low, but positive correlation between these 
measures suggests that they share some, albeit small, common processing requirement. 
3.3.3 .3 The Span and Reasoning Measures 
The next set of correlations refer to the relationships between the span measures and the 
reasoning measures. This section examines whether individual differences in working 
memory predict individual differences in both verbally and visually presented spatial 
inferences. From past research, it is suggested that spatial reasoning requires CE resources. 
as Nvell as a reliance on a spatial storage component (e. g., Klauer, Stegmaier & Metser. 
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1997; Vandierendonck & De Vooght. 1997). Hence. the reasoning, tasks sho, ý, vn in Table -33.7 
would be expected to show relationships with the complcx measures of working memory. 
arrow word verbal TTT 
spatial ver 
spatial vis 
. 52*** 
. 25' 
-)0* 
. 14 
. 36* 
. 24 
. 46** 
. 41 
** 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '=p <0.1, * =p <0.05, ** =p <0.01, *** =p <0.001) 
Table 3.7- Experiment 2 correlations between the span and reasoning tasks 
The verbally presented spatial reasoning task (spatial ver), xvill be considered first, in 
relation to the span measures used. Table 3.7 shows the best predictors of this spatial task 
are the arrow and TTT spans, and to a lesser extent the -verbal and word spans. These results 
are consistent with those from Experiment 1, except for the arrow span correlations. There 
was no significant correlation betwcen arroxv span and this task in Experiment I (r =A 0), 
but in Experiment 2 the correlation was significant (r = . 52, p< . 001 ). 
The results here are 
consistent with predictions made about the relationships between spatial reasoning and 
working memory. Stronger relationships would be expected with the spatial spans, over and 
above the verbal spans, due to the spatial nature of the reasoning task. The verbally 
presented spatial task correlated moderatel-v with all the span tasks indicating that both 
verbal and spatial resources are required for correct responding. So for the verbally 
presented spatial reasoning task, the results shown in Table 33.7 are consistent ý, vith the N, ie\% 
that both spatial and verbal resources of working memory are required in order to interpret 
and make inferences from spatial descriptions. Due to the complex span measures being 
strongly correlated. it may be the case that those central resources are domain dependent. In 
addition. it may be assumed from this data that some sort of passive verbal storage is 
required (as measured by the word span) in order to perform the task. 
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Considered next is the visually presented spatial reasoning task (spatial vis). in relation to 
the span measures used. Table 3.7 shoxvs the best predictor of this spatial task is the 
complex TTT span (r = . 41, p <. 01). A drop in significant correlations vvith the other span 
measures can be seen for this task. This finding may provide support for the suggestion that 
presenting the problems visually lowers the load put on,,., erbal ývorking memory. explaining I 
the drop in cross-correlations with the verbal spans. The participants did not need to keep in 
mind the premises as they were presented on screen for the duration of their responding 
time. However, the correlation between the two spatial reasoning tasks was significant (r = 
. 69, p<. 00 1), suggesting that both tasks draw to some extent on common resources. 
Furthermore, the data reflects a general reduction in the magnitude of correlations between 
the visually presented spatial task and both spatial and verbal spans, perhaps indicating a 
general reduction in working memory load. This, together with the fact that there are 
significant correlations between the complex span measures makes it difficult to clearly 
interpret these findings. Therefore, these results may be consistent with the view that 
central resources of working memory are important in accurate responding, but spatial 
resources are more pertinent when working memory load for the verbal aspect of the task 
are controlled for. 
3.3.3.4 Further Analysis 
This section assesses the reasoning tasks based on whether they were easy or difficult in 
nature. Past research suggests that problems based on one model of the premises are easier 
than problems based on multiple models of the premises. 
172 
correct 
spatver IM 71 
spatverMM 46 
spatvisIM 79 
spatvisMM 61 
Table 3.8 - Experiment 2% of correct responses to IM and MM problems 
Problem difficulty percentages for the spatial tasks are presented in Table 3.8. The IM 
problems, both verbally and visually presented, were solved more often than the MM 
problems. An average of 9 out of 16 (56%) verbally presented spatial inferences .,, -ere 
solved, 5 of which were single model problems. This is highly consistent with Experiment 
1 (58% spatial ver solved correctly). An average of II out of 16 (69%) visually presented 
spatial inferences were solved, 6 of which were single model problems. 
A two by two repeated ANOVA was used for testing the differences among means for 
model type (I M or MM) and modality type (verbal or visual). The prediction would be that 
the number of models and type of presentation would significantly effect the spatial 
inference scores (see Appendix B 1.5 for ftill results). From Table 3.8 it might be expected 
that one model visual presentation would be the easiest to perform. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of modality, F(1,46) = 21.34, p <. 001; amain effect of number of models, 
F(1,46)=49.8l, p<. 001; and an interaction between the two, F(1,46)=4.20, p<-046- 
This finding suggests that the effect of model number depends upon the modality of 
presentation. A participant's performance on the visual modality task was generally better 
than on the verbal modality task. This would be expected given that in the visual version of 
the taskverbal working memory load is reduced. This is consistent with the findings of 
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3 Gilhooly, Logie. Wetherick and Wynn (199)) -v,, ho found similar results with syllogistic 
inferences. It can be seen that in both the spatial inference tasks. verbal and visual 
presentations, participants performed at a higher rate on the one model problems. than the 
multi-model problems. The interaction suggests that when the spatial descriptions are 
presented verbally, there is a greater memory load. which causes poorer performance on the 
difficult multiple model problems. 
3.3.4 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 2 suggest that individual differences in , \-orking memory 
capacity can explain variation in performance on five-terin series spatial tasks, both N'ct-bally 
and visually presented. Experiment 2 also provided a further test of the separability 
hypothesis. The results showed no clear dissociation bevveen the different span measures 
and their relationships with different reasoning tasks. Both the verbal and spatial spans 
predicted individual differences on the reasoning tasks, a similar pattern of correlations ýý as 
observed, consistent with Experiment 1. Again, correlations between the complex -ý, 'erbal 
and spatial spans were significant, indicating no clear dissociation. This was a second 
failure in replicating Shah and Miyake's (1996) results. The positive correlation matrix 
between the complex span measures in Experiment 2 may imply that a general working 
memory resource explains variation on the working memory capacity measures. This result 
is entirely consistent with Experiment 1. This , vill be further addressed in the factor 
analysis section at the end of this series of experiments. 
There was a replication of the predictors of the verbal modality spatial task, as in 
Experiment I. although thcrc is a discrepancy with the arrow span betvveen experiments. 
The visual modality spatial task was again, generally correlated with all the spans, but the 
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only significant predictor was the complex TTT span. These findings could be interpreted 
as follows. There was a reduction in correlations xith the verbal span measures . N-hen the 
spatial reasoning task premises were presented on screen. This could have lowered the 
verbal working memory load, and perhaps participants therefore showed a greater reliance 
on spatial working memory. The ANOVA analysis supports the notion that visual 
presentation reduces working memory load due to the fact that in the verbal presentation 
mode, a reduction in performance on the multiple model problems was seen. However, 
there was a general reduction in the correlations with both verbal and spatial spans, when 
the problems were presented visually. This might suggest that a general reduction in 
working memory load accounts for the change in patterns of correlation. However, it is 
important to note that these interpretations should all be seen in the context of the 
correlation between the complex spans, TTT and verbal. 
In Experiment 2, and in Byrne and Johnson-Laird's (1989) study, these spatial inferences 
were investigated and in both the number of models to be constructed was controlled for. 
The results here confirm Byrne et al. 's (1989) study where it was found that one model 
problems were reliably easier to solve than multiple model problems. An interaction was 
also found between the modality of presentation and the number of models to be 
constructed. This finding could be interpreted as the participants greater reliance on verbal 
working memory load when the problems were presented verbally, causing poorer 
performance on the multiple model descriptions. This finding is supported by the work of 
Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick and Wynn (1993) who found that presenting syllogistic 
problems visually improved logical performance. Due to the generally positive 
correlational patterns between verbal and spatial span measures, there is difficulty in clearly 
interpreting these findings in the light of reasoning theory. Further discussion of these 
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theories %vill follow the presentation of a multi-group factor analysis section. xvhen all three 
experiments in this series can be related together. 
In Experiment 1, the syllogistic inferences (verbally presented) con-elated generally %\ ith all 
the span measures used, although not significantly v, -ith the complex TTT span. An 
interpretation of this might be that both verbal and spatial resources are required in order to 
perform the verbal modality syllogistic task. Verbal presentation requires the reasoner to 
remember the premise information in advance of processing. The correlations , vith verbal 
working memory capacity may in part be explained by the requirement to temporarily store 
the passive information. As with the spatial inferences, the correlations with verbal Aorkmo 
memory are perhaps not unexpected. However, this does not necessarily show that the 
deductive processes involved in the slyllogistic tasks involve similar processes to those 
involved in the verbal span tasks. Thus, the main aim of Experiment 3, as for Experiment 2, 
is to examine this by controlling for modality of presentation. 
Further investigation was needed to investigate the influence of modality of the syllogistic 
reasoning task (verbal versus visual presentation). It might be expected that presenting the 
syllogisms visually will lead to higher accuracy rates in performance. In addition, 
reductions might be expected in the correlations between verbal working memory and 
syllo,, *st'c but especially with the simple word span (pass", ýe verbal storage). 
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3.4 EXPERIMENT 3 
3.4.1 Aim 
The motivation for Experiment 3 is the same as for Experiment 2, but in relatioii to 
syllogistic inferences. The analvsis from Experiment I sholAcd that the syllogistic 
inferences, when verbally presented, were best predicted bý a sub-set of both verbal and 
spatial working memory spans. By presenting the problems verbally. a high load may have 
been put on verbal working memory, requiring participants to hold the prem'se Information 
in mind. Therefore, the correlations between verbally presented syllotgnstIc inferences and 
verbal working memory are not inconsistent v6th this interpretation. Experiment -33 aims to 
examine the patterns of correlational change as a function of modality. 
As mentioned in the aim for Experiment 2, Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick and Wviin (1993) 
investigated syllogisms, presented both verbally and v1sualIN. together with dual tasks 
proposed to load the working memory sub-components. A significant effect of memory 
load on accuracy of syllogistic performance was obtained, v, -hen presentation modalltv Xý as 
manipulated. Presenting the syllogistic task visually increased accurate performance on the 
problems, indicating that a reduction in memory load may indeed influence responses. 
Experiment 2 of this series also showed that visually presented spatial inferences were 
solved more often than verbally presented problems. Additionally, Experiment 2 found a 
clear model type by modality type interaction, suggesting that verbal presentation mode 
places a high demand on verbal working memory Nvhich, in turn, increases the difficultv of II 
constructing multiple model representations. Experiment 3, in line with Experiment 2. 
extends this Nvork by presentino syllogistic tasks in both modalities. together . vIth a ranue of' 
working mcrnorý spans. 
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Experiment 3 was designed as a follow-up to Experiment 1. The syllogistic inferences , vere 
investigated both verbally and visually in order to account for presentation differences in 
performing the task. Experiment 3 also allowed a further test of the separability issue of 
central resources within working memory. Five working memory span tasks were used: 
two complex spatial measures, one complex verbal measure, and a simple spatial and verbal 
measure. The span tasks were given together with two reasoning tasks, a syllogistic 
inference task presented both verbally and visually. The tasks v, -ere as Experiment I unless 
otherwise stated. 
As stated previously, the complex spatial letter span task was not used in Experiment 2. 
There was a longer time scale for carrying out Experiment 3 in relation to Experiment 2. 
The addition of another task in Experiment 3 therefore would not interfere in the overall 
time scheme. Thus the letter span was used again here, as well as the TTT span. 
3.4.2 Method 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was run to ensure that the new Visual Basic computerised syllogistic task 
(visual task) was easy to understand, and use. 
Participants 
Forty-seven participants were used - 15 of whom were men and 32 of whom were women. 
The participants were undergraduate students and postgraduate students at the University of 
Plymouth, and they received course credit or cash payment for participating. None of the 
sample had prior training in logic, or prior experience on any of the tasks used in 
Experiment I or Experiment 2. They were all native English speakers. 
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Procedure 
Experiment 3 was carried out in two testing sessions per participant, the sessions being of 
approximately equal length. Participants signed up in a time slot on an experimenter sheet 
for session one. Session two was arranged individually , vith each participant at the ctid of 
session one. Session one consisted of three tasks. All participants carried out these tasks in 
the following order (where an asterix (*) indicates a computerised task, ). - 
syllogistic inference measure (verbal presentation), 
complex spatial TTT span*, 
complex verbal span*. 
Session two consisted of four tasks. All participants carried out these tasks in the same 
following order: - 
simple arrow span*, 
simple word span*, 
complex spatial letter rotation span*, 
syllogistic inference measure (visual presentation)*. 
What follows is a summary of those tasks used in Experiment 3 which have not already 
been introduced in prior experiments. 
Simple Verbal Word Span (word) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment I- 
Simple Spatial Arrow Span (arrow) 
Fhe procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
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Complex Verbal Sentence Span (verbal) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
Complex Spatial Letter Span (letter) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
Complex Spatial Tic-Tac-Toe Span (TTT) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment I 
Syllogistic Inference (Verbal and Visual Presentation) (sylls ver, sylls vis) 
Procedure 
A series of 16 syllogisms was presented to each participant in both modalities, verbal and 
visual, and the procedure followed is as Experiment 1. The same 16 problems, a sub-set of 
the 20 used in Experiment 1, were used for both the verbal and visual task, but the content 
and order of presentation was changed. The problem content can be found in Appendix 
Al. 7. The order of presentation of problem in both tasks \vas randomised before the start of 
the experiment but remained in that order for each participant. 
Instructions for the verbal problems: The procedure was identical to Experiment 1. 
Instructions for the visual problems: The screen displayed a set of instructions, similar to 
those for the verbal problems. The instructions explained that in this part of the experiment 
the participants would be asked to solve a set of syllogisms. A problem would appear on I 
the screen describing the relationship between three classes. Shortly after-wards, a question 
would also appear on the screen asking them to relate two of the classes within the mo 
statements. The participants Nverc shown by way of an example hoxv to solve a syllogism. 
and Nvere shown all the quantifiers that were possible in the conclusion: all, some. none, 
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some .... not, and not enough information. The instructions continued with a summary on 
how to respond to the syllogisms. The participants ý. vere told that the screen would also 
display a blank box in which they were to type their responses to each problem. For 
example, if they thought that the answer was "All of the bakers are carpenters" then this is 
what they should type. There was a button to press to move on to the next problem. They 
were given one practice problem. 
Scoring 
The scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
3.4.3 Results 
In addition to correlational analyses and ANOVAs, confirmatory factor analysis was also 
performed on the data from this experiment. The correlational, significance analysis and 
discussion of findings for this experiment will be reported in this experimental section, but 
the factor analysis for all of the first three experiments will be explored in a section after 
Experiment 3. 
As in Experiments I and 2 the cross-correlations of the global and normal span scores were 
highly significant. All scoring methods used in the results section are exactly the same as 
those used in previous experiments. 
3.4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
One participant was dropped due to the reasons outlined in Experiment I and 2. Thus. the 
participant who performed at base levels on all the tasks, and scored 0.0 on the arrow span 
was dropped and the rest of the analysis was run on 46, not 47, participants. A summary of 
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descriptive statistics for the measures used in Experiment 3. together -%vith reliability 
estimates, can be found in Table 3.9. 
Mean SD Min Max Skewness Reliability 
Span Tasks 
arrow 19.83 11.08 3 42 . 38 . 89 
word 45.63 18.68 20 96 . 81 . 87 
verbal 34.33 19.11 10 94 1.0-11 . 91 -1 
letter 2.83 1.25 0 5 -. 79 . 50 
letter err 9.72 7.21 1 41 2.02 - 
TTT 7.85 5.07 2 21 . 70 . 82 
Reasoning Tasks 
sylls ver 7.11 2.73 1 13 . 37 . 66 
syllsverIM 5.67 1.71 0 8 -. 93 - 
syllsverMM 1.43 1.80 0 6 1.08 - 
Sylls Vis 7.96 3.74 0 16 .54 . 
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SylISVISIM 5.98 1.82 0 8 -. 98 - 
Syllsvismm 1.98 2.65 0 8 1.13 
Table 3.9- Descriptive statistics for Experiment 3 tasks (n=46) 
Again, the span tasks in Table 3.9 show a good overall range of scores and distributions. 
and are consistent with the results obtained in Experiment 1. The TTT span now shows a 
similar mean score to that obtained in Experiment 2. The processing component of the 
letter span was again recorded in this experiment. Participants made on average 9 errors 
(13 % error) in total when making the normal/mirror-imaged judgement in processing, the 
same as in I `xperiment 1. This is , vell below the percentage of 50% that would be expected 
a guessing stratc,,,,, had been used. This result suggests that participants are atteniptin_,. -, 
both the processing and storage components of the complex span measure. r-I 
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The reliability of the span tasks was assessed by perfonning a split-half test calculation on 
each of the five span measures used. The Spearman-Brown formula was then used to 
provide an estimate of reliability for each task. The corrected correlations for the span tasks 
are shown in Table 3.9. As Table 3.9 shows, all the span tasks used produced a reliable 
odd-even corrected correlation of over r= . 75, except for the letter span. This is an adequate 
value for group measurement (Rust & Golombok, 1999). The letter span produced an odd- 
even corrected correlation of r= . 50. As in Experiment 1, this is the only span task below 
the adequate reliability level. 
Each reasoning measure was also assessed for internal reliability using Cronbach's alpha. 
As seen in Table 3.9, the reliability estimate for the syllogistic reasoning task, in the verbal 
modality, was of some value for group measurement (r = . 66). This is a 
higher reliability 
than that seen in Experiment I (where r= . 45). The reliability estimate 
for the visually 
presented syllogistic task was highly satisfactory (r = . 82). 
3.4.3.2 The Span Measures 
Correlational analysis was carried out on the data in order to investigate whether the tasks 
were associated together (see Appendix B 1.9 for the full matrix). As in Experiment I and 2, 
the first analysis reports the correlations between the span measures. Given the findings of 
Experiments I and 2, the complex span measures might be expected to cross correlate, 
whilst the simple measures might be expected to show some independence. The results for 
Experiment 3 span measures can be seen in Table 3.10. 
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arrow word verbal letter letter err 
arrow I 
word . 
26- 
verbal . 31 * . 66*** 1 
letter 
. 47*** . 41 . 48*** 1 
letter err -. 24' -. 26 
TTT . 40** . 30* 35* . 49*** -. 17 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '=p < 0.1, * =p < 0.05, ** =p<0.01, *** =p<0.001) 
Table 3.10 - Experiment 3 correlations betwcen the fivc span tasks 
As Table 3.10 shows, the highest correlation is between the word and vei-bal span measures. 
as in Experiment I and 2 (r = . 66, p< . 001). The word span also correlated slgiiificantlý 
with the complex spatial measures. letter and TTT (r=. 41, p <. 01, r =30, p <. 05). and 
there was borderline significance with the simple arrow span (r = . 
26, p<. 10). This is 
consistent with the result found in Experiments I and 2. It may be that the arrow and ývord 
spans tap separate storage systems afforded by the VSSP and PL respectivek, although they 
may have some common processing requirement. The arrow span did correlate significantly 
with the other span measures, this was not found in the first two experiments. In 
Experiment I the arrow span only showed a significant relationship v, -ith the letter span, 
which is consistent Nvith the correlation here (r = . 
47, p< . 
001). What is inconsistent are the 
relationships between the arrow span and the verbal and TTT spans. The correlations here 
are significant, whereas this was not found in Experiments I and 2. The verbal span 
correlated with the letter and TTT spans at levels of r= . 48 and r= . 
35 respectively. 
reasonably moderate relationships. This was also seen in Experiments I and 2 and is 
inconsistent NN ith a dissociation bem een verbal and spatial infomiation at the level of a 
central cxecutivc of working memory. Lastly, the two complex spatial spans correlated 
significantlý (r = . 49. p< . 
001). This result is in line with Experiment I and -vould be 
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expected if the tvvo are tapping similar resources. The processing, error associated xvith the 
letter span shows similar results to those obtained in Experiment I- there are negative 
relationships between this error and the accuracy of responding on all the spans. There are 
significant relationships again between the complex verbal and letter spans xN ith the letter 
error (r = -. 32, r=-. 333, p< . 05). This suggests that there was no trade off betwecii the 
processing and storage components on the complex letter span task. There were also 
borderline significances between the letter error and the simple span measures (r = -. 224. r=- 
. 26, p<A 0). This is consistent with Experiment 1, although the correlations were not 
significant, but in the same negative direction. 
For the data shown in Table 3.10, the results are generally consistent with those obtained in 
Experiments I and 2. A positive matrix can be seen bet,, \-cen all the span measures in Table 
3.10. The data indicates there are significant correlations between all the complex span 
measures used. This result would not be expected if there was a separation of verbal and 
spatial resources at the level of the CE. The results from this, taken together with 
Experiments I and 2, support the notion that a general working memory resource may 
underlie variation in the working memory measures. Experiments 1,2 and 3 all show low 
relationships between the word and arrow spans. Thus, the data from these experiments 
also lends some support to the notion of two separate sub-systems of working memory that 
deal with the relatively passive storage of verbal versus spatial information. Ho,, N-ever, some 
common processing requirement on these tasks may also be suggested by the positive 
correlation between the tvvo. 
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3.4.3.3 The Span and Reasoning Measures 
The next set of analyses examined the relationships between the span measures and the 
reasoning measures. The reasoning tasks shown in Table ' ). I I ý, vould be expected to show 
relationships with the complex measures of working memory. The extent to vvhich 
syllogistic reasoning tasks relate to particular complex span tasks may lead to a better 
understanding of the role of verbal and spatial working memory in syllogistic reasoning. I 
arrow word -verbal letter TTT 
sylls ver . 
50*** 
SYIIS Vis . 
45** 
. 
57*** 
. 
44** 
. 
45** 
. 
50*** 
. 
46** 
. 
47*** 
. 
45** 
. 
--, I 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '= p<0.1, p<0.05, ** =p<0.01, *** = p<0.001 ) 
Table 3.11 - Experiment 3 correlations bet,, veen the span and reasoning tasks 
Consider first the verbally presented syllogistic reasoning task (sylls \, er), in relation to the 
span measures used. Table 3.11 shows that this syllogistic task correlated significantly ý, vith 
all the span measures, but the best predictor was the word span (r =. 57, p <. 001). These 
results are consistent with those from Experiment 1. except in Experiment 3 there is a 
positive correlation with the TTT span. There was no significant correlation between the 
TTT span and this task in Experiment 1 (. 10), but in Experiment 3 the correlation was 
significant (r =. 45, p <. 01). These results, as in Experiment 1, are consistent with findings 
from previous studies that investigated syllogistic reasoning and working memorý-. 
Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick and Wynn (1993) found that secondary tasks assumed to load 
the CE component of working memory, affected syllogistic performance. Relationships 
with both N crbal and spatial measures of working memory x-vould be expected if the 
svIlogistic task NNcrc solved usina both verbal and spatial strategies (Ford, 1991). The I :D 
N erbally presented sý flogistic task correlated moderately vvith all the span tasks indicating 
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that both verbal and spatial resources are required for correct responding. However. due to 
the lack of a dissociation between the complex measures, it is difficult to conclude that there 
are separate central resources for verbal and spatial information. So for the verbally 
presented syllogistic reasoning task. the results shown in Table 33.11 are consistent vvith the 
view that generally allocated CE resources of working memory. as measured by the 
complex span tasks, are required in order to interpret and process their meaning. In 
addition, it may be assumed from this data that some sort of passive verbal storagc Is 
required (link with word span) in order to perform the task. 
Secondly, the visually presented syllogistic reasoning task (s,, -Ils vIs'), will be discussed in 
relation to the span measures used. Table 3.11 shows very similar results to the task ýý hen 
verbally presented, although there is a drop in significance vvith the TTT span (r = .21). 
There is a difference here which is inconsistent with that found for the five-term series 
spatial task. When presented visually, the spatial task did not correlate as highly ýý ith the 
verbal spans which may suggest that presenting the problems visually may lower the load 
put on verbal working memory. For the syllogisms, there was no drop off in correlations 
with the verbal spans when it was presented visually. This might be due to the differences 
in interpreting the quantifiers (such as some) against interpreting orientations (such as left). 
It might have to be considered that participants understood the spatial terms better and thus 
a reduction in the use of verbal resources is shown when they are presented \'isually. For 
the syllogisms, even though the participants had the premises on screen in the visual variant 
of the task, this may not have helped because of the complexity of understanding the 
quantifiers. Therefore, these results are consistent xvith the vicv, - that both verbal and spatial 
central resources of working memory are important in accurate responding. whell modalltv 
is controlled for. flo\\eN-cr, the complex verbal and spatial span tasks. assumed to meýisure 
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CE capacity, correlated significantly, and so any interpretation made from this must account 
for the commonality between the complex measures. The syllogisms may rel\- upon a 
general or domain independent CE, as measured by both the complex -verbal and spatial 
span tasks. 
Table 3.11 shows a generally positive matrix where both reasoning tasks are predicted býý 
both the spatial and verbal working memory tasks. The data in Table 3.11 indicates almost 
identical patterns of results on both syllogistic reasoning tasks, verbal and visual. The cross 
correlation between the two was also highly significant (r = . 66, p<. 00 1). 
3.4.3.4 Further Analysis 
Presentation mode and model type will be investigated in this section. Past research 
suggests that problems that only need one model to be constructed in order to reach a 
conclusion should be easier than problems where multiple models are needed. 
correct 
syllsverIM 71 
syllsverMM 18 
syllsvisIm 75 
syllsvismm 25 
Table 3.12 - Experiment 3% of correct responses to IM and MM problems 
Problem difficulty percentages for the syllogistic tasks are presented in Table 3.12. The IM 
problems, in both the verbal and visual variant of the syllogistic task, appear to be solved 
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more often than the MM problems. Table 3 ). 12 shoýý s an average of 7 out of 10 (44%) 
verbally presented syllogistic inferences were soh ed. 6 of , vhich xvere single model I 
problems. This is consistent with Experiment 1 (50% sylls , er solved correctly). An 
average of 8 out of 16 (50%) visually presented syllogistic inferences were solved. 6 of 
which were single model problems. 
A two by two repeated ANOVA was used for testing the differences among means for 
model type (I M or MM) and modality type (verbal or visual). The prediction would be that 
the number of models and type of presentation would significantly effect the sý Ilogistic 
inference scores (see Appendix B 1.6 for full results). From Table 3.1 -' it mi, ht be expected 
that one model visual presentation would be the easiest to perform. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of modality, F(1,45) = 4.13. p <. 048; a main effect of number of models, 
F(1,45) = 166.81, p< . 001; but no interaction between the two. F(I. 45) = . 58, p <. 448. 
This finding suggests that the effect of model number does not depend upon the modality of 
presentation. A participant's performance on the visual modality task was slightly better 
than on the verbal modality task. This would be expected given that in the visual version of 
the task, verbal working memory load is reduced. This finding is consistent with that of 
Gilhooly, Logic, Wetherick and Wynn (1993). It can be seen that in both the syllogistic 
inference tasks, verbal and visual presentations, participants performed at a higher rate on 
the one model problems, than the multi-model problems. The interaction showed no effect 
of the two factors, the effect of modality is the same for both one and multi model problems. 
4.4 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 3 again suggest that individual differences in working memory 
capacltý can explain variation in performance on syllogistic tasks, both verbaliv and 
189 
visually presented. Experiment 3 also provided a further test of the separability issue of 
central resources within working memory. Experiment -3) sho,, ved no clear dissociation 
between the different span measures and their relationships with different reasoning task-s. 
Both the verbal and spatial spans predicted individual differences on the reasoning tasks. a 
similar pattern of correlations was observed, consistent xvith Experiment 1. 
There were cross-correlations between the complex verbal and spatial spans, indicating a 
positive relationship, with little dissociation. Shah and Miyake (1996) found a clear 
dissociation between the spatial spans and spatial information ,, ersus the verbal spans and 
verbal information. Experiment 3 results again failed to replicate this finding. The positivc 
correlation matrix between the complex span measures in Experiment 3 may imply that a 
domain general central resource of working memory accounts for the relationships found. 
The results could imply that a common factor underlies individual differences on the 
measures used. 
There was a clear replication of the predictors of the verbal modality syllogistic task, as in 
Experiment 1, although there is a discrepancy with the complex TTT span. An explanation 
for this might be that the TTT span used in Experiment I had a lower reliability due to it 
being a non-computerised version. These correlations suggest that modality differences did 
not give differing results. The ANOVA carried out on this data also suggested no 
interaction between the modality of presentation and the number of models. 
In Experiment 1, both the spatial and syllogistic inferences correlated ývith both spatial and 
vei-bal working mcmory span tasks (verbal modality). Experiment 2 also supports the fact 
that spatial infei-ences in both modalities. were correlated with both verbal and spatial 
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working memory capacity measures, although the only consistently significant predictor 
was spatial working memory capacity. Experiment 3 results suggest that there are similar 
relationships between the syllogistic problems (both verbally and visually presented) and 
working memory resources, both spatial and verbal. However, any interpretation must be 
considered in light of the significant relationship between the complex span measures. The 
findings from these three experiments have implications for the three classes of reasoning 
theory outlined earlier. Further interpretations of this will take place in the general 
discussion (Section 3.6) after the factor analysis. 
The findings from the first three experiments in this thesis lend support to the notion that 
working memory capacity predicts variation in performance on both spatial and syllogistic 
inference. This is an important and very clear finding, and is consistent with processing 
theories of reasoning (i. e., verbal and analogical) which suggest that reasoning depends 
upon an explicit system capable of maintaining and processing representations involved in 
making deductive inferences. At the outset, this thesis was interested in the following 
question. To what extent do verbal and spatial working memory, as measured by the 
complex and simple verbal and spatial spans, predict reasoning performance? In particular, 
given the dual-task work, it might have been expected that verbal working memory 
correlated most highly with syllogistic reasoning performance, and spatial working memory 
with spatial reasoning performance. Because there was no clear dissociation between verbal 
and spatial working memory, it is difficult to make interpretations from the correlational 
data about the representation in these deductive tasks. Therefore, there is a clear need for a 
more sophisticated analysis. 
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The first three experiments in this thesis lends some support to the notion of a ceiitral 
executive of ý%orking memory, served by two slave sub-systems for storage ot'verbal and 
spatial information. Ho%vever, for both the simple verbal and spatial spans, as for both 
complex verbal and spatial spans, there are low positive correlations between them, perhaps 
suggesting that they also have something in common. The model proposed by Shah and 
Miyake (1996) consisted of two separate systems for verbal and spatial information at the 
level of the executive. The results here do not conform to this pattern, where the five-teriii 
series and syllogistic tasks were predicted by both complex verbal and spatial span measures 
showing common influences used by all the tasks. VvIbat follows is an investigratioii of I 
working memory models using a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis. In this xýay, the 
data here can be tested against the types of model proposed in the literature Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974; Shah & Miyake, 1996). 
3.5 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
EXPERIMENTS 1,2 AND 3 
3.5. I Rationale for the Factor Analysis 
The syllogistic inference data from both Experiments I and 3 suggested that individual 
differences in both the verbally and visually presented tasks were predicted by both complex 
and simple verbal and spatial working memory spans. The spatial inference data from both 
Experiments I and 2 suggested that individual differences in both the visually and verbally 
presented tasks were predicted by both complex and simple verbal and spatial spans, 
although the visual mode problems , vere only significantly predicted by the complex TTT 
span. One potential explanation for these findings for both the syllogistic and spatial 
I () --) 
reasoning tasks is that they draw on central resources of working memory and that the 
working memory capacity tasks are also measuring this resource. 
Evidence for this is suggested by intercorrelations between the span measures across all 
three experiments. In all experiments, the complex verbal and spatial spans intercorrelated 
significantly. Thus, what might underlie this finding is variations in central executive 
function. There were marginal correlations between the simple word and arroxv spans 
throughout the experimental series (passive stores). This suggests that the simple spans may 
measure some common resource, but may also show that the simple spans measure the 
separate storage systems. There was a complete failure to show a dissociation between the 
complex spatial and verbal spans (as Shah & Miyake, 1996). Therefore, the findings so far 
are not inconsistent with Baddeley's (1986) model of a central executive with two 
peripheral subsystems. 
The following confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) models were run in order to further test 
the findings of the correlational data obtained from the first three experiments. A number of 
different models were tested, including one, two and three factor models. The following 
summary contains the best fit model found from those that were originally investigated. A 
three-factor multiple group analysis was run on Experiments 1,2 and 3. This involved 
pooling the data from the different studies. Using EQS it is possible to do this even though 
the measures from the three experiments only partially overlap. For the tasks that were 
common across experiments, the parameters of the model were constrained for equality. 
This is an important point given the sample sizes used in relation to individual differences 
work. By pooling the data across experiments, the sample size was increased overall. 
Another important point to note is that the use of CFA allows for unreliability in those 
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measures and methods and for measure specific variance. The folloý\ iiig summary also 
contains a two-factor model, based on that of Shah and %I i vake (1996). in order to compare 
the nine measures used here with an already accepted model of these tasks. The following 
investigation also covers a re-analysis of Shah and Miyake's (1996) data (see factor analysis 
discussion). 
3.5.2 Method and Results 
A model based on two underlying factors was run before the three-factor model, in line ýN ith 
Shah and Miyake (1996). They investigated an orthogonal two-factor model, wlicre the 
spatial tasks loaded on one factor and the verbal ones on another. The difference bem een 
the Shah and Miyake (1996) model and the one used here is that the reasoning tasks from 
Experiments 1-3 were loaded on both factors. In this way, the reasoning tasks could be 
tested to see which resource or factor was most involved in their performance. The set up of 
the model loadings are shown in Table 3.13. The spatial span tasks were loaded on a spatial 
factor, whilst the verbal span tasks were loaded on a verbal factor. The reasoning tasks x\'ere 
loaded on both factors. The two factors were investigated both uncorrelated and correlated. 
The factors are represented as FI- verbal resource, and F2 - spatial resource. The loadings 
in Table 3.13 were constrained to equality across the experiments. The error variance 
associated with each of the tasks ý, vas also constrained across experiments. The appropriate 
EQS methods were set up to handle the data. Table ')- 14 presents the goodness of fit 
summary for the uncorrelated t-wo-factor model for Experiments Iý2 and 33. 
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FI F2 
arro-vv 
word 
verbal V/ 
verbal process error V/ 
letter 
letter process error 
TTT 
syllogisms - verbal mode 
syllogisms - visual mode 
spatial inference - verbal mode 
spatial inference - verbal mode 
Table 3.13 - Set up of two-factor model for Experiments 1-3 
The goodness of fit summary tables contain multiple fit indices which alloýv the evAuation 
of the fit of the model. The chi-square statistic measures the degree to -vvhich the 
covariances predicted by the specified model differ from the observed covariances. A small 
value for the chi-square statistic indicates no statistically meaningful difference between the 
covariance matrix generated by the model and the observed matrix. suggesting a satisfactory 
fit. Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is a modified version of the chi-square statistic 
that takes into consideration the 'complexity' of the evaluated model (in tenns of degrees of 
freedom) and penalises more complex models (models , vith fewer degrees of freedom). 
Lower values of AIC, including negative ones, indicate a better fit. In contrast, for the other 
fit indices, Bentler-Bonett Non-ned Fit Index. Bentler-Bonett Nonnormed Fit Index. and the 
Comparativc Fit Index. higher values indicate a better fit. These fit indices quantify the 
extent to which the tested model is better than a baseline model. Typically values that 
exceed .9 are considered ý-, ood 
fits. 
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chi-square 133 8.02 
degrees of freedom 75 
probability of chi-square 0.001 
akaike's information criterion -11.98 
bentler-bonett normed fit index 0.621 
bentler-bonett nonnonned fit index 0.767 
comparative fit index 0.779 
Table 3 . 14 - Goodness of 
fit summary (two-factor model. uncorrelated) - multiple , 'I-oup 
analysis of Experiments 1-3 
It can be seen from Table 3.14 that the uncorrelated two factor model %\as a poor fit to the 
data, giving low fit indices and a significant chi-square value. The Chi-square for testino tý 
the goodness of fit of the model is 13 8.02. based on 75 degrees of freedom. Thus, there \\as 
a significant discrepancy between the model and the data. The fit indices N\ ere belo%\ an 
acceptable level (Dunn, Everitt & Pickles, 1993). Recall that this was the model used hv 
Shah and Miyake (1996) to account for their data set. Even though there are measures thcý, 
used that overlap with the current set, this model does not hold for this data. Table 3.15 
presents the goodness of fit summary for the correlated two-factor model for Experiments 1, 
2 and 3. 
The correlated two factor model in Table ' ). 15 faired better, giving higher fit indices but still 
with a significant chi-square value. There are significant discrepancies between the two 
factor models and the data from Experiments 1-3. so both were rejected as incompatible. 
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chi-square 97.016 
degrees of freedom 72 
probability of chi-square 0.0 26 
akaike's information criterion -46.98 
bentler-bonett non-ned fit index 0.73) 3 
bentler-bonett nonnormed fit index 0.904 
comparative fit index 0.91" 
correlation between factors 0.77 
Table 3.15 - Goodness of fit summary (m o-factor model, correlated) - multiple I'OLIP 
analysis of Experiments 1-3 
Due to the significant chi-square values for the m o-factor models, both NN ith and without 
correlated factors, a three-factor model was further investigated. The general assumption 
underlying the three-factor model , vas to test the data based on the Baddelcy model. The 
span measures were loaded onto particular factors to identiýv them as different stores or 
resources. For instance the word span was loaded onto factor 1, together with the verbal 
span (passive verbal resource). The verbal and word spans were additionally loaded onto 
factor 3 (general resource). In contrast, the arrow span was loaded onto factor 2, together 
with the TTT and letter spans (passive spatial resource). The arrow, TTT and letter spans 
were additionally loaded onto factor 3 (general resource). The reasoning measures , vere 
loaded onto all three factors in order to identlfý which resources were most associated with 
them. A multiple group confirmatory three-factor analyses was run on all three 
experiments. The set up of the model is shown in Table 3.16. 
The factors are rcprcscnted as FI- verbal resource. F-I - spatial resource. and F3 - general 
resource. All the above loadings were constrained to equality across the experiments. The 
error , ariance associated with each o I'the tasks \\as also constrained to equality across 
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experiments. The three factors were not allowed to correlate. Note that the complex TTT 
span was treated as the same task in the computerised and non-computerised versions. It 
needs to be acknowledged that this model is less parsimonious than the previous t,,, %-o-factor 
models. There are more parameters in this model and therefore it will fit the set of data 
easier. The appropriate EQS methods were set up to handle the data. Table 3.17 presents 
the goodness of fit summary for this model. 
F1 F2 F3 
arrow I/ V/ 
word V/ V/ 
verbal V/ 
verbal process error 
letter V/ 
letter process error V/ 
TTT V/ V/ 
syllogisms - verbal mode V/ V/ 
syllogisms - visual mode V/ V/ V/ 
spatial inference - verbal mode V/ V V/ 
spatial inference - verbal mode V/ V/ V/ 
Table 3.16 - Set up of orthogonal three-factor model for Experiments 1-3 
Table 3.17 gives the results of fitting the hypothetical three-factor model outlined above. 
The three factors were orthogonal in nature. The Chi-square for testing the goodness of fit 
of the model is 66.269, based on 66 degrees of freedom. This result may be likely (p <. 47) 
to occur with a sample of this size if the model truly holds in the population. A fit index of 
above .9 suggests that 
data fit the model well (Dunn, Everitt & Pickles, 1993). This was the 
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best set of fit indices out of the three models tested here. and was the onl-, - one to achiexe a 
non-significant chi-square probability, which further strengthens the result. 
chi-square 66.269 
degrees of freedom 66 
probability of chi-square 0.47 
akaike's information criterion -65.73 
bentler-bonett normed fit index 0.818 
bentler-bonett nonnormed fit index 0.999 
comparative fit index 0.999 
Table 3.17 - Goodness of fit summary (three-factor model, uncorrelated) - multiple group 
analysis of Experiments 1-3 
Tables 3.17A-C present the factor loadings of each of the nine tasks on the three factors. 
LOADINGS 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 
MEASURE verbal store spatial store general store R-sq 
arrow . 57*** . 33*** . 44 
word . 48*** . 64*** . 63 
verbal . 47*** . 
64*** . 63 
verbal error -. 46*** . -) I 
letter . 38*** . 59*** . 
49 
letter error -. 44*** . 19 
TTT . 10 . 60*** . ') 7 
syllogisms - verbal mode . 31 . 52*** . 42*** . 
54 
spatial inference - verbal mode -. 18 . 14 . 72*** . 57 
( significant loadings 1 p<0.05, p<0.0 
1, p<0.005) 
Table 3.17A - Experiment I factor loadings for the uncorrelated three-factor model 
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MEASURE 
Factor I 
verbal store 
LOADINGS 
Factor 2 
spatial store 
Factor 
general store R-sq 
arrow 
. 
57*** 
. 
333 
. 
44 
word . 
48*** 
. 
64*** 
. 
6) 
verbal . 
47*** 
. 
64*** 
.63 
TTT 
. 
10 
. 
60*** 
. 
') 7 
spatial inference - verbal mode -. 18 . 
14 
. 
72*** 
. 
57 
spatial inference - visual mode -. 60*** -. 17 . 
78*** 1.00 
(significant loadings p<0.05, p<0.01, *** =p<0.005) 
Table 3.17B - Experiment 2 factor loadings for the uncorrelated three-factor model 
MEASURE 
Factor I 
verbal store 
LOADINGS 
Factor 2 
spatial store 
Factor 3 
general store R-sq 
arrow . 57*** . 33*** . 44 
word . 48*** . 64*** . 63 
verbal . 47*** . 64*** . 63 
letter 
. 38*** . 59*** . 49 
letter error -. 44*** . 19 
TTT . 10 . 60*** . 37 
syllogisms - verbal mode . 31** . 52*** . 42*** . 54 
syllogisms - visual mode . 64*** . 75*** . 14 1.00 
(significant loadings p<0.05, **= p<0.0 1, ***=p<0.005) 
Table 3.17C - Experiment 3 factor loadings for the uncorrelated three-factor model 
0 The span measure loadings 
The following summary relates to Tables 3.17A-C. The tables represent the data from 
Experiment 1,2 and 3 data which was constrained as a multiple group analysis. explained 
previously (see Appendix B 1.13 for the full analysis). The loadings show that the word and 
verbal spans significantly load factor I and factor 3 (verbal and general resources). The 
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loadings for the word and verbal spans on factor 3 are identical suggesting that the complex 
task is no more effective in tapping factor 3 than is the simple task. This may mean that the 
word span, mostly thought to rely on simple passive resources, may also have a processing 
component, and vice versa for the verbal span. Experiments 1-3 correlational analyses also 
revealed that the arrow and word span had commonalities as represented by their positive. 
sometimes significant, relationship. Due to the issue of processing, it might be the case that 
the word span does not only measure a passive resource, but is part of the active resource 
component of working memory. It may be that factor I and factor 2 are tapping into 
domain specific parts of the CE, rather than necessarily mapping onto the PL and the VSSP. 
A consideration of how to interpret factor I and factor 2 follows in the discussion. The 
arrow and letter spans significantly load factor 2 and factor 3 (spatial and general resources). 
The TTT span only significantly loads factor 3. 
The three-factor CFA for Experiments 1-3 successfully identified a spatial and verbal factor. 
The simple and complex verbal spans loaded the verbal factor. The simple and complex 
spatial spans loaded the spatial factor (except TTT span). However, all the verbal and 
spatial span measures also loaded a general factor. 
0 The reasoning task loadings 
The syllogisms, verbally presented, significantly load all three factors. The syllogisms. 
visually presented, lose significance when loading factor 3. The spatial inferences, in the 
verbal mode, show significance only on the factor 3 loading. The spatial inferences, 
visually presented, significantly load factor I and factor 3, although the loading on factor I 
is negative. Interestingly, eight of the nine tasks significantly load factor 3 (the general 
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store). Also of interest, when processing error is taken into consideration. N erbal and letter 
error load significantly and negatively on factor 3. 
The R-squared values account for how much of the variance in the measures are explained 
by the factors. These values are generally lower than the split half reliabilities from Tables 
3.1,3.5 and 3.9. This may suggest that there is systematic variance in the measures which is 
not down to the variance of working memory factors, but may be task specific. This could 
indicate that one participant may have a better strategy over and above another participants 
choice of strategy. Due to the fact that this was a multiple group CFA, the problem of task 
specific variance may have been overcome. Using multiple measures will alleviate variance 
specific to one measure. 
The only R-squared values that were a problem were in relation to the visual variants of the 
spatial and syllogistic tasks (see Table 3.17B and Q. These values imply that the error 
variance was fixed at 0.00. This zero error variance estimate has been called the Heywood 
case and has been found to be induced from sampling fluctuations (Harman, 1971). The 
visual variants of the spatial and syllogistic task were the only reasoning measures to appear 
only once in the data set, and thus the sample size was small. This might be the reason for 
this discrepancy (Dillon, Kumar & Mulani, 1987). 
An important point to note is that the R-squared values for the reasoning measures are 
similar to those for the working memory measures. The reasoning measures R-squared 
values ranged between. 54 and. 57 (except the Heywood cases outlined above). The R- 
squared values for the span measures ranged between .37 and . 63. This suggests that 
reasoning is as good a way to measure working memory capacity as using the working 
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memory measures themselves. Thus, individual differences in reasonin, -, performance are 
not much more than individual differences in -%ý orking memory capacity measures. This 
emphasises the strength of the relationship betweenworking memory and reasoning. 
3.5-3 Factor Analysis Discussion 
The confirmatory multiple group three-factor analysis carried out for this series of 
experiments suggests that some form of general factor of working, memory capacity i 7 is 
implicated in all higher level thinking, be it verbal or spatial in nature. The data analysis 
and discussion below support the notion of a centrally controlled executive. but the 
interpretation of factor I and factor 2 as the two relatively passive storage systems is 
questionable. 
Firstly, a comparison needs to made bet,., veen the two-factor and three-factor models 
investigated above. It can be seen from the goodness of fit summaries that both the two- 
factor models, either correlated or uncorrelated, did not fit the data significantly. Shah and 
Miyake (1996) performed an exploratory factor analysis on their nine measures from their 
Experiment 1. They found that a two-factor orthogonal model fitted their data best. The 
first factor was loaded highly on the spatial ability tasks and spatial spans. The second 
factor was loaded highly on the verbal ability tasks and verbal span. They interpret these 
results in terms of two separate pools of domain-specific resources that support both the 
processing and maintenance of spatial and language information. The results of fitting the 
two-factor model (orthogonal) to the data from the current series does not conform to this 
picture. 
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In an attempt to resolve this discrepancy. a CFA ,,, -as run using Shah and Miyake's (1996) 
Experiment I data. This was in order to assess their results in detail by looking at two 
different models. Firstly. their data was re-run as a CFA t%\ o-factor uncorrelated model 
with the set up of the model corresponding to the reported EFA in their paper. Secondl%. 
their data was assessed as a CFA three-factor model as in Experiments 1. -1 and 3. This 
would enable comparisons between best fit model types for their own data, as %vell as 
comparisons with the present data set. 
Shah and Miyake's (1996) original two-factor EFA was re-run using the methods of EQS in 
order to ensure that the resultant two-factor orthogonal CFA model was consistent with the 
methods they used previously (BMDP 4M program). Tables 3.18A and 3.18B give the 
results of fitting the hypothetical two-factor orthogonal model outlined in their Experiment 
I to EQS methodology. 
chi-square 26.563 
degrees of freedom 26 
probability of chi-square 0.43 
akaike's information criterion -25.44 
bentler-bonett normed fit index 0.861 
bentler-bonett nonnormed fit index 0.995 
comparative fit index 0.996 
Table 3.18A - Goodness of fit summary (two-factor model, uncorrelated) - analysis of 
Shah and Miyake's (1996) data 
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LOADfNGS 
Factor I Factor 2 
MEASURE -verbal spatial 
Simple arrow span . 69*** 
Complex verbal span . 54 
Complex spatial letter span . 74*** 
Paper form board test . 60*** 
Spatial relations test . 90*** 
Clocks test . 71*** 
Quantitative SAT . 75*** 
Verbal SAT 
.8 
33 
Identical pictures . 
20 33 2 
(significant loadin-s p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.005) zzý 
Table 3.18B - Shah and Miyake's (1996) data factor loadings, a two-factor orthogomil 
model 
Table 3.1813 gives the factor loadings of the two factor CFA carried out. Note that none of 
the loadings of factor I are significant. Table 3.18A and -' ). I 
8B are consistent with the 
original findings of Shah and Miyake's (1996) model. Table 3.18B shows a good model. 
but nothing loaded significantly on factor 1, indicating that they may not have needed this 
extra factor. Due to similar results being obtained through EQS methodology in comparison 
with Shah and Miyake's (1996) methodology, it can be assumed that the two programs are 
compatible in nature. 
Table 3.19A gives the results of fitting the hypothetical three-factor model outlined above to 
the Shah and Miyake (1996) data, where all the tasks additionally loaded a third factor 
(geiicral). The three factors Nvere orthogonal in nature. The Chi-square for testing the 
ooodness of fit of the model was 10.730, based on 17 degrees of freedom. Th's result may tN I 
-)Oý 
be likely (p < . 87) to occur ,ý ith a sample of this size if the model truly holds in the 
population. Thus, considering the high fit indices, the model %\as accepted. 
The conclusion that the three-factor model (Table 3.19) fitted the data better than the t%\ o- 
factor model (Table 3.18) for Shah and Miyake's (1996) data was further supported by the 
direct statistical comparison of alternative models. The chi-square difference test produced 
a significant chi-square, )C2 (9) = 15.83. . 05 <p< 10, suggesting that the two-factor model 
fits the data significantly worse than the three-factor model did and hence must be rejected. 
It has to be noted that the three-factor model is less parsimonious than the two-factor model, 
but with a significant chi-square difference result, the finding is strengthened. 
chi-square 10.7 30 
degrees of freedom 17 
probability of chi-square 0.87 
akaike's information criterion -23.27 
bentler-bonett normed fit index 0.944 
bentler-bonett nonnormed fit index 1.085 
comparative fit index 1.000 
Table 3.19A - Goodness of fit summary (three-factor model, uncorrelated) - re-analysis of 
Shah and Miyake's (1996) data 
Table 3.19B gives the results of the factor loadings of each of the nine tasks on the three 
factors. The simple arrow and complex letter spans significantly load factor 2 (spatial 
store). The complex verbal span significantly loads factor 3 (general store). All of the 
spatial ability tests significantly load factor 2. The verbal ability tests significantly load 
factor I (verbal store). where previously they did not. A proportion of the spatial and verbal 
ability tests also load factor -3). Identical pictures significantly load factors I and 2. 
-'06 
MEASURE 
Factor I 
N-erbal store 
LOADINGS 
Factor 2 
spatial store 
i'actor 33 
gencral store 
Simple arrow span . 
73 
. 
01 
Complex ý'erbal span . 
28 
Complex spatial letter span . 
7')*** 
. 
14 
Paper form board test 
Spatial relations test . 
84*** 
Clocks test .6 
3' *** 
. 
38* 
Quantitative SAT 
. 
67*** 
.37 
Verbal SAT 
. 
81 * 
Identical pictures . 
82*** 
. 
49** -. 30 
(significant loadings *=p<0.05, =p<0.0 1, p<0.005) 
Table 3.19B - Shah and Miyake's (1996) data factor loadings. a three-factor orthogonal 
model 
The factor loadings for the span tasks in this three-factor model of Shah and MIN-ake's 
(1996) data are consistent with those of Experiments Iý2 and -' 3. Both the simple arrow and 
the complex letter spans significantly loaded the spatial factor in both models. Theý v,, ere 
also positively loaded on the general factor in both models. The complex verbal span was 
positively loaded on both the verbal and general factors in both models. 
The other tasks used in the models were not comparable in the same way. Shah and Miyake 
(1996) did not use many of the tasks seen in the present series, including some of the span 
and all of the reasoning measures. But all of the abilitv measures used by Shah and Miyake I 
(1996) positively loaded the general factor (except identical pictures) in the thi-ce-factor 
model. If factor 33 is to be described as a general resource then these ability tasks seem to be 
reliant on it as x\cll as a specific resource. Deductive tasks would be expected to require 
active proccssing and specific storage resources for accurate performance. It seems that 
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even ability measures mal-y require active processing over and above the specific resource 
proposed by Shah and Miyake (1996). 
Turning now to the present data set (Experiments 1,2 and 3), the uncorrelated two-factor 
model was not able to fully explain the data from the nine tasks used here. Thus. a 
correlated two-factor model was run to investigate whether there v, -as a relationship bem cen 
the two factors. There was a highly significant correlation between what , vere called the 
verbal and spatial resources (r =. 77) in this version of the model. This may imply somc 
common processes underlying both the verbal and spatial resource. This finding disagrees 
with that of Shah and Miyake (1996) and will be further discussed in the general discussion 
at the end of the full set of experiments. The high correlation bet,, veeii the verbal and 
spatial resources could reflect a common resource underlying them both. Therefore, it ýý as 
decided that a three-factor model should be tested. 
The three-factor model was indeed the only model that produced a non-significant chi- 
square in explaining the data sets from Experiments Iý2 and 3. It was also the best model 
in explaining the Shah and Miyake (1996) data set. In this model the correlation 
represented in the two-factor model was replaced by a general resource factor. This three- 
factor model is partially compatible with the working memory model put forward by 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974). The verbal resource might represent the storage of information 
in the PL. The spatial resource might represent the storage of spatial information in the 
VSSP. The general resource might represent the storage and processing of verbal and 
spatial information in the CE. 
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The only problem with this explanation are the loadings of the word span and verbal span 
tasks on the factors assumed to measure the PL and CE components of working memory. 
The traditional view of working memory would expect the word span to load more on factor 
I (PL) than factor 3 (CE), and vice versa for the verbal span. This traditional view is more 
supported when looking at the spatial spans, where the arrow span loads factor 2 more than 
the complex spatial spans, and vice versa for factor 3. The fact that there are similar 
loadings on the specific versus general factors, especially for the verbal span tasks, might 
lead to the conclusion that what was originally thought of as passive storage systems (F I 
and F2) are actually domain specific components of the CE resource. This is an alternative 
position to the one put forward in the last paragraph. It might be the case that the three- 
factor model represents a totally active processing and storage system that is more likely to 
be domain specific parts of the CE. Even Shah and Miyake (1996) admit that other models 
of working memory with different architectural assumptions might also be compatible with 
their results. They acknowledge that Baddeley's (1986) model could account for their 
findings by attributing more active functions to the spatial component of the peripheral 
subsystems than they assume. 
As surnmarised in Chapter 1, La Pointe and Engle (1990) investigated the relationship 
between a simple (word) and complex (reading) span and reading comprehension. This 
study can be related to the finding that the word span loads the general resource as well as 
the verbal resource. La Pointe et al. (1990) showed that the simple word span significantly 
predicted reading comprehension, and that the correlations were as high as those obtained 
for the complex reading span. Previous experiments have not found a relationship between 
simple word span and comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Turner & Engle, 
1989). La Pointe et al. (1990) suggested that the complex and simple tasks may not be 
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greatly different in what they measure, but it is unclear v, -hat they do measure that is 
important to higher level cognition. It is suggested that the crucial similarity is in relation to 
some form of articulatory coding. This interpretation is that the phonological input store 
plays a role in comprehension, but possibly only for demanding material. This finding 
could be mapped onto the data here. It could be that the complex verbal span has a PL 
component, and this would explain its loading on factor 1. What this does not explain, 
however, is the loading of the simple word span on factor 3. It could be the case that the 
passive word span contains elements of processing more in line with an active CE 
component. Thus, an interpretation of this data is that both the simple word and complex 
verbal spans consist of a Pl, and CE component. 
The explanation of the reasoning task loadings on the three factors will be considered next. 
From the verbally presented syllogistic reasoning loadings, it can be seen that performance 
relied on the verbal, spatial and general working memory resources. The visually presented 
syllogisms also loaded the verbal and spatial factors, but not significantly on the general 
factor. The ANOVA identified that a main effect of modality did influence syllogistic 
reasoning performance. Therefore, a reduction in the loadings on the verbal factor might 
have been expected for the visually presented task. An explanation stated previously for 
this was that participants may have to keep in mind the premise information, which 
logically relies on a verbal working memory resource, and then formulate a mental model 
that holds spatial (or propositional) information from the problem, which may rely on a 
spatial working memory resource. Due to the verbal and visual variants of the task loading 
both verbal and spatial factors, an alternative explanation might be more appropriate. This 
finding is most consistent with recent work into strategies, that suggests that syllogisms may 
be solved by using spatial and/or propositional representations (Ford, 1994). 
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The spatial reasoning data suggests that performance relied most heavily on the geiieral 
resource. It does not seem to relv on the spatial resource as would be expected. This can 
also be seen for the TTT span, , ýhich also onlv loaded sigmficantl% on the geiieral resource. 
This is consistent with the notion that both require the maintenance and processing of 
information, but that this is achieved over and above the level of peripheral subsYsteiiis. 
This is consistent with the notion that a high proportion of individual differences in spatial 
inference is accountable to centrally located working memory resources. 
It has already been noted that the R-squared values for the reasoning measures are similar to 
those for the working memory measures. Therefore, the same predictions could be made 
from the reasoning measures, as could be made from the working memory capacity 
measures. The reasoning tasks would predict performance on working memory span tasks, 
and vice versa. This result highlights the strength of the relationship bem cen workim, 
memory and reasoning ability. Individual differences in working memory capacity may be 
little more than individual differences in reasoning ability. 
The modality differences were not clear for either the syllogistic or spatial inference data. 
There were no major differences in the patterns of loadings as a function of the mode of 
presentation, except for the spatial inference verbal/visual tasks loadings on the verbal 
resource (-. 18 vs. -. 60*, respectively). The visual modality inferences were more heaýily 
influenced by the verbal resource factor than were the verbal modality problems. The 
direction of this influence was in the opposite direction to the verbal span measures 
association Nvith this resource. An explanation for the negative loading on the verbal factor 
of the visually presented spatial inferences might be that people -with good verbal stores 
makes them Nvorse at this task. It may tempt those people into using a verbal strategN that 
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doesn't help in the long run. However, this negative loading is most marked for the visually 
presented spatial inferences, in contrast to the verbally presented task. An explanation for 
this could be because, in the verbal presentation mode, participants use N-erbal resources to 
keep the premise information in mind. Therefore, there might not be any verbal resources 
left for using an inappropriate verbal strategy. In the visual presentation mode, there may be 
more resources available for using an inappropriate verbal strategy. Related findings have 
been reported elsewhere. For example, Phillips, Wynn, Gilhooly, Della Sala and Logie I 
(1999) found that articulatory suppression enhanced performance on the Tower of London 
task. Their results suggested that preventing verbal rehearsal in the PL during planning 
encouraged the use of an optimal spatial strategy involving the VSSP. The negative loading 
found here similarly suggests that reasoners using a verbal strategy may have performed 
worse overall, when an alternative strategy would have improved their performance. 
Lastly, the results obtained from entering the processing error into the analyses are 
informative. Both errors, verifying sentences as true or false and verifýing letters as mirror- 
imaged or normal, loaded negatively on the general, or central resource. This lends support 
to the notion that the general resource is a processing factor. Also, error associated with the 
span tasks should load the factor in a contrasting manner to the accuracy scores of the nine 
measures used. All the tasks loaded positively on the general factor. Therefore this result 
shows that as performance levels get better on the tasks, the error associated with them 
actually decreases. This strengthens the three-factor model for the tasks due to the opposite 
loadings for error on the central resource. These negative loadings of error on factor 3 
identifies the need to look at both storage and processing components of the tasks. The 
verbal span and letter span errors correlated highly (r = . 49) in Experiment I and this says 
something about the generality of factor 3. The processing component of these tasks 
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involves accessing background knowledge. for instance knowledge of orl I ientations. and then 
integrating this ,,,, ith a representation of the problem at hand. This is assumed to be a core 
function associated with the CE component of workin, -, memorv and is consistent with the 
traditional type working memory model (e. g., Baddeley. 1986). The traditional model of 
the CE is that it deals with the processing of all information in the same wav (domam- 
general viewpoint). This finding also emphasi investigate both storauc and ises the need to 
processing components when using either the reading span or letter span tasks. 
3.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION FOR EXPERIMENTS 1-3 
A central goal of the current set of studies was to demonstrate that individual differences in 
working memory capacity can explain variation in performance on syllogistic and spatial PII 
reasoning tasks. The pattern of correlations in Experiments 1-3 support this notion. The 
correlational patterns demonstrated that the deductive tasks were best predicted by both 
simple and complex capacity measures (requiring either storage or additional processing 
components for accurate responding). The factor analysis also yielded results suggesting 
that a general factor of working memory capacity underlies both these deducti-ve tasks, 
regardless of the presentation modality. 
Another aim of this set of experiments was to investigate the separability hypothesis for 
central resources of working memory (e. g., Shah & Miyake, 1996). The patterns of 
correlations in Experiments 1-3 are inconsistent with this view. The correlations bemeen 
the complex capacity measures ranged significantly between . 31 and . 48. 
The correlations 
between the simple capacity measureswere of lower magnitude, and ranged bemeen . 23 
and . 228- 
These results are consistent with the notion of a general central executive, as 
measured by the complcx spans, with two relatively independent passive sý stems for verbal 
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and spatial information, as measured by the simple spans (Baddeley. 1986). The 
interpretation of the factor analysis also suggests that the deductive tasks require a centrally 
controlled resource. 
As briefly reviewed earlier. the dual-task work identified that performance on simple 
deductive tasks was only affected by similar secondary tasks assumed to load the relatix cly 
passive storage systems of working memory (e. g., Farmer, Berman & Fletcher, 1986). 
Work involving performance on more complex deductive tasks, such as syllogisms and 
spatial inferences, demonstrated that they were most affected by secondary tasks assumed to 
load the central executive of working memory (e. g.. Gilhooly. Logle, Wetherick &- Wynn, 
1993; Vandierendonck & De Vooght, 1997). 
The results from Experiments 1-3 are consistent with these findings. The syllogistic tasks 
were associated with both complex verbal and spatial working memory span tasks. In 
addition, the factor analysis demonstrated that, regardless of modality, syllogistic inference 
performance relied upon both the verbal and spatial factors, and in addition the verbal 
modality problems loaded the general factor. This is consistent with studies that suggested 
a link between syllogistic reasoning and the PL and CE components of working memory 
(e. g., Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick & Wynn, 1993). However, the syllogisms also loaded the 
spatial factor in the CFA. This result may be consistent xvith studies that identified a sub-set 
of participants who use verbal strategies against a sub-set of participants v, -ho use spatial 
strategies (e. g., Ford, 1991). Experiment 3 also found a difference bet\A, -een the verbally and 
visually presented syllogisms consistent with Gilhooly et al. (1993) -who found better 
performance rates x0en the premises were available for inspection. Ho\\c\-cr, some of the 
findings here do not sit as comfortably with Gilhooly et al. 's (1993) results. Their 
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explanation of dual-task data v, -as that participants -%vere using heuristic strateLnes (matching 
or atmosphere) which placed lox, ý, demands on the slave systems but enough ot'a load on tile 
CE to be disrupted by random generation. The present results suggest that sý Ilogistic 
reasoning performance requires more than CE processing and supports the -vle, ýv that they 
require verbal and spatial components plus a general processing component of xwrking L- tl 
memory in order for accurate responding. 
The spatial tasks were associated with both complex verbal and spatial , vorking memory 
span tasks. The factor analysis demonstrated that, regardless of modality, spatial inference 
performance relied upon the general factor, and to some extent negatively on the verbal 
factor (for the visual modality task). This is consistent with studies that suggest a link 
between spatial reasoning and the CE component of working memory (e. g., 
Vandierendonck & De Vooght. 1997). Experiments I and 2 showed differences between 
the verbally and visually presented spatial inferences in line with Gilhooly, Logie, 
Wetherick & Wynn's (1993) syllogistic study. An interpretation of this might be that 
presenting the spatial problems visually reduced the need for verbal resources of working 
memory. The factor analysis also identified a negative loading of the spatial problems on 
the verbal factor, when they were visually presented. An explanation of this might be that, 
in the visual modality, participants have more verbal resources available for using an 
inappropriate verbal strategy. The findings for the spatial inference task support the vievv 
that generally they require an active processing component of working memory in order for 
accurate respondino t7 * 
Past research also shows that complex tasks such as reading comprehension are best 
predicted by span tasks assumed to measure the CE resource (e., -,.. Daneman & Carpenter, 
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1980). The findings here are consistent with this, but also shoxv that complex reasoning 
tasks require both the storage and maintenance of information. over and aboN e the 
peripheral subsystems of working memory. This is highlighted in the factor analysis where 
both the syllogistic and spatial tasks loaded most heavily on a general factor. 
The findings from Experiments 1-3 support a unitary -viev, of working, memoi), resources. 
There was no clear dissociation between the complex verbal and spatial span measures. 
Thus, the results are in line with accounts suggesting that information is stored and 
maintained in an all purpose, not domain specific processing system (as Turner & Enole, 
1989). The correlational analysis showed no clear evidence of a separability of resources at 
a centrally controlled level (as Shah & Miyake, 1996). Having said this, there may be an 
indication of a separation of central resources depending on the interpretation of the factor 
analysis. The two factors originally assumed to represent the PL and VSSP may actually 
relate to domain specific areas of the CE. This is because the complex verbal and simple 
word span loaded similarly on both the -verbal and general stores. If the tlvo factors xýere 
measuring the capacity for passive storage of information, the verbal span should only relate 
to factor -3 3 (general) and the word span to 
factor I (verbal). Thus, there may be some 
indication of the separation of information vvithin the CE, as Nvell as there being a domain 
general component. 
The brief review at the start of these experiments also explored the relation betweeii these 
tasks and the interpretations that might be made by three classes of reasoning theorists. The 
first and second class of theory were introduced as processing theories. The verbal accounts 
(e. o.. Rips, 1994, Polk & Newell, 1995. Hagert, 1984) all rely on the notion of linguistic or 
verbally based processes for performance on syllogistic and spatial inferences. For instance. 
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Rips (1994) proposed that reasoning performance depends on the participant's ability to I 
generate internal abstract rules of proof. A special case was also highlighted in relation to 
the Verbal Reasoning model of Polk and Newell (1995). They proposed that conclusions 
are derived from encoding and reencoding the premises, processes that are also required for 
verbal comprehension, and that this occurs without any separate or special process of 
reasoning. The spatial or analogical accounts (e. g., Johnson-Laird, 1983) all rely on the 
notion that reasoners form mental models representing possible states of affairs consistent 
with the premises. The third class of theory, the heuristic accounts of reasoning, propose 
that syllogistic performance relies entirely on noninferential mechanisms (e. g., Woodworth 
& Sells, 1935; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990; Chater & Oaksford, 1999). 
Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989) suggested a spatial representation explanation when 
performing spatial reasoning tasks. Experiments I and 2 are consistent with this view 
because of the high association between the spatial spans and especially the visual variant of 
the task. However, the CFA results suggested that spatial memory, specifically, is not a 
limiting factor in these kinds of task. This issue will be discussed more fully in the 
following chapter, where the relationship between spatial reasoning and working memory is 
further examined. Ford (1991) assumed the need to look at both verbal and spatial 
strategies in relation to solving syllogistic tasks. Experiments I and 3 are consistent with 
this view where the syllogistic task, in both modalities, loaded the verbal and spatial factors. 
All three experiments are inconsistent with the verbal class of theory, where single 
deterministic verbal processes are proposed. Spatial working memory tasks were predictive 
of performance on both the spatial and syllogistic tasks, a finding that would not have been 
expected by this class of theory. These findings are also inconsistent with the Verbal 
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Reasoning theory that relies on the notion that reasoning is not resource intensive and does 
not require any special processing over and above the type used in tasks such as verbal 
comprehension. Working memory span tasks, assumed to measure the capacity of an 
explicit processing system, did predict individual differences on the reasoning tasks. 
However. all these interpretations must be made in light of the correlations bem cen the 
complex span measures, and the emergence of a general factor in the CFA. These results do 
not clearly differentiate between process theories of reasoning. They do. however. have 
implications for heuristic accounts. 
The heuristic accounts rely upon the notion of an implicit processing system, and do not 
assume the use of conscious deductive reasoning processes (e. -, -,.. 
Wetherick & Gilhooly, 
1990; Chater & Oaksford, 1999). Wetherick and Gilhooly (1990) proposed that people use 
heuristic strategies, such as matching, rather than actually reasonino s-vIlogistically. Chater 
and Oaksford (1999) provided a set of heuristics that operate under a general principle of 
information gain to generate candidate conclusions -,. vhich are then evaluated for, and chosen 
on the basis of, their informativeness. If participants were following low load strategies, 
such as matching, then there would be no reason to expect a significant correlational 
relationship between tasks proposed to measure the capacity of an explicit processing 
system and deductive reasoning tasks. This correlation would not necessarily be expected 
by the heuristic theories because they assume there is no special requirement for this kind of 
resource intensive processing. The results of Experiments 1-3) showed that measures of the 
efficiency of an explicit system (working memory spans) can predict logical performance on 
the reasoning tasks, both syllogistic and spatial. The heuristic accounts must be able to 
explain why these meaSLires of working memory span predict individual differences in 
performance on deductive reasoning tasks. 
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From the further analysis sections of Experiment I-') results. it can be seen that the one 
model problem types were significantly easier to solve than the problems requiring more 
than one model to be constructed. This is consistent vvith most theories which rely on the 
notion of a limited capacity working memory as a constraint on processing and maintaining 
information (e. g.. Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rips, 1994). 
Experiments 1,2 and 3 investigated the degree to which individual differences in working 
memory can explain the variation in performance on fix-e-terin series spatial and syllogistic 
inference tasks. Thus, Experiments I-3 Nvere limited to onlv two deductive tasks. As was 
outlined in Chapter 2, Stanovich and West (1998) have recentl\, studied a rame of deducti% e 
and problem-solving tasks and found that they were all cross-correlated, and could be 
predicted from the combined influence of cognitive ability and a reasoner's thinking style. 
Experiments 4,5 and 6 will examine the same types of working memory span measures, but 
extend their relationships to additional reasoning tasks such as temporal, conditional and 
abstract reasoning measures. The working memory span measures are -valuable here 
because they have been shown to differentiate the reasoning tasks at the level of the sub- 
systems (or domain specific CEs). The complex span measures vvould be expected to cross 
correlate again and give some indication of CE processing in a wider range of reasoning 
tasks. 
2) 19 
CHAPTER 4- WORKING MEMORYAND DEDUCTIVE 
REASONING: COGNITIVE CAPACITY AND THIN'KIN'G STYLE 
4.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION FOR EXPERINIEN'TS 4-6 
Chapter 4 presents three experiments which extend the findings from Experiments I -', to a 
wider range of reasoning tasks. The degree to %ýhich individual differences in working 
memory can explain the variation in performance on fi,, -e-term senes spatial and s,, Ilogistic 
inference tasks was investigated in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 xvill examine the same "oiling 
memory measures and their relationships xvith additional reasonin, -, tasks such as temporal. 
conditional and abstract/propositional deductive measures. The reasomn-g and capacitv 
measures will be investigated in the context of the work of Stanovich and colleagues. 
Stanovich and West (1998) used cognitive abilitv tests and thinking disposition 
questionnaires as predictors of accurate reasoning performance. Experiments 4-6 ýN ill use 
working memory capacity tests as an alternative way of measuring cognitive ability in order 
to predict correct reasoning responses. 
From Experiments 1-3 of this thesis, it was concluded that individual differences in five- 
term series spatial and syllogistic reasoning were associated with individual differences in a 
range of working memory measures. The pattern of findings were consistent ýý ith a unitarv 
vicxv of executive function. The factor analysis showed a dissociation between the verbal 
and spatial resources, but a general factor also emerged. Two explanations were put 
forward as interpretations of this finding. The first was based on the Baddeley perspectivc. 
\\-here the general factor related to the CE and the verbal and spatial resources to the PL and 
VSSP, respectively. The second perspective accounted for the fact that the complex and 
passive span measures loaded similarly on what had originally been thought of as the 
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subsystem factors, the PL and VSSP. Consequently. this interpretation related all three 
factors to the CE, with general and specific components of executive processing. This 
ex lanation contrasts with that put forward bly Shah and .I P Miyake (1996. ). They presented a 
factor analytic model compatible with separate central resources of working memory. over 
and above the level of the subsystems. A general factor did not emerge from their analý sis. 
These separate systems accounted for the maintenance and processing of spatial and verbal 
information as autonomous systems. This contrasts with the model found here where spatial 
and verbal information showed no clear independence, and additionally a general factor also 
emerged. The primary aim of this set of experiments is to extend the findiii, -, s from the 
three-factor working memory model from Experiments 1-3 to a vvider range of reasoning 
tasks. In this way, further justification of this working memory model may be obtained. 
Simpler and more complex reasoning tasks will be investigated, in addition to those already 
looked at, to try and differentiate the factors found in the model outlined above. 
Stanovich and West (1998) attempted to demonstrate that patterns of individual differences 
across cognitive tasks can have important implications for current debates about what it 
means to be rational. They investigated a wide range of reasoning tasks and their 
relationships with measures of cognitive ability and a person's thinking disposition. 
Stanovich and colleagues have studied a multitude of tasks from the heuristics and biases 
literature, and investigated whether, at least for certain classes of task, there are significant 
cross-task correlations. The direction of these correlations could give useful results - 
participants giving the normative response on one task may be more likely to give it on 
another. 
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In four studies, Stanovich and West (1998) explored the extent to which measures of 
cognitive a lity and thinking dispositions could predict discrepancies from normatix e 
responding on a variety of tasks from the deductive literature. The deductive tasks were 
syllogisms, the selection task, statistical reasoning, and argument evaluation. They 
measured cognitive capacity by administering well-known cognitive ability and academic 
aptitude tasks. Stanovich and colleagues suggest that cognitive ability reflects cognitive 
capacity, specifically that measures of cognitive ability reflect computational limitations. 
They used a cognitive ability composite score composed of the Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT), the Raven Matrices, and reading comprehension. All are known to load highly on 
psychometric g (Carpenter, Just & Shell, 1990), and such measures have been linked to 
neuropsychological and information-processing indicators of efficient cognitive 
computation (Deary & Stough, 1996; Vernon, 1991,1993). In Baron's (1985,1988) 
conceptualisation, measures of cognitive capacity include perceptual speed, working 
memory capacity and the efficiency of the retrieval of information stored in long-term 
memory. These capacities are thought to underlie traditional psychometric intelligence. 
Thus a link can be seen here between Stanovich and West's (1998) cognitive ability tests, 
and the working memory tests used in this series of experiments, as measures of cognitive 
capacity. Stanovich and West (1998) also measured thinking dispositions by administering 
a questionnaire consisting of intermixed items from a number of subscales (including 
counterfactual thinking scale and others). This measure was proposed to tap processes such 
as the motivation to search for counter-examples on the deductive tasks. 
Stanovich and West (1998) looked at the relationships between performance on the 
reasoning tasks, composite scores of cognitive ability and measures of thinking dispositions. 
Each of the rational thinking (or reasoning) tasks displayed individual differences that 
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tended to be reliably correlated with the individual differences displayed on other reasoning 
tasks. It was also found that the cognitive ability composite score was significantly 
correlated with performance on all four rational thinking tasks. Due to the cross- 
correlations between the range of deductive tasks and the significant correlations with 
ý11 ability (assumed to reflect capacity), Stanovich and West (1998) suggested that people with 
higher ability do better overall (when their performance is judged by a normative model). 
Secondly, it was found that the thinking dispositions composite score was significantly 
correlated with performance on all four rational thinking tasks. The authors suggested that 
the reasoner's thinking disposition could explain perfon-nance, partly, on the basis of non- 
normative thought patterns. For instance, one interpretation of thinking dispositions was 
that the reasoner's performance is affected by their motivation to search for alternative 
models where the conclusion does not hold. Stanovich and colleagues suggest that jointly. 
cognitive ability and thinking dispositions account for a moderate amount of variance in 
overall rational thinking performance, although cognitive ability was a stronger unique 
predictor. 
This account suggested that cross-correlations should be observed between deductive tasks, 
and that these tasks should also correlate with cognitive ability, assumed to reflect cognitive 
capacity. There should also be an additional link between reasoning tasks and those 
suggested to measure a thinking style or disposition. If Stanovich and West's (1998) 
cognitive ability composite score, assumed to measure capacity, correlated with the 
deductive tasks, it could be assumed that working memory capacity tasks should also 
correlate with those reasoning tasks. For instance, Kyllonen and Christal (1990) found that 
individual differences in reasoning ability reflected differences in working memory 
capacity. In this way, they suggested that general ability reflected the availability of 
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attentional resources (Ackennan, 1988). Thus, research has shov, -n a link between reasoning 
or general fluid ability and workin memory capacity. 9 
Stanovich and West (1998) used cognitive ability tests as a measure of capacity. In 
Experiments 4-6 working memory capacity measures will replace these. In Experiments 1 -33 
of this thesis, observations were made in agreement with the findings of Stanovich and 
colleagues, as well as Kyllonen and Christal (1990). There were cross-correlations bem-ecii 
syllogistic and spatial reasoning, and both these tasks correlated highl. v with measures of 
working memory capacity. Given Stanovich's account, and the results of Experiments 1-3, 
it would be expected that a wider range of reasoning tasks may correlate together, and with 
measures of working memory capacity. Experiments 4-6 aim to investigate these findings, 
using a selection of deductive measures and working memory capacity measures. 
The implications of this research for reasoning theory was also examined in Experiments I- 
3. The sYllogistic reasoning tasks were most associated with the specific verbal and spatial 
factors, although most consistently with the spatial factor, whilst the five-term series spatial 
reasoning tasks were most strongly associated with the general factor. This set of findings 
has implications for verbal and heuristic accounts of reasoning performance. The syllogistic 
reasoning tasks cross-correlated with span tasks requiring the maintenance and storage of 
spatial information. The verbal theorists assume that verbal comprehension and rule-based 
processes can account for performance on syllogistic problems (e. g., Polk & Newell, 1995; 
Rips, 1994). These theories must be able to explain why syllogistic performance was 
significantly influenced by the spatial factor in the CFA. The heuristic theorists suggest that 
much of the data from these types of experiments can be explained by recourse to matching 
or probabilistic strategies (e. g., Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990; Chater & Oaksford, 1999). 
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These theories must be able to explain -ý, vhv the reasoning measures in Experiments 1-3 were 
predicted by measures of the explicit system (capacity tasks). Experiments 4-6 provide 
additional reasoning measures that allo\ý the further examination and implications t'or 
reasoning theory. 
In Experiments 1-3, the factor analysis pointed to a three-factor model of working memory 
to account for the processing and representation of syllogistic and spatial inferences. All the 
tasks loaded on the general factor to some extent. What was less clear ýýeiv the loadings of 
the reasoning tasks on the specific verbal and spatial factors. The svllogisms, when verbally 
and visually presented, consistently loaded both the verbal and spatial factors. The five- 
term series spatial inferences, when verbally presented, only loaded on the general factor. 
The spatial inferences, when visually presented, loaded negativcly on the verbal factor. The 
complex span measures used in Experiments I-) showed relationships ývith the reasoning 
tasks in a very consistent way - both complex verbal and spatial spans predicted 
performance on the reasoning tasks. The simple passive measures used showed variable 
relationships with the reasoning measures, thus more evidence is needed to establish what 
these tasks are measuring. 
Previous work in this area has looked at simple versus complex tasks and working memory. 
This allowed the investigation of verbal and spatial resources of working memory. at the 
level of the subsystems. Farmer, Berman and Fletcher (1986) investigated simple tasks and 
their relation with working memory through dual task studies. Articulatory suppression 
disrupted concurrent performance of a verbal reasoning task (A is not followed by B- BA), 
but had no efTect upon performance of a spatial reasoning task (manikin task). In contrast. 
spatial suppi-cssion (continuous sequential tapping) produced reliable interference onI. v xvith 
spatial reasoning. The results implied that the slave systems of working memory are 
involved in these simple reasoning tasks, and were taken as consistent xvith Baddeley's 
notion of two passive subsystems. 
Whilst this distinction between verbal and spatial resources at the level of the PL and VSSP 
is well documented, the role that these subsystems play in more complex reasoning tasks 
appears to be minimal (e. g., Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick & Wynn, 1993 )). Dual-task studies 
that have used complex reasoning tasks, such as syllogistic tasks, have found strong 
relationships with CE tasks, and weaker relationships with tasks assumed to load the PL and 
VSSP. This could also be seen in Experiments 1-3 where the complex deductive tasks 
showed smaller loadings on factor I and factor 2, the domain specific memory factors. 
Experiments 4-6 will take simple and complex measures of reasoning and examine them 
together with the working memory capacity measures. Given the dual-task work, it might 
be expected that the simpler reasoning tasks show stronger relationships with simple 
working memory spans, assumed to reflect relatively passive storage (as Farmer, Berman & 
Fletcher, 1986), and that the complex reasoning tasks show stronger relationships with the 
complex working memory spans, assumed to reflect executive function (as Gilhooly et al., 
1993). 
Experiment 4 will examine spatial and temporal inferences, together with the working 
memory capacity measures seen in previous experiments. Both the spatial and temporal 
problems are complex in nature and would be expected to rely upon resources that reflect 
both an active (processing) and passive (storage) component. Experiment 5 and 6 in this 
series use measures which include simple and complex verbal and spatial working memory 
span measures (Shah & Miyake, 1996; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Tardif, 
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1980) together with a range of reasoning measures. The reasoning measures used in 
Experiment 5 and 6 are simple and complex tasks, which superficially seem verbal or spatial 
in nature. The factor analysis from Experiments 1-3 produced a model where two of the 
factors (the verbal and spatial factor) were open to alternative explanations. By using 
simple and complex reasoning tasks, Experiments 5 and 6 might be able to distinguish 
whether these factors are passive or active in nature. All the reasoning tasks were presented 
visually and were evaluative in nature. The tasks include the following - abstract problems 
(Braine, Reiser & Rumain, 1984), conditional inferences, three-term and five-term series 
spatial inferences (Byme & Johnson-Laird, 1989), syllogistic inferences and multiple 
quantification problems (Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Tabossi, 1989). 
Some of the simple and complex reasoning tasks are generally assumed to rely on verbal 
processing and representation. The complex verbal tasks include the syllogistic task from 
Experiments I and 3, as well as a multiple quantification task (Johnson-Laird, Byme & 
Tabossi, 1989). Both these tasks are based on quantifiable statements and require the 
integration of information between quantifiers in a sentence, either single- or multiply- 
quantified premises. The simple verbal tasks include an abstract propositional task (Braine, 
Reiser & Rumain, 1984) and conditional task. Both these tasks rely on reasoning about 
propositions. The other simple and complex reasoning tasks are generally assumed to rely 
on spatial processing and representation. The simple spatial task is the three-term series 
spatial inferences, complimented by the complex spatial task - the five-term series spatial 
inferences. 
Now that the general rationale has been introduced for Chapter 4, the specifics for 
Experiment 4 will be discussed. Experiment 4 concentrates on two types of reasoning task - 
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spatial and temporal inference. In the spatial domain, it has been proposed that humans 
reason from analogical representations, called mental models, that are "representing objects. 
states of affairs, sequence of events, the way the world is... " (Johnson-Laird, 198-33). Byme 
and Johnson-Laird (1989) designed their experiments to test a theory of spatial inference 
based on mental models. Indeed, their results show that it is easier to draxv a valid spatial 
inference when a description corresponds to just a single layout as opposed to multiple 
layouts. 
It has been argued (e. g., Baddeley, 1993) that temporal and causal relationships, in addition 
to spatial relationships, are also coded spatially in working memory. Schaeken, Johnson- 
Laird and d'Ydewalle (1996) report five experiments investigating reasoning based on 
temporal relations. The problems were based on producing a conclusion. They used 
problems of the following form (Example 4.1), substituting the letters with everyday events. 
a before b, 
b before c, 
d while b, 
e while c, 
What is the relation between d and e? 
Example 4.1 
The results showed that problems requiring one mental model elicited more correct 
responses than problems requiring multiple models, which in turn elicited more correct 
answers than multiple model problems with no valid answers. This can be mapped directly 
onto the examples given by Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989) in relation to spatial reasoning, 
surnmarised in Chapter 2. Schaeken, Johnson-Laird and d'Ydewalle (1996) experiments 
228 
corroborate the mental model theory for temporal reasoning. as did B,, -me and Johnsoii- 
Laird (1989) for spatial reasoning. 
Vandierendonck and De Vooght (1997) report two experiments testing the use of working 
memory components during reasoning with temporal and spatial relations in four-term 
series problems. The problems were based on evaluating a set of giveri conclusions. Fhcý 
used the following form (Example 4.2) for the spatial problems. 
The guitar is to the right of the violin, 
The guitar is to the left of the drum kit, 
The drum kit is to the left of the piano, 
Where is the violin in relation to the piano? 
Example 4.2 
The temporal problems were based on this form also. Flowever, the temporal problems 
related to actions performed by a person. An example would be, "Charles went to the 
movies before going to the play". The results of Vandierendonck and De Vooght's (1997) 
dual-task studies suggested that visuo-spatial resources are used by persons solving linear 
reasoning problems with a temporal or a spatial content. Articulatory, visuo-spatial, and 
central executive interference tasks resulted in degraded solution performance in both 
spatial and temporal cases. 
From the review of these studies it might be expected that similar patterris of cor-relations 
rnav be observed for both spatial and temporal reasoning tasks. As yet. no studies tackle the 
relationship between spatial and temporal reasoning from an individual differences 
perspective. Thus. Experiment 4 aims to investigate the relationships bet,, \ cen spatial and 
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temporal reasoning problems, and their relationships with working memorý- span measures. 
Through a correlational and factor analytic investigation, these results may add to the 
conclusions made in the first part of this thesis regarding the processing and representation 
of problems with a spatial content. 
Experiment 4 in this series is designed to look at the intercorrelation between spatial and 
temporal reasoning and their relationship with working memory capacity. Experiment 4 
uses measures which include simple and complex verbal and spatial working memory span 
measures (Shah & Miyake, 1996; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Tardif, 1987), 
together with spatial and temporal reasoning measures (Byme & Johnson-Laird, 1989; 
Schaeken, Johnson-Laird & d'Ydewalle, 1996). Comparisons have been made between 
temporal versus spatial reasoning problems, and suggest that they may rely on similar 
resources and use similar representations. 
4.2 EXPERIMENT 4 
4.2.1 Aim 
The primary aim of Experiment 4 was to build on the assumptions made by Stanovich and 
West (1998) but using spatial and temporal problems together with capacity measures of 
working memory. Another aim of Experiment 4 was to further assess the results found in 
Experiment 2, in relation to spatial reasoning, but with the addition of a temporal reasoning 
task. The results from Experiment 2 suggested that spatial reasoning relied upon a general 
resource of working memory. Experiment 4 investigates the extent to which capacity 
measures of working memory predict performance on both spatial and temporal problems. 
Four working memory span tasks were used - one complex spatial measure (TTT), one 
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complex verbal measure (verbal), and a simple spatial (arrow) and verbal (,, vord) measure 
(Daneman & Tardif, 1987; Shah & Miyake, 1996; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). The 
capacity tasks were shown to separate onto different factors in the factor analysis section of 
Experiments 1-3, identifying a verbal and spatial resource as -,, ý-ell as a general one. The 
span tasks were given together with two reasoning tasks, the spatial inference task used in 
Experiment 2, and a temporal order task (based on that used by Schaeken, Johnson-Laird 
and d'Ydewalle, 1996). The reasoning tasks were both presented visually. 
4.2.2 Method 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was run to ensure that the new Visual Basic temporal inference computer task 
was easy to understand, use, and at a reasonable difficulty level. The task was found to be 
suitable for use in the main study. 
Participants 
Forty-seven participants took part in this study. The participants were undergraduate 
students and postgraduate students at the University of Plymouth, and they received course 
credit or cash payment for participating. None of the sample had prior training in logic. 
They were all native English speakers. 
Procedure 
Experiment 4 was carried out in one testing sessions per participant, the session being 
approximately one and a half hours long. Participants signed up in a time slot on an 
experimenter sheet for the session. The session consisted of six tasks. All participants 
carried out these computerised tasks in the following order: - 
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temporal inference visual measure. 
complex spatial tic-tac-toe span, 
complex verbal sentence span, 
simple spatial arrow span, 
simple verbal word span, 
spatial inference visual measure. 
A description of the tasks in Experiment 4. not already explained in previous experiments. is 
presented next. The procedure for all other tasks was identical to that described previously. 
Simple Verbal Word Span (word) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment I- 
Simple Spatial Arrow Span (arrow) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
Complex Verbal Sentence Span (verbal) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment I- 
Complex Spatial Tic-Tac-Toe Span (TTT) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 2. 
Spatial Inference (spatial) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 2. 
Temporal Inference (temporal) 
Procedure 
The procedure followed was based on that employed by Schaeken, Johnson-Laird and 
d'Ydewalle (1996). Each participant received 16 vvo -dimensional temporal problems in the 
visual modality. Similar representations have been suggested to underlie both spatial and 
temporal reasoning, thus the temporal problems were mapped onto the 16 spatial problems 
(used in Experiments I and 2) as consistently as the model structures would allow. For 
instance - 'left' was substituted for 'before', 'right' for after. and 'behind' and 'in front' 
became 'while'. Some of the spatial layouts would not translate into temporal ones. due to 
structural differences between 'behindTin front' versus 'while'. Therefore. some 
indeterminate temporal layouts were introduced. 14 temporal problems had valid 
conclusions, 2 were indeterminate or invalid. Half of the valid problems, according to 
model-based theory, had one model answers. Figure 4.1 shows an example of this. 
Determinale validproblem Models 
The lever is pressed before the alarm rings. GLA 
The gate opens before the lever is pressed. BD 
The bulb goes on while the gate opens. 
The door shuts while the alarm rings. 
Hence, what is the relation between the bulb going on and the door shutting? 
Figure 4.1 -A one model temporal problem 
Only one model of the premises can be used here to describe the relation of the events 
N\ ithin this set. The correct answer would be that the bulb goes on before the door shuts. 
2 -3) 3 
The other half of valid problems, according to model-based theorý-, had multiple model 
answers. Figure 4.2 shows an example of this. 
Indeterminate validproblem Alodels 
Tom drinks coffee before he watches television. SCTCST 
He has a shave before he watches television. B N1 B NI 
He eats a biscuit while he has a shave. 
He reads a magazine while he watches television. 
Hence, what is the relation between Tom eating a biscuit and Tom reading a magazine I .) 
Figure 4.2 -A multiple model temporal problem 
More than one model of the premises can be used here to describe the relation of the events 
within this set. The correct answer would be that Tom eats a biscuit before he reads a 
magazine. The order of presentation of problems ý, vas randomised before the start of the 
experiment but remained the same for all participants. A ftill list of all the problems used 
can be found in Appendix A2.1. The screen displayed a set of instructions explaining that 
in this part of the experiment the participants would be asked about the order of events in a 
given description. A problem would appear on the screen describing the order of events of a 
set of five activities or actions. All statements for each problem were presented at the same 
time. Shortly afterwards, a question would also appear on the screen asking them to relate 
two of the activities or actions within a set. They were told that there would be 16 
descriptions using the following terms to describe the order in time in which each activity or 
action occurs: before, after, and while. The participants Nvere told that their task was to link 
tN\ o of the activitics or actions in the set using the above relations. For example. Toni may 
-34 
eat a biscuit be re he watches television; Tom may eat a biscuit after he watches 
television; or Tom may eat a biscuit ii, hile he watches television. Of note here is that some 
problems had less believable content and participants were reminded that these -Nvere 
hypothetical situations and believability was of no consequence to the conclusions theý- 
gave. They were also told that for some of the descriptions they may feel there was not 
enough information to determine the relation between the activities or actions, in which case 
they should answer "not enough information". The instructions continued with a sunimarý, 
on how to respond to the descriptions. The participants were told that the screen .,, -ould also 
display a blank box in which they were to type their response to each problem. There was a 
button to press to move on to the next problem. They were given one practice problem (see 
Appendix A2.2 for a full set of instructions). 
Scoring 
The number of temporal problems correctly solved (out of a maximum of 16) was taken as a 
participant's score for the temporal reasoning task. This figure was then used in the main 
analysis. In addition, it was noted how many of each type of problem (one-model, two- 
model, or indeterminate) was solved. This was used in further analysis to test the 
assumptions made by the mental models theory of reasoning. 
4.2.3 Results 
In addition to correlational analyses and t-tests, confinnatory factor analysis was also 
performed on the data from this experiment. The correlational and significance analysis 
will be reported in this experimental section, but the factor analysis for the three 
experiments (Experiments 4-6) will be discussed in a factor analytic section (Section 4.5) 
after Experiment 6. This is due to a multi-group analysis consisting of Experiments 4 
through to 6. 
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As discussed previously, there are multiple scoring methods for many of the span tasks. 
However, only one method per task will be used throughout the results section. The cross- 
correlations of the global and norinal span scores (as defined in Section 3.2.2) across 
different measures were between . 91 ***and . 96***. This suggests that both scoring 
methods reflected the same underlying construct. Thus, for arrow, word and verbal spans, 
the global score will be used throughout. 
4.2.3. I Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the six measures used in Experiment 4 are presented in Table 4.1. 
The table also contains data relevant to the reliability of the measures used. 
Mean SD Min Max Skewness Reliability 
Span Tasks 
arrow 15.17 9.40 1 37 . 83 . 81 
word 46.53 14.83 19 96 . 74 . 85 
verbal 36.26 18.73 6 78 . 35 . 91 
TTT 6.94 6.23 0 25 1.22 . 80 
Reasoning Tasks 
temptot 9.51 3.74 1 15 -. 43 . 81 
templm 4.66 1.77 0 7 -. 48 - 
tempMM 4.51 2.00 0 7 -. 53 
tempIND . 32 . 52 
0 2 1.29 - 
sPattot 8.91 3.37 2 15 -. 40 . 70 
sPat IM 4.47 2.01 0 7 -. 53 - 
sPatMM 4.45 1.93 1 8 -. 07 
Table 4.1- Descriptive statistics for Experiment 4 tasks (n=47) 
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Table 4.1 shows that all tasks produced a good overall range of scores. The spatial and 
temporal tasks have been broken down into problem type - one. multiple and indetermiiiate 
problems. The one and multiple model types shoxv similar performance rates. whilst the 
indeterminate temporal problems show a lower accurate response rate. Both the span and 
reasoning measures show a varying level of performance. The distribution of scores in all 
tasks was satisfactory, there were no hea-vil-v skewed distributions for anv of the measures 
used. 
The reliability of the span tasks was again assessed to ensure thev were internally reliable. 
Each span task was inspected for each participant to ensure that each set in each span task 
was answered equally often. Their reliabilitv v, *as assessed by performing a split-half 
calculation on each of the four span measures used. The Spearman-Brown formula was 
used to provide an estimate of reliability for the full task. The corrected correlations for the 
span tasks are shown in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 shows that the arrow, word, verbal and TTT 
span tasks produced a reliable odd-even corrected correlation of over. 80. All span 
measures showed a highly satisfactory level of reliability (Rust & Golombok, 1999). 
Each reasoning measure was also assessed for internal reliability using Cronbach's alpha. 
As seen in Table 4.1, the reliability estimate for the spatial reasoning task ý, vas adequate for 
group measurement (r = . 70). This can be compared to Experiment 2 where the spatial task, 
presented visually, also showed an adequate level of reliability (where r= . 75). The 
reliability estimate for the temporal reasoning task was highly satisfactory for group 
measurement (r = .81). 
2 
4.2.3.2 The Span Measures 
The first analysis examined whether similar patterns of cross-correlations could be observed 
between the span measures (see Appendix B 1.10 for the full matrix). This would further 
substantiate the claim for a general CE resource, as opposed to separate CE resources for 
verbal and spatial information (e. g., Turner & Engle, 1989; Shah & Miyake, 1996). The 
correlation matrix for Experiment 4 span measures is presented in Table 4.2. 
arrow word verbal 
arrow I 
word . 38** 
verbal . 45** . 71*** 1 
TTT . 38** . 18 . 24' 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '=p<0.1, *=p<0.05, **=p<0.0 1, ***=p<0.00 1) 
Table 4.2- Experiment 4 correlations between the four span tasks 
As Table 4.2 shows, a positive matrix can be seen between the span measures used. Firstly, 
the highest correlation is between the simple word and complex verbal spans (r = .71, p< 
001). This is entirely consistent with the experiments so far. The passive word span 
correlates with the passive arrow span (r = .38, p< .0 1), which was observed in Experiments 
2 and 3 (r = . 28 and r= . 26, p<. 10), and less strongly in Experiment I (r = . 23). This does 
not fit the picture of two separate subsystems of working memory. However, the correlation 
could still arise if both tasks draw on the general resource. Experiments 1-3 multiple CFA 
three-factor model showed that both the simple span measures, word and arrow, loaded the 
general factor as well as the specific factors. Thus, some of the correlation between the 
simple measures could be explained if they measure domain independent parts of the CE. 
The arrow span also correlates significantly with the two complex span measures, the verbal 
and TTT spans (r =. 38, r =. 45, p< . 01). The arrow span would be expected to correlate 
238 
with the TTT span due to them both relying on the manipulation of spatial inforination. It is 
not so clear as to why the arrow span correlates with the complex verbal span. Ho,, vever. 
again as indicated in Experiments 1-3 CFA, it might be that all the span measures tap some 
general processes. This correlation between the arrow and verbal spans was also found in 
Experiment 3 (r = .31, p< . 05). The correlation between the two complex spans, TTT and 
verbal, reached a borderline significant correlation (r = . 24, p<. 10). Overall, the findings 
fail to replicate the dissociation found by Shah and Miyake (1996). 
4.2 .3.3 The Span and Reasoning Measures 
The next set of analyses relates to the influence of the span measures on the temporal and 
spatial reasoning tasks. Similar relationships between both types of reasoning task and 
working memory spans would be expected. Past literature shows that the solution of linear 
reasoning problems with a spatial or a temporal content require visuo-spatial resources of 
working memory (e. g., Vandierendonck & De Vooght, 1997). The relevant correlations 
from Experiment 4 are presented below in Table 4.3. 
arrow word verbal TTT 
temporal . 40** . 32* . 31* . 52*** 
spatial . 47*** . 31 . 27' . 41** 
temporal - spatial 
correlation . 68*** 
(two-tailedsig. levels: '=p<0.1, * =p<0.05, ** =p <0.01, *** =p <0.001) 
Table 4.3- Experiment 4 correlations between the span and reasoning tasks 
Table 4.3 presents data relevant to whether individual differences in working memory 
predict individual differences in both temporal and spatial reasoning in similar ways. For 
both tasks the matrix is generally positive in relation to the span measures used. The pattern 
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of correlations for both the spatial and temporal task are verý- similar. The data shows that 
the best predictors of both reasoning tasks are the spatial spans - simple arrow and complex 
TTT (r = . 40, r= . 52 for the temporal task; r= . 47, r= . 41 for the spatial task). This result 
is entirely consistent with that found in Experi 11 iment 2 for the spatial reasoning task (for 
arrow, r= . 25; for TTT, r= . 41). The spatial and temporal task would be expected to 
correlate highest with the spatial spans due to the spatial nature of the measures. These 
results are also consistent with research that indicates the similar nature of processing and 
representation in temporal and spatial problems. However. there is also an indication that 
the reasoning tasks correlate marginally with the verbal spans. This is also consistent with 
Experiment 2 results. 
The spatial and temporal problems appear to draw on processes that are common with 
spatial working memory capacity, but there is also some evidence of a relationship with 
verbal working memory capacity. The last finding to further strengthen the view that 
temporal and spatial problems may rely on similar resources is the correlation between 
them, a very strong relationship (r = . 68, p< . 001). This lends support to the idea that 
temporal and spatial reasoning rely on similar representations and processes. 
4.2.3.4 Further Analysis 
The spatial and temporal tasks were also divided into easy and difficult problems. Past 
research suggests one model problems are easier to solve than multiple model problems. 
Problem difficulty percentages for the temporal and spatial tasks are presented in Table 4.4. 
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correct 
temp IM 67 
tempMM 64 
tempIND Iý 
spat IM 56 
spatMM 55 
Table 4.4 - Experiment 4% of correct responses to I M, MM and IND problems 
An average of 10 out of 16 (59%) visually presented temporal inferences were solved. 5 of 
which were single model problems. It should be noted that there were only 2 indeterminate 
temporal problems, therefore this data may be noisy. An averagc of 9 out of 16 (56'o) 
visually presented spatial inferences were solved, 5 of x,, -hich , ý-ere single model problems. 
This is a lower overall accuracy rate for the spatial problems than in Experiment -1. where 
69% were solved correctly. 
A number of t-tests were also performed on the data (see Appendix B 1.2 for full results). 
These would identify whether there were significant differences between the single model 
and multiple model problems, and whether there were differences between the reasoning 
tasks used. Overall, in both the temporal and spatial inference task, participants performed 
at similar rates (d. f = 46, t=1.43, p= . 16). This might reflect the 
fact that both tasks rely 
on similar processing and representations. Participants performed significantly better on 
both the temp IM and tempMM problems in contrast to the tempIND problems (d. f = 46. t 
= 17.94, p= . 001, 
d. f. = 46,1 = 14.721, p= . 001). This 
is in line -with work that showed 
that more difficult indeterminate problems are harder to solve (Schaeken. Johnson-Laird & 
d'Ydewalle. 1996). There \\ ere no significant differences bem cen the temp IM and 
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tempMM problems (d. f = 46, t =. 81. p ý. 42). Similarly. participants performed equally 
well on the spat IM versus spatMM problems (d. f = 46, t =. 07. p =. 94). This finding is 
inconsistent with Experiment 2 results and previous studies which show an effect of the 
number of models to be constructed. However, in Experiment 2, it \ý-as shown that visual 
presentation reduced the difficulty between one model and multiple model problems. 
Perhaps in this case, the reduction in memory load through visual presentation eliminated 
this difference in difficulty. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 4 suggest that individual differences in working memory 
capacity can explain variation in perforinance on five-term series spatial and temporal tasks, 
when visually presented. Experiment 4 indicates that temporal and spatial inference tasks 
correlate positively, and mostly significantly, with complex measures of both verbal and 
spatial working memory. The complex span tasks were differentiated by the type of 
information being stored and processed - the verbal span required the storage and processing 
of words and sentences, whilst the spatial TTT span required the storage and processing of 
winning lines in a three-dimensional game. There was no clear separation of central 
resources for temporal and spatial reasoning dependent on the nature of these span tasks. 
Both the verbal and spatial spans predicted individual differences on the reasoning tasks. A 
similar pattern of correlations was observed for both the temporal and spatial measures, 
vdien visually presented, although there was no significant correlation between the spatial 
task and the complex verbal working memory measure. 
Past studies have shown that tasks that interfere with all three components of working 
memory resourccs (i. e.. articulatorN. visuo-spatial. and central executive suppression) afl'cct 
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performance on both types of reasoning task - spatial and temporal (e. L,.. Vandierendonck & I-- 
De Vooght, 1997). Vandierendonck et al. (1997) claim that although there has been no 
evidence that indicates that the representation constructed is in the visuo-spatial mode 
(Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993), their experiment is consistent xvith both the older spatial 
array view (e. g., De Soto. London & Handel, 1965) and with the more recent mental models 
theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983). The results of Experiment 4 are in line with the fiindiiig from 
Vandierendonck et al. 's (1997) work, from an individual differences perspective. It was 
found that both types of reasoning problem relate to all resources of working memory 
capacity tasks, and that a difference could be seen in performance on simple single model 
and difficult indeterminate temporal problems -a finding consistent with Johnson-L aird's 
(1983) account. These results suggest that both reasoning tasks draw on verbal and spatial 
resources of working memory, although the correlation with the spatial spans is hi-ghest. 
A possible explanation of the relationship between span and reasoning measures is that the 
spatial and temporal inferences rely on both verbal and spatial resources which enables 
particular aspects of the deductive process to occur. It may be that performance on both 
types of problems first requires the interpretation of the linguistic information given in each 
premise. The role of verbal comprehension processes may explain the relationships 
between both temporal and spatial inferences with the simple and complex verbal working 
memory measures. The verbal information may then be processed by the manipulation of 
some form of mental model. This link with the manipulation of a mental model may 
explain the relationships between both temporal and spatial inferences with the simple and 
complex spatial working memory measures. 
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The findings for the spatial and temporal task have implications for theories of reasoning. 
Both tasks showed strongest correlations with spatial Nýorking memory. but Nvere also 
correlated with verbal xorking memon-. Interpretations of this finding. in relation to the 
three classes of reasoning theory (Chapter 2). will be left until the Lmieral discussion 
(Section 4.6). In this way, the factor analysis in Section . 
33.5 can be used to furtlicr identify 
which resources each reasoning task utillses. 
Further investigation was needed to identify the function of the three factors identified in 
Experiments 1-3 CFA. Therefore, the next two experiments examine a wider range of 
reasoning tasks, some that are verbal or propositional in nature v, -hilst others are spatial in 
nature. The wider range will allow the investigation into underlying resources required in 
performing both simple and complex reasoning measures. The tasks used so far - 
syllogistic, spatial and temporal tasks - appear to consistently relate to the complex span 
measures. In general, the reasoning tasks do seem to rely on centrally allocated resources of 
working memory, as defined by the general factor in Experiments 1 -3. What has been less 
clear is how these tasks utilise the storage systems of working memory (or domain-specific 
parts of the CE), that may be best reflected by the simple span measures. Thus, in 
Experiment 5, only the simple word and arrow spans were used in order to try to iclentiýv the 
verbal (F I) and spatial factor (F2) from Experiments 1 -3 CFA more fully. Thus, 
Experiment 5 investigated the interrelationships between the simple span measures and 
performance on a set of reasoning tasks. These included tasks assumed to rely on verbal 
processing and storage - abstract and conditional tasks. Also included v, -ere tasks assumed 
to rely on spatial processing and storage - three-ten'n and five-term series spatial reasoning. 
Other complex tasks \\ ere also investigated, and as yet there are uncertain findings as to 
how these tasks are processed and stored - syllogistic and multiple quantification tasks. 
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4.3 EXPERIMENT 5 
4.3.1 Aim 
A range of simple and complex reasoning tasks is introduced in Experiment 5. The first set 
of experiments in this series identified a working memory model that consisted of three 
factors - with a verbal, spatial and general factor. The reasoning tasks that xere used in 
these experiments were all complex in nature - the, v Nvere all assumed to require the 
maintenance and storage of information, and generally loaded heavily on the general factor. 
Due to this general factor that emerged throughout the first three experiments. it was 
decided that Experiment 5 would concentrate solely on identifyino what the specific factors 
were measuring. It might be that factor I and factor 2 represent the PL and VSSP of 
working memory. However, it might also be the case that these two factors represent 
domain specific parts of the CE. Thus, Experiment 5 attempted to adjudicate hemcen these 
two alternatives by using additional reasoning tasks. 
A finding from the first three experiments was that the arrow and word span showed the 
lowest correlations, perhaps suggesting a dissociation between them. In the CFA, the word 
span loaded factor I and factor 3, in contrast, the arrow span loaded factor 2 and factor 3 3. 
These loadings were significant and consistent across the three experiments. Thus. it could 
be that the simple spans load factor I and factor 2 due to their passive storage element. but 
also both load factor 3 due to the commonality in processing. By using the two span tasks 
that showed the lo\\ est association, it may be possible to identiýv -whether factor I and factor 
are passive or active resources. 
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The five-ten-n series spatial inferences from the previous experiments loaded heavily on the 
general factor. although the visually presented problems had the additional negative 
relationship with the verbal factor. The syllogistic inferences, "hether visually or verbally 
presented, seemed to load all three of the factors, includin-, -, the spatial one. Experiment 5 
will further test the best way to interpret factors I and 2. the -verbal and spatial resource. by 
using the word and arrow span to identify their passive or acti've nature. 
Experiment 5 investigates simple and complex reasoning tasks. A reason for this is dUe to 
past dual-task research, although the tasks are not identical. For instance, Farmer, Berman 
and Fletcher (1986) used a simple verbal or propositional task and a simple spatial task, 
together with secondary tasks assumed to load the sub-systems of working memory, the PL 
and VSSP. They found that a detriment in performance on both the simpic reasoning tasks 
only occurred with same modality secondary tasks, for instance, articulatory suppression or 
spatial tracking. This, they suggested is evidence for a distinction between ý, erbal and 
spatial resources at the level of the sub-systems. Thus the reasoning tasks to be used in 
Experiment 5 may also be differentiated at this level. An expectation might be that simple 
reasoning tasks will show higher correlations with simple span measures, if the span 
measures reflect passive storage. Three simpler reasoning tasks, that are assumed to rely 
mainly on passive resources, with some processing requirement, will be used in Experiment 
5. Two of these are based on propositional logic (abstract and conditional tasks). and one is 
based on three-term series spatial descriptions (simple spatial task). Although dual-task 
\\ ork has identified conditionals as being affected by CE secondary tasks (Toms, Morris & 
Ward, 1993), thev ý\ ere chosen to be labelled together with the other propositional and 
simple spatial task in contrast to the quantifiable and complex spatial tasks described iiext. 
Other dual-task work has Investigated more complex reasoning tasks, such as sý-11()o istic and Z__ -- 
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five-term series inferences (e. g., Gilhooly. Logie. Wetherick & Wynn. 1993 ); Klauer. III 
Stegmaier & Meiser, 1997). A detriment in performance on these reasomng tasks was most 
seen when carried out with secondary tasks assumed to load the CE component of working 
memory. Thus, three of these more complex reasoning tasks, that may rely on executive 
processing as well as storage, were chosen be used in Experiment 5. Two of these are based 
on syllogisms (syllogistic and multiple quantification tasks), and one is based on five-term 
spatial descriptions (complex spatial task). 
The role that factor I and factor 2 play in performance on the six reasoning tasks might be 
better identified by using a mixture of simple and complex reasoning measures. The factors 
may be easier to interpret by the addition of propositional and simple spatial tasks (labelled 
the simple reasoning measures). If factor I and factor 2 do represent the PL and VSSP, it 
might be expected that the simpler reasoning tasks load more on the verbal and spatial 
factor, whilst the complex reasoning tasks show weaker relationships with these two factors. 
This experiment also allows a test of the proposals put forward by Stanovich and 
colleagues. Stanovich and West (1998) used syllogistic and statistical reasoning tasks, 
together with a version of the selection task and an argument evaluation test. These 
reasoning tasks were found to be significantly correlated and the authors suggested that it 
was systematic response tendencies, not random performance errors, that could account for 
individual differences across very different reasoning tasks. If Stanovich and West (1998) 
were correct in the explanation of the correlations between their reasoning tasks, they ývould 
expect positive correlations between all the reasoning tasks used in Experiment 5. 
Stanovich and West (1998) also implemented tests of cognitive ability and used them as 
measures of cognitive capacity (e. g.. SATs). Stanovich and colleagues would expect the 
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reasoning tasks used here to correlate with measures of capacity (in comparison to their 
ability measures). 
As previously mentioned, six reasoning tasks will be used in Experiment 5. The simple 
reasoning tasks in consist of three-term series spatial inferences, abstract problems (Braiiic. 
Reiser & Rumain, 1984) and conditional inferences. The three-terin series problems require 
reasoning about relations. The abstract and conditional problems require reasonin, -, about 
propositions. The complex reasoning tasks consist of t-, \-o tasks already used in prior 
experiments, five-term series spatial and syllogistic inferences. An additional complex task 
is multiply quantified inferences (Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Tabossi, 1989). similar to 
syllogistic reasoning but with double the quantifiers in each premise. 
Two alternative explanations were put forward for the three-factor model, xý here factor I 
and factor 2 could be the sub-systems of working memory, or that they might be domain 
specific components of the CE. Therefore. the two span measures that will be used in 
Fxperiment 5 are those tasks that were found to be most associated with those two factors, 
the word span and the arrow span (Shah & Miyake, 1996). The span tasks were given 
together with the six reasoning tasks. The reasoning tasks were presented visually and in 
order to maintain consistency across all the reasoning tasks, an evaluative paradigm %vas 
used. This involved the evaluation of conclusions, rather than their production. The tasks 
also differed from those in the experiments so far due to the use of abstract content 
throughout (Experiments 1-4 used thematic/arbitrary content). -vvhich also helped to 
maintain consistencv. 
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4.3.2 Method 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was run to ensure that the new paper and pencil reasoning tasks (all six) were 
easy to understand, use, and at a reasonable difficulty level. A number of participants 
carried out the tasks and were happy ý, vith the procedure and t% pe of problem. The abstract 
reasoning and three-term series tasks , vere found to be too easy when not timed (cciling 
effect). Therefore a time limit was introduced of 15 and 10 seconds per problem, 
respectively, in order to overcome this effect. No other changes were made to the initial 
design. 
Participants 
Fifty-one participants took part in this study. The participants were undergraduate students 
and postgraduate students at the University of Plymouth, and they received course credit or 
cash payment for participating. None of the sample had prior training in logic. All 
participants were native English speakers. 
Procedure 
Experiment 5 was carried out in one testing session per participant, the session being 
approximately one and a half hours long. Participants signed up in a time slot on an 
experimenter sheet for the session, and were run in groups. The session consisted of eight 
tasks. All participants carried out these tasks in the following order (where an asterix (*) 
indicates a computerised task): - 
simple spatial inference. 
abstract reasoning. 
simple arro\\ span*. 
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simple word span*, 
conditional inference, 
syllogistic reasoning. 
complex spatial inference, 
multiple quantification. 
A description of the tasks in Experiment 5 not already explained in previous experiment, -,. 
are presented next. 
Simple Verbal Word Span (word) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
Simple Spatial Arrow Span (arrow) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 1. 
The Reasoning Tasks 
All reasoning problems were presented as paper and pencil tasks. They were all, to a greater 
or lesser degree, evaluation tasks. In Experiments 1-4 the participants were asked to 
produce a conclusion to the problems given. In Experiment 5. participants were given a 
choice of conclusions to pick from. This was in order to provide consistency across all the 
reasoning tasks used. The reasoning tasks all contained abstract content (non-thematic). 
They Nvere all based on hypothetical relationships bet,, veen letters and numbers. In this 
respect, the reasoning tasks differed from those used in previous experiments, vvhich 
required the production of a conclusion and employed thematic content. 
-1ý0 
Abstract Reasoning Task (abstract) 
Procedure 
9 multi-step problems, rated at 5.00 and above on the scale presented by Bra' iie. Reiser & 
Rumain (1984) were used. This task was concerned %ýith people's ability to reason logically 
with sentences in various forms. They were presented 'with a total of 9 problems in the 
booklet. For each of the problems they Nvere given a set of statements. An example of those 
statements is shown in Figure 4.3. 
Abstractproblem 
If there is both an N and an 1, then there's not aB 
It is false that there's not an N 
There is an I 
Figure 4.3- An abstract problem 
Respol7SCoptions 
Fliere's aB 
There's not aB 
There may or may not be aB 
Each problem concerned the presence or absence of letters on an imaginary black-board. 
The set of statements contained some facts about the black-board. The facts or premises 
contained the information that was known about the black-board and they should be 
accepted as true. A full list of all the problems used can be found in Appendix A3.1. 
The participant's task in each case was to decide on whether a presented conclusion 
necessarily followed from the statements about the black-board. A conclusion was 
necessary if it must be true, given that the statements were true. A list of the possible 
answers Nvas presented below each problem. There were three response options per 
problem. They Nýcre to tick one of the response conclusions for each set of statements (see 
Figure 4.1). The correct response to this problem would be that there is not a B. If thev 
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thought that no conclusion necessarily followed given that the statements xverc true. then 
they " ere to tick the relevant box. for instance, that the letter B may or may not be there. 
Participants were instructed to move onto the next problem after I -, seconds. A final 
requirement for participants was that no diagrams or notes , vere to be made during the task. 
Any questions about the task were asked before the start. There was one practice problem. 
A set of full instructions may be found in Appendix A-33.21. 
Scoring 
The number of abstract problems correctly solved (out of a maximum of 9) was takeii as a 
participants score for the abstract reasoning task. This figure -, vas then used in the main 
analysis. 
Conditional Inferences (condition) 
Procedure 
Participants received a total of 16 problems -4 modus ponens, 4 modus tonens, 4 
affirmation of the consequent, 4 denial of the antecedent. Following is Table 4.5, taken 
from Evans, Newstead and Byrne (1993), which presents the logical structure of the 
problems used. 
Inference Abbreviation First Premise Second Premise Conclusion 
Modus Ponens NIP If p then q p q 
Denial of the Antecedent DA If p then q not-p not-q 
Affirmation of the Consequent AC If p then q q p 
Modus Tollens MT If p then q not-q not-p 
Table 4.5- The logical structure of conditional inferences 
*? Z% -1 
The MP and MT inferences are logically valid, whilst the DA and AC inferences are 
logically fallacious in nature. Participants were instructed that this task concerned people*s 
. -'Dility to reason logically with sentences in various forms. They v, -ere presented with a total 
of 16 problems in the booklet. All four forms of conditional were used by systematically 
manipulating negation within the first conditional premise. A full list of all the problems 
used can be found in Appendix A3.3. For each of the problems they were given two 
statements as shown in Figure 4.4. 
Conditional problem (MP) 
If the letter is M then the number is not 3 
The letter is M 
Figure 4.4 -A conditional problem 
Response options 
The number is a3 
The number is not 3 
The number may or may not be a3 
They were told that each problem concerned an imaginary letter-number pair and contained 
an initial statement or rule which determined which letters could be paired with which 
numbers. In each case, they were to assume that the rule held and then combine it with the 
information given in the second statement. This would concern either the letter or the 
number of an imaginary pair. Their task in each case was to decide on a conclusion that 
necessarily followed from the statements. A conclusion was necessary if it must be true, 
given that the statements were true. A list of the possible answers was presented below each 
problem. They were to tick one of the response conclusions for each pair of statements. 
There were three response options for each problem (see Figure 4.4). If they thought that no 
conclusion necessarily followed given that the statements were true, then they xvere to tick 
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the relevant box. for instance. that the number may or ma,, not be a 33. In the above 
example. Figure 4.4. the correct response would be that the number is not a _3 3. Participants 
were also instructed that no diagrams or notes were to be made during, the task. A full set of 
instructions may be found in Appendix A-3 3.4. 
Scoring 
The number of conditional problems correctly solved (out of a maximum of 16) was taken 
as a participants score for the conditional reasoning task. The logicall-v correct answers 
were used, i. e., MP and MT were taken as logical. -,, vhereas DA and AC Nvere assigned a 
point if an indeterminate conclusion or 'no conclusion necessarily follows' x\ as chosen. 
This figure was then used in the main analysis. 
Simple Spatial Inference (simspat) 
Procedure 
Each participant received 16 one- and two-dimensional spatial problems. I -D problems 
relate to three letters in a set, 2-D problems relate to five letters in a set, as previously 
explained. The order of presentation of problem in the tasks was randomised before the 
start of the experiment but remained in this order for each participant. For the three-term 
task, spatial problems from six possible orders were used, as shown in Figure 4.5. 
ABC ACB BAC BCA CAB CBA 
Figure 4.5- The six possible orders for three-ten-n series problems 
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Eight problems had valid conclusions. and eight had invalid conclusions. A ftill list of the 
problems used can be found in Appendix A3.5. Figure 4.6 sho\Ns an example of a -valid 
problem. 
Valid three-terin series problem 
A is left of B 
B is left of C 
Response options 
A is left of C 
A is right of C 
invalid 
Figure 4.6-A valid three-term series problem 
Participants were given three response options for each problem (see Figure 4.6). The 
correct response to this problem would be that A is left of C. The instructions for the three- 
term task were similar to the five-term series task. On each page of a booklet was a problem L- 
which would describe the layout of a set of either three or fi-ve letters. In each task the 
participants were told that there would be 16 descriptions using the following terms to 
describe the layout of the letters in the three-term task: left and right. The participants were 
told that their task was to link two of the letters in the set using the above relations. Tlicy 
xvere told to imagine the three letters as if they were in front of them and then apply these 
relations to them. They were also told that for some of the descriptions they may feel there I 
was not enough information to determine the relation between the letters, in ý, vliich case they 
should answer "Invalid" for the three-term problems. The instructions continued with a 
summary on how to respond to the descriptions. To remind them of the responses they 
might givc. a list of all the possible answers was gi-ven below each problem. They xvere told 
to tick the ansx\er that they thought was correct. Participants Nvere instructed to move onto 
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the next problem after 10 seconds. A full set of instructions can be found in Appendix 
A3.6. 
Scoring 
The number of spatial problems correctly solved (out of a maximum of 16) was taken as a 
participant's score for the simple spatial reasoning task. This figure was then used in the 
main analysis. In addition it was noted how manv of each type of problem Nvere solved. be 
it one-model or invalid. 
Complex Spatial Inference (comspat) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment 2. 
Syllogistic Inference (syllogs) 
The procedure and scoring was identical to Experiment I 
Multiple Quantification Task (mulquan) 
Procedure 
As in the syllogistic task, participants Nvere asked to solve 16 problems, based on the logic 
of syllogisms. A syllogism was explained as a pair of statements providing them with 
information about the relationships between three classes. The three classes were labelled 
by letters (e. g. Bs, Ps and Cs etc. ). On the basis of the inforination provided by the two 
statements, thev were asked to draw a conclusion about the relationship between two of the 
classes. One of the letters was common to both statements; their task xvas to produce a 
conclusion linking the other two letters. The participants were presented xvith a total of 16 
problems in each booklet. on separate pages. A full set of problems may be found in 
'. 7. Partici nstructed to find a lo-, -, icall, -, - valid conclusion 
that linked \ppendix A-) i ipants Nvere i11 
"' 
the classes not explicitly related in the two premises. A conclusion was logicallý- valid if it 
must follow given that the statements were true. If a conclusion could but did not hai, e to or 
necessarily follow, then it was not logically valid. For each of these problems they were 
given two statements. An example is shown in Figure 4.7. 
Multiple quantification problem 
Some of the Ps are in the same place as some of the Bs 
Some of the Bs are in the same place as some of the Fs 
Response options 
of the Ps are in the same place as of the Fs 
OR 
No Valid response 0 
Figure 4.7 -A multiple quantified problem 
The participants had the following quantifiable options for the conclusion - All, Some, 
None, and Any. They also had the option of ticking'no valid response'. They were given a 
response conclusion with two gaps indicating where they must fill in a response. They were 
told to write the answer that they believed was the correct, and strongest conclusion to each 
problem (i. e. If the answer could have been some... or all..., they were to tick the stronger 
conclusion, all ... ). Figure 4.7 shows the response options to the problem. 
Their task was to 
fill in the two gaps with the correct quantifiers (all, some, none or any), for instance for the 
example above they might fill in the gaps with - some of the Ps are in the same place as 
some of the Fs. If they thought that no one conclusion logically followed, then they were to 
tick no valid conclusion. Participants received the following problems - 10 one-model, 4 
multi-model indeterminate, and 2 multi-model determinate problems. They were asked to 
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take their time and be certain they had the logically correct answer before stating, it. If theN 
had any questions, they were asked to please ask them now, as the experimenter could not 
answer after the task had commenced. They could not make notes or draw diagrams of any 
kind to aid them in these tasks. A practice problem was given to show them the format of 
each of the 16 problems in each task. A full set of instructions may be found in Appendix 
A3.8. 
Scoring 
The number of multiple quantification problems correctly solved (out of a maximum of 16) 
was taken as a participant's score for this reasoning task. This figure was then used in the 
main analysis. In addition, it was noted how many of each type of problem (one-model or 
multi-model) were solved. This was used in further analysis to test the assumptions made 
by the mental models theory of reasoning. 
4.3.3 Results 
In addition to correlational analyses and t-tests, confirmatory factor analysis was also 
performed on the data from this experiment. The correlational and statistical for 
Experiment 5 will be reported in this experimental section, but a multi-group factor analysis 
for the three experiments (Experiments 4-6) will be discussed after Experiment 6. 
As discussed in relation to previous experiments there are multiple scoring methods for 
many of the span tasks. However, only one method per task will be used throughout the 
results section. The cross-correlations of the global and normal span scores across different 
measures were between. 85*** and. 93***. This suggests that both scoring methods 
reflected the same underlying construct. Thus, for simple arrow, simple word and complex 
verbal spans, the global score will be used throughout. 
258 
4-3-3. I Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the eight measures used in Experinient 5 may be found in Table 
4.6. The table also contains data relevant to the reliability of the measures used. 
Mean SD Min Max Skewness Reliability 
Span Tasks 
arrow 23.24 12.93 2 60 
.75 . 64 
word 48.33 15.08 19 87 
.45 . 
88 
Reasoning Tasks 
abstract 5.90 1.59 2 9 11 3) 4 
condition 8.75 1.80 5 14 ýI ý0* 
simspat 7.78 2.99 1 . 
56 
. 
67 
simspatIM 5.27 1.58 2 8 -. 228 - 
simspatINV 2.51 2.20 0 7 .75 - 
comspat 9.76 3.44 1 16 -. 58 . 
76 
comspat IM 5.71 2.11 1 8 -. 85 - 
comspatMM 4.06 2.04 0 8 -. 05 - 
syllogism 8.37 3.41 0 16 . 
65 
. 
84 
syIllM 6.61 1.65 0 8 -1.92 - 
SyllMM 1.76 2.67 0 8 1.31 - 
mulquan 7.71 1.95 3 12 -. 16 . 
28 
mulquan IM 6.10 1.33 3 8 -. 40 - 
mulquanMM 1.61 1.27 0 5 . 
92 
*= Cronbach alpha could not be calculated with all MPs problems. Estimations can be made by dropping 
problems 2 and 4 (see Appendix 3.3A). 
Table 4.6- Descriptive statistics for Experiment 5 tasks (n=51) 
Table 4.6 shows that all tasks, both span and reasoning measures. produced a good overall 
range of scores. Of note here is that the range of scores is less varied than in the first three 
experiments. probably due to the evaluative rather than productive nature of the reasoning 
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tasks set. The distribution of scores in all tasks is acceptable, there are no heavily skevved 
distributions for any of the measures used. 
The reliability of the two span tasks was assessed by performing a split-half test calculation 
on each of them. The Spearman-Brown formula was then used to provide an estimate of 
reliability for each task. The corrected correlations for the span tasks are shown in Table 
4.6. Table 4.6 shows that the word span task produced a reliable odd-even corrected 
correlation of over. 80, of highly satisfactory value in group measurement. This is 
consistent with the estimates found for the word span in Experiments 1-4. The arrow span 
did not produce as high reliability as this, at a corrected . 64, although this is still of some 
value in group measurement (Rust & Golombok, 1999). This is the lowest estimate of the 
arrow span so far in this experimental series. 
The reliability of the reasoning measures was assessed using Cronbach's alpha. Table 4.6 
shows that the simple and complex spatial inferences, together with the syllogistic task, 
were all satisfactorily reliable (between . 67 and . 84). The abstract task exhibited a poor 
reliability of . 34, as did the conditional task (. 30) and the multiple quantification task (. 28). 
This will be taken into account when looking at the coffelations, to be discussed next. 
4.3.3.2 The Span Measures 
Due to the fact that the complex working memory span measures were not used here, the 
first set of correlations relates to the relationship between the arrow and word spans and 
then to their influence on the reasoning tasks (see Appendix B 1.11 for the ful I matrix). In 
the prior experiments it has been shown that these two measures act relatively independently 
of each other, and two interpretations have been considered. The first is that these two span 
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measures tap into the passive storage systems of working memory for verbal and spatial 
information. The second is that these tv, -o span measures tap into domain specific parts of 
the CE component of working memory. The results can be found in Table 4.7. 
arrow 
arro,, k- I 
word . 17 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '=p<0.1, p<0.05, 
** =p<0.01, *** =p<0.001) 
Table 4.7- Experiment 5 correlations between the t\vo span tasks 
As Table 4.7 shows, a dissociation can be seen between the word span and arrow span, the 
lowest correlation to be found to date between these two measures (Expt. I to Fxpt. 4 
correlations ranged between r= . 23 and r= . 38). However, the arrow span in Experiment 5 
produced the lowest estimate of reliability seen so far (at r= . 64). The procedure and 
sampling for Experiment 5 was identical to Experiments 1-4. and the standard deviation for 
this task was constant throughout the series. Therefore, the lower estimate could be down to 
chance variation. So the conclusion coming from this study is that the two tasks are largely 
independent of each other in what they measure. However, the overall finding that is more 
consistent throughout the experiments is that both measures possess some commonalities 
due to the positive, and usually significant, nature of the correlation. In addition, both these 
tasks loaded the general factor in the CFA. These two measures could be interpreted as 
tappnig the relatively autonomous PL and VSSP sub-systems, but they may also have a CE 
component, and this would explain the marginal correlations between them. 
-Iol 
3-3.3 The Span and Reasoning Measures 
arroxv -word 
abstract . 26- . 3-1* 
condition . 19 . 21 
simspat 39 
comspat . 27' . 08 
syllogism . 20 . 04 
mulquan . 32* 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '=p <0.1, * =p <0.05, ** =p <0.01, *** =p <0.001) 
Table 4.8- Experiment 5 correlations between the span and reasoning tasks 
Correlations between the two span measures and each of the reasoning measures used can 
be found in Table 4.8. Please note that the complex spatial task, named to be able to 
distinguish it from the simple spatial task, is the same as the five-term series visually 
presented task seen in Experiments 2 and 4 (but based on evaluation not production). 
The five-term series spatial inferences (complex spatial) show a marginally significant 
correlation with the arrow span (. 27, p <. 10). They do not correlate significantly with the 
word span (r = . 08). In previous experiments the correlations with the arrow and word 
spans were, on average, higher than those seen here, but the positive direction of the 
relationships are consistent through Experiments 2.4, and 5. The syllogistic inferences 
show similar relationships as the five-term series spatial problems, although the correlation 
with the arrow span is smaller (r = . 20). In past experiments these correlations were also 
larger and word span Nvas significantly correlated v, -Ith the syllogistic task in Experiment ) " (r 
- . 44 and r= . 
57 for the syllo-istic task in both modalities). An explanation for the low 
correlations with these two tasks in Experiment 5 may be because the tasks were evaluative 
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in nature. The tasks may not place the same load on working memory due to the 
conclusions being in front of the participant at all times. 
The other complex task used here was the multiple quantification task. Again. lo,. N- 
correlations can be seen between it and the word span (r = . 2-3). although there is a moderate 
correlation with the arrow span (r = . 32, p< . 05). These correlations need to be interpreted 
in light of the low reliability of the multiple quantification task (r =. 28). This might explain 
the weak correlations. This said, there are certainly stronger relationships between the 
complex reasoning tasks and the arrow span (rather than the word span) perhaps indicating 
that spatial resources are needed in order to solve them. This finding would be consistent 
with previous experiments that showed a connection between these complex deductive 
measures and spatial working memory. 
Next, the simple reasoning tasks will be discussed. The abstract task correlates marginally 
with both the span measures (r = . 26, p<. 10 for arrow; r= . 32, p< . 05 for word). The 
conditional task also correlated positively, though not significantly, with both the span 
tasks. The low correlations seen between the spans and the conditional task might be due to 
the low reliability of this reasoning task (r = . 30). The simple spatial task correlated 
both 
positively and significantly with both the span tasks (r =. 33, p <. 05 for arrow; r=. 39, p< 
. 01 for word). The findings for the simple reasoning tasks show that they correlate similarly 
with both the arrow and word spans. Thus, the simple reasoning tasks seem to draw on 
processes common to both the simple span measures. 
In conclusion, it seems that the complex reasoning tasks consistently correlate with the 
arrow span, suggesting common processes between them. However, the correlations were 
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marginal, perhaps suggesting that complex reasoning tasks drav, - on a more active spatial 
resource. The simple reasoning tasks consistently correlate with both the arro%v and word 
spans. The simple spans loaded the general factor in Experiments 1-3 )C FA. and this could 
be the commonality between them and the simple reasoning tasks. 
4.3.3.4 The Reasoning Measures 
The next set of correlations concerns the relationships between the reasoning tasks 
themselves. Table 4.9 data relates to the work of Stanovich 1999) wlio suooests that t1t, 
individuals giving the normative response on one task are more likely to give it on another. 
He suggests that these patterns of covariance would not be observed if deviations from 
normative responding were simply error variance. 
abstract condition simspat comspat syllogisni 
abstract I 
condition . 45** 1 
simspat . 
45** 
. 
40** 1 
comspat . 
23 
. 
06 
. 
30* 1 
syllogism . 
16 
. 
34* 
. 
28* 
. 
48*** 1 
mulquan . 
19 
. 
26' 
. 
53*** 
. 
'36** 
. 
22 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '=p <0.1, * =p <0.05, ** =p<0.01, *** =p <0.001) 
Table 4.9- Experiment 5 correlations between the reasoning tasks 
The data in Table 4.9 relates to the relationships between the reasoning measures used. Two 
clusters of significant correlations can be seen when looking at Table 4.9. The first cluster 
refers to the simple reasoning tasks. There are moderately significant correlations bet,, \ een 
the abstract, conditional and simple spatial problems (r = . 40 to r= . 45). Both the abstract 
and conditional measures rely on understanding propositional connectives. ýýhilst simple 
264 
spatial problems have been shown to be solved using either verbal and/or spati les 'al. strategi 
(e. g., Marquer & Pereira, 1990). 
The results in Table 4.8 showed that the simple reasoning tasks correlated xvith both the 
simple arrow and word spans. The arrov, - and word spans loaded the general factor. as NNA 
as the independent factors, in Experiments 1-3 C FA, perhaps suggesti 1 ing this general 
resource as a commonality between the two. The propositional based tasks might require 
only a low memory demand, and therefore draw only on general resources. The only one of 
these simple reasoning tasks to cross correlate with the complex reasoning tasks is the 
simple spatial measure, and to some extent the conditional task. This simple spatial task 
was shown to be the one that correlated most significantly with both the arrow and word 
spans (see Table 4.8). Thus, this could be interpreted as the simple spatial task drawing on 
spatial and general resources. 
The second cluster of correlations refers to the complex reasoning tasks. There are 
moderate, mostly significant, correlations between the complex spatial, syllogistic and 
multiple quantification problems (r = . 
22 to r =. 53). The multiple quantification task is 
based upon syllogistic arguments and thus it is not surprising that they are positively related. 
The complex spatial task (five-term series) correlates significantly with both the syllogistic 
and multiple quantification task which is consistent with research showing that quantifiers 
can be dealt with using spatial strategies (Ford, 1994). These tasks seem to correlate highest 
Nvith each other and with the arrow span. This may reflect the fact that they rely mostly on 
capacity measured by a complex range of span measures, but also that they require a spatial 
resourcc for correct responding, 
---'6 5 
Stanovich and colleagues would expect a generally positiN, e matrix for the reasoning 
measures - where correlations cross all tasks. A matrix where two clusters of correlations 
for the reasoning tasks have been identified is not consistent with this. The general picture 
to emerge here is a positive matrix, where the lowest cross-correlation was between the 
abstract and syllogistic task (r = . 16), and the highest between the simple spatial and 
multiple quantification task (r = . 53). The direction and general positivity of the matrix 
conforms partly to Stanovich and West's (1998) claims. What is more difficult to explain in 
terms of their proposals is the two clusters of correlations that emerged within the general 
matrix. However, the abstract, conditional, and multiple quantification task showed low 
reliabilities here, and this could be the reason for an incomplete cross-correlated pattern. 
4.3 .3.5 Further Analysis 
The reasoning tasks were also investigated dependent on whether they could be split 
between easy and difficult problems. Past research suggests that problems built on the 
assumption that only one model needs to be constructed in order to reach a conclusion 
should be easier than problems where multiple models are needed. 
correct 
simspat IM 63 
simspatINV 38 
comspat IM 75 
comspatMM 50 
syllogism1m 88 
syllogismmm 25 
multi IM 60 
multimm 33 
Table 4.10 - Experiment 5% of correct responses to I M. MM and INV problems 
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Problem difficulty percentages for the reasoning tasks are presented in Table 4.10. On the 
whole, the table shows that one model problems appear easier than multi model problems 
throughout the reasoning set. The most difficult model type appear to have been the multi- 
model syllogistic and multi-model multiple quantification problems. Table 4.10 shows an 
average of 6 out of 9 (67%) abstract problems were solved accurately. An average of 9 out 
of 16 (56%) conditional inferences were solved logically. An average of 8 out of 16 (50%) 
simple spatial inferences were solved correctly, whilst 10 out of 16 five-term problems 
(63%) were answered accurately. The complex spatial accuracy rate is similar to that found 
in previous experiments. An average of 9 out of 16 (56%) svilogisms ,, ý ere solved 
(consistent with previous experiments). whilst an average of 8 out of 16 (500 0) multiple 
quantifiable problems were correctly answered. 
A number of t-tests were also performed on the data in order to assess whether there ,ý ere 
significant differences between the number of single model versus multiple model problems 
solved (see Appendix B 1.3 for full results). Participants performed significantly better on 
the simspatIM versus simspatINV problems (d. f. = 50, t=8.24, p <. 001). Participants 
performed significantly better on the comspatlM versus comspatMM problems (d. f. = 50, t 
= 5.05, P< . 006). This difference was not 
found in Experiment 4, although Experiments 1-3 
support the re-emergence of this distinction. Participants performed significantly better on 
the syllogismIM versus syllogismMM problems (d. f. = 50, t= 12.19, p <. 001). 
Participants performed significantly better on the mulquan IM versus mulquanMM 
problems (d. f = 50, t= 18.72, p <. 001). 
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3.4 Discussion 
A weak relationship was shown between the two simple span measures used in Experiment 
5, arrow and word. Apart from Experiment I and 5, this relationship xvas significant and 
always positive, perhaps suggesting some commonalities underlying the two tasks. In 
addition to this, the CFA in Experiments 1-3 produced a model where there were significant 
loadings of the word span on factor I and the arrow span on factor 2, and they both 
significantly loaded factor 3. It might be the case that these two simple measures, proposed 
in previous studies to be purely passive tasks for verbal and spatial storage (e. g., Shah & 
Miyake, 1996), are actually measuring some common processes as well. The results for the 
simple span tasks could be interpreted as measuring the capacity of separate parts of the CE 
component, as well as a general executive system, and this would explain the moderate 
correlations between them, and the loadings of both tasks on factor 3. 
The results from Experiment 5 suggest that individual differences in simple working 
memory resources, as measured by the arrow and word span, do not readily predict 
differences in performance on the whole range of reasoning tasks investigated. The 
following interpretation accounts for the factor loadings of the simple word and arrow span 
tasks on the general factor in Experiments 1-3 CFA, as well as their loadings on the verbal 
and spatial factors, respectively. In other words, the results collectively suggest the need to 
assume some processing commonalities between the two simple span tasks, and that they 
perhaps reflect more than passive storage of information alone. 
There appear to be stronger correlations between the simple reasoning tasks and both the 
arrow and word spans. In contrast, the complex reasoning tasks showed strongest 
correlations with the arrow span. When examining the correlations with the simple 
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reasoning tasks, it might be that these deductive tasks draw more on a general resource. 
requiring a low memory demand, as measured by both the simple spans. However, the 
simple spatial task also showed moderate correlations with the complex reasoning task' s. 
This might suggest that as well as a general resource, in line with the more complex 
reasoning tasks, it might also require additional spatial processing. In contrast, the complex 
reasoning measures only correlated significantly with the arrow span, perhaps suggesting 
that there is a higher memory demand, requiring spatial representations, drawing on 
independent spatial and general resources. However, it is important to highlight that the 
reasoning tasks used in Experiment 5 were evaluation tasks rather than production tasks. 
Having all conclusions in front of the participant during the problem solving process may 
place less demands on working memory, and hence reduce the chances of finding 
significant relationships overall. 
The results in Experiment 5, in respect to the syllogistic and spatial inferences, are 
consistent with those found in previous experiments. For the complex deductive tasks, there 
were some significant relationships with the simple arrow span, indicating the need for 
some spatial resource in order to accurately solve these problems. This holds across all the 
experiments - in respect to the five-term series spatial and syllogistic inferences. 
These results suggest that for the simple reasoning tasks, performance depends upon general 
resources of working memory, as measured by both the simple spans. These results also 
suggest that for the complex reasoning tasks, accurate performance depends upon spatial 
resources of working memory. This is due to the marginal correlations with the arrow span, 
but not with the word span. Again, this lends support to the notion that, for complex 
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deductive reasoning, spatial executi,, c resources of working memory. resources ma. v be 
associated with this process. 
It could still be the case that the tv, o simple spans represent specific components within a 
general CF, resource of working memory. As in Experiments 1 -31. this may imply that a 
general CE resource accounts for the processing of complex and simple rcasoning, tasks. 
However, it might also be the case that the complex reasoning tasks additionallý rely to 
some extent on domain-specific parts of this same sub-system, especially the spatial 
component. As in Experiments 1-3. a more sophisticated analysis is needed, over and abo, ýc 
the correlational data, in order to best determine the functions of these resources (CFA in 
Section 4.5). Factor analysis will also enable the memory resources to be loaded by the 
reasoning tasks in order to find significant influences on their performance. 
The correlational matrix from this experiment was found to contain two significant clusters 
of results. One cluster included the simple reasoning tasks, whilst the other included the 
complex reasoning tasks. This finding is only partly in agreement with the explanation put 
forward by Stanovich and West (1998). They found that a range of problem-solving and 
deductive reasoning tasks cross-correlated significantly. The findings here are consistent in 
that a generally positive matrix was observed. What is inconsistent is the fact that tv, 'o 
significant clusters of correlations emerged from this general matrix. It might be that the 
significant predictor of cognitive ability. proposed by Stanovich and West (1998). might 
only represent the capacity required for perfonning complex deductive tasks. but not the 
simpler ones. This finding Nvill be followed up in Experiment 6 to try and substantiate the 
two cluster result. 
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In relation to the representations that people must construct when reasoning. the 
experimental results support the notion that more errors are made on the multiple model 
reasoning problems. This holds for all the tasks where this split can be made between single 
and multiple model problems. Although the correlations were smaller in this experiment, 
compared to the others, the findings still have implications for reasoning theories. By 
combining all the results from Chapter 4, taken in conjunction with the CFA results, a 
discussion of the implications for the three classes of theory, introduced in Chapter 2. can be 
made. These implications will be summarised in the general discussion (Section 4.6). 
Experiment 5 suggests that working memory resources, as measured by the arrow and word 
span, account for only a small proportion of the variance in reasoning ability. Maybe it is 
the case that, even for simpler deductive tasks, the magnitude of correlations would be 
highest with the complex working memory spans. So in order to further investigate this, 
Experiment 6 replicated Experiment 5, but with the addition of the complex span measures. 
4.4 EXPERIMENT 6 
4.4.1 Aim 
From Experiment 5 it can be seen that some of the simpler reasoning tasks were associated 
with the simple working memory span measures. This may imply that these simpler 
deductive tasks required mainly general resources of working memory in order for correct 
responding, as implied by the arrow and word span's common loading on the general factor. 
However, the more complex reasoning measures showed weaker relationships with the 
simple spans, especially the word span. This may imply that these tasks required both 
processing and storage resources afforded by spatial and general executive resources. Thus 
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in Experiment 6, the complc. x working memory span tasks ,N ere re-introduced to 
substantiate these results. 
Experiment 6 investigates simple and complex reasoning tasks, together XN ith simple and 
complex working memory span tasks. Experiment 6 provides a further test of , vhether the 
simple reasoning tasks rely on passive storage resources, such as the PL and VSSP, in 
contrast to the complex reasoning tasks, or whether thev relv on a general processing 
resource. In light of Experiment 5, it might be expected that the simpler reasoning tasks 
draw on general resources, and the correlations with the complex span measures maN 
determine this. This experiment also makes comparisons with the work of Stanovich and 
colleagues (e. g., 1998). Stanovich would expect positive correlations betýýeen all the 
reasoning tasks used. He would also expect the tasks to correlate xvith measures of capacity 
(in comparison to his ability measures). 
Experiment 6 investigated the degree to which individual differences in , vorking memory 
capacity can explain variation in performance on a wide variety of reasoning types. Four 
working memory span tasks were used - the simple word and arrow spans, plus the complex 
TTT and verbal spans (Shah & Miyake, 1996. Daneman & Tardif. 1987, Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980). This was in order to assess the relationship of reasoning to the three 
systems indicated by the CFA in Experiments 1-3. The span tasks were given together , vith 
six reasoning tasks - three-tenn and five-tenn series spatial inference tasks, abstract and 
conditional inference tasks, and syllogistic and multiple quantified inferences. The tasks 
\\ere all presented visually and were evaluative in nature. They can be compared . vith 
Fxperiment 5 tasks due to the non-thematic content in both. 
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4 .4 .2 Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight participants took part in this study. The participants \\ ere undergraduate 
students and postgraduate students at the University of PIN-mouth, and they received cotirse 
credit or cash payment for participating. None of the sample had prior training in logic. All 
participants were native English speakers. 
Procedure 
Experiment 6 was carried out in two testing sessions per participant, the sessions being of 
approximately an hour long each. Participants signed up in a time slot on an experimenter 
sheet for the first session. Session I consisted of five tasks. All participants carried out 
these tasks in the following order, (where an asterix (*) indicates a computerised task): - 
complex spatial TTT span*, 
complex sentence span*, 
simple arrow span*, 
simple word span*, 
conditional inference. 
Session 2 consisted of five tasks. All participants carried out these tasks in the folloxý ing 
order: - 
simple spatial inference, 
abstract reasoning, 
syllogistic reasoning, 
complex spatial inference, 
multiple quantification. 
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All the tasks have been explained in previous experiments. Therefore, the next section 
relates to the results found. 
Simple Verbal Word Span (word) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment 1. 
Simple Spatial Arrow Span (arrow) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment 1. 
Complex Verbal Sentence Span (verbal) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment 1. 
Complex Spatial Tic-Tac-Toe Span (TTT) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment 2. 
Abstract Reasoning Task (abstract) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment 5. 
Conditional Inferences (condition) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment 5. 
Simple Spatial Inference (simspat) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment 5. 
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Complex Spatial Inference (comspat) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment I 
Syllogistic Inference (syllogs) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment ' 3. 
Multiple Quantification Task (mulquan) 
The procedure and scoring is identical to Experiment 5. 
4.4.3 Results 
In addition to correlational analyses and t-tests, confirmatory factor analysis v, -as also 
performed on the data from this experiment. The correlational analysis and discussion of 
findings for this experiment will be reported here. Hoxvever, the factor analysis for 
Experiment 6 will be explored in the multi-group factor analytic section following this study 
(Section 4.5). 
As discussed in previous experiments, there are multiple scoring methods for many of the 
span tasks. However, only one method per task will be used throughout the results section. 
The cross-correlations of the global and normal span scores across different measures were 
between . 87*** and . 94***. This suggests that 
both scoring methods reflected the same 
underlying construct. Thus, for simple arrow, simple word and complex verbal spans, the 
global score will be used throughout. 
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4.4.3. I Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the ten measures used in Experiment 6 nlay be found in Table 4.11. 
The table also contains data relevant to the reliability of the tasks used. 
Mean SID Min Max Skewness Rellabiliv, 
Spun Tasks 
arrow 23.58 10.46 6 52 . 58 . 85 
word 49.71 17.07 2ý 108 1.18 . 88 
verbal 37.13 20.52 10 100 1.02 . 91 
TTT 7.96 5.04 0 22 1.01 . 84 
Reasoning Tasks 
abstract 5.40 1.97 1 9 . 56 
condition 8.63 1.99 14 . 29 . 29 
simspat 8.10 2.94 2 1 . 66 
simspat IM 5.27 1.55 2 8 -. 26 - 
simspatINV 2.83 2.14 0 8 . 40 - 
comspat 9.21 3.14 1 15 -. 44 . 68 
comspat IM 5.27 1.85 1 8 -. 46 - 
comspatMM 33.9 4 2.14 0 8 -. 08 - 
syllogism 8.02 3.00 1 16 . 45 . 75 
SY111M 6.29 1.57 1 8 -1.33 - 
SYIIMM 1.73 2.18 0 8 1.06 - 
mulquan 6.54 1.92 2 10 -. 26 . 31 
mulquan IM 5.25 1.59 2 8 -. 36 - 
mulquanMM 1.29 1.11 0 4 . 46 
Table 4.11 - Descriptive statistics for Experiment 6 tasks (n=48) 
Table 4.11 shows that all tasks produced a good overall range of scores, both span and 
reasoning measures. The distribution of scores in all tasks was at an acceptable level. there 
are no hca% il\ ske\, N, ed ranges of data in any of the measures wsed. 
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The reliability of the span tasks ý, vas again assessed by perforininu a split-half test 
calculation on each of the four measures used. The Spearman-Brown formula was then 
used to provide an estimate of reliabilitv for each task. The corrected correlations for the 
span tasks are shown in Table 4.11. Table 4.11 shows that all the span tasks produced a 
reliable odd-even corrected correlation of over . 80. These corrected correlations are highly 
satisfactory for use in group measurement (Rust & Golombok, 1999). It can be seen that the 
arrow span in this experiment produced a much higher corrected correlation than in the 
previous experiment (in Experiment 5 it was . 64). This lov, - correlation in Experiment 5 
may have reduced the correlations overall for this task. There wcre no differences in 
procedure for the arrow span between experiments. and thus the contrast in corrected 
correlations is probably due to chance variation. 
The reliability of the reasoning measures was assessed using Cronbach's alpha. Table 4.11 
shows that the simple and complex spatial inferences, together with the syllogistic task, 
were all satisfactorily reliable (between . 
66 and . 
75). These are comparable to Experiment 5 
where these correlations were between . 67 and . 84. The abstract task produced a reliable 
corrected correlation of . 56, which is of some use in group measurement. This can be 
compared to Experiment 5 where the abstract task did not produce a reasonable corrected 
correlation (at . 34). As in Experiment 5, the conditional task (. 29 
in Expt. 6, . 30 in Expt. 5) 
and the multiple quantification task (. 31 in Expt. 6, . 28 in Expt. 5) 
did not produce a reliable 
corrected correlation. This will be taken into account when looking at the correlations, to be 
discussed next. 
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4.4.3.2 The Span Measures 
The first set of correlations relates to the relationship between the simple and complex span 
measures and then to their influence on the reasoning tasks (see Appendix B 1.12 for the full 
matrix). In the previous experiments it could be seen that the correlations betm, -een the 
simple span tasks, arrow and word, were ambiguous. In Experiment I and 5 the relati ip 
was positive, but not significant. In Experiments 2,3 and 4 the relationship was positiN, e 
and significant. The word span also loaded the verbal factor, and the arrow span the spatial 
factor, whilst they both loaded the general factor. The relationship between the arroxv and 
word spans was interpreted as reflecting either the VSSP and PL components, respectively, 
or the activity of modality dependent components of the CE. Also seen previously, the 
complex span measures, verbal and spatial, were to some extent associated together, and 
loaded on the general and specific factors. The relationship between the complex span 
measures was interpreted as reflecting a general working memory resource accounting for 
both the storage and processing of information - the modality independent CE. The results 
can be found in Table 4.12. 
arrow word verbal 
arrow I 
word . 42** 1 
verbal . 33* . 69*** 1 
TTT . 33* . 11 . 08 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '=p<0.1, * =p<0.05, ** =p <0.01, *** =p <0.001) 
Table 4.12 - Experiment 6 correlations between the four span tasks 
Table 4.12 presents the relationships between the span measures used. The simple span 
measures will be discussed first. The relationship between the arrow and word spans, -vas 
significant in Experiment 6 (r =. 42, p <. 01), as it was in Experiments 2-4 (r = . 28 to r= 
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38, p <. 10 to p< . 01). However this correlation did not reach significance in Experiments 
I and 5 (in Expt. I it was . 23, in Expt. 5 
it was . 17). This finding, overall, disagrees Nvith the 
notion that the two tasks are purely representative of underlying passive storage systems for 
verbal and spatial information, which act independently. However. the resources of the PL 
and VSSP could still be part of what is being measured by these two simple span measures. 
The arrow span showed higher reliabilities in the experiments where the results show this 
significant correlation. This may undermine the interpretation made at the start of this 
thesis that the simple word and arrow spans tap just the PL and VSSP components of 
working memory, and will be discussed in detail later on. 
Secondly, the complex span measures will be considered from Table 4.12. The highest 
correlation is again between the complex verbal and word spans (r =. 69, p <. 001). This 
result is consistent throughout all the experiments. The arrow span correlates significantly 
with both the complex span measures, TTT and the complex verbal span (r = .33, p< .05 
for 
both), as seen in Experiment 4. The data indicates there are no significant correlations 
between the complex span measures (r =. 08). This is inconsistent with Experiments 1-4 
where significant relationships were found between the complex spatial and complex verbal 
measures(r= . 24tor=. 
41). The result here is more compatible with Daneman and 
Tardif s (1987) data, where they found dissociations between spatial and verbal span 
measures. 
4.4.3.3 The Span and Reasoning Measures 
The span measures were looked at in relation to all the reasoning measures used, and this 
can be found in Table 4.13. 
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arrow word verbal TTT 
abstract . 05 . 24- . 14 
condition . 18 . 24- .11 
simspat . 5)*** . 39** . 28- . 26- 
cornspat . 28' . 07 -. 14 . 14 
Syllogism . 13 . 04 . -)1 . 14* 
mulquan . 26- . 00 -. 14 
(two-tailed sig. levels: '= p<0.1, *=p<0.0-5, ** =p<0.01, *** =p<0.001) 
Table 4.13 - Experiment 6 correlations between the span and reasoning tasks 
Table 4.13 presents the correlations between the span measures and the reasoning measures. 
As in Experiment 5. the first comparisons will be made between the tasks already seen in 
prior experiments, namely the five-term series spatial and syllogistic measures. The tlvc- 
term series spatial inferences, as in Experiment 5, correlate with the arro%% span (r = . 
28, p< 
10 here and r= . 27, p< . 10 in Expt. 5). They do not correlate significantly with the word 
span, or the complex measures (r=. 07, r= -. 14, r =. 14). In previous experiments the 
correlations between the five-term series spatial task with the complex span measures were 
higher, and usually significant with the complex spatial spans (an average r= . 40 represents 
the relationship between the spatial reasoning and complex spatial tasks seen in previous 
experiments). The differences seen here could be explained in reference to the type of 
spatial reasoning task used. In this instance it was an evaluative task with non-thematic 
content. The syllogistic inferences only show significant relationships with the complex 
TTT span (r = . 34ý p <. 
05). This is consistent with links found previously with spatial 
working memory spans (an average of r= . 34 
for both the complex spatial spans in Expts. I 
and 3). An explanation for the lower correlations, especially for the five-term series task, 
with the span nicasures in Experiment 6 ma-, be because the reasoning tasks were evaluative 
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in nature. The evaluative tasks ma-Y not draw on,, vorking memon- resources as lieavily as 
the production tasks used previously. 
The other complex task used here was the multiple quantification task. As in Experiment 5, 
low correlations can be seen between it and the arroxv and ý\ord span (r= . 26, r=. 00), 
although there is a significant correlation with the complex TTT span (r = . 52. p <. 001). 
Multiple quantification problems are related to the syllogistic task due to both measures 
relying on quantifiable statements, and they therefore might be expected to show similar 
relationships to the working memory capacity measures. The correlations between both 
these tasks and the span measures are similar in Experiment 6. Both these types of problem 
appear to have links with spatial working memory. The major finding for the complex 
reasoning tasks is that they are most strongly linked with spatial working memory spans 
than verbal ones, although most of the correlations are low. An explanation might be that 
the complex tasks rely on spatial executive processing, as measured bv the arrow and TTT 
spans. These findings are consistent with Experiment 5 and with previous experiments that 
showed a connection between these complex deductive measures and spatial working 
memory. 
The simple reasoning tasks will be discussed next. The findings for the abstract and 
conditional tasks are consistent with Experiment 5. The abstract and conditional tasks 
correlate positively with both the simple span measures, but only marginally significantly 
NN, -Ith the word span (r = . 24 for both reasoning tasks). The low correlations seen between 
the spans and the conditional task might be due to the low reliability of this reasoning task (r 
- -29). Thcsc tasks could 
be interpreted to rely more on a verbal resource, as measured by 
the simple Nwrd span. assuming a role for partly passive and partly active processing. The 
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simple spatial task correlated both positively and significantly xith both the simple arroxv 
and word spans (r =. 53, p <. 001; r =. 39, p <. 01). as in Experiment 5. The only 
significant correlations between the simple reasoning tasks and the complex span measures 
was in relation to the simple spatial reasoning task (r =. 28, r=. 26, p <. 10 for both). Asin 
Experiment 5, the simple reasoning tasks nearly all correlate with both the arrow and word 
spans. The simple spans loaded the general factor in Experiments 1-3 CFA, and this could 
be the commonality between them and the simple reasoning tasks. This may suggest a 
contrast between the way these simple problems are dealt with in working memory and the 
way the complex reasoning tasks are handled. 
4.4.3 .4 The Reasoning Measures 
The next set of correlations concerns the relationships between the reasoning tasks 
themselves. Table 4.14 data relates to the work of Stanovich (e. g., 1999) who suggested 
that cross-correlations should be observed across a wide range of deductive tasks, and that 
these tasks should be predicted from a combined influence of cognitive ability and thinking 
style measures. This data also relates to Experiment 5 where generally two clusters of 
correlations were observed. One cluster related to the simple reasoning measures which 
cross correlated quite highly. The other cluster of correlations related to the complex 
reasoning measures which also cross correlated quite highly. 
The data in Table 4.14 relates to the relationships between the reasoning measures used. 
These results are entirely consistent with Experiment 5. As in that experiment, two clusters 
of correlations can be identified. One cluster relates to the simple reasoning tasks, and the 
other to the complex. 
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abstract condition simspat comspat syllogism 
abstract I 
condition 
simspat .31 . 23 
comspat . 00 . 16 . 44** 1 
syllogism . 19 . 10 . _3 0*I 
mulquan . 08 . 10 . 47*** 3) 6 . 41 
two-tailed sig. levels: '=p <0.1, * =p <0.05, ** =p <0.01, *** =p<0.001 ) 
Table 4.14 - Experiment 6 correlations between the reasoning tasks 
Again, there are moderate relationships between the simple reasoning measures (rangin,, 
from r= . 
23 to r= .31, p< . 
05). Also. as in Experiment 5, the only simple task to correlate 
with the complex ones is the simple spatial task (ranging from .30 to . 47, p< . 05). 
Additionally, the simple spatial task is the only one to correlate with both the arrow and 
word spans (see Table 4.13). 
The second cluster of correlations refers to the complex reasoning tasks. There are 
moderate, and mostly significant, correlations between the complex spatial, syllogistic and 
multiple quantification problems (ranging from r= . 
25 to . 
47). This result is nearly 
identical as that found in Experiment 5 (ranging from r= . 22 to r= . 53). These tasks seem 
to correlate highest with each other and with the spatial spans. This may reflect the fact that 
they rely mostly on capacity afforded by an executive system that is best measured by the I 
complex range of span measures, but also that they require mostly spatial resources for 
correct responding. 
These results arc inconsistent with the Nvork of Stanovich and colleagues. They Nvould 
expect significant cross correlations between all the reasoning measures used (Stanovich 
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West, 1998). Due to the two clusters of correlations identified, the notion that participants 
giving the normative response on one task are usually significantly more likelý- to give it on 
another can not be fully supported. This might suggest that rather than one type of 
cognitive capacity being relevant, there may be two capacities that relate to certain 
deductive tasks, one to the simple and one to the complex reasoning measures. 
4.4.3.5 Further Analysis 
As in Experiment 5, the reasoning tasks were further analysed by looking at the easy versus 
difficult divide between problems. Past research showed that performance on multiple 
model problems was harder than on single model problems. 
correct 
simspatIM 66 
simspatINV 38 
comspat IM 66 
comspatMM 50 
syll IM 79 
syllmm 22 
mulquanIM 53 
mulquariMM 22 
Table 4.15 - Experiment 6% of correct responses to I M, MM and INV problems 
Percentage accuracy for the reasoning tasks are presented in Table 4.15. On the whole the 
table shows that one model problems appear easier than multi model problems throughout 
the reasoning set. The most difficult model type appear to have been the multi-model 
syllogistic and multiple quantification problems, as in Experiment 5. The following 
percentages relate to Experiment 6 findings, those shown in italics relate to Experiment 
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findings for comparison. Table 4.15 shows an average of 5 out of 9 (56`0.6-Xc, ) abstnict 
problems were solved accurately. An average of 9 out of 16 (56'o. 56%) conditional 
inferences were solved logically. An average of 8 out of 16 (500 o. 50%) simple spatial 
inferences were solved correctiv, whilst 9 out of 16 five-term problems (W o. 
answered accurately. An average of 8 out of 16 (50%. 56%) syllogisms Nvere solved. whilst 
an average of 7 out of 16 (44%, 50%) multiple quantifiable problems were correctly 
answered. 
A number of t-tests were performed on the data in order to examine the relative difficulty of 
single and multiple model problems (see Appendix BI. 4 for full results). As in Experiment 
5, participants performed significantly better on the simspat IM versus simspatINV 
problems (d. f = 47, t=7.33, p< . 001). Participants performed significantly better on the 
comspatIM versus comspatMM problems (d. f. ý 47, t=3.73, p <. 005). This %%as also 
observed in Experiment 5. Participants also performed significantly better on the 
syllogismIM versus syllogismMM problems (d. f = 47, t= 13.55, p <. 001), as they did on 
the mulquanIM versus mulquanMM problems (d. f. = 47ý t= 14.02, p <. 001). These 
findings are all consistent with those found in Experiment 5. 
4.4.4 Discussion 
The independent verbal and spatial factors from Experiments 1 -3 )C FA were investigated in 
Experiment 5 by using the two simple span tasks and additional simple reasoning tasks. 
These results were still ambiguous concerning the role these factors played in the reasoning 
process, and therefore the complex span measures were re-introduced in Experiment 6 to try 
and better identify the factors that different reasoning tasks draw upon. Experiment 6 
allowed the final test of how to interpret the three factors from the first series of 
2,8 5 
experiments. It is worth emphasising at this stage that the reasoning tasks differ in 
Experiments 5 and 6, from the rest of the experimental series. The other expenmei-its used 
production measures to assess performance on the problems. In Experiments 5 and 6. the 
reasoning tasks were evaluative in nature. This may account for some of the discrepancies 
seen in Experiments 5 and 6 as comparedwith the other experiments. What follo,, vs is a 
summary of findings of Experiment 6, accounting for the consistencies and inconsistencies 
between this and the other experiments. 
The reasoning task cross correlations, as well as their relationships Nvith the working Z, 
memory capacity measures, were much lower in magnitude in Experiments 5 and 6 than in 
the other experiments. In response to these differences, one explanation may be that 
evaluation tasks require less working memory resources in order to correctly respond to a 
set of conclusions. Experiments 1-4 required participants to produce a conclusion, whereas 
in Experiments 5 and 6 the participants were only required to choose a conclusion flicy 
thought was correct from a list of possibilities. This information should be kept in mind 
when discussing the results from this experiment, and that of Experiment 5. Significant 
cross correlations were seen between the verbal and spatial span measures, as in the 
previous experiments, although this ývas the first experiment where a non-signIficant 
correlation was observed between the complex TTT and complex verbal span tasks. Again, 
there was no total dissociation between verbal and spatial spans, as in Shah and Miyake 
(1996). 
The correlational results from Experiment 6 suggest that complex reasoning task 
performance required spatial working memory resources. The five-term series, syllogistic 
and multiple quantification problems all correlated highest Nvith the arro%v and T-FT spans. ltý 
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There were lower correlations here with verbal working memon- resources. This is 
consistent with Experiment 5 results where the complex reasoning tasks correlated ývith the 
arrow span. For the simple abstract and conditional reasoning tasks, the only significant 
correlations here were with the simple word span, whereas the simple spatial task correlated 
significantly with both simple and complex verbal and spatial resources. This is not entirelýý 
consistent with Experiment 5 results, where all the simple reasoning tasks correlated 
similarly with both the word and arrow spans. However, with the addition of the complex 
span measures in Experiment 6, it can be seen that only the simple spatial task correlated 
significantly with them. This might be expected given that in Experiment 5 it was the only 
simple task to correlate significantly with both the arrow and word spans, but also with the 
complex reasoning tasks, perhaps suggesting some commonalities between this task and the 
more complex ones. 
These results may suggest that performance on the complex reasoning tasks, which rely on 
processing and storage resources, do relate to central pools of working memory resources, 
as measured by the complex and simple spatial span tasks. This is in contrast to the simple 
reasoning tasks, which have stronger relationships with just the simple verbal resources, 
although the simple spatial reasoning task required resources more in line with the complex 
reasoning tasks. Thus, it might be that the complex reasoning tasks, and the simple spatial 
task, require both general and spatial CE resources in order to perform them. For the other 
simple reasoning tasks it is most likely that the memory load involved is not as demanding, 
as shown by the lower correlations with the complex spans, which could be interpreted as 
their reliance on only general resources of working memory, without recourse to additional 
independent executive processes for verbal and spatial information. 
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Again, this lends support to the notion that, especially for complex reasoning exercises. 
central workin memory resources may be associated with this process, but that this entails 9 
more than just general processing. This finding that spatial processing is an important 
factor in their perfon-nance holds across all the experiments - in respect to the five-term 
series spatial and syllogistic inferences. For the simpler tasks, only general executive 
resources may be required. It could be the case that the simple tasks would only load the 
general factor in a CFA, reflecting the fact that they don't have a huge storage component, 
but do have a processing component. It might also be the case, as in Experiments 1-3, that 
the complex reasoning tasks, in addition to loading the general factor, also load the specific 
factors, perhaps reflecting the fact that they need additional spatial and/or verbal processing. 
As in Experiments 1-3, this may imply that a general domain explanation of working 
memory is required, but that additionally, verbal and spatial executive processing factors are 
also essential. This will be further addressed in the factor analysis section at the end of this 
section. 
As in Experiment 5, the data in the correlational matrix in Experiment 6 support two 
clusters of correlations for the reasoning tasks. The simple reasoning tasks again cross 
correlate together, as do the complex reasoning tasks. This finding can be related to 
Stanovich and West (1998) who proposed that a general capacity (as measured by cognitive 
nil ability) accounted for the total cross correlations seen in their studies. Due to the two 
clusters of correlations being consistent over both Experiments 5 and 6, the results can not 
be explained by chance alone. It is true that the tasks used here are different to the ones 
used by Stanovich et al. (1998), except for the syllogistic task. Thus, it might be that the 
tasks used by Stanovich fit into the cluster of correlations for the complex reasoning tasks 
seen in Experiments 5 and 6. These complex deductive measures seem to have 
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commonalities that could be interpreted as relying on one capacity resource. What 
Stanovich did not find was a second cluster of correlations in relation to another identifiable 
group of tasks, in this instance, the simple reasoning task cluster. It could be that there are 
two capacity resources available, one more impli I icated in the complex tasks. and another 
more implicated in the simple tasks. 
The experimental results, as with all the other experiments, also support the notion that the 
more models that need to be manipulated in order to reach a valid conclusion, the morc 
errors will be made on reasoning problems. This ý, vas consistent for all the tasks x\ licre this 
split between single and multiple models was made. These results again have implications 
for theories of the reasoning process. As for Experiments 4 and 5, these theoretical accounts 
will be covered in the general discussion in Section 4.6. The CFA, as v,, ell as the 
correlational analysis, can then be combined from all three experiments to provide the most 
consistent interpretation of the data. 
Experiments 4-6 involved a wide range of reasoning tasks and a number of working 
memory span measures. In order to find a best fit model for the three correlational data sets, 
a multiple group factor analysis was carried out on Experiments 4-6 .A factor analytic 
investigation would help to fully understand the pattern of data in terms of models of 
working memory. What follows is an investigation into the best fit models of the data sets 
for Experiments 4-6, and the results and interpretation made of this. 
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4.5 CON Fl RMATORYFACTOR ANALYSIS 
EXPERIMENTS 4,5 AND 6 
4.5. I Rationale for the Factor Analysis 
The spatial and temporal inference data from Experiment 4 suggested that individual 
differences were predicted by both complex and simple verbal and spatial xý orkmg memory 
spans. The five-term spatial inference data from Experiments 5 and 6 sug-ested that tý 
individual differences were predicted by both complex and simple spatial ý\ýorking memory 
spans, although there was some influence from the verbal spans (negative correlation in 
Experiment 6). The syllogistic inference and multiple quantification task data from both 
Experiments 5 and 6 suggested that individual differences were best predicted by both 
complex and simple spatial spans. A potential explanation for the findings for the complex 
reasoning tasks - temporal, five-term series, syllogistic and multiple quantification, is that 
they draw more heavily on general CE resources. with additional executi\, e processing for 
spatial information. 
The abstract and conditional task data from Experiments 5 and 6 showed highest 
correlations with the simple spans, especially the word span. The three-term spatial 
inference data from Experiments 5 and 6 showed similar correlations ,,, -ith the simple and 
complex spans, both verbal and spatial. One potential explanation for these findings for the 
simpler reasoning tasks - abstract, conditionals and three-term series, is that they dra\\ more 
heavily on general resources of working memory (as measured by the simple spans). 
requiring only minor processing, although the simple spatial task seems to require additional 
spatial processing, as did the complex tasks. This general processing. partly measured by 
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the arrow and word spans, seems to be the most important component in performance of the 
simple reasoning tasks. 
The interpretation that the complex spans measure verbal and spatial executive capacity 
resources and the simple spans measure a general executive capacity resource is evidenced 
by intercorrelations between the span measures across all three experiments. Cross- 
correlations between all the span measures were positive, as they were in Experiments 1-33. 
In Experiments 4 and 6, the complex verbal and spatial spans intercorrelated positively. 
Thus, what might under lie this finding is variations in central executIve ftinctIon, be it 
verbal or spatial in nature. There were positive correlations between the simple word and 
arrow spans throughout Experiments 4-6, a finding that is consistent with Experiment 1-3. 
A possibility is that the complex spans tap into executive processes that are verbal or spatial, 
and the simple spans partly tap the general, independent, CE. 
There was a clearer separation between the complex verbal and spatial spans than in 
Experiments 1-3, although there were positive relationships between them. Shah and 
Miyake's (1996) complete dissociation between verbal and spatial spans was still not 
observed here. Overall, the general cross-correlations between span tasks, both simple and 
complex, through Experiments 4-6 showed positive relationships, as in the first three 
experiments. Therefore, these findings are not entirely consistent with Baddeley's (1986) 
model of a central executive with two peripheral subsystems. The inconsistency lies in the 
result between the simple span measures. Due to the positive, and mostly significant, 
relationships between the arrow and word span throughout the experimental series, it is 
difficult to interpret these measures as drawing on two separate sub-systems. Further 
evidence for the difficulty in interpreting these two measures as simple passive storage tasks 
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was seen in the factor analysis for Experiments I These two tasks %ý ere shown to load 
both the specific and general factors. This will be further imestiLated in the factor analysis 
for Experiments 4-6. 
The following confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) models Nvere run in order to further test 
the findings of the correlational data obtained from Experiments 4-6, as ýý ell as the patterns 
observed from the first three experiments. A number of different models were tested. 
including three and four factor models. The following summary contains the best fit models 
found from those that were originally investigated. Firstly, a three-factor multiple group 
analysis was run on Experiments 4,5 and 6. This was in order to further test the best fit 
model found for Experiments 1-3 data. Section 3.5 contains the CFA results produced for 
Experiments 1-3. The best fit model of the data vvas a three factor, uncorrelated one. The 
simple word and complex verbal spans loaded factor I and factor 3 significantly. The 
simple arrow and complex letter spans loaded factor 2 and factor -') significantly. whilst the 
complex T'F'F span only loaded factor 3 significantly. It must be emphasised that this is a 
multiple group analysis, which pools data across experiments to reach conclusions that are 
valid for all experiments. As in Experiments 1-3, for the tasks that were common betwcen 
experiments, the parameters of the model were constrained for equality across experiments. 
This is an important point given the sample sizes used in relation to individual differences 
work. 
4.5.2 Method and Results 
A multiple group confirmatory factor analyses was run on all three experiments where the 
factors \N-ci-c loaded as shown in Table 4.16. The span measures were loaded as in 
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Experiments I -' 3. The verbal and word spans were loaded on both factor I and factor 'I - 
The arrow and TTT spans were loaded on both factor 2 and factor ' 3. 
The loadings of the reasoning measures on the three factors will be explained next. The 
complex reasoning tasks. five-term series spatial. syllogistic and multiple quantification 
tasks, were loaded on all the factors, as in Experiments 1-33. The simple reasoning measures 
were loaded onto specific factors - statistical and theoretical reasons for these specific 
loadings are discussed below. If the simple reasoning measures were allowed to load all 
factors, as the complex ones, it might make the definition of the factors by the span 
measures problematic. Thus, due to the addition of many more reasonint) tasks, the simple 
tasks were also used to define the factors, past theory being used as a guide to define which 
tasks should load which factor. Past research showed that simple spatial tasks are disrupted 
by secondary tasks assumed to load the VSSP of working memory (Farmer, Berman and 
Fletcher, 1986). This research implied that simple spatial problems tend to be solved by 
using simple spatial resources. Therefore, the simple spatial inferences (three-term series) 
were loaded on both the spatial factor and the general factor (F2 and F3). Past research 
showed that conditional inferences are disrupted by secondary tasks assumed to load the Pl, 
and CE components of working memory (Toms, Morris & Ward, 1993; Klauer, Stegmaier 
and Melser, 1997). The abstract task also requires reasoning about propositions, the 
conditional inferences being a sub-set of this type of problem. Therefore, the conditional 
and abstract reasoning tasks were loaded on both the verbal factor and general factor (F I 
and F3). 
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FI E. F3 
arrow 
word 
verbal 
TTT 
three-term spatial inference 
five-term spatial inference V/ V/ 
temporal inference V V/ 
abstract inference V/ 
conditional inference V/ 
syllogistic inference V/ V/ 
multiple quantified inference V/ V 
Table 4.16 - Set up of the orthogonal three-factor model for Experiments 4-6 
The factors are interpreted as FI- verbal resource, F2 - spatial resource, and F3 - general 
resource. The three factors were orthogonal in nature. The above loadings were constrained 
to equality across the experiments where the same tasks were involved. For instance, the 
simple span measures were constrained across Experiments 4,5 and 6. The complex span 
measures were constrained across Experiments 4 and 6. The reasoning tasks used in 
Experiments 5 and 6 were also constrained to equality. The only reasoning task that vvas 
constrained to equality across all three experiments was the five-term series spatial 
problems. Even though the task was a production one in Experiment 4, as opposed to an 
evaluation task in Experiments 5 and 6, the structure of the problems ývere identical. The 
error variance associated with each of the tasks was also constrained to be equal across 
experiments in the same way. The appropriate EQS methods were set up to handle the data. 
The full EQS output can be found in Appendix B 1.14. 
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chi-square 74-716 
degrees of freedom 73 
probability of chi-square 0.42 
akaike's information criterion -71.28 
bentler-bonett normed fit index 0.794 
bentler-bonett nonnormed fit index 0.992 
comparative fit index 0.994 
Table 4.17 - Goodness of fit summary (three-factor model, uncorrelated) - multiple group 
analysis of Experiments 4-6 
Table 4.17 gives the results of fitting the hypothetical three-factor model Outlined abo% c. 
The Chi-square for testing the goodness of fit of the model is 74.716. based on 7) de-, -, i-ccs 
of freedom. This result may be likely (p<. 42) to occur with a sample of this size i I- the 
model truly holds in the population. Thus, considering the high fit indices. ýýc inaV accept 
the model. The factor loadings for the tasks in Experiments 4-6 (three-factor model) can be 
found in Tables 4.17A-C. 
LOADINGS 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 
verbal spatial general R-sq 
MEASURE resource resource resource 
arrow .31 . 
45*** . 30 
word . 40*** . 
62*** . 54 
verbal . 79*** . 
61*** 1.00 
TTT . 60*** . 
17 . 39 
fivc-term spatial inference -. 22 . 56*** . 
')6** 37 
temporal inference . 06 . 
89*** . 22 5 . 
85 
(significant loadings 
11 p<0.05, 
p<0,0 1, p<0.005) 
Table 4.17A - Fxpcriment 4 factor loadings for the three-factor uncorrelated model 
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LOADINGS 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 
verbal spatial general R-sq 
MEASURE resource resource resource 
arrow . 31*** . 45*** . 110 
word . 40*** . 62*** . 54 
three-term spatial inference . 43*** . 67*** . 64 
five-term spatial inference -. 22 . 56*** . 36** . 37 
abstract inference -. 20 . 62*** . 42 
conditional inference -. 17 . 51*** . 29 
syllogistic inference -. 01 . 38*** . 30* 
multiple quantified inference -. 16 . 69*** . 31 * . 60 
(significant loadings *=p<0.05, **=p<0.0 1, ***=p<0.005) 
Table 4.17B - Experiment 5 factor loadings for the three-factor uncorrelated model 
LOADINGS 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 
verbal spatial general R-sq 
MEASURE resource resource resource 
arrow . 31*** . 45*** . 30 
word . 40* . 62*** . 54 
verbal . 
79*** . 
61 *** 1.00 
TTT . 
60*** 
. 
17 
. 
39 
three-term spatial inference . 
43*** 
. 
67*** 
. 
64 
five-term spatial inference -. 22 . 
56*** 
. 
36** 
. 
37 
abstract inference -. 20 . 
62*** 
. 
42 
conditional inference -. 17 . 
51*** . 
29 
syllogistic inference -. 01 . 
38*** 
. 
30* 
. 
23 
multiple quantified inference -. 16 . 
69*** 
. 
31 * 
. 
60 
(significant loadings p<0.05, p<0.0 1, p<0.005) 
Table 4.17C - Experiment 6 factor loadings for the three-factor uncorrelated model 
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In the three-factor model, especially for Experiment 5. the largest standardised residuals 
were mostly in relation to the correlations between reasoning tasks. It might be that there 
were correlations amongst the reasoning measures that were not fully explained by the three 
factors. In addition to this, it can be seen from the factor loadings in Tables 4.17A-C that 
none of the reasoning tasks loaded on factor I (the verbal resource). This is inconsistent 
with Experiments 1-3 where significant loadings for the syllogistic and five-term series 
reasoning problems were found on factor 1. It was therefore decided that, even though the 
fit was good for the three-factor model, another factor might be justified in explaining 
variance on the reasoning measures. 
It can be seen from the cross-correlations of all the reasoning tasks used in Experiments 4-6 
that there were positive relationships between them. However, two clusters of correlations 
did emerge - one group related to the simple reasoning measures, and one to the complex 
reasoning measures. This suggests that performance on one simple task can predict 
performance on another simple task, with similar predictions relating to the complex tasks. 
It may also highlight an underlying theme to all the reasoning tasks. Due to the addition of 
many more reasoning tasks in Experiments 4-6, a possibility could be that cognitive 
motivation or thinking styles influence performance. This motivational factor would be 
independent of ability and may connect these tasks on another level. 
Stanovich and West (1998) found that cognitive capacity alone could not explain the 
variance amongst the reasoning tasks they studied. They found that thinking dispositions 
could serve as a predictor independent of differences in cognitive ability. The thinking 
styles that were investigated included thinking of alternative explanations to the problem at 
hand, how dogmatic people's beliefs were, and how open-minded they were. All of these 
297 
thinking dispositions are important features of the reasoning process. For instance. 
especially in relation to mental model theorN. the moti I ive -at on to search for alternat' 
models, is necessary for correct responding - Thus, Stanovich and West (1998) could not 
explain variation in performance on a range of reasoning tasks without recourse to both a 
cognitive ability and thinking disposition factor. 
Stanovich and West's (1997,199 8) results can be brought in here to expand on v. -hat ý\ as 
found in the current experimental series. Their cognitive capacity measure (in comparison 
to the working memory capacity measures used here) significantly correlated with 
performance on the deductive tasks they investigated. The\, su--cst that errors in 
performance can be accounted for by limitations in a person's cognitive capacity. Theý- also 
suggested that predictions can be made through looking at thinking dispositions, \\ hich can 
be related to the ability of the reasoner to search for alternative models or representations of 
the problem. 
Comparing the experimental tasks used here Nvith Stanovich's work, it would be expected 
that if reasoning performance does rely on variation in cognitive capacity, then they should 
load on what has been called the general factor. that reflects that capacity. But, another 
variable, that is linked to cognitive motivation or style, could underlie these tasks too. So, 
rather than it being solely capacity limitations, there could be something else explaining L- 
variations on these tasks, such as searching for alternative models of the problem, %ý lilch is a 
major component of the mental model theory of reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983). These 
separate activities may not rely on working memory resources, but on the thinking style 
adopted by the person in order to solve the problem. 
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In Experiments 1-3, there were only a few reasoning tasks involved within each experinient. 
and therefore the extra factor accounting for thinking style did not emerge in tlie factor 
analysis. In Experiments 1-3 CFA only one correlation could be used in which to look for 
discrepancies between predicted and observed scores. In Experiment 4-6, many reasoning 
tasks were used and therefore allowed the addition of a thinking style factor in order to 
investigate more of Stanovich and West's (1997,1998) claims. 
The factor loadings for the three-factor model will not be discussed until the discussion of 
the next four-factor model. This is because the loadings are very similar betx, ý-een these tN,,, o 
models. Therefore, the loadings on factors 1,2, and 3 remain static and can be considered 
together with the results found for the four-factor model. The interpretation of factor 
loadings will follow the goodness of fit summary for a four-factor model. 
The following confirmatory factor analytic model was run in order to further test the notion 
of a fourth underlying factor that influences reasoning performance. It may be that some 
other factor, as well as capacity, may explain variance on the reasoning tasks. A four-factor 
multiple group analysis was run on Experiments 4,5 and 6. This involved combining the 
data from all three experiments into a single model in order to strengthen the final outcome. 
A multiple group confirmatory factor analyses was run on all three experiments where the 
factors loaded as shown in Table 4.18. The tasks in the four-factor model were loaded on 
factor 1,2 and 3 in exactly the same way as in the three-factor model. The only difference 
with the four-factor model was that, additionally, all the reasoning measures were loaded 
onto a fourth factor that represented thinking style or disposition. 
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F1 F2 F3 F4 
arrow V/ V/ 
word V/ 
verbal V/ V/ 
TTT V/ 
three-term spatial inference V/ V/ 
five-term spatial inference V/ V/ V/ V/ 
temporal inference V/ V/ V/ V/ 
abstract inference V/ V/ V/ 
conditional inference V/ V/ V/ 
syllogistic inference V/ V/ V/ V/ 
multiple quantified inference V/ V/ V/ V/ 
Table 4.18 - Set up of orthogonal four-factor model for Experiments 4-6 
The factors are interpreted as FI- verbal resource, F2 - spatial resource, F3 - "ciieral 
resource, and F4 - thinking style or disposition. The factors , verc uncorrelated. The above 
loadings were constrained to equality across the experiments. The error variance associated 
with each of the tasks was also constrained across experiments. The appropriate EQS 
methods were set up to handle the data. 
Table 4.19 gives the results of fitting the hypothetical four-factor model outlined above, 
where all four factors were orthogonal. The Chi-square for testing the goodness of fit of the 
model is 57.807, based on 66 degrees of freedom. This result may be likely (p<. 75) to 
occur with a sample of this size if the model truly holds in the population. Thus. 
considering the high fit indices, we may accept the model. 
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chi-square 57.807 
degrees of freedom 66 
probability of chi-square 0.75 
akaike's information criterion -74.19 
bentler-bonett normed fit index 0.840 
bentler-bonett nonnormed fit index 1.040 
comparative fit index 1.000 
Table 4.19 - Goodness of fit summary (four-factor model, uncorrelated) - multiple group t7 
analysis of Experiments 4-6 
The conclusion that the four-factor model (Table 4.19) fitted the data better thaii the three- 
factor model (Table 4.17) for Experiments 4-6 datawas supported by the direct statistical 
comparison of alternative models. The chi-square difference test produced a significant chi- 
square, X2 (7) = 16.9 1, p< . 
05 
. suggesting that the three-factor model 
fits the data 
significantly worse than the four-factor model. However, both produced a non-significant 
chi-square to the data sets and this must be noted. From the factor loadings it can be seen 
that there were a number of significant loadings on factor 4 which also strengthens the case 
for the inclusion of this factor. Another important point is that the AIC value in the four- 
factor model was smaller than in the three-factor one (-74.19 as opposed to -71.28 in the 
three-factor model). The AIC provides a tool for comparing models that differ in their free 
parameters, and therefore is a good indicator as to whether the fourth factor is necessary. 
The three-factor model can be seen as a constrained version of the four-factor model. The 
four-fýictor model is less parsimonious than the three-factor model, but with a significant 
chi-square difference result and a lower AIC. the finding is strengthened. Considering the 
similarity bem cen loadings for the thrce-factor versus four-factor model. the rcsults for both 
will be discussed as for the four-factor model below. 
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LOADLNGS 
Factor I Factor 22 Factor 33 Factor 4 
verbal spatial general thinking R-sq 
MEASURE resource resource resource disposition 
arrow . 34*** . 48*** . 34 
word . 35*** . 68*** . 58 
verbal . 80*** . 59*** 1.00 
TTT 
. 61*** . 22 . 4-1 
five-term spatial inference -. 09 . 50*** . 22* 36 . -1 
temporal inference . 01 . 81*** . 20 . 55* 1.00 
(significant loadings *=p<0.05, **=p<0.0 1, ***=p<0.005) 
Table 4.19A - Experiment 4 factor loadings for the four-factor uncorrelated model 
MEASURE 
Factor I 
verbal 
resource 
LOADINGS 
Factor 2 Factor 3 
spatial general 
resource resource 
Factor 4 
thinking 
disposition 
R-sq 
arrow . 34*** . 48*** . 34 
word . 35*** . 68*** . 58 
three-term spatial inference . 40*** . 65*** . 26* . 64 
five-term spatial inference -. 09 . 50*** . 22* . 23* . 36 
abstract inference -. 05 . 44*** . 55*** . 50 
conditional inference . 00 . 34** . 41*** . 
29 
syllogistic inference . 45*** . 67*** -. 
10 . 59*** 1.00 
multiple quantified inference -. 23* . 64*** . 
34* . 11 . 59 
( significant loadings *=p<0.05, **=p<0.0 1, ***=p<0.005) 
Table 4.19B - Experiment 5 factor loadings for the four-factor uncorrelated model 
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LOADINGS 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 
-3 Factor 4 
verbal spatial general thinking R-sq 
MEASURE resource resource resource disposition 
arrow . 34*** . 48*** . 
34 
word . 35*** . 68*** . 58 
verbal . 80* . 59*** 1.00 
TTT . 61*** . 22 . 
42 
three-term spatial inference . 40* **. 65*** . 26* . 
64 
five-term spatial inference -. 09 . 50*** . 22* . 233 
* . 36 
abstract inference -. 05 . 44*** . 55*** . 
50 
conditional inference . 00 . 34** . 41*** . 
-)g 
syllogistic inference . 45*** . 67*** -. 10 . 
59*** 1.00 
multiple quantified inference -. 23 * . 64*** . 34* . 
11 . 59 
(significant loadings *=p<0.05 , ** =p<0.01 , 
*** =p< 0.005) 
Table 4.19C - Experiment 6 factor loadings for the four-factor uncorrelated model 
Tables 4.19A-C give the results of the factor loadings of each of the eleven tasks on the four 
factors (see Appendix B 1.14 for the full analysis). Note the similarity in loadings between 
tasks on factors 1,2 and 3 in comparison to the three-factor model. Thus, the results above 
are supported by the previous three-factor model in Tables 4.17A-C. The following 
summary relates to Tables 4.19A-C, and to a four-factor orthogonal model. The loadings 
for the span measures will be discussed first, as these can be related to the results found in 
Experiments 1-3. Note that the loadings for the span measures are not much affected by 
whether a three-factor or four-factor solution are accepted. The loadings in Experiments 4-6 
show that the word and verbal spans significantly load factor 1 (. 35 and . 80, respectively) 
and factor 3 (. 68 and . 59, respectively). This was also 
found in Experiments 1-3. HoweN-er 
the loadings in Experiments 1-3 were slightly different. The word span loaded factor I 
similarly to Experiments 4-6 (. 48). However. the verbal span did not load factor I as highly 
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in Experiments 1-3 (. 47) as it did in Experiments 4-6 (. 80). The \wrd span loaded factor ', 
similarly to Experiments 4-6 (. 64), as did the verbal span (. 64, ). The N erbal span loaded 
factor I more than the word span. If the xvord span , vas only a passive measure it would 
only be expected to load factor 1. If the verbal span was an active measure it would only be 
expected to load factor 3, when in fact it loaded factor I most significantly. Aii 
interpretation of factor I might be more compatible . vith the idea of a domain-spccific 
component of the CE, rather than it being the PL component of working memory. 
The arrow span loadings in Experiments 4-6 show that it significantly loads factor 2 (. 34) 
and factor 3 (. 48). This is fairly consistent with the loadings found in Experiments 1 -33, 
where the arrow span significantly loaded factor 21 (. 57) and factor 3 (. 331). The TTT span in 
Experiments 4-6 only significantly loads factor 2 (. 61). This was not found in Ixperiments 
1-3, where the TTT span only loaded factor 3 significantly (. 60). If the arroxv span ý\ Lis mily 
a passive measure it would be expected to load factor 2 alone. If the TTT span was an 
the complex span active measure then it would be expected to load factor alone. Due to 
measures (verbal and TTT) loading the specific factors more than factor 3. the Baddeley 
interpretation is not the best fit to the data. Thus. this pattern of results, again, might be 
more compatible with the notion that factor 2 is actually a domain-specific part of the CE, 
rather than being the VSSP component of working memory. 
Next, the span measures will be discussed in relation to their R-squared values and the 
reliability estimates made for each of them. The R-squared values can be compared to those 
found in Experiments 1-3, where they ranged from . 37 to . 
63. The R-squared values for the 
span measures in this series of experiments ranoc from . 34 to 1.00. where the only problem 
value is the one for the N-crbal span task. VvIben error variance equals 0.00 (r = 1.00) the case 
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is called the Heywood effect (Hannan. 1971) and this result could be explained as a chance 
finding in a relatively small sample (Dillon, Kumar & Mulani. 1987). 
The simple tasks will be discussed next, as they were only loaded onto certain factors. The 
three-term spatial inferences, significantly load factors 2,3 and 4 (. 40,. 65,. 26, 
respectively). The abstract and conditional inferences significantly load factor 3) and factor 
4 (. 44,. 55 for abstract and . 34,. 41 for conditionals, respectively). The consistent finding 
across all the simple reasoning tasks is that they all load the general and thinking stý-le 
factors. An interpretation might be that all the simple tasks rely upon a general capacity 
working memory resource and in addition, upon the thinking style adopted by the reasoner. 
The complex reasoning tasks were loaded onto all four factors. The temporal inferences 
significantly load factor 2 and factor 4 (. 81,55, respectively). The five-term spatial 
inferences significantly load factors 2,3 and 4 (. 50,22,23, respectively). In Experiments 
1-3 the five-term spatial inferences loaded factor I and factor 3 significantly (-. 60,. 78, 
respectively). The overall finding for the complex spatial reasoning tasks is that they 
positively load the spatial, general and thinking style factors. An interpretation could be 
that these types of complex spatial task rely upon general and spatial executive resources of 
working memory, and additionally that the thinking style adopted by the reasoner also 
affects accurate performance. 
The syllogistic inferences significantly load factors 1,2 and 4 (. 45, . 67, .59, respectively), 
losing significance when loading factor 3. It should be noted that the loading of the 
syllogistic task on factor I was not found in the three-factor model. This is a major 
difference between the three-factor and four-factor model, the four-factor model findings 
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being more consistent with those found in Experiments 1-33. The multiple quantification 
task significantly loads factors 1 (-. 2--)), 2 and 3' (. 64. . 34. respectively). This negative 
loading on factor I is of interest in relation to the loading found for the s-,, Ilo, -, Istic task (. 45). 
Both these tasks rely upon similar assumptions and reasoning about quantifiers. HoweN er, 
the multiple quantification task requires the processing of double quantified statements in 
relation to the syllogistic arguments. The negative loading of the multiple quantification 
task on factor I could be due to the fact that some reasoners rely upon verbal strategics in 
order to perform the task, which in the long run leads to poorer performance. HoNý c,, er. the 
multiple quantification task also showed loýv reliability estimates in Experiments 5 and 6 
and the findings should be taken in light of this consideration. The consistent finding for 
both the syllogistic and multiple quantification tasks is that they both shnificantly load the 
spatial factor, a finding consistent with Experiments 1-33. An interpretation might be that 
reasoning about quantifiers relies upon some sort of spatial executive resource of working 
memory in order for accurate responding. 
The syllogistic and multiple quantification problems rest on similar assumptions about the 
relationships between quantifiers. From Experiments 5 and 6 correlational analyses it was 
shown that they relate positively (r = . 22 and r= . 
41). However. the relationship betýý, een 
their loadings on the factors in this model are quite different. These differences could be 
due to the large R-squared value for the syllogistic task, or the low reliability of the multiple 
quantification task in both Experiments 5 and 6 (. 28 and .31. respectively). 
Interestino Iy. eight of the eleven tasks significantIN, load factor 3 (the general resource). 
Also of interest. six of the seven reasoning tasks significantly load factor 4 (thinking 
disposition). This could be interpreted as showing that the mzijjority of the span measures 
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and reasoning tasks rely upon a general capacity resource (Stanovich's cognitiN e abilit% ) as 
well as the reasoning tasks being further affected by the thinking style adopted by the 
reasoner (Stanovich's thinking disposition). 
Next, the reasoning measures will be discussed in relation to their R-squared values and the 
reliability estimates made for each of them. Comparisons with Experiments 1-31 are difficult 
here due to the fact that Experiments 5 and 6 used evaluation tasks, as opposed to 
production tasks. The R-squared values for the reasoning measures in this series of 
experiments range from . 29 to 1.00, where the only problem values are for the temporal and 
syllogistic inferences. These problem values are again related to the Heywood case and 
may be explained by chance variation from sampling fluctuations. The reliability estimates 
for the reasoning measures used in Experiments 4-6 were variable, ranging from . 
28 to . 
84. 
Those with unsatisfactory reliability estimates were particularly the conditional and multiple 
quantification tasks. This is mirrored in the low R-squared value for the conditional 
inference task (. 29). 
4.5.3 Factor Analysis Discussion 
Consistent with Experiments 1-3, the confirmatory multiple group four-factor analysis 
carried out for this series of experiments shows similar results. Due to the range of 
reasoning tasks used in these three experiments, it was possible to evaluate the influence of 
a fourth factor, thinking disposition, which did not emerge in the first three experiments. 
The results here are consistent with the first three experiments in that some form of general 
factor loads all of the reasoning and capacity measures. This factor may be interpreted as a 
general working memory capacity resource Nvhich executes all higher level thinking, be it 
\ erbal or spatial in nature. In other words, this general factor could be interpreted as a low 
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demand processing resource, that deals with all information, be it span or reasoning 
measures. In contrast, the specific verbal and spatial factors could be interpreted as high 
demand processing resources, important in performing complex reasoning tasks. The data 
analysis and discussion below can not be explained by the Baddeley interpretation of a 
centrally controlled executive with two relatively passive storage systems (Baddeleý-. 1986). 
What this pattern of data does suggest is that the factors that emerged in all the CFA carried 
out on Experiments 1-6 support the notion of a general CE. with domain-specific 
components for verbal and spatial information. In addition to this finding, the present 
analysis adds that some form of thinking style influences the ability to reason deductively 
(Stanovich & West, 1997,1998). 
From Experiment 4-6 three-factor model it can be seen that the loadings were very similar 
to the four-factor model, with only a few discrepancies which did not change significances. 
With the additional y2 difference test and lower AIC value showing that the four-factor 
model was a better fit, the following discussion deals with this fourth factor as well, 
representing thinking dispositions. However, it should be noted that the three-factor and 
four-factor model can both be accepted as good fits to the data. In Experiment 1-3 CFA 
(Section 3.5) it was found that a three-factor model of working memory could account best 
for the pattern of data observed. What was not so clear was whether the factors represented 
a general executive with two relatively passive storage systems; or whether the factors 
could be interpreted as a general executive with two additional active components beyond 
the scope of the PL and VSSP. 
An explanation of the span measure loadings in the four-factor model are considered next. 
together with comparisons with Experiments 1-3 CFA. The word span significantly loaded 
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factor I (verbal) and factor 3 (general), although highest on the general factor. These 
significant loadings are consistent with Experiments 1-3, --ývhere the same result was found. 
The verbal span loaded the verbal factor and the general factor significantly. although higher 
on factor 1. These findings, together with Experiments 1-3, suggest that the niost plausible 
possibility is that factors 1,2 and 3 represent specific components of the CE of working 
memory, as measured by the simple and complex span measures. 
The arrow span significantly loaded factor 2 (spatial) and factor ') (general). However, as 
did the word span, the arrow span loaded the general factor most significantly. These 
significant loadings were also found in Experiments 1-3, although the arrow span loading on 
the spatial factor was higher. The TTT span, on the other hand, loaded the spatial factor 
significantly, but not factor 3, the general resource. The reverse of this was found in 
Experiments 1-3, where the TTT span loaded the general factor and not the spatial one. An 
interpretation of these findings for both sets of experiments might be that instead of being 
representative of the VSSP, factor 2 is actually involved in both the storage and processing 
of spatial representations. As previously suggested, the original idea that the three factors 
might represent working memory resources from the Baddeley perspective are again 
questioned here. A more plausible explanation might be that factors 1,2 and 3 are all active 
in nature, and represent specific components of the CE. 
Considered next is an explanation of the reasoning task loadings in the four-factor model. 
From the abstract and conditional reasoning data, it can be seen that performance relied on 
the general working memory resource and was influenced by thinking style. The factor 3 
loading is consistent with the knowledge that these types of reasoning task rely on a general 
CE resource (Toms, Morris & Ward, 1993; Klauer, Stegmaier and Meiser, 1997). The use 
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of different thinking styles, or motivation. can also account for the performance on these 
tasks. These simpler reasoning tasks appear to require central processing and be influenced 
by the thinking style adopted by the reasoner. Further factor 3 and factor 4 interpretations 
will be made after all the reasoning tasks have been summarised beloN), -. 
From the three-tenn and five-term spatial reasoning data, it can be seen that performance 
relied on the general and the spatial resource of working memory, together with an influence 
of thinking style. The five-term series problems differ in this factor analytic investigation 
from that of the prior one (Experiments 1-3) due to the fact that it was an evaluative task 
here (with non-thematic content). This said, both types of spatial inference task used here 
require the use of a spatial resource in order to correctly respond (Farmer, Berman and 
Fletcher, 1986). As well, they use central resources, also seen in Experiments 1-3, in order 
to produce valid conclusions. Individual differences in thinking style can account for some 
of the variation in performance. 
From the syllogistic reasoning data, it can be seen that performance relied on the verbal and 
spatial working memory resources, as well as having an influence of thinking style. This is 
consistent with Experiments 1-3 and recent work that suggests that syllogisms are solved by 
using spatial and/or propositional representations (Ford, 1994). As stated previously, one 
explanation may be that participants have to keep in mind the premise information, which 
logically relies on a verbal working memory resource, and then formulate a mental model 
that holds spatial (or propositional) information from the problem, which may rely on a 
spatial working memory resource. The addition of a thinking style influence may also 
account for variation in performance on the task. 
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From the multiple quantification reasoning data, it can be seen that perforniance relied on 
the spatial and general working memory resources, whilst being negatively related to the 
verbal resource. The negative verbal store loading was also found for the five-term series 
spatial inference when using a production task. As previously explained in the last factor 
analytic discussion (Section 3.5), the reason for the negative loading on the verbal store in 
both cases may be due to the use of a verbal strategy, rather than a spatial one. Phillips, 
Wynn, Gilhooly, Della Sala and Logie (1999) found that articulatoi y suppression increased 
accurate performance on the Tower of London task. This was interpreted as indicating that 
the Pl, resources were not available and reasoners were forced into using the VSSP 
resources, which produced better results. The reasoners in this set of experiments may have 
used verbal resources when in fact spatial resources would have achieved increased logical 
responses. This might explain the negative loading of the multiple quantification task on 
factor 1, although this finding must be taken in light of its low reliability estimates in both 
Experiments 5 and 6. 
The loadings of the reasoning tasks on factor 4 show that all the measures load it 
significantly, except the multiple quantification task. This factor could be interpreted as a 
commonality between tasks that is independent of a general resource capacity (factor 3). 
Indeed, this is what was found by Stanovich and West (1998) who proposed that a 
combination of both cognitive ability and a reasoner's thinking disposition accounted for 
reasoning performance. Stanovich's explanation of this thinking style rests on the notion 
that the reasoner's performance might be influenced by their ability to search for counter- 
examples. One component of the mental models theory also relies on the assumption that 
the reasoner must search for alternatives where the conclusion does not hold (Johnson- 
Laird, 1983). The CFA from Experiments 4-6 shows a range of reasoning tasks load factor 
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4. which was interpreted as this thinking disposition of the reasoner. The only task iiot to 
load this factor was the multiple quantification task. A reason for this miLlht be that it was 
the only task where the majority of the problems only required one model of the premises in 
order to correctly respond. Therefore, the search for counter- example s. as represented by 
factor 4, might not have improved the reasoner's performance. 
The pattern of results from the measures used in Experiments 4-6 could be interpreted as the 
reasoning tasks drawing on CE resources. The CFA is most consistent \ýIth the notion that 
the CE component of working memory consists of specific modules which are im olved in 
actively processing a variety of deductive tasks. The simpler reasoning tasks, that are 
assumed to need a low working memory load, are most associated with the -, eneral factor, 
whilst the complex reasoning tasks, assumed to need a high v, 'orking memory load, at-e most 
associated with all the processing factors (factors 1-3). In addition to this mental workspace 
notion, Experiments 4-6 results support the idea that an individual's thinking style might 
affect the ability to reason deductively. This thinking style may represent the motivation a 
reasoner has for the searching for counter-examples. The following discussion expands on 
these possibilities, as well as discussing the findings in the context of reasoning theory. 
4.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION FOR EXPERIMENTS 4-6 
A central goal of the Experiments 4-6 was to demonstrate that individual differences in 
working memory capacity can explain variation in performance on a range of reasoning 
tasks. As in Experiments 1-3, the patterns of correlations do support this idea. Overall. the 
correlational data suggested that the simple deductive reasoning tasks were best predicted 
by simple capacity measures. This could be interpreted as the partIcIpant's reliance on a 
(micral executive resource that is independent of modality. Also, the correlational data 
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suggested that the complex deductive tasks were best predicted by the spatial capacity 
measures, although the magnitude of these was lower than seen in Experiments 1 -3. Thus. 
it could be suggested that these complex deductive tasks require general and spatial 
resources capable of both storing (passive) and processing (active) the infonnation. The 
factor analysis, consistent with Experiments 1-3, yielded results suggesting that a general 
factor of working memory capacity underlies all these deductive tasks. The factor analysis 
additionally yielded results suggesting that the reasoner's thinking style or disposition 
influences their performance on the deductive measures. 
As in Experiments 1-3, this series of experiments also investigated the issue of the 
separability of central working memory resources for verbal and spatial information (Shah 
& Miyake, 1996). The patterns of correlations in Experiments 1-3 were inconsistent with 
the view that CE resources can be separated for verbal and spatial information. Experiments 
4-6 correlations between the complex capacity measures ranged between . 24 (p <. 10) and 
08 (In Experiments 1-3 the range was between .31 and .5 5). The correlations between the 
simple capacity measures ranged between . 17 and . 42 (In Experiments 1-3 the range was 
between . 23 and . 28). The Shah and Miyake (1996) interpretation and the Baddeley 
interpretation (CE, PL and VSSP) are not compatible with the pattern of CFA results found 
here. As in Experiments 1-3, the interpretation of the factor analysis suggests that the 
deductive tasks require a centrally executed working memory resource, but that some tasks 
additionally require verbal and spatial processing resources. The simple spans may be 
measuring part of the PL and VSSP components, in respect to storage requirements. 
However, more than these passive stores are required to explain the simple span loadings on 
factor 3 (a processing component). A possible interpretation from the results found for the 
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simple span measures is that the commonalitv bet%veen the tx,, -o may he likely to represent 
general resources of v,, orking memory. requi in ring part storage and part process' 
Experiment 4 results will be discussed next. in relation to spatial and temporal thinking. 
Past research has highlighted the similarity in the way reasoners deal Ný ith spatial as 
opposed to temporal information (Byme & Johnson-Laird. 1989, - Schaeken, Johnsoii-Laird 
and d'Ydewalle, 1996). These studies have shown, through dual-task methodoloov. that 
articulatory, visuo-spatial, and central executive interference tasks degrade logical 
performance on both spatial and temporal tasks. In Experiment 4. the correlation betwccn 
the five-term series and temporal inferences was significant. suggesting common processes 
underlying both the measures. This is consistent with past research that has demonstrated a 
link between these two types of reasoning (Vandierendonck and De Vooght, 1997). The 
relationships between the spatial/temporal tasks with the working memory span measures 
was also investigated. Experiment 4 results showed that positive and significant 
correlations were obtained for both these tasks and all the working memory measures used. 
Experiment 4 results are also consistent with Experiment 2 where the five-tenn spatial 
inferences correlated positively with all the span measures. This is again consistent with 
past research, suggesting that both verbal, spatial and general resources of working memory 
are needed for logical performance (Vandierendonck and De Vooght, 1997). 
Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 results will be discussed next in relation to the range of 
evaluative reasoning tasks used. It must be noted that any comparisons made between thesc 
two experiments and the previous four production type experiments must take account of 
these differences in methodology. These tasks will be split into simple (three-ten-n series, 
abstract and conditionals) and complex (five-term series, syllogistic and multiple 
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quantification) groups. Past research has shown that simple deductive tasks can be 
separated due to their verbal or spatial nature. Fanner. Bennan and Fletcher (1986). through Zý 
dual-task methodology, found that performance on a simple spatial task was only affected 
by VSSP interference tasks; whilst performance on a simple verbal task was only affected I 
by PL interference tasks. Gilhooly, Logle, Wetherick & Wynn (1991 ") found that 
interference tasks that are assumed to load the subsystem of working memory only had 
small effects on more complex deductive reasoning tasks, and that they were most affected 
by interference tasks assumed to load the CE component of working memory. 
Experiment 5 and 6 showed that the simple reasoning tasks were positively, although not 
always significantly, correlated with the simple span measures. The abstract and 
conditional tasks, that rely upon reasoning with propositions, showed the strongest 
relationships with the word span in both Experiments 5 and 6 (. 32 and . 24 for abstract and 
. 21 and . 24 for conditionals). This would be expected considering the propositional nature 
of both these reasoning tasks and the word span task. The factor analysis loadings for these 
two reasoning tasks are less consistent with this view, where the only significant loadings 
were on the general factor and the thinking style factor. However, the word span loaded the 
general factor significantly too. A possibility might be that propositional deductive tasks 
rely upon general resources at the CE level. However, any interpretations made of the 
correlations and loadings for these tasks must be taken in light of the low reliability 
estimates obtained for both. The three-term series spatial inferences correlated significantly 
with the simple span measures, and positively with the complex span measures. The factor 
analysis results for this task showed significant loadings on the spatial, general and thinking 
style factors. This lends support to the notion of spatial processing of three-term series 
descriptions. However, again these resources might be at the level of the CE. 
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Experiment 5 and 6 showed that the complex reasoning tasks ýý ere positively. although not 
always significantly, correlated with the spatial span measures, both simple and complex. 
Performance on five-term series spatial inferences has been shown to be degraded by tasks 
assumed to load the PL, VSSP and CE components of working memory (Vandierendonck 
and De Vooght, 1997). although the major interference v, as seen NvIien using CE secondary 
tasks. The factor analysis results for the five-term series descriptions showed that they 
significantly loaded the spatial, general and thinking style factors. This is consistent with 
this past research which has assumed that processing of these types of problem rely upon the 
manipulation of spatial models. 
Performance on the syllogistic and multiple quantification tasks xvill be discussed together. 
This is because both types of problem rely upon reasoning about quantifiers and might be 
expected to show similar patterns of results. As with the complex spatial task, both these 
tasks appeared to have stronger correlational relationships x, 6th the spatial spans, both 
simple and complex. These correlations and part of the factor analysis results from 
Experiments 1-3 are also compatible. The consistency is the loading for both these tasks on 
the spatial factor, which is congruous with Experiments 1-3 findings for the syllogistic task. 
The syllogistic task was also shown to significantly load the verbal and thinking styles 
factors in this CFA. This is incompatible with Experiments 1-3 where the visually 
presented syllogisms loaded the general factor. The multiple quantification task was sho\ýn 
to significantly load the verbal (negatively) and general (positively) factors. It must be 
noted that the multiple quantification task produced low reliability estimates in both 
Experiments 5 and 6. The only consistent finding here is that both these quantifiable tasks 
relied upon spatial resources and this is in agreement with past research which suggests that L- 
reasoners might use different strategies based upon either spatial or verbal information 
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(Ford, 1994). These results are less consistent with the idea that general CE resources are 
required for logical performance (Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick & 'Wynn. 1993). unless factor 
I and factor 2 are interpreted as domain-specific parts of the CE component of working 
memory. 
Experiments 4-6 investigated a wide range of deductive nicasures, together xvith measures 
of working memory capacity. Thus, the findings here can be related to Stanovich and 
West's (1998) work where they suggested that measures of cognitive ability could predict 
individual differences in reasoning ability. The patterns of data, especially in Fxperiments 
and 6, indicated that two clusters of correlations emerged. One cluster of correlations 
contained simpler reasoning tasks, whilst the other cluster contained the more complcx 
tasks. Stanovich and West (1998) would expect a general positive matrix of results, where 
all the deductive tasks correlated together. The results of the correlational analysis here 
only partially support this notion. However, the factor analysis for Experiments 4-6 resulted 
in a four-factor model, where the majority of reasoning tasks loaded the general (capacity) 
and thinking disposition factors. This is consistent with Stanovich and West's (1998) claim 
that cognitive ability and thinking style can predict individual differences in deductive 
reasoning ability. 
As briefly reviewed earlier, Stanovich and West (1998) found that measures of cogniti%*c 
ability and thinking disposition correlated with and predicted performance on a xvide ranue 
of tasks from the deductive and problem-solving literature. These findings lend support to 
the notion that a general capacity resource (Stanovich's cognitive ability) is needed in order 
to perform the deductive tasks used. In addition, one interpretation of the thinking style 
factor supports the notion that an individual's ability to search for counter-examples 
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influences their logical performance (Stanovich's thinking disposition). These 
interpretations will be discussed briefly belmv. 
The general factor in both Experiments 1-3 and 4-6 CFAs could be interpreted as t-Ollows. It 
could be the case that this is not just an executive memory resource, due to the loadings of 
the simple reasoning tasks. Because the simple reasoning tasks only loaded the general 
factor, it might be that this factor represents decontextualisation of the reasoning process. It 
might reflect the participant's general control processes for dealing Nvith different tasks. For 
instance, reasoning task performance relies to some extent on inhibiting responses from the 
pragmatic system in order to produce or evaluate conclusions. Therefore, this factor could 
reflect the attentional system needed to control and switch responses from one system to 
another. However, the span measures also loaded this factor. This is also consistent with 
the notion that this factor is an attentional controller. For instance, the complex verbal span 
requires participants to switch between processing sentences, and remembering words. The 
general factor might be the attentional system that allows this constant switching of 
particular processes. A more direct measure of the capacity of working memory can be seen 
in the loadings on the specific verbal and spatial factors. These factors were most identified 
with the span tasks and the complex reasoning tasks. This could be interpreted as the 
complex reasoning tasks additional reliance on capacity systems able to store and process 
modality dependent information. 
The fourth factor, again, might not be related to capacity, but to the participant's thinking 
style. For instance, the conditional task (for AC and DA) requires the reasoner to resist the 
fallacious arguments and respond Nvith 'no valid conclusion'. This relies on recognising the 
fact that alternatives might exist where the antecedent does not hold, but the consequent 
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does, and this might involve searching for other explanations. The other reasoning tasks 
could all be split into single and multiple model problems. Thus, it might be that they all 
relied on the individual's ability to search for counter-examples. In addition to this. the fact 
that the multiple quantification task, where most of the problems were based on one model 
of the premises, did not load this factor, further substantiates the interpretation of factor 4. 
In this task, participants may not have needed the motivation to search for alternative 
models of the conclusion, and thus were not affected by this fourth factor. 
The results of Experiments 4-6 also have implications for theories of deductive reasoning. 
What is clear throughout this experimental series is the reliance of many of the reasoning 
tasks on spatial resources of working memory. The first class of theory introduced in 
Chapter 2 was loosely labelled as the verbal account of the reasoning process. These 
theories proposed that propositional rule-based or verbal comprehension processes could 
account for variation seen in performance of deductive reasoning tasks (e. g., Rips, 1994; 
Polk & Newell, 1995). The results here do not conform to this picture, showing many 
significant correlations between spatial working memory and the reasoning tasks, as well as 
links to a spatial factor (factor 2). The second class of theory introduced in Chapter 2 
related to spatial accounts of the reasoning process. These theories proposed that 
performance on deductive reasoning problems involves the manipulation of mental models 
(e. g., Johnson-Laird, 1983). The results of Experiments 4-6 are in accordance with this 
view due to the relationships with spatial resources, although the syllogistic reasoning task 
was also positively loaded on the verbal resource. Due to the emergence of a general factor 
in the factor analysis, together with positively associated active/complex capacity measures 
of working memory in the correlational analysis, claims about processing theories of 
reasoning can not be made clearly. However, what can be claimed is that the span 
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measures, presumed to measure the capacity of the executiN e system. did predict individual 
differences in perfonnance on the deductive tasks. 
The heuristic accounts of syllogistic reasoning do not draw on the notion of an exPlicit 
processing system, and would not have predicted this relationship between capacitY and 
reasoning. This was the third class of theory introduced in Chapter I These accounts rel,, 
on the idea of implicit processing, where rules of thumb prevail. For instance, Wetherick 
and Gilhooly (1990) proposed that people endorse conclusions ý. vhose mood is similar to the 
premises. Other noninferential theories, such as Chater and Oaksford's (1999) PI IM, also 
proposed that syllogistic data can be accounted for in terms of heuristic decision processes 
related to the information conveyed by the premises and conclusions. The patterns of- 
results found in all six experiments showed that individual differences in reasoning abilitv 
can be predicted by working memory capacity, as measured by the span tasks. These 
accounts must be able to explain and account for the relationship between explicit 
processing and reasoning ability. 
The findings from Experiments 4-6 correlational analysis and the CFA can be summarised 
as follows. The CFA identified four factors which influenced the ability to reason 
deductively. Factor I and factor 2 were interpreted as requiring executive capacity for 
processing and storing verbal and spatial information, respectively. Factor 3 was interpreted 
as representing a general attentional component, where switching and inhibiting responses, 
as Nvell as a general capacity, were important. The fourth factor that emerged was identified 
as the thinking disposition of the reasoner. Thus, the results showed that individual 
differences in reasoning ability can be predicted by a general attentional resource. plus 
additional verbal and spatial resources of working memor-v, each of ý\hich relies on more 
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than *ust passive storage. In addition to these II i factors. the motivation of the reasoner to 
search for counter-examples was also shown to affect the reasoning process (factor 4). In 
the chapter that follows, the findings from both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 will be considered 
together. The interpretation of the CFAs ,, vill be extended to consider the best -vay to 
account for the four factors. Comparisons will also be made Nvith models from other areas 
of study, such as intelligence and executive function. 
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CHAPTER 5- GENERAL DISCUSSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first aim of this chapter is to summarise all the findings from Experiments 1-6. and the 
interpretations made from these. Chapter 5 is then separated into a further six sections. The 
first of these sections considers models of working memory in light of the experimental 
findings. The second section goes on to examine alternative ways of looking at this data 
through the tradition of intelligence research. Models of intelligence are compared to the 
data from this series of experiments. Considered then is the relation of these experimental 
findings to theories of reasoning, with a particular focus on the interpretation of the fourth 
factor identified in the CFA. A brief section examining the use of indi-vidual differences 
methodology will then be given, looking at both advantages and disadvantages of this 
approach. Future research directions will then be examined before the final concludnio 
comments. 
5.2 SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS 
The first experimental chapter was inspired by the Nvork of Shah and Miyake (1996). From 
their research they concluded that central executive resources of working memory could be 
separated for language based and spatially based processing. Experiments 1-3 examined the 
extent to which different reasoning tasks draw on these distinct systems. The first three 
experiments Nvere additionally designed to look at the role of working memory components 
in sN, Ilo, -, istic and spatial inference tasks. 
To test these claims. a ranue of simple and 
complex verbal and spatial working memory span measures were used, together with 
svIlogistic and five-term series spatial inferences. In contrast to the claims of Shah and 
Miyake (1996). the complex verbal and spatial working memory span measures did not 
show a clear dissociation. Additionally. the simple verbal and spatial span measures did flot 
show total independence. In terms of the reasoning tasks. the clear general finding x\ as that 
individual differences in working memory capacity could account for individual dift'crences 
on them both. 
A CFA three-factor model was identified to best account for the data from all three 
experiments, and the following discussion focuses on the interpretation from this. The three 
working memory resource factors in Experiments 1-3 CFA were labelled as follows. Factor 
was classified as a verbal resource. factor 2 as a spatial resource, and factor 3 as a general 
resource. The CFA identified the simple word span and the complex verbal span with the 
verbal and the general factors. The simple arrow span and the complex spatial spans ý\, ere 
identified with the spatial and the general factors. The reasoning tasks were allowed to load 
all three factors. The interpretation that was most favoured for these findings v,, as in support 
of a unitary view of executive function, where the complex and simple spans load a general 
resource, and additionally load specific verbal and spatial resources. The ýý ord span and the 
verbal span loaded to similar degrees on both the specific verbal and general factors. 
Correspondingly, the arrow span and the complex spatial spans loaded to similar degrees on 
both the spatial and the general factors. Due to the significant loadings of both simple and 
complex span tasks on these factors, it was assumed that all three relied to some degree on 
processing as a requirement, and that these spans were measuring this ability to process and 
store information. The simple word span and complex verbal span might reflect the 
measurement of both processing and storage resources of verbal working memory. One 
possible interpretation, consistent with Baddeley's working memory model. is that the% 
reflect passive storage and active CE involvement. These loadings could be explained by L- 
recourse to partly PL and partly CE resources. The simple arrow and complex TTT and 
letter spans might reflect the measurement of both processing and storage resources of 
spatial working memory. These loadings could be explained by recourse to partl-v VSSP 
and partly CE resources. However, the simple spans could not be specific ineasures ot 
storage requirements, and the complex spans could not be specific measures of process"'(-' 
requirements, due to the loadings explained above. Therefore, the pattern of loadin, -, s 
favour an alternative interpretation, where the verbal and spatial factors reflect more than 
simple storage, suggesting the separation of verbal and spatial information in the CE, as 
well as there being a general component. The general factor, now characterised as domain 
independent, will be discussed later on in terms of a more detailed interpretation. 
The syllogistic inferences, whether verbally or ý'Isually presented, correlated ý, 6th both 
complex verbal and spatial working memory spans. In the C FA, theY were sho, ývn to load 
all three factors, regardless of modality. Given the interpretation presented above, this 
finding demonstrated that syllogistic inference performance depends upon both verbal and 
spatial resources of working memory. Of particular interest, in the context of theoretical 
accounts of syllogistic reasoning performance, there was clear evidence for a role of spatial 
working memory. 
The spatial inferences, whether verbally or visually presented, also correlated with both 
complex verbal and spatial working memory spans. In the CFA, they were shown to load 
the general factor, regardless of modality. This finding demonstrated that spatial reasoning 
performance depends upon a general working memory capacity. There v, -as clear evidence 
fI or a role of general working memory in the five-term series spatial inference task. 
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Better performance on both the syllogistic and spatial inferences was shown N\ hen in the 
visual modality, and on single model problems. The verbally presented reasoniii, -, tasks 
were suggested to rely hea,,, Ily on verbal working memory capacity. By presenting the 
problems visually, the verbal working memory load , N-as reduced, and logical performance 
rates increased. 
The second experimental chapter was inspired by the work of Stanovich and colleagues 
(e. g., Stanovich & West, 1998). From their research they demonstrated that a range of 
reasoning tasks, drawn from both deduction and decision making literatures, cross 
correlated. They also showed that these reasoning tasks vvere predicted by the combined 
influence of cognitive ability and independently with the reasoner's thi IIII inking disposition. In 
Stanovich's terms, cognitive ability equals capacity, and variations in that capacity 
explained logical performance on the reasoning tasks. Experiments 4-6 were primarily 
designed to extend Stanovich's work to a wider range of reasoning tasks, using a more 
direct measure of capacity. 
The reasoning tasks, classified as simple, were the abstract, conditional and three-term 
series spatial inferences. The correlational analysis identified that they were best predicted 
by simple working memory spans. The reasoning tasks, classified as complex, were the 
five-term series spatial and temporal inferences, plus the syllogistic and multiple 
quantification problems. The correlational data suggested that they were best predicted by 
complex working memory spans, especially spatial ones. Two clusters of correlations were 
identified, where the simple reasoning tasks cross correlated, and the complex reasoning 
tasks cross correlated. Therefore, what might underlie perfon-nance on the simple reasoning 
tasks may be different to what underlies performance on the complex reasoning tasks. 
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Consequently, these results only partially support Stanovich's claims. HoNNever. the CFA I 
identified a four-factor model to best account for the results. Additionally. to the three 
factors identified in Experiments 1-3, Experiments 4-6 CFA identified a fourth factor. which 
was classified as a thinking style influence, and this will be interpreted in Section 5.5.1. 
The CFA in Experiments 4-6 was consistent with that seen in Experiment 1 -33, in relation to 
the span measures. The simple and complex verbal and spatial spans showed similar 
loadings to those obtained in the first CFA. Again, these results suggested that the factoi-s 
could represent both general and specific verbal and spatial resources at the leý,, cl of a CE - 
requiring both processing and storage of information, and that the simple and complex spans 
were also measuring these resources. Experiments 4-6 CFA also identified a fourth factor. 
linked to the reasoning tasks, and this was classified as the reasoner's style of thinking. 
The five-term series and temporal problems showed similar correlational patterns, both 
complex and simple verbal and spatial spans were shown to be related to their performance. 
The CFA identified the spatial factor as most important in both these types of reasoning 
process, although some influence could be seen from the general and the thinking style 
factors. The result for the spatial task is different to that seen in Experiments 1-3, where 
they only loaded the general factor. However, they do consistently correlate with the 
complex spatial span tasks throughout the experimental series. The complex spatial and 
temporal tasks were considered to rely upon spatial working memory resources and to be 
affected by the reasoner's thinking disposition. 
The reasoning tasks, classified as simple in Experiments 5 and 6, showed stronger 
correlational relationships NN ith the simple span measures than vvith the complex span 
326 
measures. The reasoning tasks, classified as complex ones. sho, -ved stronger correlational 
relationships with the complex span measures than with the simple span measures. 
However, the CFA identified that five of the seven reasoning tasks loaded the general factor 
and six of the seven reasoning tasks loaded the thinking style factor. These results were 
taken as support for a person's reliance on a domain independent CE of'working mei-nory. 
and that their style of thinking was also a significant predictor of their abilitv to reason. 
Experiments 1-6 findings have strong implications for a number of distinct bodies of 
research within the psychological literature. The results can be applied to the areas of 
working memory, intelligence, and reasoning theory. The follox\ ing three sections discuss 
these areas in turn. In addition, the results from Experiments 1-6 have implications for the 
alternative research methodologies of dual-task versus individual differences work. to bc 
discussed later on in Section 5.6. The next section considers the findings in terms of 
existing models of working memory. 
5.3 MODELS OF WORKING MEMORY 
Overall, the experimental series very clearly demonstrated a role for working memory in 
reasoning. Individual differences in a reasoner's working memory capacity were related to 
individual differences in their reasoning performance. Three capacity resources \ý ere 
identified through CFA (factors 1,2 and 3). The factors were all suggested to rely on 
storage and processing requirements - one for a verbal, one for a spatial. and one for a 
general resource, as measured by the simple and complex span measures. Whilst the -verbal 
and spatial factors were interpreted as specifically dealing ý, vith verbal and spatial 
information, respectively. the general factor was interpreted as handling information from 
both these domains. capable of dealing with information using domain independent 
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representations. The following discussion relates to the explanation that the Leneral 
resource is a domain independent processing resource, .,, -hilst the other tx),, o resources are 
domain specific processing components. 
This thesis has concentrated on differentiating bet-ween a Baddele% (1997) perspective and a 
Shah and Miyake (1996) perspective of working memory. The Baddeley model proposes a 
general CE component with two relatively passive subsystems, the PL and VSSP, which are 
used in higher level cognitive thinking. The Shah and Miyake model suggests a separation 
of CE resources for verbal and spatial information, -which are important in the ability to 
reason. This section aims to systematically compare and contrast these models with other 
existing models from the literature. The question is to what extent are working memory 
models compatible with the findings from this thesis? 
There are at least two models of working memory that can be ruled out. The first is a model 
consistent with a single CE resource of working memory. Kyllonen and Christal (1990) 
suggested that reasoning ability was little more than working memory capacity, and a 
unitary resource of CE working memory could be accepted. They found that working 
memory test scores correlated significantly with higher-order ability scores even when the 
broad domains of these predictor and criterion tests did not match. The results here support 
the idea that working memory is a major factor in determining reasoning performance. 
Working memory capacity consistenfly predicted deductive reasoning performance through 
Experiments I to 6. However, the unitary model can not be reconciled with the data here 
for two reasons. The first is that two clusters of reasoning task were identified in 
Experiments 5 and 6. The simple reasoning tasks mainly correlated xvith each other. and the 
complex i-casoning, tasks mainly correlated with each other. All the i-casoning tasks would 
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ha, ve had to show similar relationships with each other to accept that they draw on one pool 
of general resources. The second reason for a rejection of this unitar,,,, vievv is due to the 
separation of simple and complex verbal and spatial spans across the three factors in the 
CFA. If the single executive perspective v, ýas to be accepted then there should ha-% c been no 
need for additional specific verbal and spatial factors, o,,, er and aboN-c the general resource. 
The second model that can be rejected as incompatible ý, vith the results from Experiments I- 
6 is one based on two separate but independent CEs, one for langua,,,, c based and one for : 71 
spatially based information. Shah and Miyake (1996) found that working memory span 
tasks and higher-order ability tasks correlated more strongly NNhen their domains matched. t-- ý 
They also found a dissociation between language based and spatially based domains, 
indicating the necessity to separate these specific executive functions. The results from 
Experiments 1-6 did not show a clear dissociation between verbal and spatial working 
memory spans. or their relationships with verbally or spatially based deductive tasks. The 
Shah and Miyake (1996) uncorrelated two-factor model was not supported by the data here. 
However, a variant of Shah and Miyake's (1996) model in which the verbal and spatial 
factors were allowed to correlate might be substantiated (Section 3.5). Consequently, ývhen 
Shah and Miyake's (1996) data was re-run as a three-factor model, the results were 
consistent with the addition of a third factor to exPlain the underlying commonality between 
the initial independent factors (the correlation). 
The model that has already been used as a perspective throughout this thesis - the multiple 
component model of working memory (Baddeley, 1993). cannot be rejected. Baddelev's 
model rests on the assumption of a peneral CE with t, ývo slave systerns for verbal (PL) and 
spatial (VSSP) inforniation. The three factors identified in the CFA loaded tasks requiring Z, 
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both the processing and storage of information. Due to the consistent loadin-gs of the simple 
and complex verbal and spatial working memory spans on the three factors. it -%N, as 
concluded that individual differences in reasoning are influenced by domain specific 
components of the CE - verbal, spatial and general. This does not mean a rejection of the 
PL and VSSP components of the Baddeley working memory model. However. a particular 
interpretation of the three factors in terms of the CE, PL and VSSP, can be discounted. 
Consequently, the unitary view of CE function can also be discounted due to the spatial and 
verbal factors being best interpreted, not as passive storage systems, but more as active 
processing systems specifically associated with particular modalities. 
The span measures that were labelled as simple measures in Experiments 1-6 were the word 
and arrow spans. These tasks require storage resources for correct responding, and 
originally this was the only criterion for classification. Due to the findings of the CFAs it 
was acknowledged that they may depend upon some processing component as well, since 
they loaded similarly to the complex span tasks. Participants might develop strategies to 
help them hold the information in mind. For instance, the arrow span could be solved by 
using a clock-face strategy which may have added a processing load to this task. Similarly 
for the word span, it was observed that some participants used the first letter of each word in 
a set as a cue to recalling them later. This, too, could have entailed the addition of a 
processing load to this task. The span measures that were labelled as complex measures in 
Experiments 1-6 were the verbal, TTT and letter spans. These tasks all required the storage 
and processing of information. Therefore, it might be said that, although the word and 
arrow span tasks were simpler (only arrows or words to be remembered), they too required 
processing resources, reflected in their loadings on the factors that were similar to the 
complex span tasks. 
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The best way to account for the three factors identified throughout the CFAs was as a 
general domain independent CE resource, with additional CE resources forverbal and 
spatia in ormation specifically. These resources depend on both processing and storage 
requirements, as measured by the complex and simple spans. The verbal factor vvas 
assumed to be responsible for the capacity to store. manipulate and process verbal 
representations. In contrast, the spatial factor was assumed to be responsible for the 
capacity to store, manipulate and process spatial representations. The general factor was 
assumed to reflect the capacity to process information in a domain independent resource. 
The characteristics of the general factor will be discussed in more detail in the reasoning 
section. Accumulating across the six studies, there is strong evidence to suggest that the 
unitary view, and the Shah and Miyake (1996) perspective, are not compatible with the 
patterns of findings across these data sets. 
The original Baddeley and Hitch (1974) model has more recently been updated, especially 
in relation to the functions of the CE (Baddeley & Logie, 1999). The original model 
assumed that the CE comprised a pool of general-purpose processing capacity that could be 
used to support either control processes or supplementary storage. Baddeley and Logie 
(1999) subsequently abandoned the assumption that the CE itself stores information, 
proposing instead that any increase in total storage capacity beyond that given by a slave 
system is achieved by accessing either long-term memory or other sub-systems. This notion 
could be supported by the CFA carried out on Experiments 1-6. it might be that the general 
factor relates to the CE as a processor, whilst the specific verbal and spatial factors could be 
interpreted as 'other sub-systems' in the context of Baddeley and Logie (1999). 
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A similar account to the one presented here is the one propo, ýed by Engle. Kane and 
Tuholski (1999). They were guided by two questions in their pursuit of the role of 
individual differences in working memory capacity and cognition. The first question was t-n 
what is measured by the complex spans that is also important to high-level cognitive tasks" Z-- 
The second question was what do the results of studies in individual differences in xNorking 
memory capacity tell us about the nature of xvorking memory in general? They proposed 
that individual differences on measures of working memory capacity primarily reflect 
differences in capability for controlled processing and, thus. will be reflected only in 
situations that either encourage or demand controlled attention (e. p., Rosen & Engle, 1997). t7 
They go on to say that the working memory/attention system is probably neither entirely 
unitary nor entirely separable into domain-specific systems, and this is entircly consistent 
with the CFA results found in Experiments 1-6. Rosen and Engle (1997) also suggested 
that working memory/attention may be organised similarly to intelligence (e. (,,, Carroll, 
1993; Kyllonen, 1996, see next section). This is explained as a hierarchical structure with a 
domain-free factor overarching several subordinate domain-specific factors. As in 
intelligence research, a general factor appears to account for too much variance to be 
ignored. However, in some studies (Shah & Miyake, 1996) significant variance Is left to be 
explained beyond that accounted for by a general factor. In the next section these models of 
intelligence will be considered. 
5.4 INTELLIGENCE 
The unitarv versus non-unitary view of working memory has an interesting historical 
parallel in the domain of intelligence. Spearman (1904,1927) factor-analysed the results of 
children's performance on various tests and found that man\, tests were moderatel-y 
positively correlated. concluding that all the tests had something in common (a general 
factor) as well as something specific to each test (a specific factor). Vemon (1947) 
elaborated and extended Spean-nan's model by identifý, ing, a series of group factors (major 
and minor) in between g and s factors. Vernon studied the structure of human cognitive 
abilities through a hierarchical group factor theory. Thirteen tests were gl,., -en to 1000 Army 
recruits. He identified g as accounting for what all the tests are measuring, and the major 
group factors (verbal-education and spatial-mechanical abilities) as what some tests are 
measuring. The minor group factors were identified as what particular tests are measuring 
whenever they are given, while specific factors were identified as what particular tests 
measure on specific occasions. This was suggested to provide evidence that good 
predictions of ability in education, industry or everyday life, can be achieved by g tests 
alone, and that somewhat more ground can be covered by tests of the main group factors. 
More recent models of abilities (e. g., Carroll, 1993) are very much compatible with 
Vernon's hierarchical treatment. 
The hierarchical model of Vernon (1947) can be compared to the findings of the two CFAs 
in this experimental series, when Experiments 1-3 and 4-6 are looked at in combination. A 
general factor was identified in this experimental series onto which II out of 12 of the 
capacity and reasoning measures loaded significantly and positively. This might represent a 
general capacity CE resource, although it could also be interpreted as what all the tasks are 
measuring - identified by Vernon as g, and by Stanovich as cognitive ability. 
Factor I was 
identified as a verbal resource, capable of the maintenance and processing of verbal 
information. This could be compared to Vernon's verbal-education factor, reliant on verbal, 
numerical or educational abilities. Factor 2 was identified as a spatial resource, capable of 
the maintenance and storage of spatial information. This could be compared to Vernon's 
spatial-mechanical factor, reliant on practical, mechanical, spatial and physical abilities. 
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Experiments 1-6 demonstrated that individual differences in working memon- capacity 
could consistently predict individual differences in reasoning performance. Kyllonen and 
Christal (1990) also demonstrated that reasoning is little more than working memory. 
Before this series of experiments, especially from the individual differences perspectixýe. the 
relationship between working memory capacity and syllogistic and spatial inference tasks 
was not well established. Kyllonen and Christal (1990) used working mernorý- capacity 
tests and suggested that the capacity measures themselves load highly on g. Stanovich and 
West (1998) found that measures of general intelligence (cognitive ability) could predict 
reasoning performance. What this thesis did was pull this research together, providing 
evidence that Stanovich's cognitive capacity could be related to working memory capacity. 
The experimental series also clarified the appropriateness of applying Kyllonen's findings to 
those of Stanovich. 
Stanovich's results, and the findings from Experiments 1-6 can be related to the dual 
process theory of reasoning (e. g., Wason & Evans, 1975). This theory proposed that the 
ability to demonstrate logical competence reflects the product of an explicit logical system, 
whereas beliefs implicitly influence this process. Another dual distinction was made 
between two different notions of intelligence. The first is universal and embedded in the 
implicit cognitive system, and has been termed rationality 1. The second involves the 
explicit reasoning system and corresponds to rationality 2. This second type of rationalitv 
involves individual differences in g, whereas the first type of rationality does not. If 
competence, when motivated, is ultimately limited by working memory capacity then this 
links neatly with recent evidence that such capacity is itself highly loaded on g (Kyllonen & 
Christal, 1990). 
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5.5 REASONING THEORY 
Throughout this thesis, reference has been made to the various reasoning theories and ho,, N- 
they might account for the findings here. Three classes of theory were introduced - t-, -, -o 
classes were related to processing accounts, the verbal versus analogical, and the third to 
heuristic accounts of reasoning performance. The findings in Experiments 1-6 can be 
related to these theories. The accounts must be able to explain why individual differences in 
working memory capacity predict individual differences in reasoning ability. The initial 
discussion below looks at patterns of loadings on the three working memory resource 
factors - verbal, spatial and general. The section that follows (Section 5.5.1) looks at the 
fourth factor identified in Experiments 4-6 in relation to the reasoning tasks, with particular 
attention to the work of Stanovich and cognitive thinking styles. 
The first class of reasoning theory loosely fitted into those relying on verbal processes, 
verbal comprehension, or rule-based accounts. The formal inference rule theory proposed 
syntactic conceptions of logic that use proof-theoretic methods, based on deriving valid 
conclusions by means of rules of inference (Rips, 1994). Formal rule theorists maintain that 
the human being has within the mind a set of rules or inferential schemes similar to those of 
logic, upon which answers to the deductive problems are derived. The reasoner's task can 
be broken down into three distinct phases - discovering the abstract form of the premises, 
applying the fonnal rules that lead to a valid inference, and re-translating the conclusion into 
a specific problem-content (Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993). The larger the set of rules 
required in the process of deriving a conclusion, the greater the problem's difficulty. 
The second class of reasoning theory loosely fitted into those relying on analogical models 
to account for the reasoning data. The mental models theory holds that the basic processes 
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of human reasoning competence are based on the construction and manipulation of mental 
models (Johnson-Laird, 1983). The mental model theory approaches reasoning in a clearly 
distinct way. There are three stages of deduction according to the model theory: 
comprehension, description, and validation. Comprehension refers to reasoners applying 
their knowledge to constructing models that represent the state of affairs described in the 
premises. Description refers to the fact that reasoners try to formulate a parsimonious 
conclusion that accounts for the models constructed in the prior stage. Validation refers to 
how they try to falsify their previous conclusion by searching for alternative models or 
counter-examples (see Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). A prime assumption of the mental 
model theory is that given the limited nature of human working memory resources, people 
try to represent explicitly as little information as possible - the more information represented 
explicitly, the greater the load on the working memory. 
Comparisons can be made between the results in this thesis and both the verbal and 
analogical based accounts in relation to the use of an explicit processing system (rationality 
2). All the processing accounts rely on the notion of a mental workspace which people use 
in order to perform mental deduction. Experiments 1-6 showed correlations between the 
working memory capacity tests and the reasoning measures. Thus, the results from the 
experimental series showed that recourse to an explicit system could indeed account for 
variations in performance on a variety of reasoning tasks. Both the verbal and model based 
theories would expect this correlation between capacity and reasoning ability, due to the 
individual's reliance on underlying rules, or the construction of models, respectively. These 
theories, and this experimental series, implicate a role for an explicit processing system in 
reasoning. What is less clear from the results here is whether reasoning performance relied 
upon verbal/propositional based or spatial/analogical based processes. This is due to the 
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lack of dissociation between complex %ýorking memon- capacitv measures, mak-in, -, these 
conclusions difficult or ambiguous. 
I laving said this, however. the clearest results throughout the thesis Nvere in relation to the 
syllogistic inferences. It was found that the syllogisms consistently correlated xvith spatial 
working memory, as defined by the spatial factor. The syllogistic task loaded all three of 
the working memory resource factors and was therefore assumed to rely on both vei-bal and 
spatial processing. The multiple quantification task also involves understanding the 
quantifiers in the two premises. The multiple quantification task also loaded on the spatial 
factor. This finding suggests that deterministic verbal accounts of the reasoning process are L- 
misguided. The results here seem unlikely to be accounted for solely on verbally based 
processes. Perhaps, instead, different people use different strateoies, some using verbal, and tl ZI 
others using spatial heuristics. 
In relation to the spatial inferences, they correlated with both verbal and spatial Nýorkins, 
memory spans, but only positively and significantly loaded the general factor (Experiments 
1-3) and the spatial factor (Experiments 4-6). The spatial inferences also correlated highly 
with the temporal inferences, which is in support of recent research suggesting they are 
solved using similar spatial processing (e. g., Schaeken, Johnson-Laird & d'Ydewalle, 
1996). The strongest predictors of both the spatial and temporal tasks were the spatial 
spans, Nvhich are dependent on the storage and manipulation of spatial information. This 
result again has implications for the verbal based accounts of reasoning. However, these 
implications must be made in light of the cross correlations between the complex capacity 
measures. It seems likely that people use spatial representations in order to solve these 
problems, although this processing might be achieved using a CE component of \\orking 
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memory (spatial and general resources). Thus, these results seem more consistent with an 
account based on spatial mental models, 
Before moving on to the evaluation experiments (5 and 6), a more detailed interpretation 
will be given in relation to the general factor. It was identified as an all purpose capacity 
resource, capable of processing deductive arguments in a domain independent way. In 
relation to the work of Stanovich, the general factor could reflect the abilitN of the 
participants to resist pre-potent responses cued by the pragmati II Itv Seems ic system. This abili - 
to be important to all the reasoning tasks, reflected in the fact that nearly all of them loaded 
this third, general factor. For instance. syllogistic reasoning involves resisting 
conversational inferences. Spatial reasoning involves recognising that relational terms 
describe deterministic, constrained relationships. The general factor might reflect the extent 
to which people can de- contextual i se their reasoning processes. In addition, due to the 
loadings of the span tasks on this factor, it might lend support to the idea that it is more of- 
an attentional controller, than a pure memory resource. The general factor might allow the 
switching of processes from one component of a task to another - the larger this resource, 
the more capacity is available in order to control these processes. 
The discussion now turns to the tasks used in Experiments 5 and 6, the evaluation 
experiments. The three-term series spatial task loaded the spatial and general resources 
significantly. This links neatly with the result found for the five-term series spatial task. It 
seems that, for all types of spatial reasoning task examined in this thesis, spatial and general 
working memory resources are implicated over and above verbal resources. Thus, an 
interpretation might be that logical performance on the spatially based reasoning tasks relied 
to some extent on the manipulation of spatial mental models. 
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The only reasoning tasks not to load on the specific factors, verbal and spatial. were the 
abstract and conditional tasks. These tasks only significantly loaded the general "vorking w -- 
memory resource factor. Both these tasks rely on the manipulation of propositions, as 
opposed to the spatial and quantified tasks outlined above. Taking the , -Iex,, - that the general 
factor reflects the participant's ability to de-contextualise their reasoning processes, this 
finding is very interesting. It could be that the propositional based tasks do not load the 
verbal and spatial factors because the memory load involved in them is quite small 
(classified as simple tasks). The reason for their loading on the general factor might be 
because accurate performance entails resisting pragmatic inferences. For instance, for the 
conditional task, recognising that 'if p then q' does not imply 'if q then p' entails resisting 
conversationally invited inferences (e. g., Geis & Zwicky, 1971). Therefore, the only 
consistent finding for the propositional tasks is that they rely on a general executive 
resource, at the level of the CE, and, consequently, differentiation between verbal and 
analogical accounts of the reasoning process is difficult. 
Now that the processing accounts have been examined, this discussion turns to the third 
class of reasoning theory, the heuristic accounts. Noninferential accounts include the 
atmosphere theory of syllogistic reasoning which proposes that reasoners select conclusions 
on the basis of the mood of the premises (Woodworth & Sells, 1935), or the matching 
hypothesis (Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990), which suggests that responses are elicited which 
match the quantified form of one of the premises. A more recent version of these 
noninferential accounts is grounded in information theory, and proposes that reasoners 
select conclusions that match the least informative syllogistic premise (Chater & Oaksford, 
1999). These heuristic accounts assign a very limited role for explicit inferential processing 
in syllogistic reasoning. 
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Taking the Chater and Oaksford (1999) theory a little further, they base their heuristics on 
probability. They associate these heuristics with an implicit processing system. Therefore. 
there might be no reason to expect that measures of an explicit system (xvorking memory 
capacity) predict logical performance on the task. They suggest that people do not generate 
proofs, or construct mental models, instead they rely on rules of thumb, and 95% of their 
data was predicted by these simple heuristics. Experiments 1-6 showed that efficiency in 
the explicit system, as measured by the working memory capacity tasks, could predict 
performance. This finding could not be explained if simple heuristics were the dominant 
processes involved in performing deductive reasoning tasks. 
As briefly mentioned in the intelligence section, Evans and Over (1996) have explored the 
notion of two types of rationality. These rationality types have been linked to two specific 
processing systems. Rationality I refers to reasoning in such a way as to achieve one's 
goals, and requires implicit processing. Rationality 2 refers to reasoning by a process of 
logic, and requires explicit processing. It seems that the heuristic accounts rely on the 
notion of rationality 1. Experiments 1-6 demonstrated that logical competence could be 
reflected as a product of an explicit system, that rests on the assumptions of rationality 2. It 
seems that the heuristic theories propose a single process account, and explain performance 
with recourse to implicit processes. What the heuristic accounts fail to explain is that 
measures of the capacity of the explicit system are able to predict logical reasoning 
performance. These accounts explain variation in logical reasoning performance by 
recourse to a goal directed mechanism, or implicit processing. This thesis has been able to 
demonstrate that capacity measures, which reflect the efficiency of the explicit system, 
predict reasoning performance. The heuristic accounts are therefore challenged to explain 
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why deductive reasoning performance can be explained in FCfeFence to the capacity of 
explicit processing systems. 
5.5.1 A Fourth Factor? 
This discussion so far has concentrated on three of the factors identified in Experiments 1-6 
CFAs, that related to the capacity resources of working memory. Experiment 4-6 CFA 
additionally uncovered another factorwhich systematically predicted perforinance on the 
range of reasoning tasks used. This fourth factor that emerged was interpreted similarly to 
the predictor identified by Stanovich and West (1998) as a thinking style influence. 
Thinking style can be related to Johnson-Laird and Byrne's (1993) notion that people are 
programmed to accept inferences as valid provided that they have constructed no mental 
model of the premises that contradict the inference. Inferences are categorised as false when 
a mental model is discovered that is contradictory, hov, -ever, the search for these models is 
not governed by any systematic or comprehensive principles. Consequently, it might be 
that related cognitive dispositions may in fact be reflecting this kind of process. Stanovich 
and West (1998) suggested that individual differences in the extensiveness of the search for 
contradictory models could arise from a variety of cognitive factors such as cogniti%, c 
confidence, reflectivity, need for cognition, ideational generativity, dispositions toward 
confirmation bias and premature closure. 
The fourth factor identified in Experiments 4-6 CFA might reflect similar processes to the 
thinking dispositions identified by Stanovich and West (1998). They found a combined 
influence of cognitive ability and thinking disposition affected the deductive process. The 
CFA was most compatible , vith the data sets only when this extra factor loaded the 
d deductive tasks. Therefore, it might be that something. independent of capacity, accounterl 
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for an individual's reasoning performance. This factor did not emerge in the first CFA 
carried out on Experiments 1-3. The reason for this could have been the limited number of 
deductive tasks used in this experimental series. When additional deductive tasks -were 
introduced in Experiments 4-6, this fourth factor was important in accounting for I 
performance on the tasks. Thus, there mav be individual differences in cognitive style. in 
addition to limitations in cognitive capacity, that influence the way the individual reasons. 
A possibility could be that the production of alternatives correlates with reasoning 
performance, and those individuals with higher intellectual ability will presumably have 
more capacity to generate alternati II Additionally. cognitive styles determines the extent 
to which the reasoner is motivated to search for these alternatives. All the reasonin'-, tasks. I 
bar one, included multiple model problems. For instance, conditional reasoning requires 
recognising that alternative antecedents are possible. The only task that consisted of mainly 
one model problems was the multiple quantification task, which, interestingly did not load 
the fourth factor significantly. This lends support to the notion that this factor entails 
searching for alternatives. 
5.6 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The method of choice throughout this thesis has been the individual differences approach. 
The individual differences methodology essentially aims to discover which test items 
correlate with one another and which do not and then to identiýy the resulting correlation 
clusters (or factors). The use of CFA is based on correlation, and attempts to reduce a large 
amount of data to a much smaller amount. This method allowed the identification of a 
number of factors (four) in this series of experiments that could account for the resources 
required to perforrn deductive reasoning tasks. The use of this approach through 
Experiments I to 6 led to the clear demonstration of a role of vvorkin., memory in reýisoning. 9- 
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In contrast, the experimental approach (dual task work) has not provided as clear a mes-saLe 
about the role of CE function in reasoning. 
Despite the clear results foundv, 'hen using this method, there are limitations to the 
individual differences approach. One of its major limitations is its inability to deal readily 
with individual variation in the waýý different abilities are used in the performance of tasks. 
The usual assumption in this regard is that the abilities required f'Or a task are the same for 
all individuals in a sample. However, in general. the limitations are not as serious as they 
are often thought to be. Many of the difficulties , vith the individual differences approach 
have come about because of the inappropriate design and selection of the tests, improper 
design of factor-analytic studies, unwisely chosen methods of computational analý sis, and 
unfortunate interpretations of results (Carroll, 1978a). Frequently. re-analysis of data 1'rom 
different studies can lead to much more convergence and agreement in the findings than has 
appeared previously. Different factorial models of mental abilities can be translated into 
each other, and a reasonable choice among models and methods can be made by the 
application of a number of rules of parsimony. Multiple group CFAs entail pooling of data 
across a series of studies, as seen in Experiments 1 -33 and 4-6, which supports the notion of 
converging results together. Very similar results v, -ere found across the Mo experimental 
chapters, which further justifies the use of this methodology. 
Other problems with this methodology also need to be ac kno, ývl edged. For instance. a ran(-Yc 
of tasks were used in this experimental series, all of which were carried out by every 
participant. This was a major constraint concerning this methodology. both in time and 
expense. The sample sizes were small in Experiments 1-6 (n = 45-5 1 1) and 
the results need 
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to be examined in light of this. A replication of these experiments using larger sample 
numbers would strengthen the findings here. 
In contrast there are three basic assumptions behind the experimentalist approach. Firstly, it 
allows replicability, secondly it allows us to make statements about cause and effect. and 
thirdly it permits a considerable degree of control . N-hich helps to make it the most objective 
method. Most scientific theories are intended to apply to all cases of a similar kind, and 
hence results try to reflect the theory rather than the particular sample of participants used 
(general 1 sabi lity). This can be applied to the dual task work discussed previously wliere it 
was found that the CE component is implicated in the reasoning process. Hoxvever, despite 
the general agreement that dual tasking involves executivc processes, there is still no clear 
consensus on what abilities or specific executi-ve functions are implicated in dual task 
performance (e. g., Shah & Miyake, 1999). The results from dual tasking can be generallsed 
to the population in question, but they cannot account for individual variation on the 
measures used. Most of the recent literature indicates that individual differences studies 
have been supplemented by experimental analyses. but that the reverse of this is not true. 
The experimental method is able to demonstrate causal relationships, as opposed to the 
individual differences approach, which relies on correlational relationships. The results 
from this experimental series showed that participants with a lower working memory 
capacity performed less well on the reasoning tasks than participants with a larger capacity. 
Hoxvever, it must be acknowledged that a causal interpretation was made of this result v, -hen 
other interpretations could have been made. Therefore, it makes sense to converue the dual 
task work with the individual differences xvork, although the individual differences method 
itself adds something to the total picture. Understanding the origins of Individual 
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differences in its ov, -n right is important in the understanding of kvhy some people reason 
better than others. 
5.7 FUTURE DIRECTION'S 
Much discussion has centred around the definition of factor 'I (general resource) and factor 4 
(thinking style) from the CFA. Factor '3 was assumed to represent a general attentional 
resource, rather than a pure memory resource, capable of switching and inhibiting 
responses, with ftirther processing components for verbal and spatial information (factor I 
and factor 2). The general resource was proposed to be responsible for the processino of 
both verbal and spatial based tasks, reasoning and memory spans alike, using domam 
independent representations. In relation to the reasoning tasks, the results have pointed to 
the general factor as a reflection of the reasoner's ability to resist pre-potent responses, and 
to de-contextualise their reasoning processes. In relation to the rnemorý span tasks. the 
results have pointed to the general factor as a reflection of the participant's ability to switch 
between the storage and processing components of the task. Thus. it does seem likely that 
this factor is a controlled processing factor. It was compared to the cognitive ability factor 
of Stanovich and West (1998), who proposed that measures of this factor reflected 
decontextualisation, and consequently it was also linked to intelligence. In contrast, the 
fourth factor has been identified as a reflection of the reasoner's motivation to search for 
counter-examples, being indicative of their particular thinking disposition. This section 
outlines possible future research directions that may further shed light on the characteristics 
of these factors. 
Thus, the factor identified as a general resource in Experiments 1-6 mightv, -ell represent an 
element ofexecutive function (controlled processimi). with two additional distinct factors 
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related to verbal and spatial processing. The important question concerns the function of 
this general factor. Many executive functions have been examined in the literature and are 
implicated in relation to these findings. 
The pattern of data throughout this thesis supports the notion of a general CE processor. 
with two further domain-specific CE components for verbal and spatial information. The 
CFA findings are consistent with the notion that both storage and processing functions are 
carried out in the specific resources, whilst the general resource entails controlled attention. 
Baddeley and Logie (1999) argue that their current conceptualisation of working memory 
no longer attributes any storage capabilities to the CE. Engle, Kane and Tuholski (1999) 
make the same argument by proposing that working memory is STM (maintenance) plus 
'controlled attention' (executive control). In contrast, according to Lovett, Reder and 
Lebiere (1999), the maintenance of working memory elements (such as goals) is essential 
for appropriate control and regulation of cognitive behaviour to arise. Therefore, one 
important research question is to evaluate the degree to which the maintenance t'Linction and 
the executive control functions of working memory are separable. 
Another unresolved issue concerns a precise specification of different executive control 
functions and their interrelationships. For instance, Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki 
and Howerter (in press) investigated the role of executi,,, e function in complex frontal lobe 
tasks. They were interested in specifying what the general-purpose control mechanisms are 
that modulate the operation of various cognitive subprocesses and thereby regulate the 
dynamics of human cognition. They focused on three executive functions - shifting of 
mental sets. monitoring and updating of vvorking memory representations, and inhibition of 
prepotent responses. The aim was to examine how separable these functions ý, \ere and hox\ 
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they contributed to executive tasks, such as the WCST and the TOH. The CFA indicated 
that the three target executive functions are clearly distinguishable. but are related 
constructs. 
The findings from Experiments 1-6 can be related to this executive ftinction model. This 
more recent work has separated out different semi-independent explicit processing, 
components. It could be that the working memory capacity tasks would have loaded the 
monitoring and updating of working memory representations factor. It might also be the 
case that a combination of these executive functions play a role in reasoning (inhibition and 
switching), where the factors predict different aspects of the reasoning process. Therefore, 
an interesting ftiture research direction might be to examine the relationship between simple 
measures of executive function and a range of reasoning tasks. 
From Experiments 4-6 CFA a fourth factor emerged which accounted for some of the 
variance seen in performing the reasoning tasks. No direct measure of this fourth factor was 
used in this experimental series, it emerged due to the covariances between the reasoning 
tasks. Other research has investigated ways of measuring this thinking style or thinking 
disposition. As already mentioned, Stanovich and West (1998) identified a thinking style 
influence by measuring individual's performance on a composite test of questionnaires. A 
recent study by Torrens, Thompson and Cramer (1999) examined the ability to search for 
alternatives in the syllogistic task. Participants were asked to draw as many diagrams as 
possible to represent the premises of two quantified syllogisms. This was taken as their 
alternatives generation score. Participants who produced more alternative representations 
were more likely to give logically correct answers and less likely to respond on the basis of 
belief Furthermore, a range of other measures, including need for cognition, open- 
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mindedness and intelligence all failed to ser-ve as predictors. Alternative generation -%vas the 
only measure that served to predict belie% ability effects. In future work. it ml-, -, ht be fruitful 
to examine these relationships in more detail. 
Another measure, shown to be a usable and useful instrument for the assessment of an 
individual's thinking style, is the REI - the Rational Experiential Inventory (Epstein. Pacmi, 
Denes-Raj & Heier, 1996). They suggest that the rational system operates at the conscious 
level, whilst the experiential system operates at an automatic or preconcious Ie\ el. In any 
situation, behaviour is cletennined jointly by the two systems. lndi-ý, -idual differences are 
assumed to exist in the extent to which people rely on each system, xvith some people being 
more inclined to rational approaches, others to experiential. Handley, Newstead and WriAt 
(2000) found that the REI did not correlate with other measures of thinking, such as 
intelligence scales. This might suggest that the REI measures are independent of cognitiVe 
ability in the same way that the thinking disposition identified by Stanovich and West 
(1998) was needed in addition to cognitive ability. 
The work carried out in this thesis could be further investigated by using direct measures of 
the fourth factor that emerged in the CFA. Direct measures of working memory capacity 
identified three independent limited resources in relation to reasoning task performance. 
The fourth factor emerged due to the range of reasoning tasks used and was found to be 
independent of the three capacity resources. From the discussion above it can be seen that 
many tasks have been developed in order to measure how an individual's cognitive st\*Ie 
influences the deductive process. These tasks could be used together with measures of 
capacity and reasoning in order to better identify the need for this fourth factor. These tasks 
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would also be able to specify exactly what this fourth factor represents and hoNv this relates 
itY and individual differ to cognitive ability/capacl I ences in the reasoning process. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, individual differences in working memory capacity predicted individual 
differences in logical reasoning performance. These predictions covered mariv different 
reasoning tasks, classified as propositional, quantifiable. and simple and complex spatial. 
The working memory resources were represented by three factors. These Nvere identified as 
a combination of active processing and passive storage resources for vei-bal. and spatial 
information, together with a general factor entailing controlled processing. The reasoning 
tasks consistently loaded the general factor, but also showed relationships xvith both the 
verbal and spatial factors. It was concluded that complex deductive reasoning tasks rely on 
centrally controlled working memory components, consisting of general processing, plus 
verbal and spatial capacities. 
A three-factor model of executive function best accounted for the working memory capacity 
tasks. The general factor can be comPared to Stanovich and West's (1998) cognitive ability 
influence. These ability and capacity measures predicted logical reasoning performance 
similarly, perhaps reflecting a commonality between the two. This commonality might be 
what is referred to as g, thus showing links between cognitive capacity. cognitive ability and 
general intelligence. The role that this general factor played in the reasoning process Nvas 
seen as reflecting the capacity the reasoner has for de-contextual i sing their reasoning 
processes. The role this general factor played in the memory process was seen as reflecting 
the capacity the participant has for switching between the storage and processim-, elements 
of the task. Taken together, the results for the reasoning and span tasks, sug-gest that the 
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general factor is a controlled processor. This thesis also highlighted the need for additional 
executive functions, over and above the general resource. These domain-specific 
components, as represented by factor I and factor 2 in the CFA. ý, vere obligatory elements in 
relation to the reasoning tasks used. Thus, in conclusion, a non-unitany vie-w of CE 
resources can be supported, but in a way as yet not seen in the literature. These results are 
inconsistent with either a domain-specific or domain-general explanation of working 
memory executive resources, requiring both these notions in order to account for the data. 
The pattern of data supported a model where verbal and spatial capacities (Shah & Miyake, 
1996) plus general processing resources (Turner & Engle, 1989) of executive function xvere 
needed in order to account for the findings. Future research, using a range of executive 
function tasks, might enable a better understanding of the general factor identified In this 
thesis. 
A fourth factor was also identified in the CFA. This was interpreted as representing a 
thinking style or disposition of the reasoner. This was also found in the work of Stanovich 
and colleagues and was most relative to the notion that the reasoner must search for 
alternative conclusions that might refute initial ones in order for correct responding. Many 
ways have now been developed to measure thinking disposition directly. One goal of ftiture 
research might be to examine the relationship between capacity and thinking style by using 
direct measures of both these elements. 
The three classes of reasoning theory must also account for the patterns of data found here. 
This data highlighted that working memory capacity consistently predicts logical reasoning 
task performance. The heuristic accounts of reasoning do not rely on the notion of an 
explicit system, reasoners are suggested to use simple strategies in order to solve these 
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tasks. If an account of reasoning based on simple heuristics is to be accepted. then the result 
that measures of an explicit system predict performance must be integrated with this. Due 
to the lack of dissociation between the complex verbal and spatial working memon- spans. 
these results are difficult to interpret in light of the processing theories of reasoning - rules 
or models for instance. However, especially for the syllogistic task, links were fouild with I- 
the spatial working memory spans and factor 2 (the spatial factor) -, N-hich suggested the need 
for spatial resources. The processing accounts, especially the verbal ones, must be able to 
explain why this relationship exists. 
Having demonstrated the usefulness of using span measures, assumed to reflect the capacity 
of the explicit working memory system, to predict deductive reasoning task performance, 
the obvious way forward is to extend this research to further distinguish the role of wot-king 
memory in reasoning. For instance, future research is required to Investigate more fully the 
notion that the general factor reflects controlled processing, whilst the specific verbal and 
spatial factors store, process and manipulate verbal and spatial information, respectively. In 
addition, future research is required to directly measure the processes underlying the fourth 
factor, using specific thinking style tasks. Finally, more research is needed to distinguish 
between theories of reasoning. Due to the reasoning tasks correlations with both verbal and 
spatial working memory tasks, an idea might be to draw on the notion of strategies in the 
reasoning process, and to integrate this as part of the experimental design. 
351 
REFERENCES 
Ackerman, P. L. (1988). Determinants of individual differences during skill acquisition: 
Cognitive abilities and inforrnation processing. Journal q Experimental Psychology )f 
General 117,288-318. 
Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human memory .4 proposed system and its 
control processes. In K. W. Spence (Ed. ), The psychology of learning and motivation: 
advances in research and theory (Vol. 2), pp. 89-195. New York: Academic Press. 
Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1971). The control of short-term memory. Scientific 
American 225,82-90. 
Baddeley, A. D. (I 966a). Short-term memory for word sequences as a function of acoustic, 
semantic and formal similarity. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 18,362- 
365. 
Baddeley, A. D. (I 966b). The influence of acoustic and semantic similarity on long-term 
memory for word sequences. Quarterly Journal ofExperimental Psychology 18,302-309. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1966c). The capacity for generating information by randomization. 
Quarterly Journal ofExperimental Psychology 18,119-129. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1979). Working memory and reading. In P. A. Kolers, M. E. Wrolstad 
and H. Bouma (Eds. ), Processing of visible language, pp. 305-370. New York: Plenum 
Publishing Corporation. 
352 
Baddeley. A. D. (1981). The cognitive psychology of e%-er-, -da-, - life. Briti. 47Journalqf 
Psychology 72,257-269. 
Baddeley, A. D. 0 983). Working memory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London B3 02,3 11 -' ) 24. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memor. v. Ne,, v York: Oxford Universitv Press. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1990). Human memory. Hove: Lawrence ErlbaurnAssociates Ltd. 
Baddeley, A. D. (I 993b). Workingl? I ell 701-. 1, or working attention" In A. D. Baddeley and 
L. Weiskrantz (Eds. ), Attention: Selection, awareness, and control: ,ý tribute to Donald 
Broadbent. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Baddeley, A. D. (I 993b). Working memor-v and conscious aivareness. In A. Collins, S. E. 
Gathercole, M. A. Conway and P. E. Morris (Eds. ), Theories of memory (pp. 11-28). Hove., 
UK: Erlbaum. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1996). Exploring the central executive. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 49A(I), 5-28. 
Baddeleýl, A. D. (1997). Human memory: Theory andpractice. Revised Edition. Hove: 
Psvchology Press. 
-I - - 
Baddeley. A. D., Eldridge, M., Le%ýis. V. & Thomson, N. (1984). Attention and retrIeval 
from long-term memory. Journal o Experimental Psycholoýý-: General 113.5 18-:, 4(). ýf 
Baddeley, A. D., Grant, W., Wight, E. & Thomson, N. (197-5). linagery and visual working 
memory. In P. M. A. Rabbitt and S. Dornic (Eds. ). Attention and performance V. pp. 
217. London: Academic Press. 
Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memorY. In G. H. Bower (Ed. ). The 
psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 8). New York: Academic Press. 
Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1977). RecencY re-examined. In S. Dornic (Ed. ). Attention 
and performance VI, pp. 647-667. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Baddeley, A. D. & Levy, B. A. (1971). Semantic coding and short-term memory. Journal 
(? f Experimental Psychology 89.132-136. 
Baddeley, A. D. & Lieberman, K. (1980). Spatial working metnory. In R. Nickerson (Ed. ). 
Attention and performance VIII, pp. 521-539. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Baddeley, A. D., Lewis, V. & Vallar, G. (1984). Exploring the articulatory loop. The 
Quarterly Journal qfExperimental Psychology 36A. 233-252. 
Baddeley. A. D. & Logie, R. H. (1999). Working memory: The multiple-component model. 
In A. Nfiyakc and P. Shah (Eds. ). Models of working memory: Mechanisms of active 
maintenance and executive control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
'54 
Baddeley. A. D., Thomson, N. & Buchanan. M. (1975). Word length and the structure of 
short-term memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and 1erbal Behaviour 14,575-589. 
Baddeley, A. D. & Warrington, E. K. (1970). Amnesia and the distinction betweeii Ion, -- 
and short-term memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and 1erbal Behaviour 1-1.575-589. 
Baguley, T. & Payne, S. J. (1998). Given-new i, ersits new-given? An analy, sis of reading 
timesfor spatial descriptions. Mind III Conference. August 1998, Dublin. 
Barclay, J. R. (1973). The role of comprehension in remembering sentences. Cognitive 
Psychology 4,229,254. 
Baron, J. (1985). Rationallij, and intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baron, J. (1988). Thinking and deciding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Basso, A., Spinnler, H., Vallar, G. & Zanoblo, E. (1982). Left hemisphere damage and 
selective impairment of auditory verbal short-term memory: A case study. 
Neuropsychologica 20,263-274. 
Begg, 1. & Denny, J. P. (1969). Empirical reconciliation of atmosphere and conversion 
interpretations of syllogistic reasoning errors. Journal of Experimental Psy, choloKv8l. 35 1- 
)54. 
Begg, 1. & Harris. G. (1982). On the interpretation of syllogisms. Journal of Terbal 
Learning and 1"erbal Behaviour 21.595-620. 
Bourke, P. A. (1997). Measuring attentional demand in continuous dual-task performance. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 50A (4), 82' 1 -840. 
Braine, M. D. S. (1978). On the relation between natural logic of reasoning and standard 
logic. Psychological Review 85,1-2 1. 
Braine, M. D. S. & O'Brien, D. P. (Eds. ) (1998). Mental logic. NJ, USA: LEA. 
Braine, M. D. S., Reiser, B. J. & Rumain, B. (1984). Some empirical justification for a 
theory of natural propositional logic. The Psychology ofLearning and. Mlivalion IS, 311- 
367. 
Brown, J. (1958). Some tests of the decay theory of immediate memorv. Ouarierl. v Journal 
of Experimental Psychology 10.12-2 1. 
Brown, J. I., Bennett, J. M. & Hanna, G. (198 1). The Nelson-Denny reading test. Chicago, 
IL: The Riverside Publishing Company. 
Byrne, R. M. J. & Handley, S. J. (1997). Reasoning strategies for suppositional deductions. 
Cognition 02,1-49. 
, 56 
Byrne, R. M. J. & Johnson-Laird. P. N. (1989). Spatial reasoning. Journal O. Vemot-v & 
Language 28,564-575. 
Carpenter. P. A. & Just. M. A. (1975). Sentence comprehension: A psycholinguistic model 
of verification. Psychological Rei, ieii, 82,45-733. 
Carpenter, P. A., Just, M. A. & Shell. P. (1990). What one intelligence test meaStires: A 
theoretical account of the processing in the Raven Progressive Matrices test. Psj v 17 o logical 
Review 97,404-43 1. 
Carroll, J. B. (1978a). How shall we study individual differences in comitive abilitics" 
Methodological and theoretical perspectives. Intelligence, -1,87-115. 
Carroll, J. B. (1989). Factor unalYsis since Spearman: Whcrc do we sland? What do we 
know. " In R. Kanfer. P. L. Ackerman & R. Cudeck (Eds. ). Learning and individual 
differences: Abilities. motivation, and methodology. Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum- 
Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities. - .4 survey offactor-analytic studies. NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Case, R. D., Kurland, D. M. & Goldberg, J. (1982). Operational efficiency and the growth 
of short-term memory span. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 33,3 86-404. 
Chapman, L. J. & Chapman, J. P. (1959). Atmosphere effect re-examined. Jow-wil 
Experimental Psyc. holoQ, 5N. 220-2226. 
, 57 
Chater, N. &Oaksford. M. (1999). The probability heuristics model of s%lloý, Istic 
reasoning. Cognitive Psychology 38,191-258. 
Clark, H. H. (1969a). Linguistic processes in deductive reasoninga. Psychological Review 
76,387-404. 
Cohen, M. R. & Nagel, E. (1934). An introduction to logic and the scientific method. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace& Co. 
Colle, H. A. & Welsh, A. (1976). Acoustic masking in primary memory. Journal of I'crbal 
Learning and Verbal Behaviour 15,17-32. 
Conrad, R. (1964). Acoustic confusion in immediate memory. British Journal oj' 
Psychology 55,75-84. 
Conrad, R. & Hull, A. J. (1964). Information, acoustic confusion and memory span. British 
Journal of PsYchology 55,429-432. 
Daneman, M. & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individual differences in working memory and 
reading. Journal of Ferbal Learning and Ferbal Behaviour 19,450-466. 
Daneman, M. & Carpenter, P. A. (1983). Individual differences in integrating information 
betv, -een and within sentences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Alemory. 
and Cognition 9(4). 5 61-5 84. 
') 58 
Daneman, M. &Tardif, M. (1987). Working metnor. v and reading skill re-examined. InNI. 
Coltheart (Ed. ). Attention and Performance XII: The Psychology of Reading (pp. 491-508). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
De Renzi, E. (1982). Memory disorders following focal cortical damage. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society ofLondon B 298,73-833. 
De Renzi, E. & Spinnler, H. (1967). Impaired performance on colour tasks in patients with 
hemispheric damage. Cortex 3.194-216. 
De Soto, C. B., London, M. & Handel, S. (1965). Social reasoning and spatial paralogic. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2.513-521. 
Deary, 1. J. & Stough, C. (1996). Intelligence and inspection time. American PsYchologist 
51,599-608. 
Dickstein, L. S. (1978). The effect of figure on syllogistic reasoning. Afetnor_v and 
Cognition 6,76-83. 
Dillon, W. R., Kumar, A. & Mulam, N. (1987). Offending estimates in covariance structure 
analysis: Comments on the causes of and solutions to Heywood cases. Psychological 
Bulletin JOI(I), 126-135. 
Dunn, G., Evcritt. B. & Pickles, A. (1993). Modelling covariances and latent variables 
usingy EQS. London: Chapman& Hall. 
1ý9 
Egan, D. E. & Grimes-Farrow, D. D. (1982). Differences in mental reprcscritations 
spontaneously adopted for reasoning. Afemotýv and Cognition 10(4), 297-307. 
Ehrlich, K. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). Spatial descriptions and reterential continuity. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and [erbal Behaviour 21,2-96-306. 
Engle, R. W., Cantor, J. & Carullo, J. J. (1992). Individual differences in working memory 
and comprehension: A test of four hypotheses. Journal ol Experimental PsYcholoýý. - 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition 18,972-992. 
Engle, R. W., Kane, M. J. & Tuholski, S. W. (1999). Working incinory and controlled 
attention. In A. Miyake and P. Shah (Eds. ). Models of working memory: Mechanisms of 
active maintenance and executive control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V. & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in 
intuitive-experiential and anal yti c al -rational thinking styles. Journal of PersonalitY and 
Social Psychology 71,390-405. 
Erikson, J. R. (1974). A set analysis theory of behaviour informal syllogistic reasoning 
tasks. In R. L. Solso (Ed. ), Theories of cognitive psychology: The Loyola Symposium. 
Hillsdale, NJ: LEA Inc. 
Erikson, J. R. (1978). Research on sYllogistic reasoning. In R. Revlin & R. E. N la-ver 
(Fds. ), Human Reasoning. Washington, DC: Winston. 
360 
Evans, F. J. (1978). Monitoring attention deployment by random number (-, ciieration: An 
index to measure subjective randomness. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 12.335--18. 
Evans, J. St. B. T., Barston, J. L. & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and 
belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memorj! and Cognition 11,295-306. 
Evans. J. St. B. T. & Brooks, P. G. (1981). Competing xvith reasoning: A test of the 
working memory hypothesis. Current Psj, chological Research 1.139-147. 
Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley. S., Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Harper, C. (1999). Reasoning about 
necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction. Journal 
ExperimentalPsychology. - Learning, AfemorY and Cognition 25(6), 1495-15133. 
Evans, J. St. B. T., Newstead, S. E. & Byrne, R. M. J. (1993). Human Reasoning. East 
Sussex: LEA Ltd. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. & Over, D. E. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Hove. UK: 
Psychology Press. 
Eysenck, M. W. (1986). Working memory. In G. Cohen, M. W. Eysenck & M. A. Le Voi 
(Eds. ), Memory: A cognitive approach. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Farmer, E. W., Berman, J. V. F. & Fletcher, Y. L. (1986). Evidence for a visio-spatial 
scratch-pad in working memory. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 3N. A. 
675-688. 
361 
Ferreira F. & Clifton, C. (1986). The independence of syntactic processing. Journal of 
Memory and Language 25,348-368. 
Fisher, D. L. (198 1). A three-factor model of syllogistic reasoning: The study of isolable 
stages. Memory and Cognition 9.496-514. 
Ford, M. (1994). Two modes of mental representation and problem solution in syllogistic 
reasoning. Cognition 54,1-7 1. 
Frase, L. T. (1968). Effects of semantic incompatibility upon deductive reasoning. 
Psychonomic Science 12,64. 
Galotti, K. M., Baron, J. & Sabini, J. P. (1986). Individual differences in syllogistic 
reasoning: Deduction rules or mental models? Journal of Experimental Psycholoqv. - 
General 115(l), 16-25. 
Geis, M. C. & Zwicky, A. M. (1971). On invited inferences. Linguistic Inquiry, 2.561-566. 
Gigerenzer, G. & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of 
bounded rationality. Psychological Review 103,650-669. 
Gilhooly, K. J. (1998). Working memory, strategies, and reasoning tasks. In R. H. Logie 
and K. J. Gilhooly (Eds. ), Working memory and thinking, pp. 7-22. East Sussex: 
Psycholol.,, y Press. 
362 
Gilhooly, K. J. & Logie, R. H. (Eds. ) (1998). Thinking in working memory. In Working 
memory and thinking, pp. 1-7. East Sussex: Ps-,, 'chology Press. I 
Gilhooly, K. J., Logie. R. H. & 'A"Vnn, V. (1999). Syllogistic reasoning tasks, working 
memory and skill. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 1](4). 47'1-498. 
Gilhooly, K. J., Logle, R. H., Wetherick, N. E. & W,, nn, V. (199-3)). Working memory and 
strategies in syllogistic-reasoning tasks. Journal of Meinor. v and Cognition 21(h I 15-124. 
Glanzer, M. & Cunitz, A. R. (1966). Two storage mechanisms in free recall. Journal ol 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour 5,351-360. 
Guyer, B. L. & Friedman, M. P. (1975). Hemispheric processing and cognitive stý-Ics in 
learning-disabled and normal children. Child Development 46,658-668. 
Guyote, M. J. & Sternberg, R. J. (1981). A transitive chain theory of syllogistic reasoning. 
Cognitive Psychology 13,461-525. 
f lagert, G. (1983). Unpublished manuscript, Uppsala Programming Methodologý and 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. Uppsala University. 
Flagert, G. (1984). Modeling mental models: Experiments in cognitive modeling of'spalial 
reasoning. In T. O'Shea (Ed. ). Advances in artificial intelligence, pp. 389-398- 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
363 
Halford, G. S., Bain. J. D. & Mayberry, %I. T. (1984). Does a concurrent memory load 
interfere with reasoning? Current Psychological Research and Revicivs., Summer. 1984. 
Handley, S., Newstead. S& Wright, H. (2000). Rational and experiewial thinking. - A stuýv 
of the REJ. In R. J. Riding & S. G. Rayner (Eds. )I. International perspectiN es on individual 
differences, volume one, cognitive styles. Connecticut, USA: Ablex Publishing 
Corporation. 
Harman, H. H. (1971). Modernfactor analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hitch, G. J. & Baddeley, A. D. (1976). Verbal reasoning and working memory. Quarterl. i - 
Journal of Experimental Psycholotýv 28,603-62 1. 
Humphreys, G. W. & Riddoch, J. (1987). To see but not to see: .4 case studi, of visual 
agnosia. Hove, UK: LEA Ltd. 
Humphreys, G. W. & Riddoch, M. J. (Eds. ) (1987). Visual object processing: .4 cognitive 
iieuropsychological approach. Hove, UK: LEA Ltd. 
Hunter, 1. M. L. (1957). The solving of three term series problems. British Journal of 
PsYchology 48,286-298. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1972). The three term series problem. Cognition 1.5 8-82. 
Johnson-Laird. P. N. (19833). Ifental models. Cambridge: Cambridge Univet-sity Press. 
, 64 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Bara, B. G. (1984). Syllogistic inference. Cognition 17.1-61. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Byrne, R. M. J. (1990). Meta-loulcal reasom I 'nLc-,: Knights. knaves 
and Rips. Cognition 36,69-84. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hove: Erlbaum. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Byrne, R. M. J. & Tabossi, P. (1989). Reasoning by model: The case 
of multiple quantification. Psychological Review 96(4), 658-6733. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Steedman, M. (1978). The psychology of syllogisms. Cognitivc 
Psychology 10,64-99. 
Jorm, A. F. (1983). Specific reading retardation and working memory: A review. British 
Journal of Psychology 74,311-342. 
Jurden, F. H. (1995). Individual differences in working memory and complex cognition. 
Journal of Educational Psychology 87,93-102. 
Just, M. A. & Carpenter, P. A. (1992). A capacity theory of comprehension: Individual 
differences in working memory. Psychological Revieit, 99,122-149. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics 
and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
365 
Kane, M. J. & Engle, R. W. (1998). Full frontal fluidity: 'Working memory capacity. 
controlled attention, intelligence, and the prefrontal cortex. (Unpublished manuscript). 
Kaufman, H. & Goldstein, S. (1967). The effects of emotional value of conclusions upon 
distortions in syllogistic reasoning. Psychonomic Science -, -3 3 
67-3 3 68. 
Klauer, K. C., Stegmaier, R. & Meiser, T. (1997). Working memory involvement in 
propositional and spatial reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 3(1), 9-47. 
Kucera, H. & Francis, W. N. (1970). Computational analysis ofpresent-day Aincrican 
English. Providence, Rhode Island: Brown Uniý'ersity Press. 
Kyllonen, H. (1996). Is working memory capacily Spearman's g, ' In 1. Dennis and P. 
Tapsfield (Eds. ), Human abilities: Their nature and measurement. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Kyllonen, P. C. & Christal, R. E. (1990). Reasoning ability is (little more than) working 
memory capacity?! Intelligence 14,389-433. 
La Pointe, L. B. & Engle, R. W. (1990). Simple and complex word spans as measures of 
working memory capacity. Journal of Experimental Psychology, Learning, Alemory, and 
Cognition 16(6), 1118-1133. 
Lehto, J. (1996). Are executive function tests dependent on working memory capacity" 
The QuarterlY Journal of Experimental PsYchology 49A. 29-50. 
366 
Levy. B. A. (1971). The role of articulation in auditor% and visual short-terin memory. 
Journal of'Verbal Learning and 1erbal Behaviour 10,123-131. 
Levy, B. A. (1975). Vocalisation and suppression effects in sentence memor-,, -. Journal ol 
Ferbal Learning and Ferbal Behaviour 14.304-3 16. 
Logie, R. H. (1995). Visuo-spatial working memory. Hove. UK: Erlbaum. 
Logle, R. H., Baddeley. A., Mane, A., Donchin. E. & Sheptak, R. (1989). Working memory 
in the acquisition of complex cognitive skills. Acta Psychologica 1 1,533-87. 
Logie, R. H. &Marchetti, C. (1991). li, ýzio-, V)tilialit,, ot-kii7giý7ei7ioi-. I-. - Fisual, spalialor 
central execulive? In R. H. Logie & M. Denis (Eds. ), Mental images in human cognition, 
pp. 105-115. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Lohman, D. F. & Kyllonen, P. C. (1983). Individual differences in solution strategy on 
spatial tasks. In R. F. Dillon and R. R. Schmeck (Eds. ). Individual differences in cognition 
Vol. 1, pp. 105-135. NY: Academic Press. 
Lovett, M. C., Reder, L. M. & Lebiere, C. (1999). Modeling working memory in a unýfied 
architecture: An ACT-Rperspective. In A. Miyake and P. Shah (Eds. ). Models of vwrkinu 
memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance and executive control. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
-, 67 
Macleod, C. M.. Hunt. E. B. & Mathews, N. N. (1978). Individual diffemices in the 
verification of sentence picture relationships. Journal of Verbal Learning and 1erbal 
Behaviour 19.5' ) 1-548. 
Mani, K. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). The mental representation of spatial descriptions. 
Memory and Cognition 10(2), 181-187. 
Marquer, J. M. & Pereira, M. (1990). Reaction times in the study of strategies in sentence- 
picture verification: A reconsideration. Quarterly Journal of Experimental P. S-1, c17()10q1- 
42A, 147-168. 
Mayberry, M. T., Bain, J. D. & Halford, G. S. (1986). Information-processing demands of 
transitive inference. Journal of Experimental PsYcholoqi': Learning, Alcinoi-Y and 
Cognilion 12,600-613. 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our 
capacity for processing information. Psychological Review 63,81-97. 
Milner, B. (1966). Amnesiafollowing operation on the temporal lobes. In C. W. M. Whitty 
and 0. L. Zangwill (Eds. ), Amnesia, pp. 109-133. Butterworths. 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H. & Howerter, A. (in press). The 
unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex 'frontal lobe' 
tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive PS, VC17010, qI'. 
368 
Milner, B. (1971). Interhemispheric differences in the locall II isation of psycholo-gical 
processes in man. British Medical Bulletin 3 (Cognitive PsYchology, 
-172-277. 
Moeser, S. D. & Tarrant, B. L. (1977). Leaming a network of comparisons. Journal ol 
Experimental Psychology Human Learning and Alemory 3,643-659. 
Morton, J. (1967). A singular lack of incidental learning. A'antre 215,203-2-04. 
Murdock, B. B. Jr. (1965). Effects of a subsidiary task on short-term memorv. BritiSh 
Journal ofPsychology 56,413-419. 
Murray, D. J. (1968). Articulation and acoustic confusability in short-term memory. 
Journal of experimental Psychology 78.679-684. 
Mynatt, B. T. & Smith, K. H. (1977). Constructive processes in linear orderin,, problems 
revealed by sentence study times. Journal of Experimental PsYchology: Human Learning 
and Memory 3,3 5 7-3 74. 
Navon, D. (1984). Resources -a theoretical soup stone? Psychological Review 86,214- 
255. 
Newell, A. (198 1). Reasoning, problem solving and decision processes: The problem 
spacc as a. fundamental category. In R. Nickerson (Ed. ), Attention and perfon-nance Vol. 8. 
Hillsdale NJ: LEA Inc. 
69 
Newell. A. (1990). Unified theorY of cognition. Cambridge. % IA: Han-ard University 
Press. 
Newell, A. & Simon, H. A. (1972). Humanproblem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Newstead, S. E. (1989). Interpretational errors in syllogistic reasoning. Journal (? 1Afcmory, 
and Language 28,78-9 1. 
Newstead, S. E. (1995). Gricean implicatures and syllogistic reasoning. Jout-nal ol . 11cillorv 
and Language 3 4,644-664. 
Newstead, S. E. & Griggs, R. A. (1999). Premise misinterpretation and syllogistic 
reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental PsYchology 52A (4), 1057-1075. 
Newstead, S. E., Handley, S. J. & Buck, E. (1999). Falsifying mental models: Testing the 
predictions of theories of syllogistic reasoning. Memorli, and Cognition. 
Norman, D. A. & Shallice, T. (1980). Attention to action. Willed and automatic control of 
behaviour. University of California San Diego CHIP Report 99. 
Oakhill, J. V. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1984). Representation of spatial descriptions in 
working memory. Current Psychological Research and Revieivs. Spring. 52-62. 
, 70 
Oakhill. J. V. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1985). The effect of belief on the spontaneous 
production of syllogistic conclusions. Quarterly, Journal ol'Experimental Psi, cholog, 
553-570. 
Oakhill, J. V.. YuilLN. &Parkin, A. J. (1986). On the nature of the dlfference betN\cen 
skilled and less-skilled comprehenders. Journal ofResearch in Reading 9,80-91. 
Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. (1992). Bounded rationality in taking risks and clraý% ing 
inferences. Theory and Psychology 2., 225-230. 
Oaksford, M. & Chater. N. (1993). Reasoning theorics and bounded rationalitv. In K. 1. 
Manktelow & D. E. Over (Eds. ), Rationality (pp. 3 1-60). London, UK: Routlcd, -, c. 
OhIsson, S. (1981). Model-based vs. propositional inference in a spatial reasoning task. 
Unpublished paper, Department of Psychology, University of Stockholm. 
Ohlsson, S. (1984). Induced strategy shifts in spatial reasoning. Acta Psychologica 511,47- 
67. 
OhIsson, S. (1988). Trace analysis and spatial reasoning (Tech. Rep. No. KUL-87-02). 
Learning Research and Development Centre, University of Pittsburgh. 
Osherson, D, (1975). Logic and models of logical thinking. In R. J. Falmagne (Ed. ). 
Reasoning: Representation and process in children and adults. Hillsdale. NJ: LaN\ rence 
Erlbaum Associates Inc. 
371 
Paivio, A. (1971). ImagerY and verbal processes. -New York Holt: Rinehart & Win-ston. 
Pashler, H. (1994). Dual-task interference in simple tasks: Data and theory. P, ý. Ivholo,, Qical 
Bulletin 116(2), 220-244. 
Perfetti, C. A. & Lesgold, A. N. (1977). Discourse comprehension wid sources qf 
individual diffirences. In M. Just &P Carpenter (Eds. ). Cognitive processes in 
comprehension. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N. J. 
Peterson, L. R. & Peterson, M. J. (1959). Short-term retention of individual \ erbal items. 
Journal of Experimental Pslychology 58.193 )- 198. 
Phillips, W. A. & Christie, D. F. M. (1977a). Components of visual memory. Quarterlý' 
Journal of Experimental PsYchology 29,117-133. 
Phillips, W. A. & Christie, D. F. M. (1977b). Interference with visualisation. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 29,637-650. 
Phillips, L. H., Wynn, V., Gilhooly. K. J., Della Sala, S. & Logie, R. H. (1999). The role of 
memory in the Tower of London task. 
Politzer, G. (1990). Non-logical solving of categorical syllogisms. In J. P. Cavemi. J. M. 
Fabre and M. Gonzalez (Eds. ). Cognitive biases. Advances in PsYchology Vol. 68. 
Anisterdam: North Holland. 
317 '-" 
Polk, T. A. & Newell, A. (1995). Deduction as verbal reasoning. Psychological Rei, ieu- 
102(3), 533-566. 
Potts, G. R. (1972). Information processing strategies used in the encoding of linear 
orderings. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour 11.727-740. 
Potts, G. R. & Scholz, K. W. (1975). The internal representation of three-terin series 
problems. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour 14,4-39-452. 
Quinlan, P. T. (1992). The Oxford psycholinguistic database. Oxford University Press. 
RevIis, R. (I 975a). Syllogistic reasoning: Logical decisionsftom a complex data base. In 
R. J. Falmagne (Ed. ), Reasoning: Representation and process. New York: John Wiley. 
Revlis, R. (I 975b). Two models of syllogistic inference: Feature selection and conversion. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour 14,180-195. 
Rips, L. J. (1983). Cognitive processes in propositional reasoning. Psychological Review 
90,38-71. 
Rips, L. J. (1986). Mental muddles. In M. Brand & R. M. Harnish (Eds. ), The 
representation of knowledge and belief, pp. 258-286. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 
Rips, L. J. (1994). The psychology ofproof. New York: MIT Press. 
373 
Roberts, M. J. (1993). Human reasoning: Deduction rules or mental models, or both" The 
Quarterly Journal ofExperimental Psychology 46A (4), 569-5 89. 
Roberts, M. J., Gilmore, D. J. & Wood, D. J. (1997). In dividual differences and strategy 
selection in reasoning. Bristish Journal ofPsychology 88.473-492. 
Rosen, V. M. & Engle, R. W. (1997). The role of working memory capacity in retrieval. 
Journal ofExperimental Psychology: General 126,211-227. 
Rust, J. & Golombok, S. (Eds. ) (1999). Modern psychometrics: the science of 
psychological assessment (2nd Edition). London & New York: Routledge. 
Rylander, G. (1939). Personality changes after operations on the frontal lobes. Acta 
Psychiatrica Neurologica, Supplement No. 30. 
Sachs, J. S. (1967). Recognition memory for syntactic and semantic aspects of connected 
discourse. Perception and Psychophysics 2,43 7-442. 
Salame, P. & Baddeley, A. D. (1982). Disruption of short-tenn memory by unattended 
speech: Implications for the structure of working memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behaviour 21,150-164. 
Salthouse, T. A. & Babcock, R. L. (1990). The reading and computational span tasks. 
Unpublished manuscript, Georgia Institute of Technology. 
374 
Sanford, A. J. 0 985). Cognition and cognitive psychology. London: Weidenfeld &- 
Nicholson. 
Schaeken, W., Jofinson-Laird, P. N. & d'Ydewalle, G. (1996). Mental models and temporal 
reasoning. Cognition 60,205-234. 
Sells, S. B. (1936). The atmosphere effect: An experimental study of reasoning. . 4rchives 
ofPsychology No. 200. 
Shah, P. & Miyake, A. (1996). The separabilitv of working memory resources for spatial 
thinking and language processing: An individual differences approach. Journal ol 
Experimental Psychology General 125(l), 4-27. 
Shah, P. & Miyake, A. (1999). Models of working memor. v: An introduction. In A. Mlyakc 
and P. Shah (Eds. ), Models of Nvorking memory, mechanisms of active maintenance and 
executive control, pp. 1-27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shallice, T. (1982). Specific impairments of planning. Philosophical Transactions ol the 
Royal Society of London B 298ý 199-209. 
Shallice, T. & Warrington, E. K. (1970). Independent functioning of % erbal memory stores: 
Aneuropsychological study. QuarterIly Journal of Experimental Psycholog3,22.1-61-2173). 
375 
Shiffrin, R. M. & Schneider. W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information 
processing: 11. Perceptual learning, automatic attending and a general theory. 
P. gchological Review 84.127-190. 
Smith, K. H. & Foos, P. W. (1975). Effect of presentation order on the construction of 
linear orders. Memory and Cognition 3.614-618. 
Smith, P. & Whetton, C. (1988). General abilit. v tests. - Spatial. Windsor. Berkshire: 
NFER-NELSON Publishing Company. 
Spearman, C. (1904). *General Intelligence, objectively determined and measured. 
American Journal ofPsychology 15.201-29' 3. 
Spearman, C. (1927). The abilities of man. London: Macmillan. 
Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is rational? Studies o individual differences in reasoning. ýf 
Mahweh, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Stanovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (1997). Reasoning independently of prior belief and 
individual differences in actively open-minded thinking. Journal of Educational 
PsYchology 89,342-357. 
Stanovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (1998). Cognitive ability and variation in selection task 
performance. Thinking and reasoning 4,193-230. 
376 
Stemberg, R. J. (1981). Reasoning with detenninate and indeterminate Imear syllo2isms. 
British Journal oj'Psychology -, 2,407-420. 
Sternberg, R. J. & Turner. M. E. (1981). Components of syllogistic reasoning. Acta 
Psychologica 4 7,245-265. 
Sternberg, R. J. & Weil, E. M. (1980). An aptitude x strategy interaction in linear ltý- 
syllogistic reasoning. Journal ofEducational PsYchology -2,2-16-239. 
Toms, M., Morris, N. & Ward, D. (1993). Working memory and conditional reasoning, 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46A, 679-699. 
Torrens, D., Thompson, V. A. & Cramer. K. M. (1998). Individual differences and the 
belief bias effect: Mental models, logical necessity. and abstract reasoning. Thinking and 
Reasoning 5(0), 00-00. 
Trabasso, T., Riley, C. A. & Wilson, E. G. (1975). The representation of linear order and 
spatial strategies in reasoning: A developmental stzicýv. In R. J. Falmagne (Ed. ), 
Reasoning: Representation and process. NY: John Wiley. 
Turner, M. L. & Engle, R. W. (1989). Is working memory capacity task dependent? 
Journal of I lemorY and Language 28.127-154. 
Vallar, G. & Baddelcy, A. D. (1982). Short-term forgetting and the articulator,, loop. 
QuarterIv. Journal of Evperimental PSYChology 34.53-60. 
, 77 
Vallar, G. & Baddeley, A. D. (1984a). Fractionation ot'working, memory: 
Neuropsychological evidence for a phonoloulcal short-term store. Journal ol Ferbal 
Learning and Verbal Behaviour 23,151-16 1. 
Vallar, G. & Baddeley, A. D. (1984b). Phonological short-tenn storc. phonological 
processing and sentence comprehension: A neuropsycholouncal case study. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology 1,121-14 1. 
Vandierendonck, A. & De Vooght, G. (1997). Working memory constraints on linear 
reasoning with spatial and temporal contents. Quarterlv Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 5OA(4), 803-820. 
Vernon, P. A. (1991). The use of biological measures to estimate behavioural intelligencc. 
Educational Psychologist 25.293-304. 
Vernon, P. A. (1993). Biological approaches to the siu(Ii, of human intelligencc. Norwood, 
NJ: Ablex. 
Vernon, P. E. (I 947a). Research on personnel selection in the Royal Navy and the British 
Army. 4merican Psychologist 2,35-51. 
Vernon, P. E. (1947b). Psychological tests in the Royal Navy. Ann\- and A. T. S. 
Occupational Psychology 2 1.5 3 -74. 
378 
Vernon. P. E. (I 947c). The variations of intelligence with occupation. age and locality. 
British Journal of PsYch o logical Statist. Sec. 1.5 2-63 3. 
Wagenaar, W. A. (1970). Subjective randomness and the capacitN"to generate information. 
A cta Psychologica 33. 
Wason, P. C. & Evans, J. St. B. T. (1975). Dual processes in reasoning' Cognition 3,141 - 
154. 
Wason, P. C. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1972). Psyclmlogy qf reasoning: Structurc and 
content. London: Batsford. 
Waters, G. S. & Caplan, D. (1996). The measurement of verbal working nieniory capacity 
and its relation to reading comprehension. The Quarterly Jounal of Experimental 
Psychology 49A(l), 51-79. 
Wetherick, N. E. (1989). Psychology and syllogistic reasoning. Philosophical PsYchology 
21 111- 124. 
Wetherick, N. E. & Gilhooly, K. (1990). Syllogistic reasoning: Effects ofpremise order. 
In K. Gilhooly. M. T. G. Keane, R. Logie and G. Erdos (Eds. ), Lines of thought: 
Reflections on the psychology of thinking, Vol. 1. London: John Wiley. 
, 79 
Wood, D. J., Shotter, J. & Godden, D. (1974). An investigation of the relationships bevveen 
problem solving strategies, representation and memory. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 26,252-257. 
Woodworth, R. S. & Sells, S. B. (193 5). An atmosphere effect in syllogistic reasoning. 
Journal ofExperimental Psychology 18,451-460. 
380 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A- Materials and Instructions Employed in Experiments 1-6 
Appendix AI- Experiment I 
Al. I Simple word span words .................................................................... 'N 833 
Al. 2 Simple word span instructions ........................................................... 384 
Al. 3 Complex verbal span sentences ......................................................... '1 8ý 
Al. 4 Complex verbal span instructions ...................................................... . 388 
Al. 5 Five-term series spatial problems ....................................................... 3 89 
Al. 6 Five-term series spatial inference instructions ................................... 
394 
Al. 7 Syllogistic problems ........................................................................... ') 9ý 
Al. 8 Syllogistic inference instructions ....................................................... . '199 
Appendix A2 - Experiment 4 
A2. I Temporal problems ............................................................................ 
401 
A2.2 Temporal inference instructions ........................................................ 
404 
Appendix A3 - Experiment 5 
A3. I Abstract problems .............................................................................. 
405 
A3.2 Abstract inference instructions ........................................................... 
406 
A3.3 Conditional problems ......................................................................... 
407 
A-3). 4 Conditional inference instructions ..................................................... 
409 
A3.5 Three-term series spatial problems .................................................... 
410 
A3.6 Three-term series spatial inference instructions ................................ 
411 
A3.7 Multiple quantification problems ...................................................... 
412 
381 
A3.8 Multiple quantification inference instructions .................................. 414 
APPENDIX B- Summan, Tables of Statistical Analyses: t-tests, ANOVAs, 
correlations and factor analyses 
Appendix BI -All experiments 
1.1 t-tests for Experiment I ...................................................................... 416 
B 1.2 t-tests for Experiment 4 
...................................................................... 417 
B 1.3 t-tests for Experiment 5 ...................................................................... 419 
B 1.4 t-tests for Experiment 6 ...................................................................... 4 20 
B 1.5 ANOVA results for Experiment 2 ...................................................... 4-11 
B 1.6 ANOVA results for Experiment) ...................................................... 4 -1 " 
B 1.7 Correlation matrix for Experiment I ................................................. 42 
B 1.8 Correlation matrix for Experiment 2 ................................................. 4-14 
B 1.9 Correlation matrix for Experiment _3 3 ................................................. 
425 
B 1.10 Correlation matrix for Experiment 4 ............................................... 
4 26 
1.11 Correlation matrix for Experiment 5 ............................................... 
427 
B 1.12 Correlation matrix for Experiment 6 ............................................... 
428 
B 1.13 Multiple group CFA for Experiments 1-3 three-factor model ......... 
429-451 
B 1.14 Multiple group CFA for Experiments 4-6 four-factor model .......... 
452-477 
'18 21 
APPENDIX A: Materials and Instructions Employed in Experiments 1-6 
Appendix Al . 1: Experiment 1 Materials: Simple Word Span 
All words were taken from the Oxford Psycholinguistic Database (Quinlan. 1992). They 
were all 2 syllables long and were concrete nouns. None of the words in a set began xvith 
the same letter. 
Practice Sets 
40 
BERRY 
CATTLE 
LEMON 
SfNGER 
JERSEY 
APPLE 
2 Sets 
40 
WALLET 
COFFEE 
MOVIE 
KITTEN 
BANNER 
FOREST 
SILVER 
CANNON 
PLANET 
TABLE 
3 Sets 
ADULT 
CARPET 
DOLLAR 
MOTHER 
TOWER 
HOTEL 
4 Sets 
40 
BUCKET 
PEPPER 
COTTON 
STABLE 
MEDAL 
ORGAN 
COLLAR 
DOCTOR 
BATTLE 
SUGAR 
ANGEL 
RABBIT 
RIBBON 
CABIN 
POCKET 
BISHOP 
MANOR 
SUPPER 
DANCER 
RACKET 
5 Sets 
40 
ANCHOR 
LIVER 
NEEDLE 
WINDOW 
MIRROR 
METAL 
BUTTER 
FATHER 
RIVER 
CANDY 
VALLEY 
BUBBLE 
DRIVER 
CIRCLE 
LOCKER 
ISLAND 
PARTY 
CANOE 
BASKET 
LETTER 
6 Sets 
PUZZLE 
MARBLE 
TIGER 
HUNTER 
SADDLE 
BASIN 
CEMENT 
FERRY 
INFANT 
PYTHON 
WOMAN 
LAWYER 
BOTTLE 
TURTLE 
CANDLE 
GRAVEL 
JACKET 
MAPLE 
ARTIST 
WILLOW 
TICKET 
SUMMER 
CIRCUS 
LOBBY 
7 Sets 
40 
MUTTON 
SISTER 
BUCKLE 
OFFICE 
CLOVER 
LEVER 
PAPER 
CIGAR 
RUBBER 
ELBOW 
POV, rDER 
BUTTON 
GARDEN 
LINEN 
HONEY 
CABLE 
PRISON 
MONEY 
NUMBER 
BRANDY 
WATER 
CORAL 
MONKEY 
SHOWER 
FABRIC 
BULLET 
HEAVEN 
ARROW 
BANKER 
INSECT 
OTTER 
DINNER 
ANKLE 
TUNNEL 
FLOWER 
JOCKEY 
HAMMER 
CHEERY 
ENGINE 
PILLOW 
STATUE 
MARKET 
GIANT 
BARREL 
EAGLE 
ROCKET 
CELLAR 
DEMON 
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music 
PENNY 
OLIVE 
RESORT 
SALAD 
ALLEY 
WALNUT 
Appendix Al . 2: Experiment I Instructions: Simple Word Span 
In this part of the experiment, you must remember sets of words that wIII appear on the 
screen. The number of words to remember in each setv, 111 increase throughout the test. 11= 
An example of a set of words can be seen beloNA-: - 
The screen displays the word: GUITAR 
Then the screen displays the word: LORRY 
Then the screen displays the word: RECALL 
Your task is to remember the set of words, in the order they ý\ ere presented. For the above 
example, you would write down the words: GUITAR, LORRY. 
You are provided with a response sheet to mark down your responses to each set of words. 
Please have a look at the sheet now to ensure you understand hoýý to mark your responses. 
If you DO NOT understand the task, please tell the experimenter now. If you DO 
understand the task, please press the space bar and you will be g]N, cn three practice sets of 
words. 
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Appendix Al . 3: Experiment 1 Materials: Complex Verbal Span 
All end words were taken from the Oxford Psycholinguistic Database (Quinlan. 1992). 
They were all I or 2 sý Ilables long and ý, vere concrete nouns. None of the end Nvords in a , k: t began with the same letter. 
Practice Set 
A WALLET HOLDS MONEY *T 
COTTON WOOL IS HARD *F 
2 Sets 
A BIRD HAS FEET *F 
SINGERS HAVE A GOOD VOICE *T 
BREAKFAST IS EATEN IN THE MORNING *T 
A RULER DRAWS A STRAIGHT LINE *T 
MOUNTAIN TOPS ARE HIGH *T 
WINNERS COME IN SECOND *F 
A LETTER IS A NUMBER *F 
DOGS ARE MADE OF FELT *F 
THE CONCLUSION COMES FIRST*F 
ENGLAND IS A COUNTRY *T 
3 Sets 
THERE ARE FLOORS IN A HOUSE *T 
A SQUARE IS ROUND *F 
AFTER FOUR COMES FIVE *T 
OFFICERS WORK IN THE POLICE FORCE *T 
KITTENS LIKE TO PLAY *T 
CARPETS HANG ON A WALL *F 
THE ACE OF HEARTS IS BLACK *F 
ENGLISH DRIVE ON THE LEFT *T 
TWENTY MONTHS MAKE A YEAR *F 
WINNERS COME IN LAST *F 
., \ PRINCE IS A WOMAN *F 
TOMORROW IS IN THE FUTURE *T 
,, \ PENNYIS A 
COIN *T 
THE SUN COMES Ot IT AT NIGHT *F 
THEREARE' TOES ONA HAND *F 
Appendix Al .3 (cont. ): Experiment 1 Materials: Complex Verbal Span 
4 Sets 
THE NUMBER THREE IS EVEN *F 
FISH LIVE ON THE LAND *F 
GOLD HAS A HIGH VALUE *T 
A LEMON IS A FLOWER *F 
A DINGHY IS A BOAT *T 
CARTOON CHARACTERS ARE REAL *F 
THE LEADER IS AT THE FRONT *T 
THERE ARE BRANCHES ON A TREE *T 
BILLIONS ARE SMALLER THAN A MILLION *F 
POLAR BEARS ARE WHITE *T 
ELEPHANTS ARE VERY SMALL *F 
FAMILIES LIVE IN A HOME *T 
LIFTS GO UP AND DOWN *T 
ENGLISH DRIVE ON THE RIGHT *F 
WINDOWS CAN BE OPEN *T 
MEMORIES ARE FROM THE PAST *T 
A SLOPE IS LEVEL *F 
MINERS WORK IN SCHOOL *F 
CLOCKS TELL THE TIME *T 
CARS DRIVE ON A ROAD *T 
5 Sets 
A BROTHER IS A GIRL *F 
KEYBOARDS ARE USED TO TYPE *T 
SEVEN COMES BEFORE FOUR *F 
PEOPLE LIVE IN A CITY *T 
FOOTBALL IS A SPORT *T 
AT NIGHT TIME IT IS LIGHT *F 
ELECTRIC IS A FORM OF POWER *T 
WATER IS FOUND DO" A WELL *T 
ROCK MUSIC IS SUNG IN CHURCH *F 
LEGS ARE PART OF THE FACE *F 
JUDGES WORK IN COURT *T 
CROPS GROW IN A WOOD *F 
Nlt ISFUMS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC *T 
ONE PERSON MAKES A GROUP *F 
CARPETS COVER THE FLOOR *T 
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Appendix Al .3 (cont. ): Experiment 1 Materials: Complex Verbal Span 
WATER LIGHTS A FIRE *F 
PLANES FLY AROUND THE WORLD *T 
SEVENTEEN COMES BEFORE THREE *F 
CHESS IS A GAME *T 
A FROG HAS HAIR *F 
THE HOSPITAL SENDS MAIL *F 
TOWNS ARE FULL OF SAND *F 
THE OCEAN CONTAINS WATER *T 
AN APPLE IS A FRUIT *T 
CARS ARE MADE OF BONE *F 
6 Sets 
A HAND HAS A PALM *T 
YOU FIND FUR IN A SALAD *F 
PLUG RHYMES WITH LEAF *F 
BALD PEOPLE HAVE A FRINGE * fý 
HAUNTED HOUSES HAVE A GHOST *T 
BROWNIES GO TO CAMP *T 
TEA IS KEPT IN A FLASK *T 
LIONS SLEEP IN A CRADLE *F 
CIGARETTES COME IN A PACK *T 
THE SEA IS MADE OF GRAVY *F 
CEMENT IS A SPICE *F 
YOU WAKE UP WITH AN ALARM *T 
CANOEISTS USE A PADDLE *T 
YOU SIT ON A STOOL *T 
VODKA IS FOUND IN A LAKE *F 
NINETY SECONDS EQUALS ONE HOUR *F 
PIGS TAKE OFF FROM AN AIRPORT *F 
RED IS THE COLOUR OF LIME *F 
YOU KEEP ANIMALS IN A FILE *F 
YOU EAT WITH A SWORD *F 
THE SEA IS NEAR THE COAST *T 
A CINEMA HAS A SPIRE *F 
YOU CAN MOW A LAWN *T 
PEOPLE WALK ALONG A PIER *T 
YOU CAN SUCK YOUR THUMB *T 
PEASANTS LIVE IN A PALACE *F 
YOU CAN DRINK FROM A GOBLET *T 
A DAFFODII. GROWS FROM A BULB *T 
)'()I I STAYDRý IN THE RAIN *F 
PtJBS Sl-'I, I. CRISPSAND BEER *T 
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Appendix Al . 4: Experiment I Instructions: Complex Verbal Span 
In this part of the experiment. your task is to decide whether sets of sentences are true or 
false whilst remembering the last word of each sentence. The number of sentences to verif\ 
in each set ývill increase throughout the test. The test can be completed by using motisc 
clicks. 
An example of a set of sentences can be seen belo-,,. v: - 
The screen displays a sentence: THE SKY IS BLUE 
Your task is to decide whether the sentence is true (T) or false (F). In this case voLi x\ ould 
click the mouse in the "T" box. You must remember the last word of the sentence. 
Then the screen displays another sentence: THE SUN IS PINK 
Your task is to decide whether the sentence is T or F. In this case VOU NWUld click the 
mouse in the "F" box. You must remember the last word of the sentence. 
Then the screen displays the symbol of a RECALL LIGHTBULB 
When the recall lightbulb appears. your task is to remember the last word in each sentence, 
in the order in which they appeared. For the above example, ý'ou would write down the 
words: BLUE and PINK. 
You are provided with a response sheet to mark do,. ý-n your responses to each set of 
sentences. Please have a look at the sheet now to ensure you understand hov, to mark your 
responses. 
If you DO NOT understand the task, please tell the experimenter now. If you DO 
understand the task, please press the space bar and yowvill be given a practice set of 
sentences. 
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Appendix Al . 5: Experiment I Materials: Five-Term Series Spatial Inference 
One Model Problems 
The apple is on the left of the orange. 
The banana is on the right of the orange. 
The melon is in front of the apple. 
The peach is in front of the banana. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the melon and the peach? 
The melon is left of the peach. 
The vase is on the right of the clock. 
The ashtray is on the left of the clock. 
The plant is in front of the ashtray. 
The lamp is in front of the clock. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the plant and the lamp? 
The plant is left of the lamp. 
The dish is on the right of the spoon. 
The knife is on the left of the spoon. 
The fork is in front of the spoon. 
The plate is in front of the knife. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the fork and the plate'? 
The fork is right of the plate. 
The clock is on the right of the vase. 
The ashtray is on the right of the clock. 
The plant is behind the ashtray. 
The lamp is behind the vase. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the plant and the lamp" 
The plant is to the right of the lamp. 
The knife is on the left of the dish. 
The spoon is on the right of the dish. 
The fork is behind the knife. 
The plate is behind the dish. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the fork and the plate? 
The fork is to the left of the plate. 
The torch is on the right of the drill. 
The hammer is on the left of the drill. 
The spanner is behind the hammer. 
The pliers are behind the drill. 
Hence, vdiat is the relationship between the spanner and the pliers? 
The spanner is to the left of the pliers. 
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Appendix Al .5 (cont. ): Experiment I Materials: Five-Term Series Spatial Inference 
The spoon is on the right of the plate. 
The dish is behind the spoon. 
The knife is behind the dish. 
The knife is on the right of the fork. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the fork and the plate? 
The fork is behind the plate. 
The spanner is on the left of the drill. 
The torch is in front of the drill. 
The hammer is in front of the torch. 
The pliers are on the left of the hammer. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the spanner and the pliers" 
The spanner is behind the pliers. 
The hammer is on the left of the pliers. 
The torch is in front of the hammer. 
The drill is in front of the torch. 
The spanner is on the right of the drill. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the spanner and the pliers? 
the spanner is in front of the pliers. 
The apple is behind the orange. 
The orange is behind the banana. 
The banana is on the left of the melon. 
The peach is on the right of the orange. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the melon and the peach? 
The melon is in front of the peach. 
The torch is on the right of the hammer. 
The drill is on the left of the torch. 
The spanner is in front of the drill. 
The pliers are in front of the torch. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the spanner and the pliers? 
The spanner is to the left of the pliers. 
The pliers are on the right of the torch. 
The hammer is in front of the torch. 
The drill is in front of the hammer. 
The spanner is to the right of the hammer. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the spanner and the pliers' 
The spanner is in front of the pliers. 
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Appendix Al .5 (cont. ): Experiment I Materials: Five-Term Series Spatial Inference 
Multi Model Problems 
The banana is on the left of the apple. 
The orange is on the right of the banana. 
The melon is in front of the orange. 
The peach is in front of the banana. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the melon and the peach? 
The melon is to the right of the peach. 
The ashtray is on the right of the clock. 
The vase is on the left of the ashtray. 
The plant is in front of the vase. 
The lamp is in front of the ashtray. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the plant and the lamp? 
The plant is to the left of the lamp. 
The torch is on the right of the hammer. 
The drill is on the left of the torch. 
The spanner is behind the drill. 
The pliers are behind the torch. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the spanner and the pliers? 
The spanner is to the left of the pliers. 
The orange is on the right of the apple. 
The banana is on the left of the orange. 
The melon is behind the banana. 
The peach is behind the orange. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the melon and the peach" 
The melon is to the left of the peach. 
The knife is on the left of the dish. 
The spoon is on the right of the knife. 
The fork is behind the knife. 
The plate is behind the dish. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the fork and the plate? 
The fork is to the left of the plate. 
The clock is on the left of the ashtray. 
The vase is behind the clock. 
The plant is behind the ashtray. 
The lamp is behind the vase. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the plant and the lamp? 
The plant is to the right of the lamp. 
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Appendix Al .5 (cont. ): Experiment I Materials: Five-Term Series Spatial Inference 
The apple is on the left of the orange. 
The orange is in front of the banana. 
The melon is behind the banana. 
The peach is behind the apple. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the melon and the peach'? 
The melon is to the right of the peach. 
The clock is on the right of the ashtray. 
The vase is in front of the clock. 
The plant is in front of the ashtray. 
The lamp is in front of the vase. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the plant and the lamp? 
The plant is to the left of the lamp. 
The apple is on the left of the orange. 
The banana is behind the apple. 
The peach is behind the banana. 
The melon is behind the orange. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the melon and the peach" 
The melon is to the right of the peach. 
The knife is on the left of the dish. 
The fork is in front of the knife. 
The spoon is in front of the dish. 
The plate is in front of the spoon. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the fork and the plate" 
The fork is to the left of the plate. 
The vase is on the left of the clock. 
The ashtray is in front of the clock. 
The plant is in front of the ashtray. 
The lamp is in front of the vase. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the plant and the lamp? 
The plant is to the right of the lamp. 
The spoon is on the left of the dish. 
The dish is in front of the knife. 
The dish is in front of the fork. 
The knife is on the right of the plate. 
Hence, what is the relationship between the fork and the plate? 
The fork is to the right of the plate. 
A sub-set of these problems (16) was used in Experiment 2 (verbal presentation). 
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Appendix Al .5 (cont. ): Experiment I Materials: Five-Term Series Spatial Inference 
Content Substitution in Experiment 2 (visual presentation) 
beetroot notebook 
carrot biro 
turnip calculator 
potato rubber 
onion pencil 
trowel glass 
fork bowl 
pot saucer 
spade mug 
broom napkin 
These four content sets were randomly assigned to four problems cLich (a sub-set of the 
problems seen above). 
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Appendix Al . 6: Experiment 1 Instructions: Five-Term Series Spatial Inference 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked about the relations bet\N-een objects in a m2t. 
The experimenter will read to you a description of the layout of a set of objects. You should 
listen attentively to the descriptions. Each description ý\-ill be read to you txvice. and at a 
reasonable pace. Each time the description is read. youxvill be asked about the relation 
between two of the objects in the set. 
The descriptions will use the following terms to describe the layouts of the objects Nvithin a 
set: - 
in front of 
behind 
to the left of 
to the right of 
not enough information to tell 
You should imagine the objects as if flicy , vere in front of yoLi and then apply the above 
relations to them. For some of the descriptions you inav feel there is not enough I- 
information to determine the relation between the objects, in which case N ou should say so 
There is an answer sheet provided for your responses to each description. There will be 24 
descriptions plus two practice descriptions. If you understand these instructions, please tell 
the experimenter who will read to you tv, -o simple practice descriptions to introduce the 
task. You may keep this information in front of you during the test to ensure you remember 
the ways in which you can link the objects together. 
practice descriptions 
The knife is on the right of the vase. 
The glass is on the left of the vase. 
What is the relationship between the knife and the vasel 
The answer should be that the knife is on the right of the N-ase. 
The knife is on the right of the vase. 
The , lass is on the left of the vase. 
The dish is in front of the glass. 
The plate is in front of the vase. 
What is the rclationship between the dish and the plate? 
Fhe ans\\ cr '-, IIOLIld be that the dish is on the left of the plate. 
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Appendix Al. 7: Experiment 1 Materials: S,,,, Ilogistic Inference 
Mood - AB-BC 
Models - 1M 
Your conclusion should link Welders and Carpenters. 
Some of the Welders are Builders. 
All of the Builders are Carpenters. 
Thus, 
Some of the Welders are Carpenters. 
Your conclusion should link Secretaries and Climbers. 
All of the Secretaries are Cabdrivers. 
None of the Cabdrivers are Climbers. 
Thus, 
None of the Secretaries are Climbers. 
Your conclusion should link Gardeners and Nurses. 
None of the Nurses are Politicians. 
All of the Politicians are Gardeners. 
Thus, 
None of the Gardeners are Nurses. 
Your conclusion should link Conductors and Models. 
All of the Conductors are Farmers. 
All of the Fanners are Models. 
Thus, 
All of the Conductors are Models. 
Models - MM 
Your conclusion should link Plumbers and Weightlifters. 
None of the Weightlifters are Athletes. 
Some of the Athletes are Plumbers. 
Thus, 
Some Plumbers are not Weightlifters. 
Your conclusion should link Electricians and Geologists. 
Some of the Electricians are Bakers. 
None of the Bakers are Geologists. 
Thus, 
Some of the Electricians are not Geologists. 
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Appendix Al .7 (cont. ): Experiment I Materials: Syllogistic Inference 
Mood - BA-CB 
Models -IM 
Your conclusion should link Managers and Psychologists. 
None of the Musicians are Psycholo-gists. 
All of the Managers are Musicians. 
Thus, 
None of the Managers are Psychologists. 
Your conclusion should link Hairdressers and Bankers. 
All of the Cashiers are Bankers. 
Some of the Hairdressers are Cashiers. 
Thus, 
Some of the Hairdressers are Bankers. 
Your conclusion should link Designers and Gardeners. 
All of the Sailors are Designers. 
None of the Gardeners are Sailors. 
Thus, 
None of the Designers are Gardeners. 
Your conclusion should link Clowns and Divers. 
All of the Policemen are Divers. 
All of the Clowns are Policemen. 
Thus, 
All of the Clowns are Divers. 
Models - MM 
Your conclusion should link Bricklayers and Singers. 
None of the Teachers are Singers. 
Some of the Bricklayers are Teachers. 
Thus, 
Some of the Bricklayers are not Singers. 
Your conclusion should link Shopkeepers and Butchers. 
Some of the Fishmongers are Shopkeepers. 
None of the Butchers are Fishmongers. 
Thus, 
Some of the Shopkeepers are not Butchers. 
Mood - AB-CB 
Models -IM 
Your conclusion should link Managers and Plumbers. 
None of the Managers are Geolo,, ists. 
All of the Plumbers are Geologists. 
Thus. 
None of the Managers are Plumbers. 
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Appendix Al .7 (cont. ): Experiment I Materials: Syllogistic Inference 
Your conclusion should link Carpenters and Bakers. 
All of the Carpenters are Electricians. 
None of the Bakers are Electricians. 
Thus, 
None of the Carpenters are Bakers. 
Models - MM 
Your conclusion should link Athletes and Cabdrivers. 
None of the Cabdrivers are Weightlifters. 
Some of the Athletes are Weightlifters. 
Thus, 
Some of the Athletes are not Cabdrivers. 
Your conclusion should link Secretaries and Shopkeepers. 
Some of the Secretaries are Cashiers. 
None of the Shopkeepers are Cashiers. 
Thus, 
Some of the Secretaries are not Shopkeepers. 
Mood - BA-BC 
Models - 1M 
Your conclusion should link Builders and Teachers. 
Some of the Fishmongers are Builders. 
All of the Fishmongers are Teachers. 
Thus, 
Some of the Builders are Teachers. 
Your conclusion should link Psychologists and Musicians. 
All of the Hairdressers are Psychologists. 
Some of the Hairdressers are Musicians. 
Thus, 
Some of the Psychologists are Musicians. 
Models - MM 
Your conclusion should link Bricklayers and Butchers. 
None of the Bankers are Butchers. 
Some of the Bankers are Bricklayers. 
Thus, 
Some of the Bricklayers are not Butchers. 
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Appendix Al .7 (cont. ): Experiment I Materials: S. vilogistic Inference 
Your conclusion should link Climbers and Athletes. 
Some of the Welders are Climbers. 
None of the Welders are Athletes. 
Thus, 
Some of the Climbers are not Athletes. 
A sub-set of these problems (16) was used in Experiment ') (verbal presentation). 
Content Substitution in Experiment 3 (visual presentation) 
athletes farmers pilots managers 
singers clowns journalists bankers 
dancers butchers divers chefs 
These four content sets were randomly assigned to four problems each (a sub-set of the 
problems seen above). 
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Appendix Al . 8: Experiment I Instructions: Syllogistic Inference 
In this part of the experiment you \ý III is a *11 be asked to solve 20 syllogisms. A s" llo-gism i 
pair of statements providing you ýý-ith information about the relationships between three 
classes. The three classes will be labelled by professioi-is (c. g. Bakers. Painters etc. ). On the 
basis of the information provided by the two statements, you will be asked to draxv a 
conclusion between two of the classes. One of the classes is common to both statements; 
your task is to produce a conclusion linking the other t-mvo classes. 
The 20 syllogisms will be read out loud by the experimenter. Each one xvill be read tx\ ice. 
and at a reasonable pace. You ý, vill be reminded which t,, \-o terms need to be linked in the 
conclusion each time the problem is read. 
For example, the experimenter might read out the follownigy mo statements: - 
All of the Painters are Bakers. 
All of the Bakers are Farmers. 
In each of the 20 problems you xvill be told which terms need to be linked. In the above 
example, you would be asked to find a conclusion that links the terms 'Painters' and 
'Farmers'. So, for the above example you may draw the conclusion: - 
All of the Painters are Farmers. 
You would write this conclusion down in the space provided on the response sheet. 
YOU SHOULD REMEMBER THAT YOUR CONCLUSION MUST ALWAYS 
CONTAIN ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUANTIFIERS: 
tall ..... are ...... (as in the above example), 
tsome ..... are ....... 
'none ..... are ....... 
and 'some ..... are not ....... 
You also have the option Of \\Tltlllg 'no valid conclusion'. 
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Appendix Al .8 (cont. ): Experiment I Instructions: Syllogistic Inference 
So for the previous example, these are all of the conclusions you might have produced: - 
All of the Painters are Farmers. 
All of the Farmers are Painters. 
Some of the Painters are Farmers. 
Some of the Farmers are Painters. 
None of the Painters are Farmers. 
None of the Fanners are Painters. 
Some of the Painters are not Farmers. 
Some of the Farmers are not Painters. 
No valid conclusion. 
Please take your time and be certain you have the logically correct answer before statino it. 
If you have any questions, please ask theiii now. as the experimenter cannot answer after the 
task has commenced. Please keep these instructions in front of yOU in case yoLi need to refer 
to them later on. You must not make notes or draw diagrams of any kind to aid you in this 
task. 
Practice problem 
Please write a conclusion in the space provided. Your conclusion should link Doctors and 
Bus Drivers. If you think no conclusion is possible, please write'no valid conclusion'. 
Remember that your conclusion must include one of the following quantifiers: 
All, No, Some, or Some ..... not. 
Some of the Doctors are Bank Managers. 
All of the Bank Managers are Bus Drivers. 
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Appendix A2.1: Experiment 4 Materials: Temporal Inference 
One Model Problems 
Passengers board the London train before passengers board the Glasgow train. LG %1 
Passengers board the Manchester train after passengers board the Glasgow train. BP 
Passengers board the Bristol train while passengers board the London train. 
Passengers board the Plymouth train while Passengers board the Manchester train. 
Hence, what is the relation between passengers boarding the Bristol train and the Plymouth train" 
Passengers board the Bristol train before they board the Plymouth tram. 
Tom drinks coffee after he has a shave. BSC 
He eats a biscuit before he has a shave. MT 
He reads a magazine while he eats a biscuit. 
He watches television while he has a shave. 
Hence, what is the relation between Tom reading a magazine and Tom watching television? 
Tom reads a magazine before he watches television. 
Tom has a shave after he drinks coffee. CSB 
He eats a biscuit after he has a shave. TM 
He reads a magazine while he has a shave. 
He watches television while he drinks coffee. 
Hence, what is the relation between Tom reading a magazine and Tom watching television? 
Tom reads a magazine after he watches television. 
The lever is pressed before the alann rings. 
The gate opens after the alarm rings. 
The bulb goes on while the gate opens. 
The door shuts while the lever is pressed. 
Hence, what is the relation between the bulb going on and the door shutting' 
The bulb goes on after the door shuts. 
The gate opens after the alarm rings. 
The lever is pressed before the alarm rings. 
The bulb goes on while the alan-n rings. 
The door shuts while the gate opens. 
Hence, what is the relation between the bulb going on and the door shutting? 
The bulb goes on before the door shuts. 
Passengers board Flight 106 after passengers board Flight 204. 
Passengers board Flight 307 after passengers board Flight 106. 
Passengers board Flight 403 while passengers board Flight 307. 
Passengers board Flight 508 while passengers board Flight 106. 
Hence, what is the relation between passengers boarding Flight 403 and 508? 
Passengers board Flight 403 after they board Flight 508. 
The lever is pressed before the alarm rings. 
The gate opens before the lever is pressed. 
The bulb goes on while the gate opens. 
The door shuts while the alarm rings. 
Hence, what is the relation between the bulb going on and the door shutting? 
The bulb goes on before the door shuts. 
LAG 
DB 
LAG 
BD 
13 
54 
GLA 
BD 
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Appendix A2.1 (cont. ): Experiment 4 
-Materials: Temporal Inference 
Multi Model Problems 
Passengers board Flight 307 after passengers board Flight 204.1 2321', 
Passengers board Flight 106 before passengers board Flight 307.4 545 
Passengers board Flight 403 while passengers board Flight 106. 
Passengers board Flight 508 while passengers board Flight 307. 
Hence, what is the relation between passengers boarding Flight 403 and 508? 
Passengers board Flight 403 before they board Flight 508. 
Passengers board the Manchester train before passengers board the London train. MLG NI GL 
Passengers board the Glasgow train after passengers board the Manchester train. PBPB 
Passengers board the Bristol train while passengers board the Glasgow train. 
Passengers board the Plymouth train while Passengers board the Manchester train. 
Hence, what is the relation between passengers boarding the Bristol train and the Plymouth train? 
Passengers board the Bristol train after they board the Plymouth train. 
Tom drinks a coffee after he watches television. TCS 
He has a shave after he watches television. MB 
He eats a biscuit while he has a shave. 
He reads a magazine while he watches television. 
Hence, what is the relation between Tom eating a biscuit and Tom reading a magazine' 
Tom eats a biscuit after he reads a magazine. 
Passengers board Flight 307 before passengers board Flight 204.3 21 
Passengers board Flight 106 after passengers board Flight 307.5 4 
Passengers board Flight 403 while passengers board Flight 106. 
Passengers board Flight 508 while passengers board Flight 307. 
Hence, what is the relation between passengers boarding Flight 403 and 508? 
Passengers board Flight 403 after they board Flight 508. 
Tom drinks coffee before he watches television. SCT 
He has a shave before he watches television. BM 
He eats a biscuit while he has a shave. 
He reads a magazine while he watches television. 
Hence, what is the relation between Tom eating a biscuit and Tom reading a magazine? 
Tom eats a biscuit before he reads a magazine. 
TSC 
N/I B 
312 
54 
CST 
BM 
Passengers board the Glasgow train after passengers board the London train. MLGLMG 
Passengers board the Manchester train before passengers board the Glasgow train. BPBP 
Passengers board the Bristol train while passengers board the Manchester train. 
Passengers board the Plymouth train while Passengers board the Glasgow train. 
Hence, what is the relation between passengers boarding the Bristol train and the Plymouth train? 
Passengers board the Bristol train before they board the Plymouth train. 
Passengers board the London train before passengers board the Glasgow train. LMGMLG ZD 
Passengers board the Manchester train before passengers board the Glasgow train. BPBP 
Passengers board the Bristol train while passengers board the Manchester train. 
Passengers board the Plymouth train while Passengers board the Glasgow train. 
Hence, what is the relation between passengers boarding the Bristol train and the Plymouth train? 
Passengers board the Bristol train before they board the Plymouth train. 
I 
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Appendix A2 .I (cont. ): Experiment 4 Materials: Temporal Inference 
Indeterminate Problems 
Passengers board Flight 307 after passengers board Flight 204.1 23213 
Passengers board Flight 106 before passengers board Flight 307.4 554 
Passengers board Flight 403 while passengers board Flight 106. 
Passengers board Flight 508 while passengers board Flight 204. 
Hence, what is the relation between passengers boarding Flight 403 and -5,08? Not enough information. 
The alarrn rings before the gate opens. AGLALG 
The lever is pressed after the alarm rings. BDDB 
The bulb goes on while the gate opens. 
The door shuts while the lever is pressed. 
Hence, what is the relation between the bulb going on and the door shuttIng,? 
Not enough information. 
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Appendix A2 . 2: Experiment 4 Instructions: Temporal Inference 
In this part of the experiment your task is to ans%ýer a series of questions based on the 
information about the order of events given in a description. A problem NN-111 appear on the 
screen describing the order of events of a set of fi-ý, -e activities or actions. Shortl\ý 
afterwards, a question will also appear on the screen asking you to relate tN\ o of the 
activities or actions within the set. There will be 16 descriptions using, the following terms 
to describe the order in time in which each activity or action occurs: - 
before 
after 
while 
Your task is to link two of the activities or actions in the set using the above relations. For 
example, passengers may board the Bristol train before the Plymouth train; passen-crs ma), 
board the Bristol train after the Plymouth train; or passengers may board the Bristol train 
while they board the Plymouth train (hypothetically, people can't be in mo places at once, 
but for this exercise it is not necessary to have believable content). For some of the 
descriptions you may feel there is not enough information to determine the relation hct%\ccII 
the activities or actions; in which case you should answer -Not enough information". 
The screen will also display a blank box in which you must type your response to each 
problem. For example, if you thought the answer was -Passengers board the Bristol train 
before the Plymouth train" then this is what you should type. There will then be a button to 
press to move onto the next problem. If you understand these instructions, please press the 
bar below and a practice problem will appear for you to have a go at. 
Practice problem 
Passengers board Flight 106 after passengers board Flight 204 
Passengers board Flight 307 before passengers board Flight 204 
Passengers board Flight 403 vvhile passengers board Flight 307 
Passengers board Flight 508 xvhile passengers board Flight 204 
Hence, what is the relation between passengers boarding Flight 403 
The answer should be that Passengers board Flight 403 before they 
and 508? 
board Fll,, -, 
ht 508. 
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Appendix A3.1: Experiment 5 Materials: Abstract Reasoning 
Multi-Step Problems 
If there is a P, then there is aC 
There is aP 
It is not true that there is both aC and an M 
Thus, there's not an M 
There is aY or an L 
There"s not aY 
If there is either an L or an R, then there's not aW 
Thus, there's not aW 
If there is an R, then there is an F 
If there is an W, then there is an L 
There is an R or aW 
If there is either an F or an L, then there's not aZ 
Thus, there's not aZ 
It is not true that there is both aC and an H 
There is aC 
There's not aP 
Thus, there's not an H or aP 
There is a P, and there is aQ or an R 
If there is both aP and a Q, then there is an S 
If there is both aP and an R, then there is aT 
Thus, there may or may not be an S and aT 
There isaB oraZ 
There's not aZ 
It is not true that there is both aB and an R 
Thus, there's not an R 
It is not true that there is both aK and an L 
It is false that there is not aK 
Thus, there's not an L 
There is an L or aW 
If there is an L, then there is not an E 
If there is a W, then there is not an E 
There is an E or an 0 
Thus, there is an 0 
There is an E or an X 
If there is an F. then there is not an H 
If there is an X. then there is not an H 
There is an H or aT 
Thus, there is aT 
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Appendix A3.2: Experiment 5 Instructions: Abstract Reasoning 
This task is concerned with people's abilm to reason logically vith sentences in varIOLIS 
forms. You will be presented with a total of 9 problems in this booklet. For each of these 
problems you are given a set of statements. for instance: - 
If there is both an N and an 1, then there's not aB 
It is false that there's not an N 
There is an I 
Each problem concerns the presence or absence of letters on an imaginary black-board. The 
set of statements contains some facts about the black-board. The facts or premises contain 
the information that is known about the black-board and you should accept them at face 
value. 
Your task in each case is to decide on a conclusion that necessarily follows from the 
statements about the black-board. A conclusion is necessary if it must be true, giN en that 
the statements are true. A list of the possible answers is presented below each problem. 
You must tick one of the response conclusions for each set of statements. For instance, in 
the example shown you might tick: - 
There's not aB 
If you think that no conclusion necessarily follows given that the statements are true, then 
you must tick the relevant box, for instance, that the letter B may or may not be there. You 
will have 20 seconds to answer each problem. The experimenter will let you know when to 
continue onto the next problem. Please do not make diagrams or notes during the task, and 
do not go back through the booklet once you have answered a problem. If you have any 
questions about this task, please ask the experimenter now. If you understand these 
instructions, please wait before beginning the practice problem. 
Practice problem 
If there is either aK or an 0, then there is an N 
It is falsc that there's not aK 
Thus, there is an N 
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Appendix A3 . 3: Experiment 5 Materials: Conditional Inference 
Modus Ponens 
If p then q If the letter is B then the number is 7 
p The letter is B 
Therefore q Therefore the number is 7 
If p then not q If the letter is A then the number is not 8 
p The letter is A 
Therefore not q Therefore the number is not 8 
If not p then q If the letter is not C then the number is 4 
not p The letter is not C 
Therefore q Therefore the number is 4 
If not p then not q If the letter is not D then the number is not 33 
not p The letter is not D 
Therefore not q Therefore the number is not 3 
Modus Tollens 
If p then q If the letter is D then the number is 3 
not q The number is not 33 
Therefore not p Therefore the letter is not D 
If p then not q If the letter is C then the number is not 4 
q The number is 4 
Therefore not p Therefore the letter is not C 
If not p then q If the letter is not A then the number Is 8 
not q The number is not 8 
Therefore p Therefore the letter is A 
If not p then not q If the letter is not B then the number is not 7 
q The number is 7 
Therefore p Therefore the letter is B 
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Appendix A3 .3 (cont. ): Experiment 5 Materials: Conditional Inference 
Denial of the Antecedent 
If p then q If the letter is E then the number is 9 
not p The letter is not E 
Therefore not q Therefore the number is not 9 
If p then not q If the letter is F then the number is not 
not p The letter is not F 
Therefore q Therefore the number is 2 
If not p then q If the letter Is not G then the number Is 
p The letter is G 
Therefore not q Therefore the number is not 5 
If not p then not q If the letter is not H then the number is not I 
p The letter is H 
Therefore q Therefore the number is I 
Affirmation of the Consequent 
If p then q If the letter is H then the number is I 
q The number is I 
Therefore p Therefore the letter is H 
If p then not q If the letter is G then the number Is not 5 
not q The number is not 5 
Therefore p Therefore the letter is G 
If not p then q If the letter is not F then the number is 2 
q The number is 2 
Therefore not p Therefore the letter is not F 
If not p then not q If the letter is not E then the number is not 9 
not q The number is not 9 
Therefore not p Therefore the letter is not E 
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Appendix A3 . 4: Experiment 5 Instructions: Conditional Inference 
This task is concerned with people's ability to reason logically with sentence,, in various 
forms. You will be presented with a total of 16 problems in this booklet. For eLich of these 
problems you are given two statements, for instance: 
1 If the letter is M then the number is not 3 
2 The letter is M 
Each problem concerns an imaginary letter-pair and contains an initial statement or rule (1) 
which determines which letters may be paired with which numbers. In each case. \ ou must 
assume that the rule holds and then combine it with the information given in the second 
statement (2). This will concern either the letter or the number of an imaginary pair. 
Your task in each case is to decide on a conclusion that necessarily follows from the 
statements. A conclusion is necessary if it must be true, giveii that the statements are trLie. 
A list of the possible answers is presented below each problem. You must tick one of the 
response conclusions for each pair of statements. For instance, in the example slio\ý 11 you 
might tick: 
3 The number is not 3 
If you think that no conclusion necessarily follows given that the statements are true, then 
you must tick the relevant box, for instance, that the number may or may not be a 3. Please 
do not make diagrams or notes during the task, and do not go back through the booklet once 
you have answered a problem If you have any questions about this task, please ask the 
experimenter now. If you understand these instructions, please turn over to the first 
problem out of 16. 
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Appendix A3 . 5: Experiment 5 Materials: Three-Term Series Spatial Inference 
Valid Problems Invalid Problems 
A is left of B %I is left of N 
B is left of CN is right of 0 
Thus, A is left of C Thus. invalid 
E is right of FR is right of S 
F is right of GS is left of T 
Thus, E is right of G Thus, invalid 
Y is right of XW is right of V 
Z is right of YX is left of 'A' 
Thus, X is left of Z Thus, invalid 
K is left of JG is left of F 
L is left of KH is right of G 
Thus, J is right of L Thus, invalid 
I is left of JP is left of Q 
K is right of JR is left of Q 
Thus, I is left of K Thus, invalid 
L is right of MQ is right of R 
N is left of MS is right of R 
Thus, N is left of L Thus, invalid 
T is left of SC is left of B 
T is right of UC is left of D 
Thus, S is right of U Thus, invalid 
W is right of VG is right of F 
W is left of XG is right of H 
Thus, V is left of X Thus, invalid 
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Appendix A3 . 6: Experiment 5 Instructions: Three-Term Series Spatial Inference 
In this task you will be asked about the relations bet,, veen letters in a set. You are presented 
with a booklet of 16 problems each describing the layout of a set of three letters. The 
descriptions will use the following terms to describe the lavouts of the letters: - 
left 
right 
Your task is to link two of the letters in the set using the above relations. You should 
imagine the three letters as if they were in front of you and then apply these relations to 
them. For some of the descriptions you may feel there is not enough information to 
determine the relation between the letters; in ýýhich case you should ansxver "Not valld". 
To remind you of the responses you might give, a list of all the possible ansxNers is given 
below each problem. You must tick the answer that you think is correct. For example. if 
you thought the answer was "F is left of P" then this is what voLi should tick. You ýxlll have 
10 seconds to answer each problem. The experimenter 1. vill let you lcno\ý- when to continue 
onto the next problem. You must not make diagrams or notes of any kind and do not look 
back to questions that you have already answered. If VOU understand these instructions, 
please wait before beginning the first problem. 
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Appendix A3 . 7: Experiment 5. Nlaterials: Multiple Quantification 
Mood - AB-BC 
Models - 1M 
All of the Js are in the same place as all of the Ks 
All of the Ks are in the same place as all of the Ls 
Thus 
All of the Js are in the same place as all of the Ls 
All of the Ps are in the same place as some of the Qs 
All of the Qs are in the same place as all of the Rs 
Thus 
All of the Ps are in the same place as all of the Rs 
All of the As are in the same place as some of the Bs 
All of the Bs are in the same place as some of the Cs 
Thus 
All of the As are in the same place as some of the Cs 
None of the Ts are in the same place as any of the Us 
Some of the Us are in the same place as all of the Vs 
Thus 
None of the Ts are in the same place as any of the Vs 
None of the Ds are in the same place as any of the Es 
All of the Es are in the same place as all of the Fs 
Thus 
None of the Ds are in the same place as any of the Fs 
Models - MM Determinate 
None of the Gs are in the same place as any of the Hs 
All of the Hs are in the same place as some of the Js 
Thus 
None of the Gs are in the same place as some of the Js 
Models - MM Indeterminate 
All of the Xs are in the same place as some of the Ys 
Some of the Ys are in the same place as all of the Zs 
Thus 
Not valid 
None of the Bs are in the same place as some of the Cs 
Some of the Cs are in the same place as all of the Ds 
Thus 
Not valid 
12 
Appendix A3 .7 (cont. ): Experiment 5 Materials: Multiple Quantification 
Mood - BA-CB 
Models - IM 
All of the Ws are in the same place as all of the Vs 
All of the Xs are in the same place as all of the Ws 
Thus 
All of the Xs are in the same place as all of the Vs 
Some of the Ss are in the same place as all of the Rs 
All of the Ts are in the same place as all of the Ss 
Thus 
All of the Ts are in the same place as all of the Rs 
Some of the Fs are in the same place as all of the Es 
Some of the Gs are in the same place as all of the Fs 
Thus 
Some of the Gs are in the same place as all of the Es 
Any of the Ls are in the same place as none of the Ks 
All of the Ms are in the same place as some of the Ls 
Thus 
Any of the Ms are in the same place as none of the Ks 
Any of the Os are in the same place as none of the Ns 
All of the Ps are in the same place as all of the Os 
Thus 
Any of the Ps are in the same place as none of the Ns 
Models - MM Determinate 
Any of the Rs are in the same place as none of the Qs 
Some of the Ss are in the same place as all of the Rs 
Thus 
Some of the Ss are in the same place as none of the Qs 
Models - MM Indeterminate 
Some of the Ds are in the same place as all of the Cs 
All of the Es are in the same place as some of the Ds 
Thus 
Not valid 
Some of the Gs are in the same place as none of the Fs 
All of the Hs are in the same place as some of the Gs 
Thus 
Not N alid 
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Appendix A3 . 8: Experiment 5 Instructions: Multiple Quantification 
In this task you be asked to solve 16 multiple quant1ficatlon problems. based on the 
same logic of syllogisms. A syllogism is a pair of statements providing you xvith 
information about the relationships betv, -een three classes. The three classes xvill be labelled 
by letters (e. g. Bs, Ps and Cs etc. ). On the basis of the information provided by the txN-o 
statements, you will be asked to draw a conclusion between two of the letters. One of the 
letters is common to both statements; your task is to produce a conclusion linking the 
other two letters. 
You will be presented with a total of 16 problems in this booklet, on separate pagcs. For 
each of these problems you are given two statements, for instance: - 
Some of the Ps are in the same place as some of the Bs 
Some of the Bs are in the same place as some of the Fs 
Thus 
In the above example, you are asked to find a logically valid conclusion that links the letters 
'P'and'F'. A conclusion is logically valid if it must follow givell that the statements are 
true. If a conclusion could but does not havc to or necessari Iy follwN, then it is not logical] y 
valid. You will be given a response conclusion .,, -Ith two gaps indicating where you must 
fill in a response. You must write the answer that you believe is the correct, and strongest 
conclusion to each problem (i. e. If the answer could be some... or all..., tick the stronger 
conclusion, all ... ). So, in the example given, you would 
be shown the following 
conclusion: - 
of the Ps are in the same place as of the Fs 
OR 
No Valid response 0 
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Appendix A3 .8 (cont. ): Experiment 5 Instructions: Multiple Quantification 
Your task is to fill in the two gaps with the correct quantifiers (all, some. none or any). for 
instance for the example above you might fill in the 
-, -, aps %ý-ith - some of the 
Ps are in the 
same place as some of the Fs. If you think that no one conclusion lo-, -, IcallIN- follows. then 
tick no valid conclusion. 
YOU SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THE CONCLt'SION WILL ALNVANS 
CONTAIN TWO OF THE FOLLOWING QUANTIFIERS: 
All of the ..... are in the same place as ..... 
Some of the ..... are in the same place as ..... 
None of the ..... are in the same place as ..... 
Any of the ..... are in the same place as ..... 
You also have the option of ticking'no valid conclusion' 
Please take your time and be certain you have the logically correct answer before stating it. 
If you have any questions, please ask them now, as the experimenter cannot answer after the 
task has commenced. You must not make notes or draw diagrams of any kind to aid N'ou in 
this task. Please do not look back at problems you ha%, e already completed. A practice 
problem will now be given to show you the format of each of the 16 problems. 
Practice problem 
All of the Cs are in the same place as some of the Ds 
None of the Ps are in the same place as any of the Cs 
Thus 
None of the Ps are in the same place as some of the Ds 
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APPENDIX B: Summary Tables Of Statistical Analyses: t-tests, ANOVAS. 
Correlations and Factor Anah-ses 
Appendix BI . 1: Experiment I Statistics: Summary Tables of t-tests 
Summary table of t-test to investigate syllogistic inference, model type: 1NI vs. NINI 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-lcý el 
Syll IM 
Syll MM 
8.778 
1.200 
1.363 
2.073 45 7.578 2.607 19.501 44 
. 
000001 
Summary table of t-test to investigate spatial inference, model type: IM vs. MM 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-lex-cl 
Spat IM 
Spat MM 
8.200 
5.978 
2.564 
2.572 45 2.222 2.883 5.170 44 . 000005 
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Appendix B1 . 2: Experiment 4 Statistics: Summary Tables of t-tests 
Summary table of Mest to investigate temporal inference N-s. spatial inference 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t dt' p-level 
Temporal 9.511 3.741 
Spatial 8.915 33 
.I ý9ý-, 
" 74 47 
. 596 2.8 561.430 46 
Summary table of t-test to investigate temporal inference, model type: INIvs. ININI 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df P-Ie\ýC] 
Temp IM 
Temp MM 
4.660 
4.512 
1.773 
1.999 47 
. 
149 1.268 
. 
805 46 
. 
42481 
Summary table of t-test to investigate temporal inference, model type: INI Nýs . IND 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-le\, cl 
Temp IM 
Temp IND 
4.660 
. 319 
1.773 
. 515 47 
4.340 1.659 17.940 46 . 000001 
Summary table of t-test to investigate temporal inference, model type: NIM vs. IND 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-level 
Temp MM 
Temp IND 
4.511 
. 319 
1.999 
. 515 
47 4.191 1.952 14.721 46 . 000001 
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Appendix BI .2 (cont. ): Experiment 4 Statistics: Summary Tables of t-tests 
Summary table of t-test to investigate spatial inference, model type: INI vs. NINI 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t dt' P-level 
Spat 1M4.468 2.009 
Spat MM 4.447 1.931 47 . 021 2.038 . 072 
46 . 94324 
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Appendix BI . 3: Experiment 5 Statistics: Summary Tables of t-tests 
Summary table of Mest to investigate simple spatial inference, model type: INM 
Invalid 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-level 
Simspat IM5.275 1.576 
Simspat INV 2.5 10 2.203 51 2.765 '1397 8.238 50 . 000001 
Summary table of t-test to investigate complex spatial inference, model type: IM vs. 
MM 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df P-1cvel 
Spat IM5.706 2.110 
Spat MM 4.059 2.044 51 1.647 2.3 3) 1 5.046 50 . 000006 
Summary table of t-testto investigate syllogistic inference, model type: IMv's. MM 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-level 
Syll IM6.608 1.650 
Syll MM 1.765 2.665 51 4.843 2.838 12.187 50 . 000001 
Summary table of t-test to investigate multiple quantification, model type: IM -,, s. NINI 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-level 
Multi IM6.098 1.330 
Multi MM 1.608 1.266 51 4.490 1.7133 18.718 50 . 000001 
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Appendix BI . 4: Experiment 6 Statistics: Summary Tables of t-tests 
Summary table of t-test to investigate simple spatial inference, model type: INI %, s. 
Invalid 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-level 
Simspat IM 
Simspat INV 
5.271 
2.833 
1.554 
2.137 48 2.4' )8 2.305 7.3 25 47 . 000001 
Summary table of t-test to investigate complex spatial inference, mod 
MM 
el type: I NI vs. 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-level 
Spat IM 
Spat MM 
5.271 
3.938 
1.854 
2.138 48 L) 3) 3 2.478 3.727 47 . 000519 
Summary table of t-test to investigate syllogistic inference, model type: IM vs. MM 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df p-level 
Syll IM 6.292 1.570 
Syll MM 1.729 2.181 48 4.563 2333 13.549 47 . 000001 
Summary table of t-test to investigate multiple quantification, model type: IM vs. MM 
Mean S. D. N Diff. S. D. Diff t df P-level 
Multi Im5.250 1.591 
Multi MM L292 1.110 48 3.958 1.957 14.017 47 . 000001 
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Appendix BI . 5: Experiment 2 Statistics: Summary Table of ANOVA 
Summary table of ANOVA to investigate modality and model type 
Summary of all effects where I= modality. 2= model 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F p-lc% Cl 
1 1 41.19 46 1.9306 2 1.3 ') 5 1) 0000 111 
2 1 129.45 46 2.5989 49.8067 . 000000 
12 1 3.60 46 . 8566 4.1976 . 046211 
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Appendix 131 . 6: Experiment 3 Statistics: Summary table of ANOVA 
Summary table of ANOVA to investigate modality and model type 
Summary of all effects where I= modality. 2= model. 
Effect df Effect MS effect df Error %IS Error F P-level 
1 1 8.27 45 1.9996 4.131,19 . 04 79 -56 
2 1 780.66 45 4.6798 166.8132 . 000000 
12 1 . 66 45 1.12433 . 5849 . 44 8 ') 83 
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Appendix B1 . 13: Experiments 1,2 and 3 Statistics: Niulti-Group Factor Analysis, 
Three-Factor Model 
EQS, A STRUCTURAL EQUATION PROGRAM \It-'LTI'\'. -\Rl.. \TE SoF I ý\ ARF. 
INC. COPYRIGHT BY P. M. BENTLER VERSION 5.7b (0 1985 - 1998. 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
I /TITLE 
2 Experiment I- Three factors 
3 /SPECIFICATIONS 
4 VARIABLES = 11, CASES = 45; METHOD ='\IL. MATRIX = CORR-, 
5 ANALYSIS = CORR; GROUP = 3-, 
6/LABELS 
7VI= ARROW; V2 = WORD; V3 = LETTER, V4 = TTT, V5 = VERBAL, 
8 V6 = SPATver; V7 = SYLI-ver, V8 = SPATvis. V9 = Sý'Ll, vis. VIO = LETTerr-, 
9VII= VERerr; 
10 /EQUATIONS 
II VI =+ 4*F2 +5*F3 +EE 
12 V2 =+ 10*Fl + 10*1`33 + E2, 
13 V3 =+0.15*F2 + l*F3 + E3, 
14 V4 =+ 4*F2 + 4*F3 + E4-, 
15 V5 =+ 8*Fl +I l*F3 + E5-ý 
16 V6 =+1.5*Fl + I*F2 + 2*F') + E6; 
17 V7 =+0.5*Fl + 0.5*F2 + 1.5*F3 + E7, 
18 V10 =+ *F3 + E10; 
19 VI I=+ *F3 +Ell; 
20 NARIANCES 
21 FI=1.00, 
22 F2 = 1.00-, 
23 F3 = 1.00-, 
24 El = *; 
25 E2 = 
26 E3 = 
27 E4 = 
28 E5 = 
29 E6 = 
30 E7 = 
11 E10 
32 El I=*-. 
33 /MATRIX 
34 1 
-3 
5 0.23 1 
"10.42 1 )6 0.3 
17 0.0 8 0.3 9 0.5 51 3 
59 0.37 031 1 )8 0.11 0. - 
-ýq 
0.10 0.50 0-4 0.48 0. '16 1 
429 
40 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.10 0.30 0.27 1 
41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
43 -0.12 -0.22 -0.27 -0.28 -0.40 -0.17 -0.16 0.00 0.00 1 
44 0.08 -0.20 -0.29 -0.25 -0.30 -0.28 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.48 1 
45 /STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
46 10.26 15.43 1.10 8.26 17.00 4.25 2.335 0.00 0.00 5.91 5.633 
47 /TECHNICAL 
48 ITR = 50, 
49 /END 
49 CUMULATED RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ (GROUP 1) 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
50 /TITLE 
51 Experiment 2- Three factors 
52 /SPECIFICATIONS 
53 VARIABLES = 11, CASES = 47, METHOD = ML; MATRIX = CORR, 
54 ANALYSIS = CORR; 
55 /LABELS 
56 VI = ARROW, V2 = WORD; V-3 = LETTER; V4 = TTT, V5 = VERBAI, -. 
57 V6 = SPATver, V7 = SYLLver; V8 = SPATvis-, V9 = SYLLvls-, V 10 = LETTerr, 
58 VII= VERerr, 
59 /EQUATIONS 
60 VI =+ 4*F2 + 5*F3 + El, 
61 V2 ý+ 10*Fl + 10*F3 + E2-, 
62 V4 =+ 4*F2 + 4*F3 + E4ý 
63 V5 =+ 8*Fl +I I*F3 + E5, 
64 V6 =+1.5*Fl +I *F2 + 2*F3 + E6; 
65 V8= +2*Fl + 0.5*F2 + 2*F3 + E8; 
66 /VARIANCES 
67 Fl = 1.00, 
68 F2 = 1.00; 
69 F3 = 1.00; 
70 El = *, 
71 E2 = 
72 E4 = 
73 E5 = 
74 E6 = 
75 E8 = 
76 /MATRIX 
77 1 
78 0.28 1 
79 0.000.001 
80 0.19 0.40 0.00 1 
81 0.10 0.64 0.00 0.41 1 
82 0.520.30 0.00 0.46 0-36 1 
83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
84 0. -15 
0.14 0.00 0.41 0.24 0.69 0.00 1 
85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
4-3 0 
87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
88 /STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
89 9.53 16.56 0.00 5.19 17.96 33.75 0.00 '). 1') 0.00 0.00 0.00 
90 JECHNICAL 
91 ITR = 50; 
92 /END 
92 CUMULATED RECORDS OF fNPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ (GROLTP I) 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
93 /TITLE 
94 Experiment 3- Three factors 
95 /SPECIFICATIONS 
96 VARIABLES = 11, CASES = 46; METHOD = ML; MATRIX = CORR; 
97 ANALYSIS = CORR; 
98 /LABELS 
99 VI ARROW; V2 WORD; V3 = LETTER: V4 = TTT: V5 = VERBA L: 
100 V6 SPATver; V7 SYLLver, V8 = SPATN'ls-, V9 ý SY1,1-vis: VIO = LETTerr; 
101 VI I= VERerr; 
102 /EQUATIONS 
103 VI + 4*F2 + 5*F) + El, 
104 V2 = +I O*F I +I O*F3 + E2. 
105 V3 = +0.15*F2+ 1*1`3 +E3-, 
106 V4 =+ 4*F2 + 4*F3 + E4-, 
107 V5 =+ 8*Fl +II *F3 + E5, 
108 V7 =+0.5*Fl + 0.5*F2 + 1.5*F3 + F7; 
109 V9 = +0.05*FI+2*F2 +')*F3 +E9-, 
110 VIO =+ *F3 + E10; 
III NARIANCES 
112 Fl = 1.00; 
113 F2 = 1.00, 
114 F3 = 1.00; 
115 El = *: 
116 E2 = 
117 E3 = 
118 E4 = 
119 E5 = 
120 E6 = 
121 E7 = 
122 E9 = 
123 E10 
124 /MATRIX 
125 1 
126 0.26 1 
1-2 7 0.47 0.41 1 
1-18 0.40 0.30 0.49 1 
129 0.31 0.66 0.48 0.315 1 
110 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 I 
131 0.50 0.57 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.00 1 
Iv) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
43 1 
133 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.21 0.50 0.00 0.66 0.00 1 
134 -0.24 -0.26 -0.33 -0.08 -0.332 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.06 1 135 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
136 /STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
137 11.08 18.68 1.25 5.07 19.11 0.00 2.73 0.00 3.74 7.21 0.00 
138 /TECHNICAL 
139 ITR = 50; 
140 /LMTEST 
141 XONSTRAINT 
142 (1, VI. F')) = (2. VI. F3) = ('). Vl. F')): 
143 (1, V2, F3) = (2. V2, F-')) = (3. V2. F3). 
144 (1, V3, F3) = (), V3, F3); 
145 (1, V4, F3) = (2, V4, F3) = (-)', V4. F3); 
146 (1, V5, F3) = (2, V5, F3) = (3. V5, F3), 
147 (1 ýV6,1`3) = (2, V6, F3), 148 (1, V7, F3) = QýWý1`3), 
149 (1, V I 0, F3) = (3, V I 0, F3); 
150 (1, V 1, F2) = (2, V 1, F2) = (' ), V I Y2); 
151 (1, V2, Fl) = (2, V2, Fl) = Q. V2,1`1)ý 
152 (1, V3, F2) = (1V3Y2); 
153 (1, V4, F2) = (2, V4, F2) = (3), V4. F-2), 
154 (1, V5, Fl) = (2, V5, Fl) = (3, V5, Fl)ý 
155 (1, V6, F 1) = (2, V6, F I), 
156 (1, V7, Fl) = (3. V7, F I), 
157 (1, V6, F2) = (2, VU2)-, 
158 (LV7,1`22) = (3, W, F2)ý 
159 (1, EI, El) = (1ELEI) = (3, ELEl): 
160 (1, E2, E2) = (2, E2, F2) = (3. E2. E2), 
161 (1, E3, E3) = 
162 (1, E4,1`4) = (2. F4, E4) = (3, E4. F4). 
163 (1, E5, E5) = (1E5, E5) = (3, E5, E5)-, 
164 (1, E6, E6) = (2, E6, E6), 
165 (1, E7. E7) = (3, E7, E7)-, 
166 (LE10, E10) = (3, E10. E10), 
167 /END 
167 CUMULATED RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ (GROUP 3) 
CORRELATION MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 9 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM 
II VARIABLES) BASED ON 45 CASES. 
WARNING *** STATISTICS MAY NOT BE MEANINGFUL 
DUE TO ANALYZING CORRELATION MATRIX 
ARROW WORD LETTER 
vI V2 V3 
ARROW V1 1.000 
WORD V2 0.230 1.000 
I-ETTER V3 0.310 0.420 1.000 
TTT V4 0.080 0.390 0.550 
VF. RBAL V5 0.110 0.590 0.370 
432 
TTT VERBAL 
V4V5 
1.000 
0.3 10 1.000 
SPATVER V6 0.100 0.500 0.240 0.480 0.360 
SYLLVER V7 0.430 0.400 0.370 0.100 0.300 
LETTERR VIO -0.120 -0.220 -0.270 -0. -180 -0.4()(-) VERERR VII 0.080 -0.200 -0.290 -o. iýO -0.3100 
SPATVER SYLLVER LETTERR 
V6 V7v 10 
SPATVER V6 1.000 
SYLLVER V7 0.270 1.000 
LETTERR VIO -0.170 -0.160 1.000 
VERERR V 11 -0.280 -0.040 0.480 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES =9 
DEPENDENTV'S: 1234567 10 11 
VERERR 
V 11 
1.000 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = I' 
INDEPENDENT F'S: 123 
INDEPENDENTE'S: 1234567 10 11 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 27 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS = 12 
CORRELATION MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 6 VARIABLP, (SELECTED FROM 
II VARIABLES) BASED ON 47 CASES. 
***WARNING*** STATISTICS MAY NOT BE MEANINGFUL 
DUE TO ANALYZING CORRELATION MATRIX 
ARROW WORD TTT VERBAL SPATVER 
VI V2 V4 V V6 
ARROW V 1 1.000 
WORD V 2 0.280 1.000 
TTT V 4 0.190 0.400 1.000 
VERBAL V 5 0.100 0.640 0.410 1.000 
SPATVER V 6 0.520 0.300 0.460 0.360 1.000 
SPATVIS V 8 0.250 0.140 0.410 0.240 0.690 
SPATVIS 
V8 
SPATVIS V81.000 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES =6 
DEPENDENT V'S: 124568 
NUMBER OF INDI, PFNDENT VARIABLES =9 
INDEPENDENT F'S: I ') ý 
43) 1 
INDEPENDENT E'S: 124568 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 220 NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARA\ I F-J-f" RS=9 
CORRELATION MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 8 VARIABLES (SELEC FED FRO',, \l II VARIABLES) BASED ON 46 CASES. 
***WARNING*** STATISTICS MAY NOT BE l\lFANl\i(jFt'L 
DUE TO ANALYZING CORRELATIO'N'%I. ATRIX 
ARROW VI 
WORD V2 
LETTER V3 
TTT V4 
VERBAL V5 
SYLLVER V7 
SYLLVIS V9 
LETTERR VIO 
SYLLVER V7 
SYLLVIS V9 
LETTERR VIO 
ARROW 
vI 
1.000 
0.260 
0.470 
0.400 
0.310 
0.500 
0.450 
-0.240 
SYLLVER 
V7 
1.000 
0.660 
-0.200 
WORD LETTER TTT VERBAL 
v2 V3 V4 x- 
1.000 
0.410 1.000 
0.300 0.490 1.000 
0.660 0.480 0. i50 1.000 
0.570 0.460 0.450 0.450 
0.440 0.470 0. --110 0.500 
-0.260 -0.330 -0.080 -0.320 
SYLLVIS LETTERR 
v9v 10 
1.000 
-0.060 1.000 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES =8 
DEPENDENT V'S :1234579 10 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 12 
INDEPENDENT F'S: 123 
INDEPENDENT E'S :12345679 10 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 26 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS 
3RD STAGE OF COMPUTATION REQUIRED 23755 WORDS OF MEMORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATED 100000 WORDS 
" E-0 I DFTERMIN. /kNT OF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP I IS 0.6598) 
DETERMINANTOF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP 21S 0.11548E+00 
DETERMINAN I- OF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP ý is 0.39878E-01 
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MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS. INFOR'\IA-f 10\ IN GROUP I 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES APPEAR IN ORDER, 
NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS WERE ENCOI--'NTERFD DL-'RIN('j OPTI, %11/-\TIO\'. 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA): 
ARROW WORD LETTER TTT VERBAL 
VI V2 V3 V4 V 
ARROW V1 0.000 
WORD V2 0.018 0.000 
LETTER V3 -0.108 0.045 -0.008 
TTT V4 -0.176 0.008 0.158 0.000 
VERBAL V5 -0.103 -0.042 -0.007 -0.074 0.000 
SPATVER V6 -0.224 0.125 -0.243 0.030 -0-019 
SYLLVER V7 -0.006 -0.013 -0.076 -0.200 -0.113 
LETTERR V 10 0.027 0.058 -0.011 -0.016 -0.120 
VERERR V 11 0.234 0.093 -0.018 0.027 -0.006 
SPATVER SYLLV ER LETTERR VERERR 
V6 V7 V 10 VII 
SPATVER V6 -0.012 
SYLLVER V7 -0.051 0.007 
LETTERR VIO 0.148 0.023 0.000 
VERERR V11 0.054 0.152 0.278 - 0.003 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVA RIANCE RESIDUAL S 0.0697 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS 0.0862 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
ARROW WORD LETTER TTT VERBAL 
VI V2 V3 V4 V5 
ARROW V1 0.000 
WORD V2 0.018 0.000 
LETTER V3 -0.108 0.045 -0.008 
TTT V4 -0.176 0.008 0.158 0.000 
VERBAL V5 -0.103 -0.042 -0.007 -0.074 0.000 
SPATVER V6 -0.224 0.125 -0.243 0.030 -0.019 
SYLLVER V7 -0.006 -0.013 -0.076 -0.200 -0.113 
LETTERR V 10 0.027 0.058 -0.011 -0.016 -0.120 
VERERR VII 0. )4 0.093 -0.018 0.027 -0.006 
SPATVER SYLLVER LETTERR VERERR 
V6 V7 10 VII 
SPA IXFR N' 6 -0.01-1 
4') 5 
SYLLVER V7 -0.051 0.007 
LETTERR VIO 0.148 0.0213 
VERERR V 11 0.054 0.152 
0.000 
0.278 -0.003 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0697 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDU. -\LS - 
0.0862 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS. INFORMATION IN GROUP I 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
VI IN 10 V 6, V 3VI IN IV6, V IV7, V 4 
0.278 -0.243 0.2 34 -0.224 -0.200 
V 4, V IV4, V 3VI IN 7VI ON 6V6, V 2' 
-0.176 0.158 0.152 0.148 0.125 
V 10, V 5V TV 5V 3N IV 5N IVI IN 2 
-0.120 -0.113 -0.108 -0.103 0.093 
V TV 3V 5N 4VI ON 2VI IN 6V TV 6 
-0.076 -0.074 0.058 0.054 -0.051 
DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
20- 
15- 
RANGE FREQ 
11 -0.5 
12 -0.4 
3 -0.3) - 
1 1.4 -0.2 - 
10- -0.1 - 
6 0.0 - 
17 0.1 - 
1 18 0.2 - 
9 0.3 - 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0. -, 
436 
0 
0 
0 
5 
19 
1-1 
4 
2 
PERCENT 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
6.67% 
11.11% 
42.22% 
26.67% 
8.89% 
4.44% 
5- A 0.4 - 0.3 0 0.0000 
B 0.5 - 0.4 0 0.00% 
I! C ++ - o. ý 0 0.00% 
------------------------------- 
TOTAL 45 100.0000 
---------------------------------------- 
123456789ABC EACH "*" REPRESENTS I RESIM'AL, 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TES I 
STATISTICS 
ARROW =Vl = -. 573*F2 +. 334*F) +1.000EI 
. 122 . 113 
-4.686 2.957 
WORD =V2 = . 480*Fl +. 635*F3 +1.000 E-2 
. 112 . 100 
4.297 6.328 
LETTER =V3 = -. 386*F2 +. 590*F3 +1.000 E3 
. 127 . 114 
-3.027 5.158 
TTT =V4 = -. 096*F2 +. 602*F, +1.000 F4 
. 
115 
. 
086 
-. 839 7.000 
VERBAL =V5 = . 473*Fl +. 638*F3 +1.000 
E5 
. 111 . 100 
4.2 526.382 
SPATVER=V6 = -. 177*Fl 
. 1-)-) 
-1.454 
SYLLVER=V7 = . 310*Fl 
. 118 
2.625 
1 -3 +1.000 
E6 -. 14'*F2 +. 725*F, 
159 . 
101 
-. 901 7.194 
- . 518*F2 + . 
416*F3 +1.000 E7 
. 105 . 
120 
-4.919 3.4 83 
LETTERR=VIO= -. 438*F3 +I. OOOEIO 
. 113 
--1.887 
VERERR =VI 1=-. 461 *F3 +I. 000 EI 1 
. 158 
--1.927 
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VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT %'. -\RIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
VF 
I Fl - Fl 1.000 
I F2 - F2 1.000 
I F3 - F3 1.000 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
D 
EI -ARROW . 
560* 
. 
117 
4.779 
E2 - WORD . 
366* 
. 
090 
4.058 
E3 -LETTER . 
511 
. 
104 
4.922 
E4 - TTT . 
629* 
. 
087 
7.23) 1 
E5 -VERBAL . 
369* 
. 
089 
4.126 
E6 -SPATVER . 
436* 
. 
088 
4"7 
. 
9. ) 
E7 -SYLLVER . 
454* 
. 
088 
5.187 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
438 
E 10 -LETTERR . 808* 
. 129 
6.238 
EII -VERERR . 790* 
. 181 
4.362 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: R-SQUARED 
ARROW =VI - . 573*F2 +. 3')4*F3 + . 749 El . 440 WORD =V2 = . 480*FI +. 635*F') + . 605 E2 . 634 LETTER =V3 =- . 384*F2 + . 588*F3 + . 712 E3 . 494 TTT =V4 =- . 096*F2 + . 602*F3 +. 793 E4 .3 71 VERBAL =V5 = . 473*Fl + . 638*F3 + . 608 E5 . 63 1 SPATVER =V6 =- . 176*Fl -. 142*F2 +. 720*F3 + . 656 E6 .570 SYLLVER =V7 = . 312*Fl -. 520*F'- +. 418*F3 + . 676 E7 5 433 LETTERR =V10 = -. 438*F3 +. 899 E10 . 19-1 VERERR =Vll = -. 460*F3 +. 888 Ell . 212 
---------------- 
---------------- 
------------ 
END 
------------ 
---------------------------- 
OF METHOD 
---------------------------- 
----------------------- 
----------------------- 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
PARAMETER CONDITION CODE 
E8, E8 CONSTRAINED AT LOWER BOUND 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA): 
ARROW WORD TTT VERBAL SPATVER 
VI V2 V4 V5 V6 
ARROW V 1 0.000 
WORD V 2 0.068 0.000 
TTT V 4 -0.066 0.018 0.000 
VERBAL V 5 -0.113 0.008 0.026 0.000 
SPATVER V 6 0.196 -0.075 0.010 -0.019 -0.012 
SPATVIS V 8 0.085 -0.069 -0.042 0.0224 0.045 
SPATVIS V8 
SPATVIS 
V8 
0.0111 
43 9 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RFSIDt'. -\LS = 0. ()4-", AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONALABSOLUTF COVAIýI. ANCE RESIDU. -\I-'. -, 0.0576 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
ARROW WORD TTT VERBAL SPAT\TR 
VI V2 V4 V v6 
ARROW V1 0.000 
WORD V2 0.068 0.000 
TTT V4 -0.066 0.018 0.000 
VERBAL V5 -0.113 0.008 0.026 0.000 
SPATVER V6 0.196 -0.075 0.010 -0.019 -0.012 
SPATVIS V8 0.085 -0.069 -0.042 0.024 0.045 
SPATVIS V8 
SPATVIS 
V8 
0.013 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0423 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUAI. S 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 6, V IV5, V IV 8N IV 6N 2V8, V 2 
0.196 -0.113 0.085 -0.075 -0.069 
V 2N IV4, V IV8, V 6V8, V 4V 5N 4 
0.068 -0.066 0.045 -0.042 0.026 
V 8, V 5V6, V 5V 4N 2V8, V 8V 6N 6 
0.024 -0.019 0.018 0.013 -0.012 
V 6, V 4V5, V 2V IN IV 5N 5V2. V 2 
0.010 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
= 0.0576 
440 
DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIM'ALS 
------- 
1 
20- 
---------- --------------- 
1 
-------- 
RANGE FREQ 
15- 
1 -0.5 - -- 0 
-0.4 - -0.5 0 
0.3 - -0.4 0 
4 -0.2 - -0.3 0 
10- 5 -0.1 - -0.2 1 
6 0.0 - -0.1 10 
7 0.1 - 0.0 9 
8 0.2 - 0.1 1 
9 0.3 - 0.2 0 
5- A 0.4 - 0.3 0 
B 0.5 - 0.4 0 
C ++ - 0.5 0 
------------------ ------ ------- 
------- ---------- --------------- 
TOTAL 
-------- 
21 
PERCENT 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.00% 
4.76"o 
47.6-",, o 
42.860o 
4.760o 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
123456789ABC EACH"" REPRESENTS I RESIDUALS 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST 
STATISTICS 
ARROW =Vl = -. 573*F2 +. 334*F3 +1.000 El 
. 122 . 113 
-4.686 2.957 
WORD =V2 = . 480*Fl +. 635*F3 +1.000 
E2 
. 112 . 100 
4.297 6.328 
TTT =V4 = -. 096*F2 +. 602*F3 +1.000 E4 
. 11-5 . 086 
-. 839 7.000 
VERBAL =V5 = . 47i*Fl +. 6)8*F3 +1.000 E5 
. 111 . 100 4.2 -5 -1 6.3 82 
sP, ATVER--Vo = -. 177*Fl -. 1433*F2 +. 725*F33 +I. OOOE6 
441 
. 
122 
. 
159 
. 
101 
-1.454 -. 901 7.194 
SPATVIS=V8 = -. 594*Fl +. 165*F2 +. 778*F') +I. OOOE8 
. 
154 
. 
240 
. 
13 5 
-3.871 . 
690 5.782 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
v F 
I Fl - Fl 1.000 
I F2 - F2 1.000 
I 
I F3 - F3 1.000 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
E D 
El -ARROW . 
560* 
. 
117 
4.779 
E2 - WORD . 
366* 
. 
090 
4.058 
E4 - TTT . 
629* 
. 
087 
7.231 
E5 -VERBAL . 
369* 
. 
089 
4.126 
E6 -SPATVER . 
436* 
. 
088 
4.93 7 
442 
E8 -SPATVIS ooo* 
019 
000 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: 
ARROW 
vI 
0.000 
0.048 
0.052 
0.144 
0.097 
0.064 
-0.022 
-0.0933 
ARROW =Vl = -. 573*F2 +. 334*F3 +. 749 El . 440 WORD =V2 = . 480*Fl + . 635*F3 + . 605 E2 . 634 TTT =V4 = -. 096*F2 +. 602*F-)' +. 793 F4 . _3 
71 
VERBAL =V5 = . 473*Fl +. 638*F3 +. 608 E5 .6 3' 1 SPATVER =V6 = -. 176*Fl -. 142*F2 + . 720*F3 +. 656 E6 . 570 SPATVIS =V8 = -. 599*Fl +. 166*F2 +. 784*F3 +. 000 E8 1.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
END OF METHOD 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP 33 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
PARAMETER CONDITION CODE 
E6, E6 CONSTRAINED AT LOWER BOUND 
E9, E9 CONSTRAINED AT LOWER BOUND 
ALL EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS WERE CORRECTLY IMPOSED 
E6, E6 VARIANCE OF PARAMETER ESTIMATE IS SET TO ZERO. 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA): 
ARROW V I 
WORD V 2 
LETTER V 3 
TTT V 4 
VERBAL V 5 
SYLLVER V 7 
SYLLVIS V 9 
LETTERR V 10 
WORD LETTER TTT VERBAL 
V2V3V4V5 
0.000 
0.035 
-0.082 
0.028 
0.157 
0.049 
0.018 
-0.008 
0.098 
0.103 
0.014 
0.101) 
-0.071 
R-SQt'ARFD 
0.000 
-0.034 
0.150 
0.058 
0.184 
SYLLVER SYLLVIS LETTERR 
V7 \' 9V 10 
0.000 
0.0 37 
0.114 
-0.040 
443 
SYLLVER V70.007 
SYLLVIS V90.020 
LETTERR VIO -0.017 
0.020 
-0-001 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE PESIf)L'. -\f-S = 0.0547 AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONALABSOLUTF COVARIANCE Rf,, "Sll)t'. \I. '-, 0.0690 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
ARROW WORD LETTER TTT 
VI V2 V3 V4 V 
ARROW V1 0.000 
WORD V2 0.048 0.000 
LETTER V3 0.052 0.035 -0.008 
TTT V4 0.144 -0.082 0.098 0.000 
VERBAL V5 0.097 0.028 0.103 -0.034 0.000 
SYLLVER V7 0.064 0.157 0.014 0.150 0.037 
SYLLVIS V9 -0.022 0.049 0.103 0.058 0.114 
LETTERR VIO -0.093 0.018 -0.071 0.184 -0.040 
SYLLVER SYLLVIS LETTER R 
V7 V9 V 10 
SYLLVER V7 0.007 
SYLLVIS V9 0.020 0.020 
LETTERR VIO -0.017 -0.001 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0547 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 10, V 4V TV 2V TV 4V 4N IV 9N 5 
0.184 0.157 0.150 0.144 0.114 
V 9N 3V 5N 3V 4N 3V5. V IV ION 1 
0.103 0.103 0.098 0.097 -0.093 
V 4, V 2V ION 3V7, V IV9. V 4V 31N 1 
-0.082 -0.071 0.064 0.058 0.052 
V 9, \" -' 
X' 2N 1 VION 5V TV 5Vi. V 2' 
0.049 0.048 -0.040 0.0 7 0.0 ý 
= 0.0690 
444 
DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDt-'ALS 
20- 
I I RANGE FREQ PERCENT 
15- 
I I 1 -0. ý- -- 0 0.00% 
2 -0.4 - -0.5 0 0.00% 
1 1 3 -0.3) - -0.4 0 0.00% 
4 -0.2 - -0.3 0 0.00% 
10- 5 -0.1 - -0.2 0 0.0000 
6 0.0 - -0.1 13 36.11 0o 
7 0.1 - 0.0 16 44.440o 
8 0.2 - 0.1 7 19.441ý o 
1 1 9 0.3 - 0.2 0 0.00% 
5- A 0.4 - 0.3 0 0.00% 
B 0.5 - 0.4 0 0.0000 
C' ++ - 0.5 0 0.0000 
---- ------------ -------- ------- 
TOTAL 36 100.00% 
---------------- 
12345 
---- 
6 
-------------------- 
789ABC EACH "*" REPRESENTS I RESIDUALS 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST 
STATISTICS 
ARROW =Vl -. 573*F2 + . 3)4*F. )' + 1.000 El 
. 122 . 113 
-4.686 2.957 
WORD =V2 . 480*Fl + . 
635*F3 + 1.000 E2 
. 112 . 100 
4.297 6.328 
LETTER =V3 -. 386*F2 + . 590*F3 + 
1.000 E 
. 127 . 114 
-3.027 5.158 
TTT =V4 -. 096*F-I + . 
602*F3 + 1.000 F4 
. 
086 
-. 8'9 7.000 
445 
VERBAL =V5 = . 
473*Fl + AIR*V', 4- 1 ()()[) 17 . 7, 
. 100 4.252 6.382 
SYLLVER =V7 . )IO*Fl - . 518*F2 + .4 16 * F-1 
. 118 . 105 . 1-10 2.625 -4.919 3.4 8.3' 
+ 1.000 E7 
SYLLVIS =V9 . 
637*Fl - . 
746*F-' + I34*F'3 
. 
155 
. 
144 
. 
154 
4.096 -5-185 . 
871 
+ 1.000 E9 
LETTERR =V 10 -. 438*F3 + 1.000 EIO 
. 113 
-3.887 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
v F 
I Fl - Fl 1.000 
I F2 - F2 1.000 
I F3 - F3 1.000 
I 
I 
I I 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
ED 
. 
560* 
. 
117 
446 
4.779 
E2 - WORD . 366* 
. 090 
4.058 
E3 -LETTER 
E4 - TTT 
E5-VERBAL 
. 511* 
. 104 
4.922 
. 629* 
. 087 
7.23 )I 
. 369* 
. 089 
4.126 
E6 - . 000* 
. 000 
: 0000000.000 
E7 - . 454* 
. 088 5.187 
E9 - . 
000* 
. 
024 
. 
000 
EIO - . 808* 
. 129 6.238 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
R-SQUARED 
ARROW =Vl - . 573*F2 +. 
334*F3 +. 749 El . 440 
WORD =V2 . 480*Fl + . 
635*F3 +. 605 E2 .634 
LETTER =V3 - . 384*F2 + . 
588*F3 +. 712 E3 . 494 
TTT =V4 - . 096*F2 + . 
602*F3 +. 793 E4 -3 71 
VERBAL =V5 . 473*Fl +. 
638*F) +. 608 E5 . 631 
SYLLVER =V7 . 312*Fl - . 520*F2 +. 
418*F3 +. 676 E7 .5 433 
SYLLVIS =V9 . 644*Fl - . 75-33*F2 +. 
135*F3 +. 000 E9 1.000 
LETTERR =V10 -. 438*F3 +. 899 EIO . 19-, 
---------------- ------------ END 
------------ 
OF M 
---------------- 
ETHOD 
----------------------- 
---------------- ------------ ------------ ---------------- 
44 
----------------------- 
7 
STATISTICS FOR MULTIPLE POP ULATIONANA1, YSIS 
ALL EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS WERE CORRECTLYINIPOSI-D 
*** WARNING *** TEST RESULTS MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATE M'E TO 
CONDITION CODE 
GOODNESS OF FIT SUMMARY 
INDEPENDENCE MODEL CHI-SQUARE 363.893 ON 79 DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 205.89278 INDEPENDENCE CAW= -104. '160-'6 
MODEL AIC = -65.7313 5 MODEL CAIC = -'124-93009 
CHI-SQUARE = 66.269 BASED ON 66 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTICIS 0.467-56 
BENTLER-BONETT NORMED FIT INDEX= 0.818 
BENTLER-BONETT NONNORMFD FIT INDEX= 0.999 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX WFI) 0.999 
ITERATIVE SUMMARY 
PARAMETER 
ITERATION ABS CHANGE ALPHA FUNCTION 
1 1.504200 1.00000 6.78130 
2 0.804048 1.00000 3.76480 
3 0.369785 1.00000 1.89001 
4 0.272837 1.00000 1.59240 
5 0.367499 0.50000 1.33348 
6 0.211601 1.00000 0.77847 
7 0.114526 1.00000 0.56235 
8 0.057159 1.00000 0.51060 
9 0.023945 1.00000 0.49483 
10 0.013211 1.00000 0.49204 
11 0.006159 1.00000 0.49121 
12 0.003578 1.00000 0.49097 
13 0.001731 1.00000 0.49090 
14 0.000977 1.00000 0.49088 
LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER TEST (FOR RELEASING CONSTRAINTS) 
CONSTRAINTS TO BE RELEASED ARE: 
CON'STRAINTS FROM GROUP ') 
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CONSTR: 1 (I. VI. F-'3)-(2. VI. F-i)= 0: 
CONSTR: 2 
CONSTR: 3 (I. V2ýF3)-(2. V2. F'»= 0: 
CONSTR: 4 
CONSTR: 5 (1, V3, F3)-(i. V3. F i)= O. 
CONSTR: 6 (1, V4.1-- 3»-(2. V4. F 3)= O: 
CONSTR: 7 
CONSTR: 8 (I. V5, F3)-(2. V5, F i)= 0; 
CONSTR: 9 (1 
CONSTR: 10 (I. V6, F'»-(2. V6, F3) =0: 
CONSTR: 11 (1 ýV7, F3)-(' ). V7. F3) =0; CONSTR: 12 (IN 1 0, F' »-(3, V 1 0, F 3)=0, 
CONSTR: 13 (I. V 1 ýF2)-(2. VI. F2) =0. CONSTR: 14 (1, Vl, F2)-(3ýVI. F2) =0. 
CONSTR: 15 (1, V2, F 1)-(2. V2, F 1) =01- 
CONSTR: 16 (LV2T 1)-(3. V2. F 1) =0. 
CONSTR: 17 (I. V3, F2)-(i, V' ) 12K 0, 
CONSTR: 18 (1 ýV4, F2)-(2ýV4. F2) =0. CONSTR: 19 (1, V4, F2)-(-' ), V4ýF2) =0-ý 
CONSTR: 20 (LV5T 1)-(2ýV-5ýF 1) =0; 
CONSTR: 21 (1 N5, F 1)-(' )N5T 1) =0ý 
CONSTR: 22 (1, V6, F 1)-(2, V6, F 1) =0; 
CONSTR: 23 (IN71 1)-(-i NT F 1) =0; 
CONSTR: 24 (1 ýV6ýF2)-(2, V6, F2) =0; CONSTR: 25 (1, V7, F2)-(-i, V7, F2) =0, 
CONSTR: 26 (1 ýE 1 ýE1)-(2. EI T 1) =O, CONSTR: 27 (1 ýE U l, E 1) =O, CONSTR: 28 (1, E2ýE2)-(2ýl-ý-'1, E2) =0ý 
CONSTR: 29 (1 ýE2, E2)-(i, E2. E2) =0ý CONSTR: 30 (LE i, E i)-(3ýE iýF--'» =0, 
CONSTR: 31 (1, E4ýE4)-('-2ýE4, E4) =0-ý 
CONSTR: 32 (1, E4, E4)-(3, E4, E4) =0. 
CONSTR: 33 (1, E5, E5)-(2, F-5, E5) =0, 
CONSTR: 34 (1 E5, E5)-(i, E5, E5) =0. 
CONSTR: 35 (1, E6, E6)-(2, E6. E6) =0; 
CONSTR: 36 (1, E7, E7)-(3, E7ýE7) =0-ý 
CONSTR: 37 (LE 1 0, E 1 0)-(3, E 1 OT 1 0)=0-, 
UNIVARIATE TEST STATISTICS: 
NO CONSTRAINT CHI-SQUARE PROBABILITY 
1 CONSTR: 1 0.263 0.608 
2 CONSTR: 2 0.8 42 0.359 
CONSTR: 0 -25 5 0.613 
4 CONSTR: 4 0.003 0.959 
ý CONSTR: ý 0.0 il i 0.8 5 -5 6 C0' \"-, l' 1 x' : 6 0.047 0.829 
7 CONSTR: 7 0.092 0.762 
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8 CONSTR: 8 0.095 0.7-58 
9 CONSTR: 9 0.027 0.870 
10 CONSTR: 10 0.027 0.871 
11 CONSTR: 11 0.582 0.446 
12 CONSTR: 12 0.002 0 .96 -3 13 CONSTR: 13 0.005 0.946 
14 CONSTR: 14 0.351 0.554 
15 CONSTR: 15 0.603 0.4 17 
16 CONSTR: 16 0.022 0.8 83' 
17 CONSTR: 17 0.148 0.701 
18 CONSTR: 18 0.478 0.489 
19 CONSTR: 19 1.375 0. -141 20 CONSTR: 20 0.164 0.686 
21 CONSTR: 21 0.177 0.674 
22 CONSTR: 22 1.659 0.198 
23 CONSTR: 23 0.027 0.869 
24 CONSTR: 24 3.613 0.057 
25 CONSTR: 25 0.514 0.474 
26 CONSTR: 26 0.290 0.590 
27 CONSTR: 27 0.063 0.801 
28 CONSTR: 28 0.007 0.9 14 
29 CONSTR: 29 0.032 0.859 
30 CONSTR: 30 0.734 0.39-' 
31 CONSTR: 31 0.075 0.784 
32 CONSTR: 32 0.000 0.983 
33 CONSTR: 33 0.001 0.980 
34 CONSTR: 34 0.384 0.535 
35 CONSTR: 35 3.193 0.074 
36 CONSTR: 36 0.493 0.48 1 
37 CONSTR: 37 0.000 0.994 
CUMULATIVE MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS UNIVARIATE INCREMENT 
STEP PARAMETER CHI-SQUARE D. F. PROBABILITY CHI-SQUARE 
PROBABILITY 
1 CONSTR: 24 3.613 1 0.057 3.613 0.057 
2 CONSTR: 35 7.226 2 0.027 3.613 0.057 
3 CONSTR: 22 12.483 3 0.006 5.256 0.022 
4 CONSTR: 10 13.834 4 0.008 1.351 0.245 
5 CONSTR: 19 15.052 5 0.010 1.219 0.270 
6 CONSTR: 2 15.811 6 0.015 0.759 0.384 
7 CONSTR: 11 17.082 7 0.017 1.270 0.260 
8 CONSTR: 20 17.889 8 0.022 0.807 0.369 
9 CONSTR: 25 18.677 9 0.028 0.788 0.375 
10 CONSTR: 14 19.228 10 0.037 0.550 0.458 
1 CONSTR: 27 19.759 11 0.049 0. ý 0.466 
1 -, CONSTR: 
6 220.163 12 0.064 0.404 0.525 
13 CONSTR: il 20.654 13 0.080 0.491 0.48 i 
14 CONSTR: 7 21-089 14 0.099 0.4 
-1 
5 0.510 
450 
15 CONSTR: 32 21.531 15 0.1-11 0.442 0. -ý()o 
16 CONSTR: 18 21.908 16 0.146 0. 
-3 
77 .ý -N 9 0. --1 17 CONSTR: 28 22.288 17 0.174 0.379 0.538 
18 CONSTR: 17 22.481 18 0.211 0.191 0.660 
19 CONSTR: 30 22.847 19 0.244 0.366 0.5 45 
20 CONSTR: 8 23.019 20 0.288 0.172 0.678 
21 CONSTR: 9 23.367 21 0. ", -) ý 0.3 48 0.5 55 
22 CONSTR: 3 23.698 22 0.363 0.3 il 0- -5 65 23 CONSTR: 15 23.867 23 0.411 0.169 0.681 
24 CONSTR: 14 24.025 24 0.460 0.158 0.691 
25 CONSTR: 12 24.076 25 0.5 15 0.051 0.821 
26 CONSTR: 37 24.107 26 0.570 0.031 0.861 
27 CONSTR: 16 24.132 227 0.62 3 0.0 -, 5 0.874 28 CONSTR: 4 24.157 28 0.6 73 0.02-5 0.874 
29 CONSTR: 21 24.176 29 0.720 0.019 0.891 
30 CONSTR: 23 24.195 30 0.763 0.019 0.890 
31 CONSTR: 1 24.208 31 0.802 0.013 0.910 
32 CONSTR: 13 24.220 32 0.836 0.012 0.914 
33 CONSTR: 26 24.243 33 0.866 0.02 1 0.879 
34 CONSTR: 36 24.251 34 0.892 0.008 0.928 
35 CONSTR: 29 24.254 35 0.914 0.003 0.9-3 1 
36 CONSTR: 5 24.258 36 0.932 0.003 0.954 
37 CONSTR: 33 24.258 37 0.947 0.000 0.987 
451 
Appendix BI . 14: Experiments 4,5 and 6 Statistics: Nlulti-Group Factor. -knalý sis. Four-Factor Model 
EQSý A STRUCTURAL EQUATION PROGRAM NIL'LTIVARIATE SOFTWARE I-NC. 
COPYRIGHT BY P. M. BENTLER VERSION-5.7b (C) 1985 -1998. 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
I /TITLE 
2 Experiment 4- Four factors 
3 /SPECIFICATIONS 
4 VARIABLES = 11, CASES = 47, METHOD = NIL: NIATRIX CORR. 
5 ANALYSIS =CORR; GROUP=33: 
6/LABELS 
7 VI = ARROW, V2 = WORD: V3 = TTT, V4 = VERBAL, V5 Sl', %ISPý, \T. 
8 V6 = COMSPAT-, V7 = ABSTRACT; V8 = CONDITION. V9 SYLL-, 
9V 10 ý MULTI; VII= TEMPORAL . 
10 /EQUATIONS 
II VI =+ *F2 + *F3 + El -, 
12 V2 =+ *Fl + *F3 + E2. 
13 V3 =+ *F2 + *F3 + E3, 
14 V4 =+ *Fl + *F3 + 1`4-, 
15 V6 =+ *Fl + *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + E6, 
16 VI I=+ *Fl + *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + El 1-5 
17 /VARIANCES 
18 Fl = 1.00; 
19 F2 = 1.00-, 
20 F3 =1 . 
00. 
21 F4 = I. W 
22 El = *-, 
23 E2 = 
24 E3 = 
25 E4 = 
26 E6 = 
27 Ell=*l 
28 /MATRIX 
29 1 
30 0.38 1 
31 0.450.29 1 
12 0.45 0.71 0.37 1 3 
33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
34 0.47 0.31 0.45 0.27 0.00 1 
-35 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
-36 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
)8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0-00 0.00 1 3 
3"0.62 0.31 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 19 0.40 0. ', - 
40 /STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
41 10.10 14.81 9.40 18.73 0.00 31.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3-74 
42 /TECHNICAl, 
4 ', ITR = 80. 
45 2 
44 /END 
44 CUMULATED RECORDS OF INPUT %101)EL FILE WERE READ (GROUP 1) 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
45 /TITLE 
46 Experiment 5- Four factors 
47 /SPECIFICATIONS 
48 VARIABLES ý 11: CASES =51: METHOD =%II IATRIX = CORR: 
49 ANALYSIS = CORR; 
50 /LABELS 
51 VI= ARROW; V2 = WORD, V' )= TTT; V4 = VERBAL, V-5 = ') I\IS PAT 
52 V6 = COMSPAT-, V7 = ABSTRACT. V8 = CONDITION: V9 = Sý'I, L. 
53 V 10 = MULTI; VII= TEMPORAL 
54 /EQUATIONS 
55 VI =+ *F2 + *F3 + El; 
56 V2 =+ *FI + *F3 + E2, 
57 V5 =+ *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + E5. 
58 V6 =+ *Fl + *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + E6; 
59 V7 =+ *FI + *F3 + *F4 + E7; 
60 V8 =+ *FI + *F3 + *F4 + E8: 
61 V9 =+ *FI + *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + E9: 
62 VIO + *FI + *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + EIO-, 
63 /VARIANCES 
64 Fl = 1.00; 
65 F2 = 1.00, 
66 F3 = 1.00-, 
67 F4 = 1.00-, 
68 El = *; 
69 E2 = 
70 E5 = 
71 E6 = 
72 E7 = 
73 E8 = 
74 E9 = 
75 EIO 
76 /MATRIX 
77 1 
78 0.171 
79 0.000-001 
80 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
81 0.33 0.39 0.00 0.00 1 
82 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.00 0-30 1 
83 0.26 032 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.23 1 
84 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.06 0.45 1 
85 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.48 0.16 0.334 1 
86 0.32 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.5-33 0.36 0.19 0.26 0.22 1 
87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0-00 0.00 0.00 0-00 0.00 0.00 1 
88 'S I'ANDARD DEVIATIONS 
89 12.93 15-08 0.00 0.00 2-99 33.44 1.59 1.80 3.41 1.95 0.00 
go 
4ý1 
-3 
91 ITR = 80; 
92 /END 
92 CUMULATED RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE'WERE READ (GROUP -) 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
93 /TITLE 
94 Experiment 6- Four factors 
95 /SPECIFICATIONS 
96 VARIABLES = 11; CASES = 48, METHOD = ML: INIATRIX = CORR: 
97 ANALYSIS = CORR; 
98 /LABELS 
99 VI ARROW; V2 = WORD, V3 = TTT, V4 = VERBAL; V5 = S1\1SPAT. 
100 V6 COMSPAT, V7 = ABSTRACT; V8 = CONDITION: V9 = Sý'Ll- 
101 VIO MULTI-, Vl I= TEMPORAL: 
102 /EQUATIONS 
103 VI =+ *F2 + *F3 + El -ý 
104 V2 =+ *Fl + *F3 + F2 9 105 V3 =+ *F2 + *F3 + E3ý 
106 V4= +*Fl + *F3 + F4-, 
107 V5 =+ *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + E5, 
108 V6 =+ *FI + *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + E6; 
109 V7= +*FI + *F3 + *F4 + E7-, 
110 V8 =+ *FI + *F3 + *F4 + E8, 
III V9 =+ *FI + *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + E9, 
112 VIO =+ *FI + *F2 + *F3 + *F4 + EIOý 
113 /VARIANCES 
114 FI = 1.00-, 
115 F2 = 1.00; 
116 F3 = 1.00; 
117 F4 = 1.00; 
118 El = *, 
119 E2 = 
120 E3 = 
121 E4 = 
122 E5 = 
123 E6 = 
124 E7 = 
125 E8 = 
126 E9 = 
127 EIO - 
128 /MATRIX 
129 1 
130 0.42 1 
131 0.31 0.05 1 
132 0.33 0.69 -0.01 1 
133 0.53 0.39 0.20 0.28 1 
1 '14 0.28 0.07 0.11 -0.14 0.44 1 
0.05 0-14 -0.21 0.14 03 1 0.00 1 
136 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.1'1 0.213 0.16 0.331 1 
1'17 0.1" 0.04 0.28 0-21 0.30 0.25 0.19 0.10 1 
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138 0.26 0.00 0.51 -0.14 0.47 0.36 0.08 0.10 0.41 1 
139 0.00 0.00 0 . 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 140 /STANDAR D DEVIATIONS 
141 10.46 17.07 7.00 20.52 2.94 3.14 1.97 1.99 3.00 1 0.00 
142 /TECHNICAL 
143 ITR = 80: 
144 /LMTEST 
145 /CONSTRA INT 
146 (INI. F22) = (2. Vl, F2) = (-)', VI. F"): 
147 (1, VI, F3) = (2, VI. F)) = (33, V1.1`3): 
148 (1, V2, F 1) = (2, V2, F 1) = (3 ). V 2, FI)ý 
149 (1, V2, F3) = (2, V2, F3) = (3 ). V2, F3), 
150 (1, V3, F2) = (3ýV3, F2)ý 
151 (1, V3, F3) = (3, V3, F3), 
152 (I, V4, F I) ý (3, V4. F I), 
153 (1, V4, F3) = QýWýF)). 
154 (2, V5, F2') = (3, V5, F2), 
155 (2, V5, F3) = (3, V5, F3), 
156 (2, V5, F4) = (3, V5, F4), 
157 (1, V6, F I) ý (2, V6, F I) = (3, V6, F I); 
158 (LV6,1`2) = (2, V6. F2) = (3, V6, F2)-, 
159 (1, V6, F3) = (2, V6, F3) = ('). V6, F3), 
160 (1, V6, F4) = (2, V6, F4) = (3, V6, F4); 
161 (2, V7, F I) = (3, V7, Fl): 
162 (2, V7, F3) = (3, V7, F3)-, 
163 (2, V7, F4) = (3, V7, F4), 
164 (2, V8, F I) = (3, V8, F I), 
165 (2, V8, F3) = (3, V8, F3), 
166 (2, V8, F4) = (3, V8, F4)-. 
167 (2, V9, Fl) = (3, V9, F I), 
168 (2, WF2) = (3), WF2)-ý 
169 (2, V9, F3) = (33, V9, F3), 
170 (2, V9, F4) = (3, V9, F4)-, 
171 (2, V I 0, F 1) = (3, V I 0, F 1), 
172 (2, V 1 0, F2) = (3, V I 0, F2), 
173 (2. V I 0, F3) = (3, V I O, F3)ý 
174 (2. V I 0, F4) = (3, V I 0, F4), 
175 (LE l, E 1) = (2, E LE 1) = (3, E I ýE 1)ý 
176 (1, E2, E2) = (2, E2. E2) = (), ElE2)ý 
177 (1, E3, E3) = (3, E3. E' 3); 
178 (1, E4, E4) = (3, E4. E4). 
179 (2, E5, E5) = (3, E5, E5), 
180 (2, E6, E6) = (3, E6, E6)-, 
181 (2, E7, E7) = (3, E7, E7), 
182 (2, E8, E8) = (3, E8, E8). 
183 (2. E9, E9) = (3, E9, E9): 
184 (2. EI0. El0 )=(3. El0. EI0); 
185 /END 
(JINWLATED RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ (GROt'P 'I) 
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CORRELATION MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 6\'ARIABI, I-'-ý(-, ELFCTEDFRoNI 
II VARIABLES) BASED ON 47 CASES. 
WARNING *** STATISTICS MAY.,, 'O'I- BEMEANINGI. T1 
DUE TO ANALYZING CORRELAI-10-. \ MATRIX 
ARROW WORD TTT VERBAL CMISPAT 
VI V2 V3 V4 Vo 
ARROW V1 1.000 
WORD V2 0.380 1.000 
TTT V3 0.450 0.290 1.000 
VERBAL V4 0.450 0.710 0.3 70 1.000 
COMSPAT V6 0.470 0.310 0.450 0.270 1.000 
TEMPORAL V 11 0.400 0.320 0.620 0.310 0.680 
TEMPORAL VII 
TEMPORAL 
vII 
1.000 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES =6 
DEPENDENT V'S :12346 11 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 10 
INDEPENDENT F'S: 1234 
INDEPENDENT E'S: 12346 11 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 22 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS = 10 
CORRELATION MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 8 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM 
II VARIABLES) BASED ON 51 CASES. 
WARNING *** STATISTICS MAY NOT BE MEANINGFUL 
DUE TO ANALYZING CORRELATION MATRIX 
ARROW WORD SIMSPAT COMSPAT ABSTRACT 
vI V2 V5 V6 V7 
ARROW V1 1.000 
WORD V2 0.170 1.000 
SIMSPAT V5 0 -33 0 0.390 1.000 
COMSPAT V6 0.270 0.080 0.300 1.000 
A ]ZACT V7 BSI 0.260 0.320 0.450 -)'o 0.23 1.000 
CONDITIO V8 0.190 0.210 0.400 0.060 0.450 
S Yl, LV9 0.200 0.040 0.280 0.480 0.160 
MULTI V 10 0.3 -1 0 O. --), o 0.360 0.190 
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CONDITIO V8 
SYLL v9 
MULTI VIO 
CONDITIO 
V8 
1.000 
0.340 
0.260 
SYLL WITI 
v9v 10 
1.000 
0.220 1.000 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES =8 
DEPENDENT V'S :1256789 10 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 12 
INDEPENDENT F'S: 1234 
INDEPENDENT E'S :1256789 10 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 33 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS = 12 
CORRELATION MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 10 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM 
II VARIABLES) BASED ON 48 CASES. 
***WARNING*** STATISTICS MAY NOT BE MEANINGFt 'I 
DUE TO ANALYZING CORRELATION MATRIX 
ARROW WORD TTT VERBAL SIMSP., \T 
VI V2 V3 V4 V 
ARROW V1 1.000 
WORD V2 0.420 1.000 
TTT V3 0.310 0.050 1.000 
VERBAL V4 0.330 0.690 -0.010 1.000 
SIMSPAT V5 0.530 0.390 0.200 0.280 1.000 
COMSPAT V6 0.280 0.070 0.110 -0.140 0.440 
ABSTRACT V7 0.050 0.240 -0.210 0.140 0310 
CONDITIO V8 0.180 0.240 0.160 0.13 0 0., 10 
SYLL V9 0.130 0.040 0.280 0.210 0.300 
MULTI V 10 0.260 0.000 0.510 -0.140 0.470 
COMSPAT ABSTRACT CONDITIO SYLL \lt'I, Tl 
V6 V7 V8 9V 10 
COMSPAT V6 1.000 
ABSTRACT V7 0.000 1.000 
CONDITIO V8 0.160 0.310 1.000 
SYLL V9 0.250 0.190 0.100 1.000 
Nlt TTI V 10 0.3) 60 0.080 0.100 0.410 1.000 
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BENTLER-WEEKS STRt-'CTt-. 'R-Al- REPRESENTATIO",,: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES = 10 
DEPENDENTV'S: 12 ') 456789 10 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 14 
INDEPENDENT F'S: 1234 
INDEPENDENT E'S 123456789 10 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 39 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS = 14 
3RD STAGE OF COMPUTATION REQUIRED 36326 WORDS OF NIENIORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATED 100000 WORDS 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP I IS 0.84680E-01 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP 2 IS 0.1531 5, `F+00 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IN GROUP 3 IS 037202F-01 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROUP I 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
PARAMETER CONDITION CODE 
E4, E4 CONSTRAINED AT LOWER BOUND 
El 1, EI I CONSTRAINED AT LOWER BOUND 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA): 
ARROW 
VI 
ARROW V1 0.000 
WORD V2 0.055 
TTT V3 0.145 
VERBAL V4 0.170 
COMSPAT V6 0.184 
TEMPORAL V 11 0.048 
TEMPORAL 
vII 
TEMPOR. M, V11 0.093 
WORD TTT VERBAL COMSPAT 
V2 V3 V4 V6 
0.000 
0.144 0.0233 
0.038 0.245 0.033 
0.183 0.087 0.204 0.116 
0.188 0.112 0.193 0.109 
\NT'RA(Il" ABSOIVTF COVARIANCE RESIDt'ALS = 0.1 IN 
\N'I. 'R., \(TEOFF- DI - WONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE 
0.1404 
4 58 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALMATRIX: 
ARROW WORD TTT VERBAL CONISIIAT 
VI V2 V N' 4 v6 
ARROW V1 0.000 
WORD V2 0.055 0.000 
TTT V3 0.145 0.144 0.023 
VERBAL V4 0.170 0.038 0.245 0.033 
COMSPAT V6 0.184 0.183 0.087 0.204 0.116 
TEMPORAL V 11 0.048 0.188 0.11-1 0.193 0.109 
TEMPORAL 
vII 
TEMPORAL V 11 0.093 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUAI, S = 0.1129 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED Rl-'Sll)t 1AP, 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 4N 3V6, V 4VI IN 4VI IN 2V6, V 1 
0.245 0.204 0.193 0.188 0.184 
V 6, V 2V4, V 1V 3N 1V iN 2V 6N 6 
0.183 0.170 0.145 0.144 0.116 
VI IN 3VI IN 6VI IN IIV6, V 3V IV 1 
0.112 0.109 0.093 0.087 0.055 
V1 IN 1V4, V 2V 4N 4V3. V 3V IV -1 
0.048 0.038 0.0333 0.023 0.000 
= 0.1404 
459 
DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDt-'AL-, 
20 
R-ANGE FREQ 
15- 
1 -0.5 - -- 0 
21 -0.4 - -M 0 
3 -0.3 - -0.4 0 
1 1 4 -0.2 - -0. ' 0 
5 -0.1 - -0.2 0 
1 6 0.0 - -0.1 1 
7 0.1 - 0.0 8 
8 0.2 - 0.1 10 
9 0.3 - 0.2 2 
5- A 0.4 - 0.3 0 
t B 0.5 - 0.4 0 
c ++ - 0-5 0 
----------------- ------ -------- 
------------------- ------------- 
1 TOTAL 
-------- 
21 
PERCENT 
0.00% 
0.00,0 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
4.76' o 
38.10% 
47.620 o 
9.5 
-1 
% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
123456789ABC EACH"" REPRFSENTS I RESIDUALS 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST 
STATISTICS 
ARROW =Vl = . 336*F2 +. 479*F3 +1.000 
El 
. 104 . 100 
3.216 4.766 
WORD =V2 = . 348*Fl +. 
679*F3 +1.000 E2 
. 116 . 
097 
3.010 7.009 
TTT =V-') = . 603*F2 +. 214*F3 +1.000 
E3 
. 121 . 129 
4.982 1.661 
VERBAL =V4 = . 
791*Fl +. 584*F3 +I. OOOE4 
. 
101 
. 
141 
7.826 4,135 
CONISPA l'-=X'6 = -. 089*FI ++ . 
"'*F' + . -'18*F4 +I. 
000 E6 
460 
. 094 . 099 . 118 . 1-14 
-. 949 5.275 1.974 1.927 
TEMPORAL=Vll = . 
006*Fl +. 775*F2 --,. 191*F') +. --; -'O*F4 -1.0()()EII 
. 
146 
. 
184 
. 
187 . 
209 
. 
042 4.221 1.025 2.4 84 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
v F 
IFI - Fl 1.000 
I 
I 
I 
I F2 - F2 1.000 
I 
I 
I I 
I F3 - F3 1.000 
I 
I F4 - F4 1.000 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
ED 
EI -ARROW . 658* 
. 092 
7.127 
E2 - WORD . 418* 
. 068 
6.103 
E3 - TTT . 568* 
. 120 
4.72 
F4 -VERBAL . 000* 
. 048 
. 000 
401 
E6 -COMSPAT . 
495* 
4.47-1 
EII -TEMPORAL . 
000* 
. 
013 
. 
000 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: 
ARROW ýVl = . 336*F2 WORD =V2 = . 348*Fl TTT =V3 = . 61 O*F2 VERBAL =V4 = . 804*Fl COMSPAT =V6 = -. 095*Fl 
+. 748 E6 
TEMPORAL =Vl I= . 006*Fl 
+. 000 El I 
R-SQUARED 
+ . 811 EI 
+ . 679*F3 +. 646 E2 . 5822 
+. 217*F + . 762 E3 . 419 
+ »594*F3 +. 000 E4 1.000 
+. 553*F2 +. 248*F3 
. 441 
+. 814*F2 +. 201*F3 +. -ý46*F4 1.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
END OF METHOD 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION IN GROtJP 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
PARAMETER CONDITION CODE 
E9, E9 CONSTRAINED AT LOWER BOUND 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA): 
ARROW WORD SIMSPAT COMSPAT ABSTRACT 
vI V2 V5 V6 V7 
ARROW V1 0.000 
WORD V2 -0.155 0.000 
SIMSPAT V5 -0.129 -0.064 -0.076 
COMSPAT V6 -0.016 -0.047 -0.136 -0.080 
ABSTRACT V7 0.050 0.038 0.006 -0.009 -0.014 
CONDITIO V8 0.025 -0.026 0.057 -0.118 0.070 
SYLL V9 0.016 -0.053 -0.104 0.040 -0.116 
MULTI V 10 -0.064 0.075 0.000 0.104 -0. W 
CONDITIO SYLL MULTI 
V8v9V 10 
CONDITIOV 8 -0-010 
4 6-2 
SYLL v90.120 -0.072 MULTI V 10 0.097 -0.149 -0.031 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS = 0.0611 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCF RESIDUALS 0.0685 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
ARROW 
vI 
ARROW V1 0.000 
WORD V2 -0.155 
SIMSPAT V5 -0.129 
COMSPAT V6 -0.016 
ABSTRACT V7 0.050 
CONDITIO V8 0.025 
SYLL V9 0.016 
MULTI V 10 -0.064 
CONDITIO V8 
SYLL v9 
MULTI V 10 
CONDITIO 
V8 
-0.010 
0.120 
0.097 
WORD 
V2 
0.000 
-0.064 
-0.047 
0.038 
-0.026 
-0.0533 
0.075 
SIMSPAT 
vý 
-0.076 
-0.136 
0.006 
0.057 
-0.104 
0.000 
SYLL MULTI 
v9v 10 
-0.072 
-0.149 -0.031 
CONISPAT 
V6 
-0.080 
-0.009 
-0.118 
0.040 
-0.104 
\BSTRACT 
V7 
-0.014 
0.070 
-0.116 
4W 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0611 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 2, V IV 10, V 9V6, V 5V 5N IV9, V 8 
-0.155 -0.149 -0.136 -0.129 0.120 
V 8, V 6V 9N 7V9, V 5VI ON 6VI ON 8 
-0.118 -0.116 -0.104 -0.104 0.097 
V 6, V 6V 5N 5V ION 2V 9N 9V8, V 7 
-0.080 -0.076 0.075 -0.072 0.070 
V 5N --' 
V IOA' 1 X' 8N 5V 93' 'V 73' 1 
-0.064 -0.064 0.057 -0.05 1 0.0. -7,0 
= 0.0695 
463 
DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RLSIM'ALS 
20- 
RANGE FREQ PERCENT 
15- 
1 -0.5 - -- 0 0.00,0 
-0.4 - -0.5 0 0.00% 
3 -0.3 - -0.4 0 0.0000 
4 -0.2 - -0.1 0 0.00,0 10- 5 
-0.1 - -0.2 8 0 
1 160.0 - -0.1 15 41.670o 
7 0.1 - 0.0 12 - -o -! _) . -) 2ý 0 8 0.2 - 0.1 1 2.780 o 
9 0.3 - 0.2 0 0.00% 
5- A 0.4 - 0.3 0 0.00% 
B 0.5 - 0.4 0 0.0000 
1 1c ++ - 0.5 0 0.00% 
----------------- ------- ------- 
TOTAL 36 100.00% 
---------------------------------------- 
123456789ABC EACH "*" REPRESENTS I RESIDUALS 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST 
STATISTICS 
ARROW =Vl = . 336*F2 +. 479*F3 +1.000 
El 
. 104 . 100 
3.216 4.766 
WORD =V2 = . 348*Fl 
. 116 
3.010 
SIMSPAT =V5 = . 
413*F2 
. 112 
3.694 
COMSPAT =V6 = -. 089*Fl 
. 
094 
-. 949 
+. 679*F3 +1.000 E2 
. 097 
7.009 
+. 669*F3 +. 271*F4 +I. OOOE5 
. 114 . 13 2 
5.891 2.048 
+ -520*F2 + . 233*F3 + . 
238*F4 +1.000 E6 
. 099 . 118 . 124 5.275 1.974 1.927 
464 
ABSTRACT=V7 = -. 045*Fl 
. 144 
-. 314 
CONDITIO=V8 = . 006*Fl 
. 133 
. 042 
+. 439*F3 +. 556*F4 -1.000 E7 
. 138 . 159 3.187 3.5 03' 
+. 345*F3 +. 412*F4 +1.000 E8 
. 127 . 134 2.724 3.078 
SYLL =V9 = . 461*Fl +. 689*F2 
. 151 . 163 3.054 4.232 
MULTI =VIO= -. 234*Fl +. 646*F2 
. 109 . 122 
-2.138 5.317 
. 099*F3 +. 611*F4 +I. OOOE9 
. 139 . 181 
-. 711 -3.375 
+ . 349*F. )' +. 107*F4 +I. OOOEIO 
. 142 . 140 2.450 . 766 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
v F 
I Fl - Fl 1.000 
I F2 - F2 1.000 
I F3 - F3 1.000 
I 
I F4 - F4 1.000 
VARIANCES OF I-NDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
ED 
EI -ARROW . 658* 
. 092 
465 
7.127 
E2 - WORD . 
418* 
. 
068 
6.103 
E5 -SIMSPAT _383* 
. 
085 
4.492 
E6 -COMSPAT . 
690* 
. 
111 
6.234 
E7-ABSTRACT 
. 
510* 
. 
163 
3.127 
E8 -CONDITIO .7 
22 
. 
132 
5.480 
E9- SYLL 
. 
000* 
. 
014 
. 
000 
E 10 -MULTI . 
425* 
. 
114 
3.714 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: R-SQUARED 
ARROW =VI . 336*1`2 +. 
479*F3 +. 811 El 
WORD = V2 . 348*Fl +. 
679*F3 +. 646 E2 
SIMSPAT = V5 . 399*1`2 + . 64503 +. 
262*F4 +. 597 E5 
COMSPAT = V6 -. 086*Fl +. 501*F2 + . 224*F3 +. 
229*F4 
+ . 799 E6 
ABSTRACT = V7 = 045*171 + . 43593 +. 
552*F4 +. 709 E7 
CONDIJ 10 = V8 = . 006*Fl + . 
34303 +. 410*F4 +. 845 E8 
SyLl- = V9 = . 446*Fl +. 
666*F2 - . 096*F3 + . 
591 *F4 
+. 000 E9 
MULTI = VIO = -. 231 *FI + . 637*F2 + . 
34403 +. 106*F4 
+ . 642 EIO 
. 
') 42 
582 
. 644 
. 361 
. 497 
. 286 
1.000 
. 588 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
END OF METHOD 
466 
MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS. INFORMATION IN GROUP 
-, 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBt'-flON THEORY) 
PARAMETER CONDITION CODE 
E4, E4 CONSTRAINED AT LOWFR BOUND 
ALL EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS WERE CORRECTLY IN I POSED 
NOTE: I CONSTRAINTS APPEAR TO BE LINEARL)'DEPENDFN-r. 
THE DEGREES OF FREEDOM HAVE BF-E-. \ADJUSTED. 
E9, E9 VARIANCE OF PARAMETER F-S'Fl\IATE IS Sl--TTO ZERO. 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA): 
ARROW VI 
WORD V2 
TTT V3 
VERBAL V4 
SIMSPAT V5 
COMSPAT V6 
ABSTRACT V7 
CONDITIO V8 
SYLL V9 
MULTI V 10 
COMSPAT V6 
ABSTRACT V7 
CONDITIO V8 
SYLL v9 
MULTI v 10 
ARROW 
vI 
0.000 
0.095 
0.005 
0.050 
0.071 
-0.006 
-0.160 
0.015 
-0.054 
-0.124 
COMSPAT 
V6 
-0.080 
-0.239 
-0.018 
-0.190 
-0.104 
WORD 
V2 
0.000 
-0.096 
0.018 
-0.064 
-0.057 
-0.042 
0.004 
-0.053 
-0.155 
TTT VERBAL SINISPAT 
V 1) V4Vý 
0.023 
-0.1 15 
-0.193 
-0.253 
-0.304 
0.086 
-0.114 
0.046 
0.0333 
-0.111 
-0.206 
-0.080 
-0.076 
-0.097 
-0.159 
0.004 
-0.1 14 
-0.11-i 
-0.084 
-0.060 
-0.076 
ABSTRACT CONDITIO SYLL MULTI 
V7V8v9v 10 
-0.014 
-0.070 -0.010 
-0.086 -0.120 -0.072 
-0.1433 -0.063 0.041 -0.031 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS = 0.0862 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS 0.0978 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
ýRRONV WORD TTT VERBAL SIMSPAT 
IV2VV4 
467 
ARROW V10.000 
WORD V2 0.095 0.000 
TTT V3 0.005 -0.096 0.023 VERBAL V4 0.050 0.018 -0.1 i5 0.03 3 SIMSPAT V5 0.071 -0.064 -0.19-), -0.111 COMSPAT V6 -0.006 -0.057 -0.25 3 4206 0.004 ABSTRACT V7 -0.160 -0.042 -0.304 -0.080 -0.1 14 CONDITIO V8 0.015 0.004 0.086 -0.076 -0.11 i SYLL V9 -0.054 -0.05 3 -0.114 -0.097 -(). 084 MULTI V 10 -0.124 -0.155 0.046 -0.159 -0.060 
COMSPAT 
V6 
COMSPAT V6 -0.080 
ABSTRACT V7 -0.239 
CONDITIO V8 -0.018 
SYLL v9 -0.190 
MULTI V 10 -0.104 
ABSTRACT CONDITIO 
V7V8 
-0.014 
-0.070 
-0.086 
-0.14-1 
-0.010 
-0.1 N 
-0.06 1 
SYLL 
%, 9 
-0.072 
0.041 
NRTTI 
N, 10 
_O. () i1 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0862 
AVER-AGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUAl 0.0978 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V TV 3V6, V 3V TV 6V6, V 4V 5N 
-0.304 -0.253 -0.239 -0.206 -0.193 
V 9, V 6V7, V IV 10, V 4V ION 2V 10, V 7 
-0.190 -0.160 -0.159 -0.155 -0.143 
V 4, V 3V7, V 5V 10, V IV9, V 8V9, V 3 
-0.135 -0.134 -0.124 -0.120 -0.114 
V 8, V 5V5, V 4V 10, V 6V 9N 4V3. V 2 
-0.113 -0.111 -0.104 -0.097 -0.096 
468 
DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
40- 
RANGE FREQ PER('F-NT 
30- 
1 -0.5 - -- 0 0.0000 
2 -0.4 - -0.5 0 0.00% 
3 -0.3 - -0.4 1 1.82'0 
4 -0.2 - -0.3 3 5.4500 20- 5 -0.1 - -0.2 14 25.45' o 
6 0.0 - -0.1 2 -', 41.82()o 7 0.1 - 0.0 14 25.4 5 () 0 
8 0.2 - 0.1 0 0.00% 
1 190.3' - 0.2 0 0.00% 
10- A 0.4 - 0.3 0 0.00% 
B 0.5 - 0.4 0 0.00% 
C ++ - 0.5 0 0.000 
----------------- ------ -------- 
TOTAL 55 100.000o 
----------------------- 
1234567 
----------------- 
89ABC EACH "*" REPRI-. ", 17NT) 2 RESIDUAI, '-, 
MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND"IT'ST 
STATISTICS 
ARROW =V I . 336*F2 + . 479*F3 + 
1.000 El 
. 104 . 
100 
3.216 4.766 
WORD =V2 . 348*Fl + . 
679*F3 + 1.000 E2 
. 116 . 
097 
3.010 7.009 
TTT =V3 . 603*F2 + . 214*F3 + 
1.000 E3 
. 121 . 129 
4.982 1.661 
VERBAL =V4 = 
SINISPAT V5 -- 
. 
791 *FI+ 
. 
101 
7.826 
. 41', *F--' + 
. 
584*F3 + 1.000 E4 
. 
141 
4.13 5 
669*1-3 + . 
271 *F4 
469 
. 112 . 114 A 1) -1 3.694 5.891 1048 
1 . 000 E5 
COMSPAT =V6 -. 089*Fl + . 520*F2 + . 233*F3 
. 094 . 099 . 118 
-049 5275 1.974 
+ . 238*F4 + 1.000 E6 
. 124 
1027 
ABSTRACT=V7 -. 045*Fl + . 439*F3 + . 556*F4 
. 144 . 138 . 159 014 3.187 3.503 
1.000 E7 
CONDITIO=V8 = 
1.000 E8 
. 006*Fl + . 345*F3 + . 412*F4 
. 133 . 127 . 134 
. 042 2.724 3.078 
SYLL =V9 . 461*Fl + . 
689*F2 - . 099*F3 
. 151 . 
163 . 139 
3.054 4.232 -. 711 
+ . 611 
*F4 + 1.000 E9 
. 181 
3.375 
MULTI =V 10 -. 234*Fl + . 646*F2 + . 
349*F3 
. 109 . 
122 . 142 
-2.138 5.317 2.450 
+ . 107*174 + 
1.000 E 10 
. 140 
. 766 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
470 
V 
I Fl - Fl 
I 
I 
I 
I F2 - F2 
I 
I 
I F3 - F3 
I F4 - F4 
F 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
---------------------------------- 
D 
El -ARROW . 658* 
. 092 
7.127 
E2 - WORD . 418* 
. 068 6.103 
E3 - TTT . 568* 
. 120 
4.722 
E4 -VERBAL . 000* 
. 056 
. 000 
E5 -SIMSPAT . 383* 
. 085 
4.492 
E6 -('()NISPAT . 690* 
111 . 
6.2 34 
17 -ABSTRACT . 510* 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
471 
E8 -CONDITIO 
E9 - SYLL 
E 10 -MULTI 
. 
16 3 
3.127 
.72 -2 
- 13 2 
5.480 
. 000* 
. 000 
: 0000000.000 
. 425* 
. 114 
3.714 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: 
ARROW =Vl = . 336*F2 WORD =V2 = . 348*Fl TTT =V3 = . 610*1`2 VERBAL =V4 = . 804*Fl SIMSPAT =V5 = . 399*F2 COMSPAT =V6 = -. 086*Fl 
+. 79 9 E6 
ABSTRACT =V7 = -. 045*Fl 
CONDITIO =V8 = . 006*Fl SYLL =V9 = . 446*Fl 
+. 00 0 E9 
MULTI =Vlo = -. 231*Fl 
+. 64 2 E10 
" . 
479*F3 
" . 
679*F3 
" . 
217*F3 
+. 594*F3 
+. 645*F3 
" . 
501*F2 
" . 
435*F3 
" . 
"43*F3 
" . 
666*F2 
+. 637*F2 
+ . 811 EI 
+. 646 U2 
+. 762 E3 
+. 0001-'4 
+. 262*F4 
+. 224*F-i 
+. -352*F4 
4- . 410*F4 
- . 096*F3 
+. ')44*F3 
R-SQt IARED 
. 
") 42' 
. 582 
. 
419 
1.000 
* . 597 1-15 . 644 
* . 
"19*F4 
. 
361 
* .709 1`7 . 
497 
* . 
845 E8 
. 
286 
+ . 
591 *F4 
1.000 
+. 106*F4 
. 
588 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
END OF METHOD 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
STATISTICS FOR MULTIPLE POPULATION ANALYSIS 
ALL EQUALITY CONSTRAINTS WERE CORRECTLY IMPOSED 
NOTE: CONSTRAINTS APPEAR TO BE LINEARILY DEPENDENT. I DEGREE(S) 
OF FREEDOM ADJUSTED 
*** WARNING *** TEST RESULTS MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATE f)tE TO 
CONDITION CODE 
GOODNESS OF FIT SUMMARY 
4 72' 
INDEPENDENCE MODEL CHI-SQt 361-960 ON 88 DEGREI-, OF 
FREEDOM 
INDEPENDENCE AIC= 185.9597-3 INDEPENDENCE -164. --; ')'/6.; MODEL AIC = -74.19283 \I()DEL CAIC= -337.11087 
CHI-SQUARE = 57.807 BASED ON 66 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS 0.7537/2 
BENTLER-BONETT NORMED FIT INDEX= 0.840 
BENTLER-BONETT NONNORMED FIT INDEX= 1.040 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) 1.000 
ITERATIVE St I NIMARY 
PARAMETER 
ITERATION ABS CHANGE ALPHA FUNCTION 
1 0.431299 1.00000 1.64948 
2 0.200842 1.00000 1.01298 
3 0.113402 1.00000 0.59798 
4 0.062814 1.00000 0.520 26 
5 0.097965 0.12500 0.5 1803 
6 0.039787 1.00000 0.485 10 
7 0.113527 0.25000 0.47997 
8 0.058886 1.00000 0.43002 
9 0.021710 1.00000 0.40769 
10 0.009288 1.00000 0.40464 
11 0.005250 1.00000 0.40436 
12 0.003167 1.00000 0.40428 
13 0.001424 1.00000 0.40426 
14 0.000883 1.00000 0.40425 
LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER TEST (FOR RELEASING CONSTRAINTS) 
CONSTRAINTS TO BE RELEASED ARE: 
CONSTRAINTS FROM GROUP 3 
CONSTR: 1 (1 N1 ýF2)-(-lýV 
1 ýF2)= 
0ý 
CONSTR: 2 (IN l, F2)-(i. V 1 ýF2)= 0, 
CONSTR: i (1 N1 ýF. ))-(2. 
V 1 ýF3)= 0ý 
CONSTR: 4 (IN l, F3)-(3, V l, F3)= 0. 
CONSTR: 5 (1, V-). F 1)-(2ýV2, F 1)= 0. 
CONSTR: 6 (1 ýX"-ýF 1)-(i XIF 1)=0, 
CONSTR: 7 
CONSTR: 8 
CONSTR: 9 
('ONSTR: 10 
CONSTR: 11 
4 7, 
CONSTR: 12 (1, V4. F'))-(')X4. F'3) ý0. 
CONSTR: 13 (2. V5. F2)-(3X5. F)) =O: 
CONSTR: 14 (2. V5. F' ))-(3 N5. F' ))==O: 
CONSTR: 15 (2. V5, F4)-(3. V5. F4) =O: 
CONSTR: 16 (I. V6. Fl)-(-). V6. Fl) =O: 
CONSTR: 17 (I. V6, F I)-(3. V6. F 1) =O: 
CONSTR: 18 (1, V6. F2)-(2. V6. F2) =O. 
CONSTR: 19 (1 V6. F2)-(-). V6. F2) =O. 
CONSTR: 20 (I. V6. F-)')-(2. V6. F)) =O. 
CONSTR: 21 (I. V6, F3)-(-'), V6. F')) =O: 
CONSTR: 22 (1 V6, F4)-(2. V6. F4) =O, 
CONSTR: 23 (1, V6, F4)-(' ), V6, F4) =O. 
CONSTR: 24 (2, V7, F I)-(' ). V7. F 1) =O-. 
CONSTR: 25 (2. V7, F-3)-(3, V7. F3) =O. 
CONSTR: 26 (2, V7. F4)-('). V7, F4) =O, 
CONSTR: 27 (2. V8, F I)-(-') N8. F 0 =0: 
CONSTR: 28 (2, V8, F3)-('), V8. F-')) =O; 
CONSTR: 29 (2, V8, F4)-(3, V8, F4) =O. 
CONSTR: 30 (2, V9, F I)-('I, V9. F 1) =O-. 
CONSTR: 31 (lV9J`2'))-(3. V9. F2) =O: 
CONSTR: 32 (2, V9, F3)-('), V9, F'I) =O, 
CONSTR: 33 (2, V9, F4)-(3. V9, F4) =O, 
CONSTR: 34 (2, V I O, F I)-(' ). V I O, F 1)=O: 
CONSTR: 35 (2, V I 0, F2)-(' )NIO, F -)=Oý 
CONSTR: 36 (2N I 0, F3)-(-' )N I 0, F 3)=O; 
CONSTR: 37 (2, VlO, F4)-(-',, VIO, F 4)=O: 
CONSTR: 38 (1, EI, El)-(2, EI, El)= O-, 
CONSTR: 39 (I. El. El)-(-'), EI. El)= O. 
CONSTR: 40 (I. E2. E2)-(2. F2. E2)= O. 
CONSTR: 41 (1, E2, E2)-(3. E2, E2)= O; 
CONSTR: 42 (1, E-'3. E3)-(3, E3. E-'))= Oý 
CONSTR: 43 (1, E4, E4)-(3. E4, E4) =O-. 
CONSTR: 44 (2, E5, E5)-(3, E5, E5) =O; 
CONSTR: 45 (2, E6, E6)-(3, E6, E6) =O: 
CONSTR: 46 (2, ETE7)-(-3. E7. E7) =O'. 
CONSTR: 47 (2, E8, E8)-(3, E8, E8) =O; 
CONSTR: 48 (2, E9, E9)-(3, E9ýE9) =O; 
CONSTR: 49 (2. EIO, EIO)-(3, EIO, EIO)=O. 
UNIVARIATE TEST STATISTICS: 
NO CONSTRAfNT 
CONSTR: I 
CONSTR: 2 
3 CONSTR: 'I 
4 CONSTR: 4 
CONSTR: 
6 CONSTRý 6 
7 CONSTR: 7 
CHI-SQUARE PROBABILITY 
0.071 0.789 
0.000 0.992 
1.729 0.188 
1.5 51 0.2 133 
0.055 0.815 
0.003 0.956 
0.0 1 0.908 
474 
8 CONSTR: 8 0.218 0.641 
9 CONSTR: 9 0.031 0.859 
10 CONSTR: 10 0.957 0.328 
II CONSTR: 11 0.271 0.602 
12 CONSTR: 12 1.099 0-294 
13 CONSTR: 13 0.257 0.61' 
14 CONSTR: 14 0.104 0.747 
15 CONSTR: 15 0.002 0.965 
16 CONSTR: 16 1.798 0.180 
17 CONSTR: 17 2.3 3 19 0.128 
18 CONSTR: 18 0.270 0.603 
19 CONSTR: 19 1.200 0.273 
20 CONSTR: 20 1.728 0.189 
21 CONSTR: 21 0.007 0.934 
22 CONSTR: 22 0.212 0.645 
23 CONSTR: 23 0.280 0.597 
24 CONSTR: 24 0.273 0.602 
25 CONSTR: 25 1.556 0.212 
26 CONSTR: 26 0.8 5 33 03- " 56 
27 CONSTR: 27 0.752 0.386 
28 CONSTR: 28 0.098 0.754 
29 CONSTR: 29 1.706 0.192 
30 CONSTR: 30 0.011 0.916 
31 CONSTR: 31 0.230 0.631 
32 CONSTR: 32 0.184 0.668 
33 CONSTR: 33 0.091 0.763 
34 CONSTR: 34 0.167 0.683 
35 CONSTR: 35 0.932 0.313 4 
36 CONSTR: 36 3.590 0.058 
37 CONSTR: 37 1.277 0.258 
38 CONSTR: 38 1.269 0.260 
39 CONSTR: 39 0.292 0.589 
40 CONSTR: 40 0.596 0.440 
41 CONSTR: 41 0.114 0.735 
42 CONSTR: 42 1.070 0.301 
43 CONSTR: 43 NOT T ESTED DUE TO NUMERICAL PROBLEMS. 
44 CONSTR: 44 0.028 0.866 
45 CONSTR: 45 0.151 0.698 
46 CONSTR: 46 0.187 0.666 
47 CONSTR: 47 0.511 0.475 
48 CONSTR: 48 0.001 0.975 
49 CONSTR: 49 0.215 0.643 
4 75 
(I ýM(], ATIVE MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS U\ - IVARIATE 
INCREMENT 
-------------------- ---------------------------------- 
STEP PARAMETER CHI-SQUARE D. F. PROBABILITY CHI-S(I)t'. -\RE 
PROBABILITY 
---- ----------- ---------- ---- ----------- ---------- ----------- 
1 CONSTR: 36 3.590 1 0.058 3. ý90 0.058 
2 CONSTR: 17 5.869 2 0.05-3 2.27 9 0.1 il 
3 CONSTR: 29 7.665 3 0.0533 1.796 0.180 
4 CONSTR: 10 9.406 4 0.052 1.74- 0.187 
5 CONSTR: 47 10.926 5 0.0533 1. ý19 0218 
6 CONSTR: 38 12.312 6 0.055 1.186 0. "' 19 
7 CONSTR: 3 14.234 7 0.047 J. ()-" 0.166 
8 CONSTR: 19 15.398 8 0.052 1.164 0.281 
9 CONSTR: 25 16.447 9 0.058 1.049 0. ', 06 
10 CONSTR: 37 17.591 10 0.062 1.14 i 02285 
11 CONSTR: 42 18.492 11 0.071 0.901 0.14" 
12 CONSTR: 20 19.399 12 0.079 0.907 0.341 
13 CONSTR: 21 21.243 13 0.068 1.844 0.17-4 
14 CONSTR: 26 22.040 14 0.078 0.797 0.3 7 --' 
15 CONSTR: 16 22.792 15 0.089 0.7 5 -' 0.186 
16 CONSTR: 12 23.237 16 0.108 0.444 0.5 05 
17 CONSTR: 11 24.059 17 0.118 0.822 0. W 
18 CONSTR: 41 24.849 18 0.129 0.790 0.374 
19 CONSTR: 8 25.250 19 0.152 0.401 0.526 
20 CONSTR: 35 25.627 20 0.178 0.376 M40 
21 CONSTR: 13 26.054 21 0.204 0.427 Ul i 
22 CONSTR: 2 26.481 22 0. -"-, -. -l - 
0.427 0.5 14 
23 CONSTR: 30 26.690 233 0.269 0.209 0.647 
24 CONSTR: 4 26.888 24 0.310 0.198 0.657 
25 CONSTR: 1 27.153 25 0.348 0.266 0.606 
26 CONSTR: 15 27.275 26 0.395 0.122 0.727 
27 CONSTR: 22 27.447 27 0.440 0.171 0.679 
28 CONSTR: 18 27.633 28 0.484 0.186 0.666 
29 CONSTR: 23 27.794 29 0.529 0.161 0.689 
30 CONSTR: 9 27.953 30 0.5733 0.160 0.689 
31 CONSTR: 24 28.093 31 0.616 0.140 0.708 
12 CONSTR: 32 28.192 1', 0.660 0.099 
0.7-3 3 
33 CONSTR: 14 28.439 33 0.694 0.248 0.619 
34 CONSTR: 31 28.705 J4 0.725 0.265 0.607 
35 CONSTR: 28 28.877 35 0.758 0.173 0.678 
36 CONSTR: 34 28.960 36 0.791 0.083 0.774 
i7 CONSTR: 6 29.120 37 0.819 
0.160 0.689 
38 CONSTR: 45 29.181 38 0.847 0.061 0.804 
, Ig CONSTR: 39 0.872 
0.054 0.816 
40 ('ONSTR: 19 29.288 40 0.894 0.05 3 0.818 
41 CONSTR: ii -) 1). i 64 41 
0.912 0.076 0.78 1 
42 ('ON'-», TR: 40 21). 397 4-1 0.921) 0.03 i 0.8-57 
4' CONSTR: 7 29.649 4i 0.939 0. -) 
ý l' 0.61 
44 CONSTR: 5 44 (). 950 0.111 0. 
476 
45 CONSTR: 44 29.816 45 0.960 0.0 56 0.813, 
46 CONSTR: 49 29.840 46 0.969 0.024 o. V7 
47 CONSTR: 46 29.857 47 0.976 0.017 (). 898 
48 CONSTR: 48 29.863 48 0.981 0.006 0. ')"() 
477 
